What do infants understand of others’ action? A theoretical account of early social cognition

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

The pain hidden in your hands: Facial expression of pain reduces the influence of goal-related information in action recognition

The involvement of the sensorimotor system in the perception of painful actions has been repeatedly demonstrated. Yet the cognitive processes corresponding to sensorimotor activations have not been identified. In particular, the respective role of higher-level and lower-level action representations such as goals and grips in the recognition of painful actions is not clear. Previous research has shown that in a neutral context, higher-level action representations (goals) are prioritized over lower-level action representations (grips) and guide action recognition. The present study evaluates to what extent the general priority given to goal-related information in the processing of visual actions can be modulated by a context of pain. We used the action violation paradigm developed by van Elk et al. (2008). In the present action tasks, participants had to judge whether the grip or the goal of object-directed actions displayed in photographs was correct or not. The actress in the photograph could show either a neutral facial expression or a facial expression of pain. In the control task, they had to judge whether the actress expressed pain. In the action tasks, goals influenced grip judgements more than grips influenced goal judgements overall, corroborating the priority given to goal-related information previously reported. Critically, the impact of irrelevant goal-related information on the identification of incorrect grips disappeared in the pain context. Moreover, judgements in the control task were similarly influenced by grip and goal-related information. Results suggest that a context of pain reduces the reliance on higher-level action for action judgments. Findings provide novel directions regarding the cognitive and brain mechanisms involved in action processing in painful situations and support pluralist views of action understanding.

Encoding interactive scripts at 10 months of age

Understanding action-reaction associations that give origin to interactive scripts (e.g., give-and-take interactions) is essential for appreciating social exchanges. However, studies on infants' action understanding have mainly investigated the case of actions performed by individual agents. Moreover, although extensive literature has explored infants' comprehension of action-effect relationships in object functioning, no study has addressed whether it also plays a role when observing social interactions, an issue we addressed here. In a first study, 10-month-old infants observed short videos of dyadic exchanges. We investigated whether they were able to link specific human gestures directed toward another person to specific vocal reactions in the receiver. We used a double-habituation paradigm in which infants were sequentially habituated to two specific action-reaction associations. In the test phase, infants watched one of the two habituated (Familiar) videos, a video with a reversed action-reaction association (Violation), and a Novel video. Results showed that the infants looked longer at both the Novel and Violation test trials than at the Familiar test trials. In a control study, we show that these results could not be accounted for by associative learning; indeed, learning of the action-reaction association did not occur when the vocalization was not produced by the receiver but only contingent on the agent's action. Thus, we show that 10-month-old infants can encode specific social action-effect relationships during the observation of dyadic interactions and that the interactivity of the social context may be critical to shaping young infants' understanding of others' behaviors.

Understanding preferences in infancy

A preference is defined as a dispositional state that helps explain why a person chooses one option over another. Preference understanding is a significant part of interpreting and predicting others' behavior, which can also help to guide social encounters, for instance, to initiate interactions and even form relationships based on shared preferences. Cognitive developmental research in the past several decades has revealed that infants have relatively sophisticated understandings about others' preferences, as part of investigations into how young children make sense of others' behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, dispositions including preferences, and epistemic states. In recent years, research on early psychological knowledge expands to including infant understanding of social situations. As such, infants are also found to use their preference understandings in their social life. They treat favorably others who share their own preferences, and they prefer prosocial and similar others (e.g., those who speak their language). In reviewing these results, we point out future directions for research and conclude with further suggestions and recommendations. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging.

The impact of low birthweight in infant patterns of regulatory behavior, mother-infant quality of interaction, and attachment

It remains unclear whether infants born preterm are more likely to develop an insecure attachment with their mothers. In this study, instead of using gestational age criteria, we observe attachment in infants born with very low birthweight. Although the collinearity between gestational age and birthweight is high, infants born with very low birthweight for their gestational age tend to stay more days in NICU and to have more comorbidities than other infants with the same gestational age. Thus, we wonder about the impact of low gestational birth (per se) in infants' regulatory behavior, the quality of mother-infant interactions, and attachment security. The participants are 71 infants' weight lower than 1599 g of gestational weight (varying between 23 and 34 weeks of gestational) and their mothers. Dyads were observed in free play and during Face to Face Still-Face paradigm with infants at 3 months of corrected age. At 12 months of corrected age, mother-infant attachment was observed during Strange Situation. Results indicate that infants with low/very low gestational birthweight have high levels of insecure attachment (70 %) and non-positive patterns of regulatory behavior (64 %). Maternal and infant interactive behavior is highly associated with infant attachment. In turn, maternal interactive behavior is associated with gestational age, birthweight, and number of days in NICU.

Can the early visual processing of others' actions be related to social power and dominance?

Although goals often drive action understanding, this ability is also prone to important variability among individuals, which may have its origin in individual social characteristics. The present study aimed at evaluating the relationship between the tendency to prioritize goal information over grip information during early visual processing of action and several social dimensions. Visual processing of grip and goal information during action recognition was evaluated in 64 participants using the priming protocol developed by Decroix and Kalénine (Exp Brain Res 236(8):2411-2426, 2018). Object-directed action photographs were primed by photographs sharing the same goal and/or the same grip. The effects of goal and grip priming on action recognition were evaluated for different prime durations. The same participants further fulfilled questionnaires characterizing the way individuals deal with their social environment, namely their sense of social power, dominance, perspective taking, and construal level. At the group level, results confirmed greater goal than grip priming effects on action recognition for the shortest prime duration. Regression analyses between the pattern of response times in the action priming protocol and scores at the questionnaires further showed that the advantage of goal over grip priming was associated with higher sense of social power, and possibly to lower dominance. Overall, data confirm that observers tend to prioritize goal-related information when processing visual actions but further indicate that this tendency is sensitive to individual social characteristics. Results suggest that goal information may not always drive action understanding and point out the connection between low-level processing of observed actions and more general individual characteristics.

Children’s Sociability in Institutional Contexts: Theoretical Reflections on Cognitive Development Within Peer Interactions

Human beings are constituted through the presence and actions of others whom they encounter during the course of their lives. We are constituted by all the interactions we enact in different social contexts and through all the meanings we create together about the experiences we share. Therefore, in order to understand the ontogenesis of cognition, one must understand how meanings are constructed with the others we encounter. A substantial amount of research has addressed how infants and toddlers—when in interaction with adults—are able to understand others’ actions and engage in social dynamics by coordinating and regulating adults’ actions. This knowledge has advanced the field of developmental psychology significantly. However, not many efforts have been made to understand the origins of social cognition via peer interactions or explore how peer interactions constitute cognitive development. In this theoretical article, we use the microanalysis of three peer interaction episodes to discuss how the constitutive role of peer experiences can be analysed beyond isolated individual processes. The encounter, the situation and the social and relational process are used as a unit of analysis. This analytical approach considers the contributions and insights provided by the enactive theory, which offers a perspective to understand the processes of cognitive development in interactive experiences.

Cultural Similarities and Differences in the Development of Sociomoral Judgments: An Eye-Tracking Study

People integrate the valence of behavior and that of outcome when making moral judgments. However, the role of culture in the development of this integration among young children remains unclear. We investigated cultural similarities and differences in moral judgments by measuring both visual attention and verbal evaluations. Three- and four-year-olds from Japan and the U.S. (N = 141) were shown sociomoral scenarios that varied in agents' behavior which reflected prosocial or antisocial intention and recipients' emotional outcome (happy, neutral, or sad); then, they were asked to evaluate agents' moral trait. Their eye fixations while observing moral scenarios were measured using an eye-tracker. We found culturally similar tendencies in the integration of behavior and outcome; however, a cultural difference was shown in their verbal evaluation. The link between implicit attention and explicit verbal evaluation was negligible. Both culturally shared and specific aspects of sociomoral development are discussed.

Children's reasoning about the efficiency of others' actions: The development of rational action prediction

The relative efficiency of an action is a central criterion in action control and can be used to predict others' behavior. Yet, it is unclear when the ability to predict on and reason about the efficiency of others' actions develops. In three main and two follow-up studies, 3- to 6-year-old children (n = 242) were confronted with vignettes in which protagonists could take a short (efficient) path or a long path. Children predicted which path the protagonist would take and why the protagonist would take a specific path. The 3-year-olds did not take efficiency into account when making decisions even when there was an explicit goal, the task was simplified and made more salient, and children were questioned after exposure to the agent's action. Four years is a transition age for rational action prediction, and the 5-year-olds reasoned on the efficiency of actions before relying on them to predict others' behavior. Results are discussed within a representational redescription account.

Do Children and Adults with Autism Spectrum Condition Anticipate Others' Actions as Goal-Directed? A Predictive Coding Perspective

An action's end state can be anticipated by considering the agent's goal, or simply by projecting the movement trajectory. Theories suggest that individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have difficulties anticipating other's goal-directed actions, caused by an impairment using prior information. We examined whether children, adolescents and adults with and without ASC visually anticipate another's action based on its goal or movement trajectory by presenting participants an agent repeatedly taking different paths to reach the same of two targets. The ASC group anticipated the goal and not just the movement pattern, but needed more time to perform goal-directed anticipations. Results are in line with predictive coding accounts, claiming that the use of prior information is impaired in ASC.

Neural dynamics of grip and goal integration during the processing of others' actions with objects: An ERP study

Recent behavioural evidence suggests that when processing others’ actions, motor acts and goal-related information both contribute to action recognition. Yet the neuronal mechanisms underlying the dynamic integration of the two action dimensions remain unclear. This study aims to elucidate the ERP components underlying the processing and integration of grip and goal-related information. The electrophysiological activity of 28 adults was recorded during the processing of object-directed action photographs (e.g., writing with pencil) containing either grip violations (e.g. upright pencil grasped with atypical-grip), goal violations (e.g., upside-down pencil grasped with typical-grip), both grip and goal violations (e.g., upside-down pencil grasped with atypical-grip), or no violations. Participants judged whether actions were overall typical or not according to object typical use. Brain activity was sensitive to the congruency between grip and goal information on the N400, reflecting the semantic integration between the two dimensions. On earlier components, brain activity was affected by grip and goal typicality independently. Critically, goal typicality but not grip typicality affected brain activity on the N300, supporting an earlier role of goal-related representations in action recognition. Findings provide new insights on the neural temporal dynamics of the integration of motor acts and goal-related information during the processing of others’ actions.

Differential effects of others' emotional cues on 18-month-olds' preferential reproduction of observed actions

Infants use others' emotional signals to regulate their own object-directed behavior and action reproduction, and they typically produce more actions after having observed positive as compared to negative emotional cues. This study explored infants' understanding of the referential specificity of others' emotional cues when being confronted with two actions that are accompanied by different emotional displays. Selective action reproduction was measured after 18-month-olds (N = 42) had observed two actions directed at the same object, one of which was modeled with a positive emotional expression and the other with a negative emotional expression. Across four trials with different objects, infants' first actions matched the positively-emoted actions more often than the negatively-emoted actions. In comparison with baseline-level, infants' initial performance changed only for the positively-emoted actions, in that it increased during test. Latencies to first object-touch during test did not differ when infants reproduced the positively- or negatively-emoted actions, respectively, indicating that infants related the cues to the respective actions rather than to the object. During demonstration, infants looked relatively longer at the object than at the model's face, with no difference in positive or negative displays. Infants during their second year of life thus capture the action-related referential specificity of others' emotional cues and seem to follow positive signals more readily when actively selecting which of two actions to reproduce preferentially.

The role of head and hand movements for infants' predictions of others' actions

In everyday life, both the head and the hand movements of another person reveal the other’s action target. However, studies on the development of action prediction have primarily included displays in which only hand and no head movements were visible. Given that infants acquire in their first year both the ability to follow other’s gaze and the ability to predict other’s reaching actions, the question is whether they rely mostly on the hand or the head when predicting other’s manual actions. The current study aimed to provide an answer to this question using a screen-based eye tracking setup. Thirteen-month-old infants observed a model transporting plastic rings from one side of the screen to the other side and place them on a pole. In randomized trials the model’s head was either visible or occluded. The dependent variable was gaze-arrival time, which indicated whether participants predicted the model’s action targets. Gaze-arrival times were not found to be different when the head was visible or rendered invisible. Furthermore, target looks that occurred after looks at the hand were found to be predictive, whereas target looks that occurred after looks at the head were reactive. In sum, the study shows that 13-month-olds are capable of predicting an individual’s action target based on the observed hand movements but not the head movements. The data suggest that earlier findings on infants’ action prediction in screen-based tasks in which often only the hands were visible may well generalize to real-life settings in which infants have visual access to the actor’s head.

Know thy agency in predictive coding: Meta-monitoring over forward modeling

Though the computation of agency is thought to be based on prediction error, it is important for us to grasp our own reliability of that detected error. Here, the current study shows that we have a meta-monitoring ability over our own forward model, where the accuracy of motor prediction and therefore of the felt agency are implicitly evaluated. Healthy participants (N=105) conducted a simple motor control task and SELF or OTHER visual feedback was given. The relationship between the accuracy and confidence in a mismatch detection task and in a self-other attribution task was examined. The results suggest an accuracy-confidence correlation in both tasks, indicating our meta-monitoring ability over such decisions. Furthermore, a statistically identified group with low accuracy and low confidence was characterized as higher schizotypal people. Finally, what we can know about our own forward model and how we can know it is discussed.

When the body reveals the mind: Children's use of others' body orientation to understand their focus of attention

A considerable amount of research has examined children's ability to rely on explicit social cues such as pointing to understand others' referential intentions. Yet, skillful social interaction also requires reliance on and learning from implicit cues (i.e., cues that are not displayed with the explicit intention to teach or inform someone). From an embodied point of view, orienting movements and body orientation are salient cues that reveal something about a person's intentional relations without being explicit communicative cues. In three experiments, the current study investigated the development of the ability to use body information in a word learning situation. To this end, we presented 2-year-old children, 3.5-year-old children, and adults with movies on an eye-tracking screen in which an actor oriented her upper body to one of two objects while uttering a novel word. The results show that the 3.5-year-old children and adults, but not the 2-year-old children, related the novel word to the referred object (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the actor oriented her body to one object while pointing to the other object, children of both age groups relied on the pointing cue (Experiment 3). This suggests that by 3.5 years children use another's body orientation as an indicator of her intentional relations but that they prioritize explicit social cues over the implicit body posture cues. Overall, the study supports theoretical views that an appreciation of others' intentional relations does not emerge as an all-or-nothing ability but rather emerges gradually during the course of early development.

Preschoolers, adolescents, and adults visually anticipate an agent's efficient action; but only after having observed it frequently

The present study examined the contribution of efficiency reasoning and statistical learning on visual action anticipation in preschool children, adolescents, and adults. To this end, Experiment 1 assessed proactive eye movements of 5-year-old children, 15-year-old adolescents, and adults, who observed an agent stating the intent to reach a goal as quickly as possible. Subsequently the agent could four times either take a short, hence efficient, or long, hence inefficient, path to get to the goal. The results showed that in the first trial participants in none of the age groups predicted above chance level that the agent would produce the efficient action. Instead, we observed an age-dependent increase in action predictions in the subsequent repeated presentation of the same action. Experiment 2 ruled out that participants’ nonconsideration of the efficient path was due to a lack of understanding of the agent's action goal. Moreover, it demonstrated that 5-year-old children do predict that the agent will act efficiently when verbally reasoning about his future action. Overall, the study supports the view that rapid learning from frequency information guides visual action anticipations.

Enhanced Neural Processing of Goal-directed Actions After Active Training in 4-Month-Old Infants

The current study explores the neural correlates of action perception and its relation to infants' active experience performing goal-directed actions. Study 1 provided active training with sticky mittens that enables grasping and object manipulation in prereaching 4-month-olds. After training, EEG was recorded while infants observed images of hands grasping toward (congruent) or away from (incongruent) objects. We demonstrate that brief active training facilitates social perception as indexed by larger amplitude of the P400 ERP component to congruent compared with incongruent trials. Study 2 presented 4-month-old infants with passive training in which they observed an experimenter perform goal-directed reaching actions, followed by an identical ERP session to that used in Study 1. The second study did not demonstrate any differentiation between congruent and incongruent trials. These results suggest that (1) active experience alters the brains' response to goal-directed actions performed by others and (2) visual exposure alone is not sufficient in developing the neural networks subserving goal processing during action observation in infancy.

Engagement: Looking beyond the mirror to understand action understanding

In this paper, we argue that the current focus on mirroring as the route to explaining the development of action understanding is misleading and problematic. It facilitates a fundamentally spectatorial stance, ignoring engagement and dialogue; it focuses on similarity between self and other and neglects difference; and it succumbs to the static terminology of mechanism rather than a dynamic language of process. Contrary to this view, dialogic exchanges are evident from the start of life, revealing infants' ability to engage with and respond appropriately to actions that are outside their own motor repertoire. We suggest that engagement rather than mirroring better accounts for many current findings in action understanding. The neurological evidence to date shows that action perception involves a process of continuous synchronization and change, suggesting that it might be more fruitful for research and theory to look beyond mirroring and instead adopt dynamic processual explanations of action understanding within interaction.

Eighteen-Month-Olds, but not 14-Month-Olds, Use Social Context to Bind Action Sequences

We demonstrate that 18-month-olds, but not 14-month-olds, can anticipate others' actions based on an interpretation of shared goals that bind together individual actions into a collaborative sequence. After viewing a sequence of actions performed by two people who socially interact, 18-month-olds bound together the socially engaged actors' actions such that they later expected the actors to share the same final goal. Eighteen-month-olds who saw nonsocially engaged actors did not have this expectation and neither did 14-month-olds when viewing either socially or nonsocially engaged actors. The results are discussed in light of the possibility that experience in collaborations could be necessary for understanding collaboration from a third-person perspective.

Proximity and gaze influences facial temperature: a thermal infrared imaging study

Direct gaze and interpersonal proximity are known to lead to changes in psycho-physiology, behavior and brain function. We know little, however, about subtler facial reactions such as rise and fall in temperature, which may be sensitive to contextual effects and functional in social interactions. Using thermal infrared imaging cameras 18 female adult participants were filmed at two interpersonal distances (intimate and social) and two gaze conditions (averted and direct). The order of variation in distance was counterbalanced: half the participants experienced a female experimenter's gaze at the social distance first before the intimate distance (a socially "normal" order) and half experienced the intimate distance first and then the social distance (an odd social order). At both distances averted gaze always preceded direct gaze. We found strong correlations in thermal changes between six areas of the face (forehead, chin, cheeks, nose, maxilliary, and periorbital regions) for all experimental conditions and developed a composite measure of thermal shifts for all analyses. Interpersonal proximity led to a thermal rise, but only in the "normal" social order. Direct gaze, compared to averted gaze, led to a thermal increase at both distances with a stronger effect at intimate distance, in both orders of distance variation. Participants reported direct gaze as more intrusive than averted gaze, especially at the intimate distance. These results demonstrate the powerful effects of another person's gaze on psycho-physiological responses, even at a distance and independent of context.

The affordance-matching hypothesis: how objects guide action understanding and prediction

Action understanding lies at the heart of social interaction. Prior research has often conceptualized this capacity in terms of a motoric matching of observed actions to an action in one's motor repertoire, but has ignored the role of object information. In this manuscript, we set out an alternative conception of intention understanding, which places the role of objects as central to our observation and comprehension of the actions of others. We outline the current understanding of the interconnectedness of action and object knowledge, demonstrating how both rely heavily on the other. We then propose a novel framework, the affordance-matching hypothesis, which incorporates these findings into a simple model of action understanding, in which object knowledge-what an object is for and how it is used-can inform and constrain both action interpretation and prediction. We will review recent empirical evidence that supports such an object-based view of action understanding and we relate the affordance matching hypothesis to recent proposals that have re-conceptualized the role of mirror neurons in action understanding.

Why we may not find intentions in the brain

Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of 'intention' in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action. We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for.