Closing the gap: connecting sudden representational change to the subjective Aha! experience in insightful problem solving

Grounding Cognition in Perceptual Experience

The aim of this Special Issue was to put forward a multifaceted reflection on the relevance of perceptual experience in affecting and modeling various aspects of cognitive performance [...].

The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty

Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.

Changes in semantic memory structure support successful problem-solving and analogical transfer

Creative problem-solving is central in daily life, yet its underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Restructuring (i.e., reorganization of problem-related representations) is considered one problem-solving mechanism and may lead to an abstract problem-related representation facilitating the solving of analogous problems. Here, we used network science methodology to estimate participants' semantic memory networks (SemNets) before and after attempting to solve a riddle. Restructuring was quantified as the difference in SemNets metrics between pre- and post-solving phases. Our results provide initial evidence that problem-related SemNets restructuring may be associated with the successful solving of the riddle and, subsequently, an analogous one. Solution-relevant concepts and semantically remote concepts became more strongly related in solvers. Only changes in semantically remote concepts were instrumental in actively solving the riddle while changes in solution-relevant concepts may reflect a pre-exposure to the solution.

Prediction error minimization as a common computational principle for curiosity and creativity

We propose expanding the authors' shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity by emphasizing an underlying computational principle: Minimizing prediction errors (mismatch between predictions and incoming data). Curiosity is tied to the anticipation of minimizing prediction errors through future, novel information, whereas creative AHA moments are connected to the actual minimization of prediction errors through current, novel information.

Surprise!-Clarifying the link between insight and prediction error

The AHA experience, a moment of deep understanding during insightful problem-solving involving feelings of certainty, pleasure, and surprise, has captivated psychologists for more than a century. Recently, a new theoretical framework has proposed a link between the AHA experience and prediction error (PE), a popular concept in decision-making and reinforcement learning. This framework suggests that participants maintain a meta-cognitive prediction about the time it takes to solve a problem and the AHA experience arises when the problem is solved earlier than expected, resulting in a meta-cognitive PE. In our preregistered online study, we delved deeper into this idea, investigating whether prediction errors also pertain to participants' predictions regarding the solvability of the problem itself, and which dimension of the AHA experience aligns with the meta-cognitive PE. Utilizing verbal insight problems, we found a positive association between the AHA experience and the meta-cognitive PE, specifically in regards to problem solvability. Specifically, the element of surprise, a critical AHA dimension, emerged as a key indicator of the meta-cognitive PE, while other dimensions-such as pleasure, certainty, and suddenness-showed no signs for similar relationships, with suddenness exhibiting a negative correlation with meta-cognitive PE. This new finding provides further evidence that aspects of the AHA experience, surprise in particular, correspond to a meta-cognitive PE. The finding also underscores the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, linking insights with learning theories and enhancing our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon.

The involvement of decomposition and composition processes in restructuring during problem solving

Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with "aha" experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger "Aha!" emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.

Tracing executive functions in insight

Usually the central executive is considered as a single capacity in the insight studies which leads to inconsistent results on the link between the central executive of working memory and insight. We suppose a more detailed view on the process of insight solution in which various executive functions could be important at different solution stages: updating is necessary to build a problem's representation, inhibition-to overcome the impasse, shifting-to restructure the problem's representation. These assumptions were not confirmed in an experiment via dual-task paradigm and cognitive load. We did not find the relation between executive functions and solution stages, but we demonstrated that the more complexity of dual-task, the more cognitive load in problem solving. Moreover, the highest load of executive functions is observed at the end of insight solution. We speculate that the loading occurs either due to decrease of the free space in working memory storage systems, or due to a resource-intensive event (for example, representational change).

The influence of insight on risky decision making and nucleus accumbens activation

During insightful problem solving, the solution appears unexpectedly and is accompanied by the feeling of an AHA!. Research suggests that this affective component of insight can have consequences beyond the solution itself by motivating future behavior, such as risky (high reward and high uncertainty) decision making. Here, we investigate the behavioral and neural support for the motivational role of AHA in decision making involving monetary choices. The positive affect of the AHA! experience has been linked to internal reward. Reward in turn has been linked to dopaminergic signal transmission in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) and risky decision making. Therefore, we hypothesized that insight activates reward-related brain areas, modulating risky decision making. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, in a pre-registered online study (Study 1), we demonstrated the behavioral effect of insight-related increase in risky decision making using a visual Mooney identification paradigm. Participants were more likely to choose the riskier monetary payout when they had previously solved the Mooney image with high compared to low accompanied AHA!. Second, in an fMRI study (Study 2), we measured the effects of insight on NAcc activity using a similar Mooney identification paradigm to the one of Study 1. Greater NAcc activity was found when participants solved the Mooney image with high vs low AHA!. Taken together, our results link insight to enhanced NAcc activity and a preference for high but uncertain rewards, suggesting that insight enhances reward-related brain areas possibly via dopaminergic signal transmission, promoting risky decision making.

Tracing Cognitive Processes in Insight Problem Solving: Using GAMs and Change Point Analysis to Uncover Restructuring

Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, incorrect mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption that this restructuring process happens suddenly, leading to the typical "Aha!" experience, the evidence is inconclusive. Among the reasons for this lack of clarity is that many measures of insight rely solely on the solvers' subjective experience of the solution process. In our previous paper, we used matchstick arithmetic problems to demonstrate that it is possible to objectively trace problem-solving processes by combining eye movements with new analytical and statistical approaches. Specifically, we divided the problem-solving process into ten (relative) temporal phases to better capture possible small changes in problem representation. Here, we go a step further to demonstrate that classical statistical procedures, such as ANOVA, cannot capture sudden representational change processes, which are typical for insight problems. Only nonlinear statistical models, such as generalized additive (mixed) models (GAMs) and change points analysis, correctly identified the abrupt representational change. Additionally, we demonstrate that explicit hints reorient participants' focus in a qualitatively different manner, changing the dynamics of restructuring in insight problem solving. While insight problems may indeed require a sudden restructuring of the initial mental representation, more sophisticated analytical and statistical approaches are necessary to uncover their true nature.

Does Thinking in Opposites in Order to Think Differently Improve Creativity?

In this paper, we focus on the link between thinking in opposites and creativity. Thinking in opposites requires an intuitive, productive strategy, which may enhance creativity. Given the importance of creativity for the well-being of individuals and society, finding new ways to enhance it represents a valuable goal in both professional and personal contexts. We discuss the body of evidence that exists concerning the importance of the first representation of the structure of a problem to be solved, which determines the baseline representation and sets limits on the area within which a problem solver will explore. We then review a variety of interventions described in the literature on creativity and insight problem solving that were designed to overcome fixedness and encourage people to move away from stereotypical solutions. Special attention is paid to the research carried out in the context of problem solving, which provides evidence that prompting people to "think in opposites" is beneficial. We suggest that an extended investigation of the effects of this strategy in various types of tasks related to creativity is an interesting line of research to follow. We discuss the rationale supporting this claim and identify specific questions, both theoretical and methodological, for future research to address.

Assessing creativity independently of language: A language-independent remote associate task (LI-RAT)

Most creativity measures are either complex or language-dependent, hindering cross-cultural creativity assessment. We have therefore developed and tested a simple, language-independent insight task based on pictures in the style of the widely used verbal remote associate task (RAT). We demonstrate that the language-independent RAT (LI-RAT) allows assessment of different aspects of insight across large samples with different languages. It also correlates with other creativity and general problem-solving tasks. The entire stimulus set, including its preliminary normative data, is made freely available. This information can be used to select items based on accuracy, mean solution time, likelihood to produce an insight, or conceptual and perceptual similarity between the pictures per item.

Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight

Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.

Surprise! Why Insightful Solution Is Pleasurable

Insight problems-as a type of ill-defined problems-are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.

Eliciting false insights with semantic priming

The insight experience (or ‘Aha moment’) generally evokes strong feelings of certainty and confidence. An ‘Aha’ experience for a false idea could underlie many false beliefs and delusions. However, for as long as insight experiences have been studied, false insights have remained difficult to elicit experimentally. That difficulty, in turn, highlights the fact that we know little about what causes people to experience a false insight. Across two experiments (total N = 300), we developed and tested a new paradigm to elicit false insights. In Experiment 1 we used a combination of semantic priming and visual similarity to elicit feelings of insight for incorrect solutions to anagrams. These false insights were relatively common but were experienced as weaker than correct ones. In Experiment 2 we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and found that semantic priming and visual similarity interacted to produce false insights. These studies highlight the importance of misleading semantic processing and the feasibility of the solution in the generation of false insights.

Between automatic and control processes: How relationships between problem elements interact to facilitate or impede insight

Solving a problem requires relating the pieces of information available to each other and to the solution. We investigated how the strength of these relationships determines the likelihood of solving insight tasks based on remote associates. In these tasks, the solver is provided with several cues (e.g., drop, coat, summer) and has to find the solution that matches those cues (e.g., rain). We measured the semantic similarity between the cues and the solution (cue-solution similarity) as well as between cues (cue-cue similarity). We assume those relationships modulate two basic processes underlying insight problem-solving. First, there is an automatic activation process whereby conceptual activation spreads across a semantic network from each cue node to their associated nodes, potentially reaching the node of the solution. Thus, in general, the higher cue-solution similarity, the more likely the solution will be found (Prediction 1). Second, there is a controlled search process focused on an area in semantic space whose radius depends on competing cue-cue similarity. High cue-cue similarity will bias a search for the solution close to the provided cues because the associated nodes shared by both cues are highly coactivated. Therefore, high cue-cue similarity will have a beneficial effect when the cue-solution similarity is high but a detrimental effect when cue-solution similarity is low (Prediction 2). Our two predictions were confirmed using both verbal and pictorial remote association tasks, supporting the view that insight is dependent on an interaction of meaningful relationships between cues and solutions, and clarify the mechanisms of insight problem solving in remote associates.

The mnemonic effects of insight on false memory in the DRM paradigm

Insight accompanied by an 'aha!' experience has a mnemonic effect. Previous studies of insight have often focused on the mnemonic effect of insight on veridical memories, while the effect of insight on false memories is not known. More understanding of the mnemonic effect of insight on false memories could have implications for the mechanism of insightful mnemonic effects. The present research examined whether insight has a mnemonic effect on false memories. Participants were asked to perform Chinese verbal compound remote associate (CRA) tasks and then complete the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, the critical lure of which was also the solution to the Chinese CRA problem. Compared to non-insight, insight was associated with a lower critical lures rate in Experiment 1 and with lower critical lures and unrelated words rates in Experiment 2 when the presentation of DRM list words was random. Giving a warning before DRM tasks could reduce the critical lures rate of non-insight but had little effect on insightful solutions in Experiment 3. These findings indicate that insight can reduce false memories.

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.

What causes the insight memory advantage?

Prior research indicates that solutions accompanied by an Aha! experience are remembered better than those missing this feeling of epiphany. The question for the present studies was whether this insight memory advantage for problem solutions is modulated by the affective component of insight (the strong feelings that typically accompany the Aha! experience), or by the cognitive component (the restructuring or representational change that occurs during insightful problem solving). In both studies, participants viewed a set of magic trick videos to generate solutions for how each trick was done, and memory for the generated solutions was tested after a week delay. They also indicated the extent to which they experienced an Aha! moment at solution along with other perceptions of their experience. In the second study, they additionally rated the relevance of five action verbs for each trick (including one that implied the correct solution) multiple times during solution as a measure of restructuring the problem representation. The explanation for the insight memory advantage that was best supported by the results is that it is the joint consequence of finding correct solutions, the subjective feeling that one has found a correct solution (certainty), and experiencing an emotional pleasurable reaction during the problem solving process that all contribute to better memory for the solution. However, it did not seem to rely on having reached the solution via a sudden restructuring process.

The Illusion of Absence in Magic Tricks

Recently, a curious illusion of absence has been described, where the space behind an occluder is compellingly experienced as empty. This illusion is similar to illusions based on amodal completion in the sense that it refers to occluded portions of a visual scene and informal observations suggest that it may also be largely impervious to conscious knowledge. The aim of the present experiment was to test the hypothesis that the illusion of absence is cognitively impenetrable in the same way as amodal completion. Participants viewed magic tricks based on amodal completion, the illusion of absence, or attentional and reasoning misdirection and tried to infer the secret behind the tricks after one, two, or three presentations. The results show that the tricks based on the illusion of absence are very difficult to debunk, even after repeated presentations. In this regard, they are similar to tricks based on amodal completion but different from tricks based on attentional and reasoning misdirection. The participants also rated how magical they felt the tricks were. Surprisingly, the magic ratings tended to be quite high even in trials where the participants had already discovered the secret behind the trick. This unexpected finding may be taken to suggest that there may be two magical moments in the lifetime of a magic trick: In addition to the magical experience evoked by trick itself, discovering the secret behind the trick may also evoke an experience of impossibility.

Feelings-of-Warmth Increase More Abruptly for Verbal Riddles Solved With in Contrast to Without Aha! Experience

When we are confronted with a new problem, we typically try to apply strategies that have worked in the past and which usually lead closer to the solution incrementally. However, sometimes, either during a problem-solving attempt that does not seem to lead closer to the solution, or when we have given up on problem-solving for the moment, the solution seems to appear out of nowhere. This is often called a moment of insight. Whereas the cognitive processes of getting closer to the solution are still unknown for insight problem-solving, there are two diverging theories on the subjective feeling of getting closer to the solution: (1) One that states that an intuitive feeling of closeness to the solution increases slowly, but incrementally, before it surpasses the threshold to consciousness and becomes verbalizable (=insight) (continuous approach), and (2) another that proposes that the feeling of closeness to the solution does not increase before it exceeds the threshold to consciousness (discontinuous approach). Here, we investigated the subjective feeling of closeness to the solution, assessed as feeling-of-warmth (FoW), its relationship to solving the problem versus being presented with it and whether a feeling of Aha! was experienced. Additionally, we tested whether Aha! experiences are more likely when the problem is solved actively by the participant or presented to the participant after an unsuccessful problem-solving attempt, and whether the frequency of Aha! experiences correlates with problem difficulty. To our knowledge, this is the first study combining the CRAT with FoW assessments for the named conditions (solved/unsolved, three difficulty levels, Aha!/no Aha!). We used a verbal problem-solving task, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT). Our data revealed that Aha! experiences were more often reported for solutions generated by the participant compared to solutions presented after unsuccessful problem-solving. Moreover, FoW curves showed a steeper increase for the last two FoW ratings when problems were solved with Aha! in contrast to without Aha!. Based on this observation, we provide a preliminary explanation for the underlying cognitive process of solving CRA problems via insight.