Modulation of financial deprivation on deception and its neural correlates

Prosocial Gains and Losses: Modulations of Human Social Decision-Making by Loss-Gain Context

The role of the loss-gain context in human social decision-making remains heavily debated, with mixed evidence showing that losses (vs. gains) boost both selfish and prosocial motivations. Herein, we propose that the loss context, compared to the gain context, exacerbates intuitive reactions in response to the conflict between self-interest and prosocial preferences, regardless of whether those dominant responses are selfish or altruistic. We then synthesize evidence from three lines of research to support the account, which indicates that losses may either enhance or inhibit altruistic behaviors depending on the dominant responses in the employed interactive economic games, prosocial/proself traits, and the explicit engagement of deliberative processes. The current perspective contributes to the ongoing debate on the association between loss-gain context and human prosociality by putting forward a theoretical framework to integrate previous conflicting perspectives.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

Distinct Patterns of Cognitive Conflict Dynamics in Promise Keepers and Promise Breakers

On a daily basis, we see how different people can be in keeping or breaking a given promise. However, we know very little about the cognitive conflict dynamics that underlie the decision to keep or break a promise and whether this is shaped by inter-individual variability. In order to fill this gap, we applied an ecologically valid promise decision task with real monetary consequences for all involved interaction partners and used mouse tracking to identify the dynamic, on-line cognitive processes that underlie the decision to keep or break a promise. Our findings revealed that on average, the process of breaking a promise is associated with largely curved mouse trajectories, while the process of keeping a promise was not, indicating that breaking a promise is associated with a larger conflict. Interestingly, however, this conflict pattern was strongly shaped by individual differences. Individuals who always kept their promises did not show any signs of conflict (i.e., straight mouse trajectories), indicating that they were not tempted by the monetary benefits associated with breaking the promise. In contrast, individuals who did not always keep their promise exhibited a large conflict (i.e., curved mouse trajectories), irrespective of whether they broke or kept their promise. A possible interpretation of these findings is that these individuals were always tempted by the unchosen decision option – the desire to act in a fair manner when breaking the promise and the monetary benefits when keeping the promise. This study provides the first piece of evidence that there are substantial inter-individual differences in cognitive conflict dynamics that underlie the decision to keep or break promises and that mouse tracking is able to illuminate important insights into individual differences in complex human’s decision processes.

Preference and strategy in proposer's prosocial giving in the ultimatum game

The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers provides evidence that humans are driven by social preferences such as preferences for fairness and prosociality. On the other hand, if and how the proposer's behavior is affected by social preferences remains unelucidated. We addressed this question for the first time by manipulating the knowledge that the proposer had about the responder's belief concerning the intentionality of the proposer. In a new game called the "ultimatum game with ambiguous intentions of the proposer (UGAMB)," we made the intentionality of the proposer ambiguous to the recipient. We expected and found that the proposer would make more unfair offers in this new game than in the standard ultimatum game. This expectation can be derived from either the preference-based model or the strategy model of the proposer's giving decision. The additional finding that more unfair giving in the UGAMB was not mediated by the proposer's expectation that the recipient would be more willing to accept unfair offers provided support for the preference-based model. Using a psychological measure of cognitive control, the preference-based model received additional support through a conceptual replication of the previous finding that cognitive control of intuitive drive for prosociality in the dictator game, rather than mind reading in the ultimatum game, is responsible for the difference in giving between the two games.