Selective reaching in macaques: evidence for action-centred attention

The Ecological View of Selective Attention

Accumulating evidence is supporting the hypothesis that our selective attention is a manifestation of mechanisms that evolved early in evolution and are shared by many organisms from different taxa. This surge of new data calls for the re-examination of our notions about attention, which have been dominated mostly by human psychology. Here, we present an hypothesis that challenges, based on evolutionary grounds, a common view of attention as a means to manage limited brain resources. We begin by arguing that evolutionary considerations do not favor the basic proposition of the limited brain resources view of attention, namely, that the capacity of the sensory organs to provide information exceeds the capacity of the brain to process this information. Moreover, physiological studies in animals and humans show that mechanisms of selective attention are highly demanding of brain resources, making it paradoxical to see attention as a means to release brain resources. Next, we build on the above arguments to address the question why attention evolved in evolution. We hypothesize that, to a certain extent, limiting sensory processing is adaptive irrespective of brain capacity. We call this hypothesis the ecological view of attention (EVA) because it is centered on interactions of an animal with its environment rather than on internal brain resources. In its essence is the notion that inherently noisy and degraded sensory inputs serve the animal’s adaptive, dynamic interactions with its environment. Attention primarily functions to resolve behavioral conflicts and false distractions. Hence, we evolved to focus on a particular target at the expense of others, not because of internal limitations, but to ensure that behavior is properly oriented and committed to its goals. Here, we expand on this notion and review evidence supporting it. We show how common results in human psychophysics and physiology can be reconciled with an EVA and discuss possible implications of the notion for interpreting current results and guiding future research.

A review and consideration on the kinematics of reach-to-grasp movements in macaque monkeys

The bases for understanding the neuronal mechanisms that underlie the control of reach-to-grasp movements among nonhuman primates, particularly macaques, has been widely studied. However, only a few kinematic descriptions of their prehensile actions are available. A thorough understanding of macaques' prehensile movements is manifestly critical, in light of their role in biomedical research as valuable models for studying neuromotor disorders and brain mechanisms, as well as for developing brain-machine interfaces to facilitate arm control. This article aims to review the current state of knowledge on the kinematics of grasping movements that macaques perform in naturalistic, seminaturalistic, and laboratory settings, to answer the following questions: Are kinematic signatures affected by the context within which the movement is performed? In what ways are kinematics of humans' and macaques' prehensile actions similar/dissimilar? Our analysis reflects the challenges involved in making comparisons across settings and species due to the heterogeneous picture in terms of the number of subjects, stimuli, conditions, and hands used. The kinematics of free-ranging macaques are characterized by distinctive features that are exhibited neither by macaques in laboratory setting nor by human subjects. The temporal incidence of key kinematic landmarks diverges significantly between species, indicating disparities in the overall organization of movement. Given such complexities, we attempt a synthesis of the extant body of evidence, intending to generate some significant implications for directions that future research might take to recognize the remaining gaps and pursue the insights and resolutions to generate an interpretation of movement kinematics that accounts for all settings and subjects.