Freedom to act enhances the sense of agency, while movement and goal-related prediction errors reduce it

Prepared to stop: how sense of agency in a preceding trial modulates inhibitory control in the current trial

Feeling in control of actions and events can enhance motivation for further actions. How this sense of agency (SoA) in fact influences flexible motor control remains poorly understood. Here, we investigated the effect of SoA on subsequent response inhibition in a modified go/no-go task with EEG recordings. We manipulated participants' SoA by varying the presence, predictability, and emotional valence of a visual outcome for a given motor action. When participants unexpectedly did not receive any visible outcome following their action on trial n - 1, they exhibited slower responses and lower hit rates to the go signal but higher rates of successful inhibition to the no-go signal on trial n, regardless of the emotional valence of the expected action outcome. Furthermore, enhanced inhibitory tendencies were accompanied by reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes, midfrontal theta power, and theta synchronization between midfrontal and medial to parietal areas, indicating that less top-down control is required for successful response inhibition on trial n after experiencing low SoA on trial n - 1. These findings suggest that feeling less in control in a preceding trial makes it easier to implement inhibitory control in the current trial, thereby providing new insights into the role of SoA in goal-directed behavior.

Ready to go: Higher sense of agency enhances action readiness and reduces response inhibition

Sense of agency is the subjective feeling of being in control of one's actions and their effects. Many studies have elucidated the cognitive and sensorimotor processes that drive this experience. However, less is known about how sense of agency influences flexible cognitive and motor control. Here, we investigated the effect of sense of agency on subsequent action regulation using a modified Go/No-Go task. In Experiment 1, we modulated participants' sense of agency by varying the occurrence of action outcomes (present vs. absent) both locally on a trial-by-trial basis and globally in terms of the overall probability of action outcomes within a block of trials (high vs. low). Importantly, we investigated how this manipulation influenced participants' responses to subsequent Go, No-Go, or Free-Choice cues. When participants' previous action led to an outcome (i.e., a happy face) compared with no outcome, they responded more accurately and faster to Go cues, reacted less accurately to No-Go cues, as well as made go decisions more frequently and faster to Free-Choice cues. These effects were even stronger when action outcomes occurred more frequently overall in a given block or in several previous trials. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that the effects of action outcome manipulation on subsequent action regulation were independent of the emotional valence of the action outcome (i.e., a happy or an angry face). Our results suggest that a higher sense of agency as induced by the presence of action outcomes enhanced action readiness and suppressed response inhibition. These findings highlight the impact of the control felt on the control used in action regulation, thereby providing new insights into the functional significance of the sense of agency on human behavior.

Task-based functional connectivity identifies two segregated networks underlying intentional action

While much of motor behavior is automatic, intentional action is necessary for the selection and initiation of controlled motor acts and is thus an essential part of goal-directed behavior. Neuroimaging studies have shown that self-generated action implicates several dorsal and ventral frontoparietal areas. However, knowledge of the functional coupling between these brain regions during intentional action remains limited. We here studied brain activations and functional connectivity (FC) of thirty right-handed healthy participants performing a finger pressing task instructed to use a specific finger (externally-triggered action) or to select one of four fingers randomly (internally-generated action). Participants performed the task in alternating order either with their dominant right hand or the left hand. Consistent with previous studies, we observed stronger involvement of posterior parietal cortex and premotor regions when contrasting internally-generated with externally-triggered action. Interestingly, this contrast also revealed significant engagement of medial occipitotemporal regions including the left lingual and right fusiform gyrus. Task-based FC analysis identified increased functional coupling among frontoparietal regions as well as increased and decreased coupling between occipitotemporal regions, thus differentiating between two segregated networks. When comparing results of the dominant and nondominant hand we found less activation, but stronger connectivity for the former, suggesting increased neural efficiency when participants use their dominant hand. Taken together, our results reveal that two segregated networks that encompass the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal cortex contribute independently to intentional action.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Combined EEG and immersive virtual reality unveil dopaminergic modulation of error monitoring in Parkinson's Disease

Detecting errors in your own and others' actions is associated with discrepancies between intended and expected outcomes. The processing of salient events is associated with dopamine release, the balance of which is altered in Parkinson's disease (PD). Errors in observed actions trigger various electrocortical indices (e.g. mid-frontal theta, error-related delta, and error positivity [oPe]). However, the impact of dopamine depletion to observed errors in the same individual remains unclear. Healthy controls (HCs) and PD patients observed ecological reach-to-grasp-a-glass actions performed by a virtual arm from a first-person perspective. PD patients were tested under their dopaminergic medication (on-condition) and after dopaminergic withdrawal (off-condition). Analyses of oPe, delta, and theta-power increases indicate that while the formers were elicited after incorrect vs. correct actions in all groups, the latter were observed in on-condition but altered in off-condition PD. Therefore, different EEG error signatures may index the activity of distinct mechanisms, and error-related theta power is selectively modulated by dopamine depletion. Our findings may facilitate discovering dopamine-related biomarkers for error-monitoring dysfunctions that may have crucial theoretical and clinical implications.

The performance monitoring system is attuned to others' actions during dyadic motor interactions

Interpersonal motor interactions require the simultaneous monitoring of one's own and one's partner's actions. To characterize how the action monitoring system tracks self and other behavior during synchronous interactions, we combined electroencephalography recordings and immersive virtual reality in two tasks where participants were asked to synchronize their actions with those of a virtual partner (VP). The two tasks differed in the features to be monitored: the Goal task required participants to predict and monitor the VP's reaching goal; the Spatial task required participants to predict and monitor the VP's reaching trajectory. In both tasks, the VP performed unexpected movement changes to which the participant needed to adapt. By extracting the neural activity locked to the detection of unexpected changes in the VP's action (other-monitoring) or to the participants' action-replanning (self-monitoring), we show that the monitoring system is more attuned to others' than to one's own actions. Additionally, distinctive neural responses to VP's unexpected goals and trajectory corrections were found: goal changes were reflected both in early fronto-central and later posterior neural responses while trajectory deviations were reflected only in later posterior responses. Altogether, our results indicate that the monitoring system adopts an inherent social mode to handle interpersonal motor interactions.

Reduced ownership over a virtual body modulates dishonesty

Although studies suggest that even higher-order functions can be embodied, whether body awareness may bias moral decisions toward (dis)honesty remains underinvestigated. Here, we tested if the Sense of body Ownership (SoO) and the magnitude of monetary rewards influence the tendency to act immorally. Through a virtual body, participants played a card game in which they could lie to others to steal high or low amounts of money. To manipulate SoO, the virtual body was seen and controlled from a first-person perspective, with hands attached or detached, or from a third-person perspective. In third-person perspective, SoO was significantly reduced and more egoistic lies were produced in high reward conditions. Thus, SoO reduction and high monetary reward facilitate dishonest behavior, likely by separating the self from the dishonest actions performed through the disowned body. Because most future interactions will likely occur in a digital metaverse, our results may have crucial societal impact.

Neural Responses to Mandatory and Voluntary Donation Impact Charitable Giving Decisions: An Event-Related Potentials Study

The present study aimed to explore the influence of donation amounts on donation decisions in different donation contexts and to reveal the psychological mechanisms. Furthermore, we focused on how to enhance individuals' intention to donate voluntarily. We designed an experiment on donation decisions, employing event-related potentials (ERPs) to probe the effect of psychological mechanisms on donation decisions by detecting the neural basis of donation decision-making. Based on S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) theory, we used donation contexts and donation amounts (stimuli) to induce psychological activity in the participants (organism) and then influence individual donation decision behaviors (response). Moreover, we applied psychological reactance (PR) theory to discuss the effect of donation context on decisions and the corresponding psychological process. The behavioral results showed that donation contexts (mandatory vs. voluntary) were significantly related to the donation amounts (i.e., less vs. more money that the charity received than money that the participants donated). At the ERP level, compared with mandatory donation, voluntary donation evoked a larger P2 amplitude when the charity received less money. In addition, a larger mean amplitude of LPP was elicited by voluntary donation compared to mandatory donation. This study provides practical implications for charity organizers to guide people to donate voluntarily.

Identification of a Brain Network Underlying the Execution of Freely Chosen Movements

Action selection refers to the decision regarding which action to perform in order to reach a desired goal, that is, the "what" component of intention. Whether the action is freely chosen or externally instructed involves different brain networks during the selection phase, but it is assumed that the way an action is selected should not influence the subsequent execution phase of the same movement. Here, we aim to test this hypothesis by investigating whether the modality of movement selection influences the brain networks involved during the execution phase of the movement. Twenty healthy volunteers performed a delayed response task in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design to compare freely chosen and instructed unimanual or bimanual movements during the execution phase. Using activation analyses, we found that the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the parietal and cerebellar areas were more activated during the execution phase of freely chosen as compared to instructed movements. Connectivity analysis showed an increase of information flow between the right posterior parietal cortex and the cerebellum for freely chosen compared to instructed movements. We suggest that the parieto-cerebellar network is particularly engaged during freely chosen movement to monitor the congruence between the intentional content of our actions and their outcome.

The choice levels modulate outcome processing during outcome independent of behavior selection: Evidence from event-related potentials

Having a choice is a basic demand to influence human behavior. However, how various choice levels modulate outcome processing when the outcome is independent of the choices remains unclear. In this event-related potential (ERP) study, thirty-seven participants were instructed to perform a one-person choice task in which they were required to choose one card from 1 (no-choice level), 2 (medium-choice level), and 8 cards (high-choice level) to win a reward, with a 50% chance. Behavioral results indicated that pleasure and perceived control rating scores were linearly promoted with increased choice levels. ERP results revealed that having choices (medium- and high-choice level) elicited greater original-RewP and PCA-RewP amplitudes than having no choice (no-choice level), suggesting the amplification of the reward prediction error by quickly detecting whether there is a choice or not. Moreover, ERP results revealed that the original-P300 amplitudes were linearly enhanced with increased choice levels, suggesting the increased attentional allocation based on the motivational and emotional significance, due to advanced processing of the value of choice levels. Therefore, these results suggest that choice levels can modulate outcome processing, even when the outcome is independent of the choices, and provide further evidence to support the intrinsic value of having choices.

Doing it Wrong: A Systematic Review on Electrocortical and Behavioral Correlates of Error Monitoring in Patients with Neurological Disorders

Detecting errors in one's own and other's actions is a crucial ability for learning and adapting behavior to everchanging, highly volatile environments. Studies in healthy people demonstrate that monitoring errors in one's own and others' actions are underpinned by specific neural systems that are dysfunctional in a variety of neurological disorders. In this review, we first briefly discuss the main findings concerning error detection and error awareness in healthy subjects, the current theoretical models, and the tasks usually applied to investigate these processes. Then, we report a systematic search for evidence of dysfunctional error monitoring among neurological populations (basal ganglia, neurodegenerative, white-matter diseases and acquired brain injury). In particular, we examine electrophysiological and behavioral evidence for specific alterations of error processing in neurological disorders. Error-related negativity (ERN) amplitude were reduced in most (although not all) neurological patient groups, whereas Positivity Error (Pe) amplitude appeared not to be affected in most patient groups. Also theta activity was reduced in some neurological groups, but consistent evidence on the oscillatory activity has not been provided thus far. Behaviorally, we did not observe relevant patterns of pronounced dysfunctional (post-) error processing. Finally, we discuss limitations of the existing literature, conclusive points, open questions and new possible methodological approaches for clinical studies.