Evidence against observational spatial memory for cache locations of conspecifics in marsh tits Poecile palustris

Environmental harshness does not affect the propensity for social learning in great tits, Parus major

According to the harsh environment hypothesis, natural selection should favour cognitive mechanisms to overcome environmental challenges. Tests of this hypothesis to date have largely focused on asocial learning and memory, thus failing to account for the spread of information via social means. Tests in specialized food-hoarding birds have shown strong support for the effects of environmental harshness on both asocial and social learning. Whether the hypothesis applies to non-specialist foraging species remains largely unexplored. We evaluated the relative importance of social learning across a known harshness gradient by testing generalist great tits, Parus major, from high (harsh)- and low (mild)-elevation populations in two social learning tasks. We showed that individuals use social learning to find food in both colour-associative and spatial foraging tasks and that individuals differed consistently in their use of social learning. However, we did not detect a difference in the use or speed of implementing socially observed information across the elevational gradient. Our results do not support predictions of the harsh environment hypothesis suggesting that context-dependent costs and benefits as well as plasticity in the use of social information may play an important role in the use of social learning across environments. Finally, this study adds to the accumulating evidence that the harsh environment hypothesis appears to have more pronounced effects on specialists compared to generalist species.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

Cognitive Phenotype and Differential Gene Expression in a Hippocampal Homologue in Two Species of Frog

The complexity of an animal’s interaction with its physical and/or social environment is thought to be associated with behavioral flexibility and cognitive phenotype, though we know little about this relationship in amphibians. We examined differences in cognitive phenotype in two species of frog with divergent natural histories. The green-and-black poison frog (Dendrobates auratus) is diurnal, displays enduring social interactions, and uses spatially distributed resources during parental care. Túngara frogs (Physalaemus=Engystomops pustulosus) are nocturnal, express only fleeting social interactions, and use ephemeral puddles to breed in a lek-type mating system. Comparing performance in identical discrimination tasks, we find that D. auratus made fewer errors when learning and displayed greater behavioral flexibility in reversal learning tasks than túngara frogs. Further, túngara frogs preferred to learn beacons that can be used in direct guidance whereas D. auratus preferred position cues that could be used to spatially orient relative to the goal. Behavioral flexibility and spatial cognition are associated with hippocampal function in mammals. Accordingly, we examined differential gene expression in the medial pallium, the amphibian homolog of the hippocampus. Our preliminary data indicate that genes related to learning and memory, synaptic plasticity, and neurogenesis were upregulated in D. auratus, while genes related to apoptosis were upregulated in túngara frogs, suggesting that these cellular processes could contribute to the differences in behavioral flexibility and spatial learning we observed between poison frogs and túngara frogs.