Modularity of mind and the role of incentive motivation in representing novelty

Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia

Macphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible problem-solving capacity (“intelligence”), but limiting the discussion to vertebrates is too arbitrary. As an example, we focus here on Portia, a spider with an especially intricate predatory strategy and a preference for other spiders as prey. We review research on pre-planned detours, expectancy violation, and a capacity to solve confinement problems where, in each of these three contexts, there is experimental evidence of innate cognitive capacities and reliance on internal representation. These cognitive capacities are related to, but not identical to, intelligence. When discussing intelligence, as when discussing cognition, it is more useful to envisage a continuum instead of something that is simply present or not; in other words, a continuum pertaining to flexible problem-solving capacity for “intelligence” and a continuum pertaining to reliance on internal representation for “cognition.” When envisaging a continuum pertaining to intelligence, Daniel Dennett’s notion of four Creatures (Darwinian, Skinnerian, Popperian, and Gregorian) is of interest, with the distinction between Skinnerian and Popperian Creatures being especially relevant when considering Portia. When we consider these distinctions, a case can be made for Portia being a Popperian Creature. Like Skinnerian Creatures, Popperian Creatures express flexible problem solving capacity, but the manner in which this capacity is expressed by Popperian Creatures is more distinctively cognitive.

Solving a novel confinement problem by spartaeine salticids that are predisposed to solve problems in the context of predation

Intricate predatory strategies are widespread in the salticid subfamily Spartaeinae. The hypothesis we consider here is that the spartaeine species that are proficient at solving prey-capture problems are also proficient at solving novel problems. We used nine species from this subfamily in our experiments. Eight of these species (two Brettus, one Cocalus, three Cyrba, two Portia) are known for specialized invasion of other spiders' webs and for actively choosing other spiders as preferred prey ('araneophagy'). Except for Cocalus, these species also use trial and error to derive web-based signals with which they gain dynamic fine control of the resident spider's behaviour ('aggressive mimicry').The ninth species, Paracyrba wanlessi, is not araneophagic and instead specializes at preying on mosquitoes. We presented these nine species with a novel confinement problem that could be solved by trial and error. The test spider began each trial on an island in a tray of water, with an atoll surrounding the island. From the island, the spider could choose between two potential escape tactics (leap or swim), but we decided at random before the trial which tactic would fail and which tactic would achieve partial success. Our findings show that the seven aggressive-mimic species are proficient at solving the confinement problem by repeating 'correct' choices and by switching to the alternative tactic after making an 'incorrect' choice. However, as predicted, there was no evidence of C. gibbosus or P. wanlessi, the two non-aggressive-mimic species, solving the confinement problem. We discuss these findings in the context of an often-made distinction between domain-specific and domain-general cognition.