Does temporal predictability of tasks influence task choice?

Reactive and proactive control processes in voluntary task choice

Deciding which task to perform when multiple tasks are available can be influenced by external influences in the environment. In the present study, we demonstrate that such external biases on task-choice behavior reflect reactive control adjustments instead of a failure in control to internally select a task goal. Specifically, in two experiments we delayed the onset of one of two task stimuli by a short (50 ms), medium (300 ms), or long (1,000 ms) stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) within blocks while also varying the relative frequencies of short versus long SOAs across blocks (i.e., short SOA frequent vs. long SOA frequent). Participants' task choices were increasingly biased towards selecting the task associated with the first stimulus with increasing SOAs. Critically, both experiments also revealed that the short-to-medium SOA bias was larger in blocks with more frequent long SOAs when participants had limited time to prepare for an upcoming trial. When time to select an upcoming task was extended in Experiment 2, this interaction was not significant, suggesting that the extent to which people rely on reactive control adjustments is additionally modulated by proactive control processes. Thus, the present findings also suggest that voluntary task choices are jointly guided by both proactive and reactive processes, which are likely to adjust the relative activation of different task goals in working memory.

The Role of Effector-Specific Task Representations in Voluntary Task Switching

There has been an increasing interest in uncovering the mechanisms underpinning how people decide which task to perform at a given time. Many studies suggest that task representations are crucial in guiding such voluntary task selection behavior, which is primarily reflected in a bias to select task repetitions over task switches. However, it is not yet clear whether the task-specific motor effectors are also a crucial component of task representations when deciding to switch tasks. Across three experiments using different voluntary task switching (VTS) procedures, we show that a greater overlap in task representations with a task-to-finger mapping than task-to-hand mapping increases participants' switching behavior (Exp. 1 and Exp. 2), but not when they were instructed to randomly select tasks (Exp. 3). Thus, task-specific stimulus-response associations can change the way people mentally represent tasks and influence switching behavior, suggesting that motor effectors should be considered as a component of task representations in biasing cognitive flexibility.

Is Self-Related Cognition Resistant to Time-Based Expectancy?

Individuals adapt to their environments by scheduling cognitive processing capacities selectively to the points in time where they are most likely required. This effect is known as time-based expectancy (TBE) and has been demonstrated for several cognitive capacities, like perceptual attention, task set activation, or response preparation. However, it has been argued that self-related cognition (i.e., processing of information linked to oneself) is universally prioritized, compared to non-self-related information in the cognitive system. Consequently, self-related cognition should be resistant to temporal scheduling by TBE, because individuals maintain a constantly high expectancy for self-related cognition, irrespective of its temporal likeliness. We tested this hypothesis in a task-switching paradigm where participants randomly switched between a self-related task and a neutral task. The tasks were preceded by a short or a long warning interval in each trial, and the interval duration predicted probabilistically the task type. We found that participants showed TBE for the neutral task but not for the self-related task. We conclude that the individual cannot benefit from time-based task expectancy when the to-be-expected task is constantly activated, due to its self-related nature.

Investigating time-based expectancy beyond binary timing scenarios: evidence from a paradigm employing three predictive pre-target intervals

When the duration of a pre-target interval probabilistically predicts the identity of the target, participants typically form time-based expectancies: they respond faster to frequent interval-target combinations than to infrequent ones. Yet, previous research investigating the cognitive time-processing mechanisms underlying time-based expectancy assessed time-based expectancy always in situations with a binary set of intervals (i.e. short vs. long). Here we aim to test whether time-based expectancy transfers to more complex settings with three different predictive time intervals (short, medium, long) in which each predicts one of three different target stimuli with 80% probability. In three experiments we varied how the medium interval was computed (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, or in between both). Our results showed that participants were able to learn the time-event contingencies for the short and the long as well as for the medium interval, and were, thus able to flexibly redirect their target expectancy two times during the course of a trial. The evidence concerning the impact of the manipulation of the medium intervals’ absolute duration on time-based expectancy was, however, mixed, as time-based expectancy for the medium interval could only be observed in one of three reported experiments. In sum, the findings of the present study suggest a previously unknown cognitive flexibility underlying time-based expectancy and offer important theoretical implications, challenging future research on the timing mechanisms involved in time-based expectancy.