Expecting to lift a box together makes the load look lighter

Predicting others' actions from their social contexts

Contextual cues have been shown to inform our understanding and predictions of others' actions. In this study, we tested whether observers' predictions about unfolding actions depend upon the social context in which they occur. Across five experiments, we showed participants videos of an actor walking toward a piece of furniture either with (joint context) or without (solo context) a partner standing by it. We found greater predictive bias, indicative of stronger action expectations when videos contained a second actor (Experiment 1), even when the solo condition had a perceptually-matched control object in place of the actor (Experiment 2). Critically, belief manipulations about the actions the walking actor would perform suppressed the difference between social context conditions when the manipulation specified an action possible in both contexts (Experiment 5) but not when the action was one that would be difficult without a partner (Experiment 4). Interestingly, the social context effect persisted when the belief manipulation specified an unlikely action given the depicted scene (Experiment 3). These findings provide novel evidence that kinematically-identical actions can elicit different predictions depending on the social context in which they occur.

Fading boundaries between the physical and the social world: Insights and novel techniques from the intersection of these two fields

This review focuses on the subtle interactions between sensory input and social cognition in visual perception. We suggest that body indices, such as gait and posture, can mediate such interactions. Recent trends in cognitive research are trying to overcome approaches that define perception as stimulus-centered and are pointing toward a more embodied agent-dependent perspective. According to this view, perception is a constructive process in which sensory inputs and motivational systems contribute to building an image of the external world. A key notion emerging from new theories on perception is that the body plays a critical role in shaping our perception. Depending on our arm's length, height and capacity of movement, we create our own image of the world based on a continuous compromise between sensory inputs and expected behavior. We use our bodies as natural "rulers" to measure both the physical and the social world around us. We point out the necessity of an integrative approach in cognitive research that takes into account the interplay between social and perceptual dimensions. To this end, we review long-established and novel techniques aimed at measuring bodily states and movements, and their perception, with the assumption that only by combining the study of visual perception and social cognition can we deepen our understanding of both fields.

Action co-representation under threat: A Social Simon study

Several studies have shown that individuals automatically integrate the actions of other individuals into their own action plans, thus facilitating action coordination. What happens to this mechanism in situations of danger? This capacity could either be reduced, in order to allocate more cognitive resources for individualistic actions, or be maintained or enhanced to enable cooperation under threat. In order to determine the impact of the perception of danger on this capacity, two groups of participants carried out, in pairs, the Social Simon task, which provides a measure of co-representation. The task was performed during so-called 'threat blocks' (during which participants could be exposed at any time to an aversive stimulus) and so-called 'safety blocks' (during which no aversive stimulation could occur). In a first group of participants, both individuals were exposed at the same time to threat blocks. In a second group, only one of the two participants was exposed to them at a time. Our results indicate that co-representation, an important cognitive mechanism for cooperation, (i) is preserved in situations of danger; and (ii) may even be increased in participants who are confronted alone to threat but in the presence of a safe partner. Contrarily to popular belief, danger does not shut down our capacities for social interaction.

Extraversion level predicts perceived benefits from social resources and tool use

Social baseline theory states that there are differences in how humans integrate social resources into their economy of action when they face environmental demands. However, although several authors suggested that extraversion may be an indicator of the social baseline, no study has demonstrated it. The present study aims to test this hypothesis and, in particular, examines whether extraversion is a specific indicator of the social baseline. In two experiments, participants were asked to move rolls either alone (with their hands), or with the help of a social resource (Experiment 1), or a tool (Experiment 2). Results showed that extraversion predicted the choice to use both types of resource. Specifically, the more participants were extraverted, the more they tended to consider the use of the social resource or the tool as beneficial. We argue that these results indicate that extraversion is not specifically an indicator of the social baseline, but rather an indicator of how individuals integrate technical and social resources into their economy of action. In addition, this study encourages future research endeavors to define what constitutes a resource and how it could fit into the Social Baseline Theory.

What If We Look at the Body? An Embodied Perspective of Collaborative Learning

The bodily experiences and implications of understanding the functioning of the human brain–body mechanism has been a center of attention in the field of cognitive neurosciences for over two decades. Research in this field has enlarged the theories of learning and development, and contributed to changes in educational practices involving language processing, mathematics, and spatial thinking; however, these changes have not yet been applied to the analysis of transversal competencies such as collaborative learning. The aim of this paper is to bridge the theoretical and applied advances in the field of embodied cognition, specifically collaborative learning. The definitions, theoretical frameworks, and current methodological approaches in the field of collaborative learning are reviewed, with a particular focus on those studies that have investigated interactive dynamics in collaborative situations. The need to take the field further by exploring the theoretical perspective of embodied cognition as a possibility that can open the field is also presented. The relevance of investigating learning in groups by analyzing bodily engagements and intersubjectivity is demonstrated and methodological considerations are raised.

The influence of prior intention on joint action: an fNIRS-based hyperscanning study

Motor performances of the same action are affected by prior intentions to move unintentionally, cooperatively or competitively. Here, a back-and-forth movement task combined with a motion capture system and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)-based hyperscanning technology was utilized to record both the behavioral and neural data of 18 dyads of participants acting in pairs [joint conditions: no-intention, cooperative (Coop) and competitive (Comp)] or alone (single conditions: self-paced and fast-speed). The results revealed that Coop or Comp intentions in the joint conditions significantly sped up motor performance compared with similar single conditions, e.g. shorter movement times (MTs) in the Coop/Comp condition than the self-paced/fast-speed condition. Hemodynamic response analysis demonstrated that stronger activities for all joint conditions than the single conditions in the premotor and the supplementary motor cortex (Brodmann area 6) were independent of variations of MTs, indicating that they might reflect more complex aspects of action planning rather than simple execution-based processes. The comparisons of joint conditions across distinct prior intentions before acting yielded significant results for both behavioral and neural measures, with the highest activation of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the shortest MTs in the Comp condition considered to be implications for the top-down influence of prior intentions on joint performance.

Embodied self-other overlap in romantic love: a review and integrative perspective

Romantic love has long intrigued scientists in various disciplines. Social-cognitive research has provided ample evidence for overlapping mental representations of self and romantic partner. This overlap between self and romantic partner would contribute to the experience of love and has been found to be a predictor of relationship quality. Self-partner overlap has been mainly documented at the level of conceptual or narrative self, with studies showing confusion between one's own and partner's identity aspects, perspectives, and outcomes. But the self is not restricted to abstract, conceptual representations but also involves body-related representations, which, research has revealed, are linked to social-cognitive processes. In this article, we review the emerging evidence that romantic love involves not only a blurring of conceptual selves but also a reduction of the distinction between self and romantic partner at a bodily level. We discuss the potential function(s) of self-other overlap in romantic relationship at the level of body-related representations and consider possible mechanisms. We conclude with possible future directions to further investigate how romantic love engages embodied self-other representations involved in social interactions.

New Caledonian crows infer the weight of objects from observing their movements in a breeze

Humans use a variety of cues to infer an object's weight, including how easily objects can be moved. For example, if we observe an object being blown down the street by the wind, we can infer that it is light. Here, we tested whether New Caledonian crows make this type of inference. After training that only one type of object (either light or heavy) was rewarded when dropped into a food dispenser, birds observed pairs of novel objects (one light and one heavy) suspended from strings in front of an electric fan. The fan was either on—creating a breeze which buffeted the light, but not the heavy, object—or off, leaving both objects stationary. In subsequent test trials, birds could drop one, or both, of the novel objects into the food dispenser. Despite having no opportunity to handle these objects prior to testing, birds touched the correct object (light or heavy) first in 73% of experimental trials, and were at chance in control trials. Our results suggest that birds used pre-existing knowledge about the behaviour exhibited by differently weighted objects in the wind to infer their weight, using this information to guide their choices.

Behavioral and oculomotor evidence for visual simulation of object movement

We regularly interact with moving objects in our environment. Yet, little is known about how we extrapolate the future movements of visually perceived objects. One possibility is that movements are experienced by a mental visual simulation, allowing one to internally picture an object's upcoming motion trajectory, even as the object itself remains stationary. Here we examined this possibility by asking human participants to make judgments about the future position of a falling ball on an obstacle-filled display. We found that properties of the ball's trajectory were highly predictive of subjects' reaction times and accuracy on the task. We also found that the eye movements subjects made while attempting to ascertain where the ball might fall had significant spatiotemporal overlap with those made while actually perceiving the ball fall. These findings suggest that subjects simulated the ball's trajectory to inform their responses. Finally, we trained a convolutional neural network to see whether this problem could be solved by simple image analysis as opposed to the more intricate simulation strategy we propose. We found that while the network was able to solve our task, the model's output did not effectively or consistently predict human behavior. This implies that subjects employed a different strategy for solving our task, and bolsters the conclusion that they were engaging in visual simulation. The current study thus provides support for visual simulation of motion as a means of understanding complex visual scenes and paves the way for future investigations of this phenomenon at a neural level.

Interacting With Robots to Investigate the Bases of Social Interaction

Humans show a great natural ability at interacting with each other. Such efficiency in joint actions depends on a synergy between planned collaboration and emergent coordination, a subconscious mechanism based on a tight link between action execution and perception. This link supports phenomena as mutual adaptation, synchronization, and anticipation, which cut drastically the delays in the interaction and the need of complex verbal instructions and result in the establishment of joint intentions, the backbone of social interaction. From a neurophysiological perspective, this is possible, because the same neural system supporting action execution is responsible of the understanding and the anticipation of the observed action of others. Defining which human motion features allow for such emergent coordination with another agent would be crucial to establish more natural and efficient interaction paradigms with artificial devices, ranging from assistive and rehabilitative technology to companion robots. However, investigating the behavioral and neural mechanisms supporting natural interaction poses substantial problems. In particular, the unconscious processes at the basis of emergent coordination (e.g., unintentional movements or gazing) are very difficult-if not impossible-to restrain or control in a quantitative way for a human agent. Moreover, during an interaction, participants influence each other continuously in a complex way, resulting in behaviors that go beyond experimental control. In this paper, we propose robotics technology as a potential solution to this methodological problem. Robots indeed can establish an interaction with a human partner, contingently reacting to his actions without losing the controllability of the experiment or the naturalness of the interactive scenario. A robot could represent an "interactive probe" to assess the sensory and motor mechanisms underlying human-human interaction. We discuss this proposal with examples from our research with the humanoid robot iCub, showing how an interactive humanoid robot could be a key tool to serve the investigation of the psychological and neuroscientific bases of social interaction.

Discovering your inner Gibson: reconciling action-specific and ecological approaches to perception-action

Both the action-specific perception account and the ecological approach to perception-action emphasize the role of action in perception. However, the action-specific perception account demonstrates that different percepts are possible depending on the perceiver's ability to act, even when the same optical information is available. These findings challenge one of the fundamental claims of the ecological approach--that perception is direct--by suggesting that perception is mediated by internal processes. Here, we sought to resolve this apparent discrepancy. We contend that perception is based on the controlled detection of the information available in a global array that includes higher-order patterns defined across interoceptive and exteroceptive stimulus arrays. These higher-order patterns specify the environment in relation to the perceiver, so direct sensitivity to them would be consistent with the ecological claims that perception of the environment is direct and animal-specific. In addition, the action-specific approach provides further evidence for the theory of affordances, by demonstrating that even seemingly abstract properties of the environment, such as distance and size, are ultimately perceived in terms of an agent's action capabilities.

Action-specific perception of speed is independent of attention

According to the action-specific account of perception, a perceiver's ability to act influences how the environment is perceived. For example, in a computer-based task, participants perceive fish as moving faster when they use a smaller net, and are thus less effective at catching the fish (Witt & Sugovic, 2013a). Here, we examined the degree to which attention may influence perceptual judgments by requiring participants to engage in a secondary task that directed their attention either toward (Exp. 1) or away from (Exp. 2) the to-be-caught fish. Though perceived fish speed was influenced by participants' catching performance-replicating previous results-attentional allocation did not impact this relationship between catching performance and perceived fish speed. The present results suggest that action directly influences spatial perception, rather than exerting indirect effects via attentional processes.

Action-specific influences on perception and postperceptual processes: Present controversies and future directions

The action-specific perception account holds that people perceive the environment in terms of their ability to act in it. In this view, for example, decreased ability to climb a hill because of fatigue makes the hill visually appear to be steeper. Though influential, this account has not been universally accepted, and in fact a heated controversy has emerged. The opposing view holds that action capability has little or no influence on perception. Heretofore, the debate has been quite polarized, with efforts largely being focused on supporting one view and dismantling the other. We argue here that polarized debate can impede scientific progress and that the search for similarities between 2 sides of a debate can sharpen the theoretical focus of both sides and illuminate important avenues for future research. In this article, we present a synthetic review of this debate, drawing from the literatures of both approaches, to clarify both the surprising similarities and the core differences between them. We critically evaluate existing evidence, discuss possible mechanisms of action-specific effects, and make recommendations for future research. A primary focus of future work will involve not only the development of methods that guard against action-specific postperceptual effects but also development of concrete, well-constrained underlying mechanisms. The criteria for what constitutes acceptable control of postperceptual effects and what constitutes an appropriately specific mechanism vary between approaches, and bridging this gap is a central challenge for future research.

Investigating the ability to read others' intentions using humanoid robots

The ability to interact with other people hinges crucially on the possibility to anticipate how their actions would unfold. Recent evidence suggests that a similar skill may be grounded on the fact that we perform an action differently if different intentions lead it. Human observers can detect these differences and use them to predict the purpose leading the action. Although intention reading from movement observation is receiving a growing interest in research, the currently applied experimental paradigms have important limitations. Here, we describe a new approach to study intention understanding that takes advantage of robots, and especially of humanoid robots. We posit that this choice may overcome the drawbacks of previous methods, by guaranteeing the ideal trade-off between controllability and naturalness of the interactive scenario. Robots indeed can establish an interaction in a controlled manner, while sharing the same action space and exhibiting contingent behaviors. To conclude, we discuss the advantages of this research strategy and the aspects to be taken in consideration when attempting to define which human (and robot) motion features allow for intention reading during social interactive tasks.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.

Competitive interaction leads to perceptual distancing between actors

People physically distance themselves from competitors and the disliked, and cooperate less with those who are further away. We examine whether social interaction can also impact the space people perceive between themselves and others by measuring the influence of competitive dynamics on visual perception. In 2 experiments, participants played a ball toss game until they reached a target score. In Experiment 1, a confederate stood across the room from the participant and either (a) played the same game competitively, (b) played the same game cooperatively, or (c) observed the participant without playing, while in Experiment 2, 2 participants played the same versions of the game with each other. After the game, participants provided an estimate of the distance between themselves and the other player. Participants in Experiment 1 who competed with the confederate consistently judged her to be more distant than participants who cooperated with the confederate or played alone. In Experiment 2, players who lost the competition perceived more distance between themselves and their opponents than did players who won, suggesting that the experience of losing a competition drives this perceptual distancing. These findings demonstrate the power of a socially distancing interaction to create perceptual distance between people.

The economy of social resources and its influence on spatial perceptions

Survival for any organism, including people, is a matter of resource management. To ensure survival, people necessarily budget their resources. Spatial perceptions contribute to resource budgeting by scaling the environment to an individual’s available resources. Effective budgeting requires setting a balance of income and expenditures around some baseline value. For social resources, this baseline assumes that the individuals are embedded in their social network. A review of the literature supports the proposal that our visual perceptions vary based on the implicit budgeting of physical and social resources, where social resources, as they fluctuate relative to a baseline, can directly alter our visual perceptions.

Action simulation: time course and representational mechanisms

The notion of action simulation refers to the ability to re-enact foreign actions (i.e., actions observed in other individuals). Simulating others' actions implies a mirroring of their activities, based on one's own sensorimotor competencies. Here, we discuss theoretical and experimental approaches to action simulation and the study of its representational underpinnings. One focus of our discussion is on the timing of internal simulation and its relation to the timing of external action, and a paradigm that requires participants to predict the future course of actions that are temporarily occluded from view. We address transitions between perceptual mechanisms (referring to action representation before and after occlusion) and simulation mechanisms (referring to action representation during occlusion). Findings suggest that action simulation runs in real-time; acting on newly created action representations rather than relying on continuous visual extrapolations. A further focus of our discussion pertains to the functional characteristics of the mechanisms involved in predicting other people's actions. We propose that two processes are engaged, dynamic updating and static matching, which may draw on both semantic and motor information. In a concluding section, we discuss these findings in the context of broader theoretical issues related to action and event representation, arguing that a detailed functional analysis of action simulation in cognitive, neural, and computational terms may help to further advance our understanding of action cognition and motor control.

Spiders appear to move faster than non-threatening objects regardless of one's ability to block them

We examined whether perception of a threatening object - a spider - was more accurate than of a non-threatening object. An accurate perception could promote better survival than a biased perception. However, if biases encourage faster responses and more appropriate behaviors, then under the right circumstances, perceptual biases could promote better survival. We found that spiders appeared to be moving faster than balls and ladybugs. Furthermore, the perceiver's ability to act on the object also influenced perceived speed: the object looked faster when it was more difficult to block. Both effects--the threat of the object and the perceiver's blocking abilities--acted independently from each other. The results suggest effects of multiple types of affordances on perception of speed.

Response bias cannot explain action-specific effects: evidence from compliant and non-compliant participants

According to the action-specific account of perception, the perceiver's ability to act influences perception of the target. For example, targets that are easier to acquire are reported to look closer, bigger, and slower. However, an alternative explanation for these effects is that they are due to response bias, rather than to changes in perception. To test the role of response bias, we employed two separate manipulations. We manipulated people's abilities to block a ball and measured the corresponding effects on estimated ball speed. We also created an explicit task demand by giving participants instructions that emphasized responding either slow or fast. Participants were grouped, based on whether they were compliant or non-compliant with the instructions. Regardless of their compliance, we found an action-specific effect of blocking ability on estimated speed. Given that non-compliant participants still showed the effect, the results provide strong evidence against a response-bias explanation of this action-specific effect. Paired with earlier research, we conclude that blocking ability influences perceived speed. Perception expresses the relationship between the environment and the perceiver, and this view is consistent with emerging neural and behavioral evidence for an interconnected perceptual-motor system.