Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data

Does the implementation of pay-for-performance indicators improve the quality of healthcare? First results in France

Background

Pay-for-performance (P4P) models are intended to promote quality of care in both hospitals and primary care settings. They are considered as a means of changing medical practices, particularly in primary care.

Objectives

The first objective of this study was to assess how performance indicators changed over time, measured through “Remuneration on Public Health Objectives” (ROSP) scores, between 2017 and 2020 in a large French region (Grand Est region), and to compare this evolution in the rural vs. urban areas of the region. The second objective was to focus on the area with the least improvement in ROSP scores and to investigate whether the scores and the available sociodemographic characteristics of the area were associated.

Methods

First, we measured the evolution over time of P4P indicators (i.e., ROSP scores) obtained from the regional health insurance system, for GP practices in the Grand Est region between 2017 and 2020. We then compared the scores between the Aube Department and the rest of the region (urban areas). To address the second objective, we focused on the area found to have the least improvement in indicators to investigate whether there was a relationship between ROSP score and sociodemographic characteristics.

Results

More than 40,000 scores were collected. We observed an overall improvement in scores over the study period. The urban area (Grand Est region minus the Aube) scored better than the rural area (Aube) for chronic disease management [median 0.91 (0.84–0.95) vs. 0.90(0.79–0.94), p < 0.001] and prevention [median 0.36 (0.22–0.45) vs. 0.33 (0.17–0.43), p < 0.001], but not for efficiency, where the rural area (Aube) performed better [median 0.67(0.56–0.74) vs. 0.69 (0.57–0.75 in the rest of the Grand Est region, p = 0.004]. In the rural area, we found no significant association between ROSP scores and sociodemographic characteristics, except for extreme rurality in some sub-areas.

Conclusions

At the regional level, the overall improvement in scores observed between 2017 and 2020 suggests that the implementation of ROSP indicators have improved the quality of care, particularly in urban areas. These results also suggest that efforts should be focused on rural areas, which already had the lowest scores at the start of the P4P program.

The Linkages Between Reimbursement and Prevention: A Mixed-Methods Approach

Background: The benefits of prevention are widely recognized; ranging from avoiding disease onset to substantially reducing disease burden, which is especially relevant considering the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases. However, its delivery has encountered numerous obstacles in healthcare. While healthcare professionals play an important role in stimulating prevention, their behaviors can be influenced by incentives related to reimbursement schemes.

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to obtain a detailed description and explanation of how reimbursement schemes specifically impact primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary prevention.

Methods: Our study takes a mixed-methods approach. Based on a rapid review of the literature, we include and assess 27 studies. Moreover, we conducted semi-structured interviews with eight Dutch healthcare professionals and two representatives of insurance companies, to obtain a deeper understanding of healthcare professionals' behaviors in response to incentives.

Results: Nor fee-for-service (FFS) nor salary can be unambiguously linked to higher or lower provision of preventive services. However, results suggest that FFS's widely reported incentive to increase production might work in favor of preventive services such as immunizations but provide less incentives for chronic disease management. Salary's incentive toward prevention will be (partially) determined by provider-organization's characteristics and reimbursement. Pay-for-performance (P4P) is not always necessarily translated into better health outcomes, effective prevention, or adequate chronic disease management. P4P is considered disruptive by professionals and our results expose how it can lead professionals to resort to (over)medicalization in order to achieve targets. Relatively new forms of reimbursement such as population-based payment may incentivize professionals to adapt the delivery of care to facilitate the delivery of some forms of prevention.

Conclusion: There is not one reimbursement scheme that will stimulate all levels of prevention. Certain types of reimbursement work well for certain types of preventive care services. A volume incentive could be beneficial for prevention activities that are easy to specify. Population-based capitation can help promote preventive activities that require efforts that are not incentivized under other reimbursements, for instance activities that are not easily specified, such as providing education on lifestyle factors related to a patient's (chronic) disease.

Is the evidence on the effectiveness of pay for performance schemes in healthcare changing? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis

BACKGROUND

This study investigated if the evidence on the success of the Pay for Performance (P4P) schemes in healthcare is changing as the schemes continue to evolve by updating a previous systematic review.

METHODS

A meta-regression analysis using 116 studies evaluating P4P schemes published between January 2010 to February 2018. The effects of the research design, incentive schemes, use of incentives, and the size of the payment to revenue ratio on the proportion of statically significant effects in each study were examined.

RESULTS

There was evidence of an increase in the range of countries adopting P4P schemes and weak evidence that the proportion of studies with statistically significant effects have increased. Factors hypothesized to influence the success of schemes have not changed. Studies evaluating P4P schemes which made payments for improvement over time, were associated with a lower proportion of statistically significant effects. There was weak evidence of a positive association between the incentives' size and the proportion of statistically significant effects.

CONCLUSION

The evidence on the effectiveness of P4P schemes is evolving slowly, with little evidence that lessons are being learned concerning the design and evaluation of P4P schemes.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings

BACKGROUND

Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review

Preventive care, such as screening, is important for reducing the risk of cancer, a leading cause of death worldwide. Indeed, some type of cancers are detected through screening programs, which in most countries run for colorectal, breast, and cervical cancers. In this context, general practitioners play a key role in increasing the participation rate in cancer screening programs. To improve cancer screening delivery rates, performance incentives have increasingly been implemented in primary care by healthcare payers and organizations in different countries. The effects of these tools are still not clear. We conducted a systematic literature review in order to answer the following research question: What is the evidence in the literature for the effects of financial incentives on the delivery rates of breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening in general practice? We performed a literature search in Web of Science, PubMed, Cochrane Library and Google Scholar, according to the PRISMA guidelines. 18 studies were selected, classified and discussed according to the health preventive services investigated. Most of studies showed partial or no effects of financial incentives on breast and cervical cancer screening delivery rates. Few positive or partial effects were found regarding colorectal cancer screening. Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determining the effectiveness of financial incentives and their effects on the improvement of cancer screening delivery rates.

[General practitioners’ preferences towards incentive measures linked with cancer screening]

INTRODUCTION

General practitioners (GPs) play a key role in the delivery of preventive and screening services for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers. Yet, their current provision of screening services remains low and varies considerably across screening contexts and GPs. This study investigates the determinants of GPs' involvement in cancer screening activities using discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology.

METHODS

A representative sample of 402 GPs was recruited in France between March and April 2014. The participants completed 12 choice tasks designed to elicit their preferences for 5 cancer screening attributes aimed at increasing their supply of cancer screening services.

RESULTS

GPs are sensitive to both financial and non-financial incentives, such as a compensated training and systematic transmission of information about screened patients, aimed to facilitate communication between doctors and patients. There is also evidence that the preferences differ across screening contexts: GPs appear to be relatively more sensitive to financial incentives for being involved in colorectal cancer screening, whereas they have higher preference for non-financial incentives in breast and cervical cancers.

CONCLUSION

Our study provides new findings for policymakers interested in prioritizing levers to increase the supply of cancer screening services in general practice.

Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006-2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.