The transition of object to mental manipulation: beyond a species-specific view of intelligence

Looking beyond seeing: Components of visual-spatial ability as an overarching process

Visual-spatial skills have been a fertile ground for assessing aspects of intelligence and investigating its components. The initial goal of this bipartite study was to elucidate the nature of the underlying components of visual-spatial processes and the relations among them. The second goal was examination of a higher, overarching factor, underlying spatial ability but also lexical-semantic performance as well. In Study 1, three components model is examined, hypothesized to form the foundation for visual-spatial processing. In Study 2, we utilized the findings from Study 1 and performed a structural model analysis with the aim of examining the hypothesis of a second-order factor, underlying both visual-spatial and lexical-semantic processes. These studies were motivated by the notion that underlying such visual-spatial and lexical-semantic skills is a factor we termed mental manipulation, which is domain-general that cuts across species. One hundred and thirty-three participants completed 9 tasks, representing visual-spatial and lexical-semantic abilities. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the resulting data was utilized to model the results and compare the fitness of one-, two- and three-factor models. After establishing the measurement model, a second-order structural model analysis was performed to assess the existence of an overarching factor, common to both verbal and visual domains. The results of the analyses confirm the existence of a second-order factor, which we regard as reflecting mental manipulation. The implication of such mental manipulation is discussed in terms of practical applications for diagnosis, intervention, and education, highlighting its potential to improve outcomes.

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Valence

Octopuses may demonstrate perceptual richness, neural unity, temporality, and finally, valence or affective evaluation, as the neural basis for consciousness. Octopuses attach a positive valence to food as 'specializing generalists' with long-term learning and flexible choices. They value shelter, yet modify, adapt and even transport it where necessary. They attach a negative valence to what may be described as pain, monitoring and protecting the damaged area and learning to associate locations with pain relief. Finally and surprisingly, octopuses attach a negative value to uncertainty so that they explore their environment before exploiting certain aspects of it and even exhibit motor play. This series of four papers, culminating in the present one, demonstrates in detail why the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness has suggested octopuses might have the substrate for consciousness, although it is likely not similar to or as complex as that shown by 'higher' vertebrate lineages.