Free choice tasks as random generation tasks: an investigation through working memory manipulations

Learning and transfer of response-effect relations

Acting means changing the environment according to one's own goals, and this often requires bodily movements as responses. How these responses are selected is a central question in contemporary cognitive psychology. The ideomotor principle offers a simple answer based on two assumptions: An agent first learns an association between a response and its effects. Later, this association can be used in a reverse way: When the agent wants to achieve a desired effect and activates its representation, the associated response representation becomes activated as well. This reversed use of the learned association is considered the means to select the required response. In three experiments, we addressed two questions related to the first assumption: First, we tested whether effect representations generalise to more abstract conceptual knowledge. This is important, because outside the laboratory and in novel situations, effects are variable and not always exactly identical, such that generalisation is necessary for successful actions. Second, the nature of the response-effect relation has been debated recently, and more data are necessary to put theorising on firm empirical ground. Results of our experiments suggest that (a) abstraction to conceptual knowledge seems to occur only under very restricted situations, and (b) it seems that no (implicit) associations between responses and effects are learned, but rather (explicit) propositional knowledge in the form of rules.

The benefit of choice on task performance: Reduced difficulty effects in free-choice versus forced-choice tasks

We investigated how self-determined (free) versus imposed (forced) choices influence task performance. To this end, we examined how changes in perceptual and central decision-processing difficulties affect task performance in an environment where free-choice and forced-choice tasks were intermixed. In Experiments 1 (N = 43) and 2 (N = 42), perceptual processing difficulty was varied by altering colored dot proportions (easy vs. hard color discrimination task). In Experiment 3 (N = 58), decision-processing difficulty was adjusted by changing the rotation degree of letters (easy vs. hard letter rotation task). Across all experiments, both free-choice and forced-choice performance were more impaired with harder stimuli, but this effect was generally less pronounced in freely chosen tasks. Specifically, this was evident from significant interactions between processing mode (free vs. forced) and difficulty (easy vs. hard) in the mean reaction times (RTs) for the tasks with the difficulty manipulation. Thus, processing in free-choice tasks is generally less affected by environmental changes (i.e., variation in information difficulties). We discuss how the benefit of self-determined choices over imposed choices can be explained by motivational and performance-optimization accounts, while also considering the finding that participants adjusted their task choices toward tasks with easier stimuli (i.e., significant main effect of task difficulty on choosing the task with the difficulty manipulation). Specifically, we discuss how having control over task choices might lead to more stable information processing and allow people to choose more difficult tasks when this increased difficulty has a relatively small impact on their performance.

A cognitive approach to better understand foraging strategies of the adult domestic hen

Foraging is known to be one of the most important activities in the behavioral budget of chickens. However, how these animals adapt different foraging strategies to diverse environmental variations is currently poorly understood. To gain further insight into this matter, in the present study, hens were submitted to the sloped-tubes task. In this task, the experimenter can manipulate the information that enables the hens to find a food reward (visible or not), placed in one of two hollow tubes. First, 12 hens were tested under free-choice conditions (no penalty for exhaustive searching in both tubes). Under these conditions, the hens adopted a non-random, side-biased strategy when the food location was not directly visible. Then, we divided the hens in two cohorts of equal size to study deeper the hens' foraging strategy when faced (1) with a different container, or (2) with a restrictive environmental constraint under forced-choice conditions (no food reward if the unbaited tube is visited first). This latter constraint increased the risk of the hen not receiving food. A change in the containers didn't modify the search behavior of the hens. However, in forced-choice conditions when the location of the food was not directly visible, four out of six hens learned to choose by exclusion. We conclude that hens can selectively adapt their foraging strategy to the point of adopting an exclusion performance, depending on available information and environmental constraints (high or low risk).

Variable, sometimes absent, but never negative: Applying multilevel models of variability to the backward crosstalk effect to find theoretical constraints

When performing two tasks at the same time, the congruency of the second task's features influences performance in the first task. This is called the backward crosstalk effect (BCE), a phenomenon that influences both theories of binding and of dual-task capacity limitations. The question of whether the BCE is found in all participants at all times is relevant for understanding the basis of the effect. For example, if the BCE is based on strategic choices, it can be variable, but if it is automatic and involuntary, it should never vary in whether it is present or not. Variability in observed BCE sizes was already documented and discussed when the group average effect was first reported (Hommel, 1998). Yet the theories discussed at the time did not motivate a more direct analysis of this variability, nor did the readily available statistical tools permit it. Some statistical approaches recently applied in cognitive psychology allow such a variability-focused analysis and some more recent theoretical debates would benefit from this as well. We assessed the variability of the BCE as well as a BCE-like free-choice congruency effect by applying a Bayesian multilevel modeling approach to the data from a dual-tasking experiment. Trials consisted of a two- and a four-response task. We manipulated which task was presented first and whether the response to the four-choice task was free or forced choice. RT data were best predicted by a model in which the BCE is zero in part of the population and drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (and thus always positive) in the rest of the population. Choice congruency bias data were best predicted by a model assuming this effect to be drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (but, in contrast to the RT data, without the subset of the population where it is zero). The BCE is not an inflexible and universal phenomenon that is directly linked to an inherent structural trait of human cognition. We discuss theoretical constraints implied by these results with a focus on what we can infer about the traits of the factors that influence BCE size. We suggest that future research might add further major constraints by using multi-session experiments to distinguish between-person and within-person variability. Our results show that the BCE is variable. The next step is understanding along which axes it is variable and why it varies.

Generalisation of unpredictable action-effect features: Large individual differences with little on-average effect

Ideomotor theory suggests that selecting a response is achieved by anticipating the consequences of that response. Evidence for this is the response-effect compatibility (REC) effect, that is, responding tends to be faster when the (anticipated) predictable consequences of a response (the action effects) are compatible rather than incompatible with the response. The present experiments investigated the extent to which the consequences must be exactly versus categorically predictable. According to the latter, an abstraction from particular instances to the categories of dimensional overlap might take place. For participants in one group of Experiment 1, left-hand and right-hand responses produced compatible or incompatible action effects in perfectly predictable positions to the left or right of fixation, and a standard REC effect was observed. For participants in another group of Experiment 1, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, the responses also produced action effects to the left or right of fixation, but the eccentricity of the action effects (and thus their precise location) was unpredictable. On average, the data from the latter groups suggest that there is little, if any, tendency for participants to abstract the critical left/right features from spatially somewhat unpredictable action effects and use them for action selection, although there were large individual differences in these groups. Thus, at least on average across participants, it appears that the spatial locations of action effects must be perfectly predictable for these effects to have a strong influence on the response time.

Similar proactive effect monitoring in free and forced choice action modes

When our actions yield predictable consequences in the environment, our eyes often already saccade towards the locations we expect these consequences to appear at. Such spontaneous anticipatory saccades occur based on bi-directional associations between action and effect formed by prior experience. That is, our eye movements are guided by expectations derived from prior learning history. Anticipatory saccades presumably reflect a proactive effect monitoring process that prepares a later comparison of expected and actual effect. Here, we examined whether anticipatory saccades emerged under forced choice conditions when only actions but not target stimuli were predictive of future effects and whether action mode (forced choice vs. free choice, i.e., stimulus-based vs. stimulus-independent choice) affected proactive effect monitoring. Participants produced predictable visual effects on the left/right side via forced choice and free choice left/right key presses. Action and visual effect were spatially compatible in one half of the experiment and spatially incompatible in the other half. Irrespective of whether effects were predicted by target stimuli in addition to participants' actions, in both action modes, we observed anticipatory saccades towards the location of future effects. Importantly, neither the frequency, nor latency or amplitude of these anticipatory saccades significantly differed between forced choice and free choice action modes. Overall, our findings suggest that proactive effect monitoring of future action consequences, as reflected in anticipatory saccades, is comparable between forced choice and free choice action modes.

Instruction effects on randomness in sequence generation

Randomness is a fundamental property of human behavior. It occurs both in the form of intrinsic random variability, say when repetitions of a task yield slightly different behavioral outcomes, or in the form of explicit randomness, say when a person tries to avoid being predicted in a game of rock, paper and scissors. Randomness has frequently been studied using random sequence generation tasks (RSG). A key finding has been that humans are poor at deliberately producing random behavior. At the same time, it has been shown that people might be better randomizers if randomness is only an implicit (rather than an explicit) requirement of the task. We therefore hypothesized that randomization performance might vary with the exact instructions with which randomness is elicited. To test this, we acquired data from a large online sample (n = 388), where every participant made 1,000 binary choices based on one of the following instructions: choose either randomly, freely, irregularly, according to an imaginary coin toss or perform a perceptual guessing task. Our results show significant differences in randomness between the conditions as quantified by conditional entropy and estimated Markov order. The randomization scores were highest in the conditions where people were asked to be irregular or mentally simulate a random event (coin toss) thus yielding recommendations for future studies on randomization behavior.

Is there hierarchical generalization in response-effect learning?

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.

Given the option, people avoid incongruent responses in a dual-tasking situation

While past work on how people can optimize dual-tasking has focused on strategic timing (i.e., when to select responses), little is known about the extent to which people can optimize dual-tasking by taking care of which responses they select. Here we test whether spatial (in)congruency influences response selection in free-choice trials. In two experiments, we combined two visual-manual tasks with spatial stimulus- and response characteristics: Participants responded to the stimulus words "left" and "right" in a forced choice task and responded "up", "down", "left" or "right" with an arrow-key to either a free choice prompt or an X located at the respective position. In Experiment 1, participants reduced the proportion of incongruent pairs of responses (i.e., left in one and right in the other task). In Experiment 2, we found that such flexibility in response selection also holds in more constrained environments: Within runs of four trials the free-choice options were continuously reduced based on the responses already given. The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that response selection in free choice trials is driven by performance optimization beyond response conflict.

Examination of a Response–Effect Compatibility Task With Continuous Mouse Movements: Free- Versus Forced-Choice Tasks and Sequential Modulations

According to ideomotor theory, we select actions by recalling and anticipating their sensory consequences, that is, their action effects. Compelling evidence for this theory comes from response–effect compatibility (REC) experiments, in which a response produces an effect with which it is either compatible or incompatible. For example, pressing a left/right response key is faster if it is predictably followed by an action effect on the same, compatible side compared with the other, incompatible side, even though the effect itself appears only after response time is measured. Recent studies investigated this effect with continuous responses (i.e., computer mouse movements) and reported an REC effect in a forced-choice but not in a free-choice task. From the keypressing literature, the opposite result pattern or no differences would have been expected. To clarify this issue, we report 3 experiments with mouse movement responses. Experiment 1 used a simpler scenario than in prior studies and found a similar result: The REC effect was evident in a forced- but not in a free-choice task. Also, sequential modulations of the REC effect were exploratorily analyzed and replicated with higher power in Experiment 2. However, Experiment 3 demonstrated that at least part of the REC effect with mouse movements can be attributed to stimulus–response compatibility (SRC), with a much smaller compatibility effect evident with a procedure for which SRC was reduced. We conclude that a sequentially modulated compatibility effect can be observed with mouse movements, but previous studies may have underestimated the contribution from SRC. The results are also discussed in terms of why the compatibility effect was observed in forced- but not free-choice tasks with mouse movement responses.

Are self-caused distractors easier to ignore? Experiments with the flanker task

Four experiments are reported that investigate the relationship between action-outcome learning and the ability to ignore distractors. Each participant performed 600 acquisition trials, followed by 200 test trials. In the acquisition phase, participants were presented with a fixed action-outcome contingency (e.g., Key #1 ➔ green distractors), while that contingency was reversed in the test phase. In Experiments 1-3, a distractor feature depended on the participants' action. In Experiment 1, actions determined the color of the distractors; in Experiment 2, they determined the target-distractor distance; in Experiment 3, they determined target-distractor compatibility. Results suggest that with the relatively simple features (color and distance), exposure to action-outcome contingencies changed distractor cost, whereas with the complex or relational feature (target-distractor compatibility), exposure to the contingencies did not affect distractor cost. In Experiment 4, the same pattern of results was found (effect of contingency learning on distractor cost) with perceptual sequence learning, using visual cues ("X" vs. "O") instead of actions. Thus, although the mechanism of associative learning may not be unique to actions, such learning plays a role in the allocation of attention to task-irrelevant events.

Are freely chosen actions generated by stimulus codes or effect codes?

A long-standing debate revolves around which mental codes allow humans to control behavior. The internal stimulus model (going back to Rudolf Hermann Lotze) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of stimuli that had previously preceded corresponding motor activities. The internal effect model (going back to Emil Harleß) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of perceptual effects that had previously resulted from corresponding motor activities. Here, we present a test of these two control models. We observed evidence for both models with stronger evidence for the internal stimulus model. We suggest that the proposed experimental setup might be a useful tool to study the relative strengths of stimulus control and effect control of behavior in various contexts.

Choice-induced inter-trial inhibition is modulated by idiosyncratic choice-consistency

Humans constantly decide among multiple action plans. Carrying out one action usually implies that other plans are suppressed. Here we make use of inter-trial effects to determine whether suppression of non-chosen action plans is due to proactively preparing for upcoming decisions or due to retroactive influences from previous decisions. Participants received rewards for timely and accurate saccades to targets appearing left or right from fixation. Each block interleaved trials with one (single-trial) or two targets (choice-trial). Whereas single-trial rewards were always identical, rewards for the two targets in choice-trials could either be identical (unbiased) or differ (biased) within one block. We analyzed single-trial latencies as a function of idiosyncratic choice-consistency or reward-bias, the previous trial type and whether the same or the other target was selected in the preceding trial. After choice-trials, single-trial responses to the previously non-chosen target were delayed. For biased choices, inter-trial effects were strongest when choices were followed by a single-trial to the non-chosen target. In the unbiased condition, inter-trial effects increased with increasing individual consistency of choice behavior. These findings suggest that the suppression of alternative action plans is not coupled to target selection and motor execution but instead depends on top-down signals like the overall preference of one target over another.

Free-choice saccades and their underlying determinants: Explorations of high-level voluntary oculomotor control

Models of eye-movement control distinguish between different control levels, ranging from automatic (bottom-up, stimulus-driven selection) and automatized (based on well-learned routines) to voluntary (top-down, goal-driven selection, e.g., based on instructions). However, one type of voluntary control has yet only been examined in the manual and not in the oculomotor domain, namely free-choice selection among arbitrary targets, that is, targets that are of equal interest from both a bottom-up and top-down processing perspective. Here, we ask which features of targets (identity- or location-related) are used to determine such oculomotor free-choice behavior. In two experiments, participants executed a saccade to one of four peripheral targets in three different choice conditions: unconstrained free choice, constrained free choice based on target identity (color), and constrained free choice based on target location. The analysis of choice frequencies revealed that unconstrained free-choice selection closely resembled constrained choice based on target location. The results suggest that free-choice oculomotor control is mainly guided by spatial (location-based) target characteristics. We explain these results by assuming that participants tend to avoid less parsimonious recoding of target-identity representations into spatial codes, the latter being a necessary prerequisite to configure oculomotor commands.

Smaller backward crosstalk effects for free choice tasks are not the result of immediate conflict adaptation

In dual-task situations, mutual interference phenomena are often observed. One particularly interesting example of such phenomena is that even Task 1 performance is improved if Task 2 requires a compatible (e.g., both responses are given on the left side) instead of an incompatible response (e.g., one response is given on the right side, and the other on the left side). This is called the compatibility-based backward crosstalk effect (BCE). In a previous paper, we observed support for a critical role of stimulus-response (S-R) links in causing this effect: The BCE was smaller when one of the two tasks was a free choice task. However, an alternative explanation for this observation is that free choice tasks lead to immediate conflict adaptation, thereby reducing the interference from the other task. In the present two experiments, we tested this explanation by varying the amount of conflict assumed to be induced by a free choice task either sequentially (Exp. 1) or block-wise (Exp. 2). While we replicated a sequential modulation of the BCE with two forced choice tasks, we observed (1) no reduction of the BCE induced by (compatible) free choice trials nor (2) an effect of block-wise manipulations of the frequency of free choice trials on the size of the BCE. Thus, while the BCE is sensitive to sequential modulations induced by the (in)compatibility of two forced choice responses, which might point to conflict adaptation, the reduced BCE in dual-task situations involving a free choice task is likely due to its weaker S-R links.

Dissociating decision strategies in free-choice tasks - A mouse tracking analysis

Everyday life offers a variety of possible actions, from which we choose one that corresponds to our intended goals. How do these goals and actions interact within the mind? One way to investigate this question is free-choice tasks, where participants freely choose the action they want to perform on any given trial. Such tasks are used in research on voluntary actions and goal-driven behavior, such as ideomotor theory. However, these tasks leave participants with a substantial amount of freedom and allow for different response strategies. Such strategies can, though being hidden in the final data, influence the results, for example by hiding the effects of manipulations of interest. To better understand participants' behavior in free-choice tasks, we used mouse tracking in an ideomotor free-choice experiment, where participants learn the connection between an action and an effect. Subsequently, they have to freely choose between actions, while the former effect is presented as a stimulus. We identified two distinct groups that applied different decision strategies. The first group made the decision at the beginning of or before the trial, irrespective of the yet to be presented effect stimulus. The second group decided within the trial and was affected by the stimulus more often. This suggests that people handle free-choice tasks differently which is expressed in heterogeneous choice patterns and response times and an underestimation of the examined effects. These differences potentially limit the reliability of inferences from free-choice experiments and should be considered in the interpretation of their results.