How primates acquire their gestures: evaluating current theories and evidence

Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean

Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."

Testing Hypotheses for the Emergence of Gestural Communication in Great and Small Apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo abelii, Symphalangus syndactylus)

Gestural communication is crucial for primates. However, little is known about how gestural repertoires emerge through development. We conducted behavioural observations on captive apes, including 18 siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus), 16 Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii), and 19 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), to test different hypotheses for the emergence of gestures (i.e., Phylogenetic Ritualization, Ontogenetic Ritualization, Social Negotiation, and Social Transmission hypotheses). Our results showed little variation in individual gestural repertories, and only one idiosyncratic gesture. Moreover, across subjects (N = 53), repertoire size did not increase with age and social centrality. When comparing repertoires across all possible combinations of conspecifics, including apes in different groups (N=273) for the four groups of siamangs and the two of orangutans, repertoire similarity was higher in dyads of the same group than of different groups, but it also increased with more observational effort and lower age difference between group members. Finally, when comparing repertoires across all dyads of conspecifics in the same group (N = 260), we found no differences in repertoire similarity depending on dyadic relationship quality. Overall, these results provide support for the Phylogenetic Ritualization hypothesis, according to which individuals are endowed with complete gestural repertories from birth. These repertoires are largely similar across individuals and groups, although they may be partially refined through social experiences.

The interaction engine: cuteness selection and the evolution of the interactional base for language

The deep structural diversity of languages suggests that our language capacities are not based on any single template but rather on an underlying ability and motivation for infants to acquire a culturally transmitted system. The hypothesis is that this ability has an interactional base that has discernable precursors in other primates. In this paper, I explore a specific evolutionary route for the most puzzling aspect of this interactional base in humans, namely the development of an empathetic intentional stance. The route involves a generalization of mother-infant interaction patterns to all adults via a process (cuteness selection) analogous to, but distinct from, RA Fisher's runaway sexual selection. This provides a cornerstone for the carrying capacity for language. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Come with me: experimental evidence for intentional recruitment in Tonkean macaques

Recruitment is a process by which animals can initiate collective movements: the action of an individual prompts conspecifics to follow. Although it has been hypothesized that animals may be able to intentionally recruit others, there is no experimental evidence of this to date. We tested this hypothesis in two pairs of Tonkean macaques in a situation requiring the subjects to find a food site in a 2800 m² area, and approach the site together to release rewards. Each subject was informed of the location of either highly or little-valued rewards. We recorded attention-action sequences in which an individual checked that his partner was attending to him before moving, and also simple departures (i.e., not preceded by eye contact). Analyses showed that sequences were more often followed by recruitment and leading the partner to a baited site than simple departures were. Moreover, subjects used attention-action sequences more frequently when informed of the location of the highly valued reward. This may be explained by the fact that the more motivated they were by the expected rewards, the more likely they were to actively recruit their partner. No such effect was found when subjects performed simple departures. We conclude that Tonkean macaques are capable of intentional recruitment because the subjects voluntarily behaved with the goal of influencing their partner's movement: they checked that the partner was paying attention to them and prompted him to follow by moving. Such performances can be accounted for either by associative learning or by intentional communication.

Limb Preference in Animals: New Insights into the Evolution of Manual Laterality in Hominids

Until the 1990s, the notion of brain lateralization—the division of labor between the two hemispheres—and its more visible behavioral manifestation, handedness, remained fiercely defined as a human specific trait. Since then, many studies have evidenced lateralized functions in a wide range of species, including both vertebrates and invertebrates. In this review, we highlight the great contribution of comparative research to the understanding of human handedness’ evolutionary and developmental pathways, by distinguishing animal forelimb asymmetries for functionally different actions—i.e., potentially depending on different hemispheric specializations. Firstly, lateralization for the manipulation of inanimate objects has been associated with genetic and ontogenetic factors, with specific brain regions’ activity, and with morphological limb specializations. These could have emerged under selective pressures notably related to the animal locomotion and social styles. Secondly, lateralization for actions directed to living targets (to self or conspecifics) seems to be in relationship with the brain lateralization for emotion processing. Thirdly, findings on primates’ hand preferences for communicative gestures accounts for a link between gestural laterality and a left-hemispheric specialization for intentional communication and language. Throughout this review, we highlight the value of functional neuroimaging and developmental approaches to shed light on the mechanisms underlying human handedness.

Symbolic Signal Use in Wild Chimpanzee Gestural Communication?: A Theoretical Framework

Symbolic communication is not obvious in the natural communicative repertoires of our closest living relatives, the great apes. However, great apes do show symbolic competencies in laboratory studies. This includes the understanding and the use of human-provided abstract symbols. Given this evidence for the underlying ability, the apparent failure to make use of it in the wild is puzzling. We provide a theoretical framework for identifying basic forms of symbolic signal use in chimpanzee natural communication. In line with the laboratory findings, we concentrate on the most promising domain to investigate, namely gesture, and we provide a case study in this area. We suggest that evidence for basic symbolic signal use would consist of the presence of two key characteristics of symbolic communication, namely arbitrariness and conventionalization. Arbitrariness means that the linkage between the form of the gesture and its meaning shows no obvious logical or otherwise motivated connection. Conventionalization means that the gesture is shared at the group-level and is thus socially learned, not innate. Further, we discuss the emergence and transmission of these gestures. Demonstrating this basic form of symbolic signal use would indicate that the symbolic capacities revealed by laboratory studies also find their expression in the natural gestural communication of our closest living relatives, even if only to a limited extent. This theoretical article thus aims to contribute to our understanding of the developmental origins of great ape gestures, and hence, arguably, of human symbolic communication. It also has a very practical aim in that by providing clear criteria and by pointing out potential candidates for symbolic communication, we give fieldworkers useful prerequisites for identifying and analyzing signals which may demonstrate the use of great apes' symbolic capacities in the wild.

Is Conceptual Diversity an Advantage for Scientific Inquiry? A Case Study on the Concept of 'Gesture' in Comparative Psychology

Growing scientific fields often involve multidisciplinary investigations in which the same concepts may have different meanings. Here, we examine the case of 'gesture' in comparative research to depict how conceptual diversity hidden by the label 'gesture' can lead to consistently divergent interpretations in humans and nonhuman primates. We show that definitions of 'gesture' drastically differ regarding the forms of a gesture and the cognitive processes inferred from it, and that these differences emerge from implicit assumptions which have pervasive consequences on the interpretations claimed by researchers. We then demonstrate that implicit assumptions about scientific concepts can be made explicit using a finite set of operational criteria. We argue that developing theoretical definitions systematically associated with operational conceptual boundaries would allow to tackle both the challenges of maintaining high internal coherence within studies and of improving comparability and replicability of scientific results. We thus offer an easy-to-implement conceptual tool that should help ground valid comparisons between studies and serve scientific inquiry.

The Method of Local Restriction: in search of potential great ape culture-dependent forms

Humans possess a perhaps unique type of culture among primates called cumulative culture. In this type of culture, behavioural forms cumulate changes over time, which increases their complexity and/or efficiency, eventually making these forms culture-dependent. As changes cumulate, culture-dependent forms become causally opaque, preventing the overall behavioural form from being acquired by individuals on their own; in other words, culture-dependent forms must be copied between individuals and across generations. Despite the importance of cumulative culture for understanding the evolutionary history of our species, how and when cumulative culture evolved is still debated. One of the challenges faced when addressing these questions is how to identify culture-dependent forms that result from cumulative cultural evolution. Here we propose a novel method to identify the most likely cases of culture-dependent forms. The 'Method of Local Restriction' is based on the premise that as culture-dependent forms are repeatedly transmitted via copying, these forms will unavoidably cumulate population-specific changes (due to copying error) and therefore must be expected to become locally restricted over time. When we applied this method to our closest living relatives, the great apes, we found that most known ape behavioural forms are not locally restricted (across domains and species) and thus are unlikely to be acquired via copying. Nevertheless, we found 25 locally restricted forms across species and domains, three of which appear to be locally unique (having been observed in a single population of a single species). Locally unique forms represent the best current candidates for culture-dependent forms in non-human great apes. Besides these rare exceptions, our results show that overall, ape cultures do not rely heavily on copying, as most ape behaviours appear across sites and/or species, rendering them unlikely to be culture-dependent forms resulting from cumulative cultural evolution. Yet, the locally restricted forms (and especially the three locally unique forms) identified by our method should be tested further for their potential reliance on copying social learning mechanisms (and in turn, for their potential culture-dependence). Future studies could use the Method of Local Restriction to investigate the existence of culture-dependent forms in other animal species and in the hominin archaeological record to estimate how widespread copying is in the animal kingdom and to postulate a timeline for the emergence of copying in our lineage.

Must all signals be evolved? A proposal for a new classification of communicative acts

While signals in evolutionary biology are usually defined as "acts or traits that have evolved because of their effect on others", work on gestures and vocalizations in various animal taxa have revealed population- or even individual-specific meanings of social signals. These results strongly suggest that communicative acts that are like signals with regard to both form and function (meaning) can also be acquired ontogenetically, and we discuss direct evidence for such plasticity in captive settings with rich opportunities for repeated social interactions with the same individuals. Therefore, in addition to evolved signals, we can recognize invented signals that are acquired during ontogeny (either through ontogenetic ritualization or social transmission). Thus, both gestures and vocalizations can be inventions or innate adaptations. We therefore propose to introduce innate versus invented signals as major distinct categories, with invented signals subdivided into dyad-specific and cultural signals. We suggest that elements of some signals may have mixed origins, and propose criteria to recognize acquired features of signals. We also suggest that invented signals may be most common in species with intentional communication, consistent with their ubiquity in humans, and that the ability to produce them was a necessary condition for the evolution of language. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Linguistics > Evolution of Language Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition

Mammals living in more complex social groups typically have large brains for their body size and many researchers have proposed that the primary driver of the increase in brain size through primate and hominin evolution was the selection pressures associated with sociality. Many mammals, and especially primates, use flexible signals that show a high degree of voluntary control and these signals may play an important role in forming and maintaining social relationships between group members. However, the specific role that cognitive skills play in this complex communication, and how in turn this relates to sociality, is still unclear. The hypothesis for the communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition posits that cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social relationships in complex social settings drives the link between brain size and sociality. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis and why key features of cognitively complex communication such as intentionality and referentiality should be more effective in forming and maintaining bonded relationships as compared with less cognitively complex communication. Exploring the link between cognition, communication and sociality provides insights into how increasing flexibility in communication can facilitate the emergence of social systems characterised by bonded social relationships, such as those found in non-human primates and humans. To move the field forward and carry out both within- and among-species comparisons, we advocate the use of social network analysis, which provides a novel way to describe and compare social structure. Using this approach can lead to a new, systematic way of examining social and communicative complexity across species, something that is lacking in current comparative studies of social structure.

Developmental perspectives on primate gesture: 100 years in the making

This paper is an introduction to the special issue entitled Evolving the study of gesture: evaluating and unifying theories of gesture acquisition in great apes. The gestures of great apes have been recorded in scientific literature for over 100 years, but the ways in which apes acquire their gestures remains a highly debated topic. Through this historical framework, we summarize and contextualize contemporary research on the development of ape gesture. We describe the papers presented in this special issue, grouping them into three themes: assessing theories, methodological innovation, and new empirical approaches. Each of the papers is a significant contribution to the literature on ape gesture, but the collection of work together represents a unique collaboration across labs, theories, and studied species. By considering the papers side-by-side, we hope that readers will see the authors as engaging in a true dialogue, one which will help the field of primate gesture research make significant advances in the years to come.

Gesturing towards the future: cognition, big data, and the future of comparative gesture research

The field of ape gesture research has grown significantly in the past two decades, but progress on the question of gesture development has been limited by methodological and terminological disagreements, small sample sizes, and a lack of fine-grained longitudinal data. The main theories of gesture acquisition are often portrayed as mutually exclusive, but only some theories actually detail learning mechanisms, and differences in the level of analysis may help explain some of the apparent disagreements. Gesture research would benefit greatly from the articulation of more testable hypotheses. We propose two hypotheses that follow from dominant theories of gesture acquisition. We urge scholars to collect new data and leverage existing data in ways that maximize the potential for comparison across datasets and articulation with studies of other communicative modalities. Finally, we advocate for a transition away from using intentionality as a marker of the 'special status' of gesture, and towards using gesture as a window onto the lives and minds of apes.

A gestural repertoire of 1- to 2-year-old human children: in search of the ape gestures

When we compare human gestures to those of other apes, it looks at first like there is nothing much to compare at all. In adult humans, gestures are thought to be a window into the thought processes accompanying language, and sign languages are equal to spoken language with all of its features. Some research firmly emphasises the differences between human gestures and those of other apes; however, the question about whether there are any commonalities is rarely investigated, and has mostly been confined to pointing gestures. The gestural repertoires of nonhuman ape species have been carefully studied and described with regard to their form and function-but similar approaches are much rarer in the study of human gestures. This paper applies the methodology commonly used in the study of nonhuman ape gestures to the gestural communication of human children in their second year of life. We recorded (n = 13) children's gestures in a natural setting with peers and caregivers in Germany and Uganda. Children employed 52 distinct gestures, 46 (89%) of which are present in the chimpanzee repertoire. Like chimpanzees, they used them both singly, and in sequences, and employed individual gestures flexibly towards different goals.

Multimodal communication and language origins: integrating gestures and vocalizations

The presence of divergent and independent research traditions in the gestural and vocal domains of primate communication has resulted in major discrepancies in the definition and operationalization of cognitive concepts. However, in recent years, accumulating evidence from behavioural and neurobiological research has shown that both human and non-human primate communication is inherently multimodal. It is therefore timely to integrate the study of gestural and vocal communication. Herein, we review evidence demonstrating that there is no clear difference between primate gestures and vocalizations in the extent to which they show evidence for the presence of key language properties: intentionality, reference, iconicity and turn-taking. We also find high overlap in the neurobiological mechanisms producing primate gestures and vocalizations, as well as in ontogenetic flexibility. These findings confirm that human language had multimodal origins. Nonetheless, we note that in great apes, gestures seem to fulfil a carrying (i.e. predominantly informative) role in close-range communication, whereas the opposite holds for face-to-face interactions of humans. This suggests an evolutionary shift in the carrying role from the gestural to the vocal stream, and we explore this transition in the carrying modality. Finally, we suggest that future studies should focus on the links between complex communication, sociality and cooperative tendency to strengthen the study of language origins.