Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness

A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad "chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

Effects of Acetic Acid and Morphine in Shore Crabs, Carcinus maenas: Implications for the Possibility of Pain in Decapods

Noxious chemicals, coupled with morphine treatment, are often used in studies on pain in vertebrates. Here we show that injection of morphine caused several behavioural changes in the crab, Carcinus maenas, including reduced pressing against the sides of the enclosure and more rubbing and picking at the mouth parts and, at least for a short time, more defensive displays. Subsequent injection of acetic acid into one rear leg caused rubbing of the injected leg and the injected leg was held vertically off the ground. These activities directed at or involving the specific leg are consistent with previous observations of directed behaviour following noxious stimuli and are consistent with the idea that decapods experience pain. Further, acetic acid but not injection of water induced autotomy of the injected leg in these animals. Because autotomy is temporally associated with directed behaviour, it is possible that the autotomy is a pain-related response. Acetic acid is clearly a noxious substance when applied to decapods. However, morphine had no effect on the activities associated with acetic acid injection and thus there is no evidence for an analgesic effect. Further, the injection of acetic acid did not interfere with behavioural effects of morphine. The activities directed towards the site of injection are like those observed with injection, or with external application, of various noxious substances and the present study adds to a growing body of knowledge about possible pain in decapods.

Trade-Offs between Avoidance of Noxious Electric Shock and Avoidance of Bright Light in Shore Crabs Are Consistent with Predictions of Pain

The suggestion that decapod crustaceans might experience pain has been dismissed by some authors who claim decapods only respond to noxious stimuli by nociceptive reflexes. Because reflexes do not require complex neuronal processing, but pain does, demonstrating reflex responses to noxious stimuli would not support the case for pain. Here, we report an experiment in which shore crabs are repeatedly placed in a light area (20 trials), but the animals can avoid the light by moving to a dark shelter. However, some crabs received an electric shock of 6 or 12 volts each time they entered the shelter. Those receiving either level of shock swiftly reduced their use of shelters and remained in the light. However, the magnitude of shelter avoidance was influenced by the brightness of the arena and the intensity of the shock. Shelter use was subsequently reduced to a greater extent if the shock level was high and the light intensity low. That is, crabs traded their avoidance of shock for their avoidance of bright light. Further, these animals showed avoidance learning and demonstrated activities suggesting anxiety, such as contact with the tank wall in the light area and increased latency to enter shelters when making the decision to enter the shelter if they had received shock in earlier trials. These results fulfil three key behavioural criteria for pain and, thus, are consistent with the idea that decapods can experience pain.

How biological codes break causal chains to enable autonomy for organisms

Autonomy, meaning freedom from exogenous control, requires independence of both constitution and cybernetic regulation. Here, the necessity of biological codes to achieve both is explained, assuming that Aristotelian efficient cause is 'formal cause empowered by physical force'. Constitutive independence requires closure to efficient causation (in the Rosen sense); cybernetic independence requires transformation of cause-effect into signal-response relations at the organism boundary; the combination of both kinds of independence enables adaptation and evolution. Codes and cyphers translate information from one form of physical embodiment (domain) to another. Because information can only contribute as formal cause to efficient cause within the domain of its embodiment, translation can extend or restrict the range over which information is effective. Closure to efficient causation requires internalised information to be isolated from the cycle of efficient causes that it informs: e.g. Von Neumann self-replicator requires a (template) source of information that is causally isolated from the physical replication system. Life operationalises this isolation with the genetic code translating from the (isolated) domain of codons to that of protein interactions. Separately, cybernetic freedom is achieved at the cell boundary because transducers, which embody molecular coding, translate exogenous information into a domain where it no longer has the power of efficient cause. Information, not efficient cause, passes through the boundary to serve as stimulus for an internally generated response. Coding further extends freedom by enabling historically accumulated information to be selectively transformed into efficient cause under internal control, leaving it otherwise stored inactive. Code-based translation thus enables selective causal isolation, controlling the flow from cause to effect. Genetic code, cell-signalling codes and, in eukaryotes, the histone code, signal sequence based protein sorting and other code-dependent processes all regulate and separate causal chains. The existence of life can be seen as an expression of the power of molecular codes to selectively isolate and thereby organise causal relations among molecular interactions to form an organism.

Behavioural Indicators of Pain and Suffering in Arthropods and Might Pain Bite Back?

Pain in response to tissue damage functions to change behaviour so that further damage is minimised whereas healing and survival are promoted. This paper focuses on the behavioural criteria that match the function to ask if pain is likely in the main taxa of arthropods. There is evidence consistent with the idea of pain in crustaceans, insects and, to a lesser extent, spiders. There is little evidence of pain in millipedes, centipedes, scorpions, and horseshoe crabs but there have been few investigations of these groups. Alternative approaches in the study of pain are explored and it is suggested that studies on traumatic mating, agonistic interactions, and defensive venoms might provide clues about pain. The evolution of high cognitive ability, sensory systems, and flexible decision-making is discussed as well as how these might influence the evolution of pain-like states.