No evidence for shared representations of task sets in joint task switching

Number to me, space to you: Joint representation of spatial-numerical associations

Recent work has shown that number concepts activate both spatial and magnitude representations. According to the social co-representation literature which has shown that participants typically represent task components assigned to others together with their own, we asked whether explicit magnitude meaning and explicit spatial coding must be present in a single mind, or can be distributed across two minds, to generate a spatial-numerical congruency effect. In a shared go/no-go task that eliminated peripheral spatial codes, we assigned explicit magnitude processing to participants and spatial processing to either human or non-human co-agents. The spatial-numerical congruency effect emerged only with human co-agents. We demonstrate an inter-personal level of conceptual congruency between space and number that arises from a shared conceptual representation not contaminated by peripheral spatial codes. Theoretical implications of this finding for numerical cognition are discussed.

When two actors perform different tasks: Still no evidence for shared task-sets in joint task switching

Two different variations of joint task switching led to different conclusions as to whether co-acting individuals share the same task-sets. The present study aimed at bridging this gap by replicating the version in which two actors performed two different tasks. Experiment 1 showed switch costs across two actors in a joint condition, which agreed with previous studies, but also yielded even larger switch costs in a solo condition, which contradicted the claim that actors represent an alternative task as their own when it is carried out by the co-actor but not when no one carries it out. Experiments 2 and 3 further examined switch costs in the solo condition with the aim to rule out possible influences of task instructions for and experiences with the other task that was not assigned to the actor. Before participants were instructed on the second of the two tasks, switch costs were still obtained without a co-actor when explicit task names (“COLOUR” and “SHAPE”) served as go/nogo signals (Experiment 2), but not when arbitrary symbols (“XXXX” and “++++”) served as go/nogo signals (Experiment 3). The results thus imply that switch costs depend on participants’ knowledge of task cues being assigned to two different tasks, but not on whether the other task is performed by a co-actor. These findings undermine the assumption that switch costs in the joint conditions reflect shared task-sets between co-actors in this procedure.

Metacontrol and joint action: how shared goals transfer from one task to another?

In most of our daily activities and in team sports, we interact with other individuals and do not act in isolation. Using a social variant of the standard two-choice Simon task, this study aims to test if competitive/cooperative processing modes (i.e., metacontrol states) change the degree of bodily self-other integration between two persons in joint action. In addition, and more exploratory the study tested if this effect depends on a shared group experience with the partner. Two participants shared a visual Simon task, so that each person basically performed complementary parts of the task, which transfers the paradigm into a go/no-go Simon task for each person. Before running this joint Simon task, we set both participants either in a competitive or a cooperative control state by means of a dyadic game, a manipulation aimed at testing possible goal transfer across tasks. We found significant joint Simon effects for participants who were in a competitive state and for participants who were in a cooperative state. The joint Simon effect for participants being in a competitive state was significantly smaller than for participants being in a cooperative state. When experiencing the goal induction together with the partner, the joint Simon effect was significantly decreased as when the induction was performed alone. Both effects (metacontrol state induction and shared experience) seem to be statistically independent of each other. In line with predictions of metacontrol state theory, our study indicated that abstract cognitive goal states can be transferred from one task to another task, able to affect the degree of bodily self-other integration across different task situations.

Incomplete information about the partner affects the development of collaborative strategies in joint action

Physical interaction with a partner plays an essential role in our life experience and is the basis of many daily activities. When two physically coupled humans have different and partly conflicting goals, they face the challenge of negotiating some type of collaboration. This requires that both participants understand their partner’s state and current actions. But, how would the collaboration be affected if information about their partner were unreliable or incomplete? We designed an experiment in which two players (a dyad) are mechanically connected through a virtual spring, but cannot see each other. They were instructed to perform reaching movements with the same start and end position, but through different via-points. In different groups of dyads we varied the amount of information provided to each player about his/her partner: haptic only (the interaction force perceived through the virtual spring), visuo-haptic (the interaction force is also displayed on the screen), and partner visible (in addition to interaction force, partner position is continuously displayed on the screen). We found that incomplete information about the partner affects not only the speed at which collaboration is achieved (less information, slower learning), but also the actual collaboration strategy. In particular, incomplete or unreliable information leads to an interaction strategy characterized by alternating leader-follower roles. Conversely, more reliable information leads to more synchronous behaviors, in which no specific roles can be identified. Simulations based on a combination of game theory and Bayesian estimation suggested that synchronous behaviors correspond to optimal interaction (Nash equilibrium). Roles emerge as sub-optimal forms of interaction, which minimize the need to account for the partner. These findings suggest that collaborative strategies in joint action are shaped by the trade-off between the task requirements and the uncertainty of the information available about the partner.

Many activities in daily life involve physical interaction with a partner or opponent. In many situations, they have conflicting goals and need to negotiate some form of collaboration. Although very common, these situations have rarely been studied empirically. In this study, we specifically address what is a ‘optimal’ collaboration and how it can be achieved. We also address how developing a collaboration is affected by uncertainty about partner actions. Through a combination of empirical studies and computer simulations based on game theory, we show that subject pairs (dyads) are capable of developing stable collaborations, but the learned collaboration strategy depends on the reliability of the information about the partner. High-information dyads converge to optimal strategies in a game-theoretic sense. Low-information dyads converge to strategies that minimize the need to know about the partner. These findings are consistent with a game-theoretic learning model which relies on estimates of partner actions, but not partner goals. This similarity sheds some light on the minimal computational machinery which is necessary to an intelligent agent in order to develop stable physical collaborations with a human partner.

Conditional automaticity: interference effects on the implicit memory retrieval process

Many studies have indicated that executing a secondary task during encoding has little influence on implicit memory (priming effect). However, relatively few studies have discussed the effect of interference on implicit memory during retrieval. Our previous studies found asymmetry between implicit encoding and retrieval processes, with the priming effect disrupted by retrieval interference. Therefore, the present study investigated why and how the priming effect is affected by interference at retrieval. We adopted a dual-task paradigm, with a lexical decision task as the memory task and an odd-even decision task as the interference task. The effect of interference during retrieval was assessed by comparing the performance in the interference condition with that in the full-attention condition. In Experiment 1, we observed that the priming effect was absent in the synchronous retrieval interference condition. In Experiment 2, asynchronous interference was also found to block the priming effect. To verify the assumption that the priming effect is sensitive to attentional resource competition during retrieval, we used two different manipulations (an extended stimulus interval in the dual-task paradigm, Experiment 3, and an interference inhibition manipulation, Experiment 4) known to reduce attentional distraction. In these experiments, the priming effect was protected from interference effects. We suggest that implicit memory retrieval could be regarded as a conditional automatic process that depends on a configuration of the cognitive system by attention and task sets. If the limited resources are occupied by another task, the implicit retrieval process can be impacted.

Is Your Color My Color? Dividing the Labor of the Stroop Task Between Co-actors

Performing a task with other actors involves two opposing forces, division of labor between co-acting individuals and integration of divided parts of the task into a shared mental representation (co-representation). Previous studies have focused primarily on the integration of task representations and limited attention has paid to the division of labor. The present study devised a test of the integration and the division in a joint task setting. A joint version of the Stroop task was developed, in which pairs of actors were assigned different sets of target colors. If the actors integrate their co-actor’s task, the colors assigned to their co-actor should be represented as if they were the actor’s own target colors; the Stroop effect should be as large when distractor color words denote their co-actor’s target colors as when these words denote the actor’s own target colors. If the actors divide the labor of the Stroop task, the colors assigned to their partner should be represented as non-target colors; the Stroop effect should be smaller when the distractor color words denote the co-actor’s target colors than when these words denote the actor’s own target colors. The results of response time did not provide clear support for either position, while those of response accuracy supported the division of labor. Possible cognitive mechanisms that support the division of labor and the integration of task representation are discussed.

Joint cognition and the role of human agency in random number choices

Joint cognition refers to the mental systems that support group performance when carrying out a shared, or jointly owned task. We focused here on understanding the social configurations that underpin key phenomena in joint cognition, in particular, whether individual cognition in task-sharing environments is mostly shaped by social factors or not. To this end, we investigated, first and mainly, whether human presence is necessary for the creation of joint performance; second and separately, whether prior experience of task sharing has an adaptive influence on subsequent individual choices; and third and additionally, whether individual differences in a social trait mediate joint performance. We describe an experiment in which participants combined with another human or a computer as they attempted to generate a paired sequence that was as random as possible. First, we found little difference in joint performance with regard to whether a human or a computer was the co-participant, except for immediate repetitive response. Second, we found evidence for choice adaptation, but only under the lower time pressure. Third, we replicated previous research in which no systematic link was established between social desirability and joint performance. We conclude that joint cognition phenomena may be rooted primarily in turn-taking configurations rather than in social dynamics per se.

Action-effect sharing induces task-set sharing in joint task switching

A central issue in the study of joint task performance has been one of whether co-acting individuals perform their partner's part of the task as if it were their own. The present study addressed this issue by using joint task switching. A pair of actors shared two tasks that were presented in a random order, whereby the relevant task and actor were cued on each trial. Responses produced action effects that were either shared or separate between co-actors. When co-actors produced separate action effects, switch costs were obtained within the same actor (i.e., when the same actor performed consecutive trials) but not between co-actors (when different actors performed consecutive trials), implying that actors did not perform their co-actor's part. When the same action effects were shared between co-actors, however, switch costs were also obtained between co-actors, implying that actors did perform their co-actor's part. The results indicated that shared action effects induce task-set sharing between co-acting individuals.

Sharing tasks or sharing actions? Evidence from the joint Simon task

In a joint Simon task, a pair of co-acting individuals divide labors of performing a choice-reaction task in such a way that each actor responds to one type of stimuli and ignores the other type that is assigned to the co-actor. It has been suggested that the actors share the mental representation of the joint task and perform the co-actor’s trials as if they were their own. However, it remains unclear exactly which aspects of co-actor’s task-set the actors share in the joint Simon task. The present study addressed this issue by manipulating the proportions of compatible and incompatible trials for one actor (inducer actor) and observing its influences on the performance of the other actor (diagnostic actor) for whom there were always an equal proportion of compatible and incompatible trials. The design of the present study disentangled the effect of trial proportion from the confounding effect of compatibility on the preceding trial. The results showed that the trial proportions for the inducer actor had strong influences on the inducer actor’s own performance, but it had little influence on the diagnostic actor’s performance. Thus, the diagnostic actor did not represent aspects of the inducer actor’s task-set beyond stimuli and responses of the inducer actor. We propose a new account of the effect of preceding compatibility on the joint Simon effect.