Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Increased temporal binding during voluntary motor task under local anesthesia

Temporal binding refers to a systemic bias in the perceived time interval between two related events, most frequently voluntary motor actions and a subsequent sensory effect. An inevitable component of most instrumental motor actions is tactile feedback. Yet, the role of tactile feedback within this phenomenon remains largely unexplored. Here, we used local anesthesia of the index finger to temporarily inhibit incoming sensory input from the finger itself, while participants performed an interval-estimation task in which they estimated the delay between a voluntary motor action (button press) and a second sensory event (click sound). Results were compared to a control condition with intact sensation. While clear binding was present in both conditions, the effect was significantly enhanced when tactile feedback was temporarily removed via local anesthesia. The results are discussed in light of current debates surrounding the underlying mechanisms and function of this temporal bias.

Attention and expectation likely underlie temporal binding measured using the Libet Clock

An interesting finding that has emerged in studies of the sense of agency is that of a perceived compression of the temporal interval between actions and the outcomes they produce. This is generally referred to as temporal binding. Although temporal binding has been studied using various paradigms, possibly the most popular of these is the Libet Clock task. The Libet task is also interesting because it suggests that temporal binding can be decomposed into two components, one purportedly relating to actions and the other relating to outcomes. These are termed action binding and outcome binding, respectively. In this article, I focus specifically on temporal binding revealed using the Libet Clock task and propose the idea that attention underpins the action binding effect, while outcome binding, on the other hand, is driven by the effects of expectation.

On the Role of Interoception in Body and Object Perception: A Multisensory-Integration Account

Various "embodied perception" phenomena suggest that what people sense of their body shapes what they perceive of the environment and that what they perceive of the environment shapes what they perceive of their bodies. For example, an observer's own hand can be felt where a fake hand is seen, events produced by own body movements seem to occur earlier than they did, and feeling a heavy weight at an observer's back may prompt hills to look steeper. Here we argue that such and various other phenomena are instances of multisensory integration of interoceptive signals from the body and exteroceptive signals from the environment. This overarching view provides a mechanistic description of what embodiment in perception means and how it works. It suggests new research questions while questioning a special role of the body itself and various phenomenon-specific explanations in terms of ownership, agency, or action-related scaling of visual information.

Action prediction modulates self-other integration in joint action

People often coordinate actions with others, requiring an adjustable amount of self-other integration between actor's and co-actor's actions. Previous research suggests that such self-other integration (indexed by the joint Simon effect) is enhanced by agent similarity of the co-actor (e.g., high in intentionality). In this study, we aimed to extend this line of research by testing whether experiencing agency over a co-actor's actions (vicarious agency) and/or action prediction strengthens the joint Simon effect. For this purpose, we manipulated experienced agency by varying the experienced control over a co-actor's actions (Experiment 1), and action prediction regarding the co-actor's actions (Experiment 2). Vicarious agency could effectively be induced, but did not modulate the size of the joint Simon effect. The joint Simon effect was decreased when the co-actor's actions were unpredictable (vs. predictable) during joint task performance. These findings suggest social agency can be induced and effectively measured in joint action. Action prediction can act as an effective agency cue modulating the amount of self-other integration in joint action.

A multi-dimensional framework for prosthetic embodiment: a perspective for translational research

The concept of embodiment has gained widespread popularity within prosthetics research. Embodiment has been claimed to be an indicator of the efficacy of sensory feedback and control strategies. Moreover, it has even been claimed to be necessary for prosthesis acceptance, albeit unfoundedly. Despite the popularity of the term, an actual consensus on how prosthetic embodiment should be used in an experimental framework has yet to be reached. The lack of consensus is in part due to terminological ambiguity and the lack of an exact definition of prosthetic embodiment itself. In a review published parallel to this article, we summarized the definitions of embodiment used in prosthetics literature and concluded that treating prosthetic embodiment as a combination of ownership and agency allows for embodiment to be quantified, and thus useful in translational research. Here, we review the potential mechanisms that give rise to ownership and agency considering temporal, spatial, and anatomical constraints. We then use this to propose a multi-dimensional framework where prosthetic embodiment arises within a spectrum dependent on the integration of volition and multi-sensory information as demanded by the degree of interaction with the environment. This framework allows for the different experimental paradigms on sensory feedback and prosthetic control to be placed in a common perspective. By considering that embodiment lays along a spectrum tied to the interactions with the environment, one can conclude that the embodiment of prosthetic devices should be assessed while operating in environments as close to daily life as possible for it to become relevant.

Disappearing and appearing: Temporal binding effects are consistent across situations

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Here, we examined the temporal binding effect, an implicit index of sense of agency, in performing actions to make objects disappear and compared the magnitude of this effect in the appearing and disappearing situations. Results showed that the temporal binding effect emerged when object's disappearances served as action outcomes. Moreover, the temporal binding effects in the appearing and disappearing situations did not differ significantly. Our findings extend the temporal binding effect to the situation of voluntarily making objects disappear, suggesting a comparable level of implicit sense of agency when voluntarily making objects disappear and appear.