A ganglionic model of "learned helplessness"

An exploration of how to define and measure the evolution of behavior, learning, memory and mind across the full phylogenetic tree of life

There are probably few terms in evolutionary studies regarding neuroscience issues that are used more frequently than ‘behavior', ‘learning', ‘memory', and ‘mind'. Yet there are probably as many different meanings of these terms as there are users of them. Further, investigators in such studies, while recognizing the full phylogenetic spectrum of life and the evolution of these phenomena, rarely go beyond mammals and other vertebrates in their investigations; invertebrates are sometimes included. What is rarely taken into consideration, though, is that to fully understand the evolution and significance for survival of these phenomena across phylogeny, it is essential that they be measured and compared in the same units of measurement across the full phylogenetic spectrum from aneural bacteria and protozoa to humans. This paper explores how these terms are generally used as well as how they might be operationally defined and measured to facilitate uniform examination and comparisons across the full phylogenetic spectrum of life. This paper has 2 goals: (1) to provide models for measuring the evolution of ‘behavior' and its changes across the full phylogenetic spectrum, and (2) to explain why ‘mind phenomena' cannot be measured scientifically at the present time.

Can Invertebrates Suffer? or, How Robust is Argument-By-Analogy?

It is a popular notion that, compared to vertebrates, invertebrates have a reduced capacity to experience suffering. This is usually based on arguments that invertebrates show only simple forms of learning, have little memory capacity, do not show behavioural responses to stimuli that would cause ‘higher’ vertebrates to exhibit responses indicative of pain, and have differences in their physiology that would preclude the capacity for suffering. But, how convincing is this ‘evidence’ of a reduced capacity to suffer? Suffering is a negative mental state - a private experience - and, as such, it cannot be measured directly. When assessing the capacity of an animal to experience suffering, we often compare the similarity of its responses with those of ‘higher’ animals, conceptualized in the principle of argument-by-analogy. By closely examining the responses of invertebrates, it can be seen that they often behave in a strikingly analogous manner to vertebrates. In this paper, I discuss published studies that show that invertebrates such as cockroaches, flies and slugs have short- and long-term memory; have age effects on memory; have complex spatial, associative and social learning; perform appropriately in preference tests and consumer demand studies; exhibit behavioural and physiological responses indicative of pain; and, apparently, experience learned helplessness. The similarity of these responses to those of vertebrates may indicate a level of consciousness or suffering that is not normally attributed to invertebrates. This indicates that we should either be more cautious when using argument-by-analogy, or remain open-minded to the possibility that invertebrates are capable of suffering in a similar way to vertebrates.

Transfer of learned information between ganglia in the insect ventral nerve cord

A yoked control training procedure was used on the decapitated cockroach, L. maderae. The right prothoracic leg was trained to lift in order to avoid a shock. It was found that this information transferred via the two interganglionic connectives from the first or prothoracic ganglion (T1) to the second or mesothoracic ganglion (T2) so that now the right mesothoracic leg lifted to avoid shock even though it was not directly trained. If both connectives were cut before training T1, no transfer to T2 was seen, i.e. the mesothoracic leg did not lift and avoid shock. However, if both connectives were cut immediately after training T1, the information had already transferred and was available for use by T2. There was redundancy in the transfer in that either connective alone could carry the same information from T1 to T2. Either mesothoracic leg could tap into this information. Using a reversible cold block on the connectives, it was found that if it was applied before training T1 it did not interfere with T1 learning but no transfer to T2 was seen after the cold block wore off. That the block was transitory and did not permanently impair the connectives was shown by the fact that if it was applied and then allowed to wear off before training began there was normal learning in T1 and transfer to T2. The transection and cold-block studies were consistent in demonstrating that the transfer of the information was 'on-line' and only occurred during T1 learning. If transfer was blocked during T1 learning the information could not be transferred or tapped into by T2 at a later time even though it was stored in T1 and available for later use by T1. The transfer occurred so quickly it most likely occurred via nerve impulses. Because no primary sensory or motor neurons are in the connectives, the information must have been coded onto interneurones for transfer from the first (T1) to the second (T2) ganglion.