Polizei und Rettungsdienst bei der Bewältigung lebensbedrohlicher Einsatzlagen

[Terror attacks : Recommendations for cooperation between police, hospitals and non-police security services]

BACKGROUND

The risk of terrorist attacks in the Federal Republic of Germany is present and is currently increasing. Publicly funded acute care hospitals and their owners are involved in disaster control as part of their remit and are responsible for taking comprehensive precautions to ensure their operational capability in the event of disasters. This mandate must also be ensured in the event of terrorist attacks and amok incidents. For this purpose, an optimal cooperation between preclinical and clinical care is indispensable.

AIM

Recommended actions for collaboration between nonclinical and clinical planning to manage a mass casualty incident in terrorist life-threatening response situations are presented.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

The Inter-Hospital Security Conference Baden-Württemberg (IHSC BW) is an association of representatives of acute hospitals in Baden-Württemberg, the Ministry of the Interior, Digitalization and Migration Baden-Württemberg, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration Baden-Württemberg, the State Police Headquarters Baden-Württemberg and the Baden-Württemberg Hospital Association. From 2018 to 2020, the IHSC BW developed recommendations for action on cooperation between police, hospitals and non-police emergency response. The recommendations for action were agreed by the group members in 6 working sessions and initialled in two subsequent video conferences. A recommendation was considered adopted when the IHSC BW plenary assembly finally gave its approval with an absolute majority.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Competence-based interface solutions for a smooth cooperation between prehospital and hospital management in the care of patients who have become victims of a terrorist attack are to be demanded. For preliminary planning, the establishment of a local safety conference at the county disaster control authority level with the following participants is recommended: disaster control authority, fire department, regional police headquarters, chief emergency physician, rescue services and disaster control officers of affected clinics. It is recommended to set up a joint command and situation center (CSC), where management personnel from the police, rescue service, fire department and disaster control can meet to organize the handling of the incident jointly, competently and without loss of time. From this CSC, a liaison officer should then provide the clinics with information at regular intervals. Exercises should take place regularly. Cross-organizational exercises are particularly important, and this is one of the tasks of the local safety conference.

[National challenges for trauma surgery in Germany due to violence and war]

Due to the war in Ukraine and the treatment of patients with war wounds in the hospitals of the TraumaNetworks of the German Society for Trauma Surgery (TraumaNetzwerke DGU®), injuries from life-threatening mission situations (LebEL), terrorism, violence and war have become a matter of daily professional life. Furthermore, the societal and global feeling of security has fundamentally changed. The much-cited term "turning point in history", the reorientation of the Armed Forces and the investigation of the resilience of the healthcare system with respect to the "fitness for war", approximate to the description of the current challenges for trauma surgery (UCH) in Germany. Based on the developments following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels in 2016, a clarification is given as to which adaptations have already been successful and how quickly an improvement could successfully be achieved. In this context, the concept of tactical care and the course on Terror and Disaster Surgical Care (TDSC), for example, have been game changing. The main challenge currently lies in overcoming the structural alterations in the German healthcare system and professionally in the treatment of war wounded personnel from Ukraine. The knowledge gained from these two national tasks must be analyzed for the future development and adaptation of established treatment structures, e.g., of the TraumaNetzwerke DGU®, under the requirements of the increased resilience against war, terrorism and violence. The aim is to name that which has already been achieved with respect to the national challenges for UCH and at the same time to outline or discuss further necessities for improvements and elimination of possible gaps in capabilities.

[Terrorist attack training exercise-What can be learned? : Baden-Württemberg counterterrorism exercise (BWTEX)]

BACKGROUND

There is a risk of terror attacks in the Federal Republic of Germany, which might increase in the future. A timely comprehensive strategy for treatment and care of a large number of casualties helps minimize chaos and improve the outcome of patients. Adequate training is vital for successful implementation of an emergency plan. Therefore, the effectiveness of training should be assessed and evaluated; however, data collection capabilities for training events are extremely limited, so that publications on the topic are almost impossible to find.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to collect data from a simulated terrorist attack in order to draw conclusions from a clinical point of view concerning the improvement of preclinical and clinical management, taking interface problems into consideration.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

On 19 October 2019 the Ministry of the Interior, Digitalization and Migration of Baden-Württemberg conducted a large-scale simulation of a terrorist attack in the city center of Constance, called the Baden-Württemberg counterterrorism exercise (BWTEX). The simulation included an explosion of a car bomb as well as the use of firearms by terrorists. The large scale of the simulation with the high number of participants in combination with close cooperation between military and civil forces was unprecedented. The police force, the armed forces, civil protection forces, air rescue teams and staff from Constance, Friedrichshafen and Sigmaringen regional hospitals in southwest Germany worked together to treat simulated injuries to victims of the attack. The following parameters were recorded when the injured patients arrived at the hospital: prehospital triage time, prehospital triage score, initial treatment and quality of documentation on site as well as triage time, triage score, injury severity scale (ISS) score based on the specified injury pattern, treatment, and quality of documentation on hospital arrival.

RESULTS

Out of a total of 84 "injured patients" 55 were admitted to hospital and 80% were triaged at the scene. Injured patients of triage category 1 (TK1 red: life-threatening injury, immediate treatment) arrived at the hospital 198 ± 50 min after the attack, injured patients of triage category 2 (TK2 yellow: severely injured, urgent treatment) after 131 ± 44 min and injured patients of triage category 3 (TK3 green: slightly injured, non-urgent treatment) arrived after 157 ± 46 min. There was no significant difference in terms of arrival time at the hospital between the triage scores (r = 0.2) or between the ISS scores (r = 0.43). The authors assume that approximately 44% of TK1 patients would have died due to avoidable time delays. Prehospital medical documentation was insufficient in 78% and insufficient in 65% in the hospitals.

CONCLUSION

A mass casualty incident resulting from a terrorist attack differs greatly from a conventional mass casualty incident. The scene of the attack has to be evacuated as quickly as possible, which means that a large number of patients arrive untreated at the nearest hospitals. The setting up of treatment facilities in city centers and areas close to the city seems to be counterproductive because the time delay may result in higher mortality rates of victims. The particularities of mass casualties caused by a terrorist attack have to be incorporated into terrorist attack training.