Hylomorphism and the metabolic closure conception of life

Cartography of the multiple formal systems of molecular autopoiesis from the biology of cognition and enaction to anticipation and active inference

A rich literature has grown up over the years that bears with autopoiesis, which tends to assume that it is a model, a theory, a principle, a definition of life, a property, refers to self-organization or even to hastily conclude that it is hylomorphic, hylozoist, in need of reformulation or to be overcome, making its status even more unclear. Maturana insists that autopoiesis is none of these and rather it is the causal organization of living systems as natural systems (NS) such that when it stops, they die. He calls this molecular autopoiesis (MA), which comprises two domains of existence: that of the self-producing organization (self-fabrication) and that of the structural coupling/enaction (cognition). Like all-NS in the universe, MA is amenable to be defined in theoretical terms, i.e. encoded in mathematical models and/or formal systems (FS). Framing the multiple formal systems of autopoiesis (FSA) into the Rosen's modeling relation (a process of bringing into equivalence the causality of NS and the inferential rules of FS), allows a classification of FSA into analytical categories, most importantly Turing machine (algorithmic) vs non-Turing machine (non-algorithmic) based, and FSA with a purely reactive mathematical image as cybernetic systems, i.e. feedbacks based, or conversely, as anticipatory systems making active inferences. It is thus the intent of the present work to advance the precision with which different FS may be observed to comply (preserve correspondence) with MA in its worldly state as a NS. The modeling relation between MA and the range of FS proposed as potentially illuminating their processes forecloses the applicability of Turing-based algorithmic computational models. This outcome indicates that MA, as modelled through Varela's calculus of self-reference or more especially through Rosen's (M,R)-system, is essentially anticipatory without violating structural determinism nor causality whatsoever, hence enaction may involve it. This quality may capture a fundamentally different mode of being in living systems as opposed to mechanical-computational systems. Implications in different fields of biology from the origin of life to planetary biology as well as in cognitive science and artificial intelligence are of interest.

Placebo From an Enactive Perspective

Due to their complexity and variability, placebo effects remain controversial. We suggest this is also due to a set of problematic assumptions (dualism, reductionism, individualism, passivity). We critically assess current explanations and empirical evidence and propose an alternative theoretical framework-the enactive approach to life and mind-based on recent developments in embodied cognitive science. We review core enactive concepts such as autonomy, agency, and sense-making. Following these ideas, we propose a move from binary distinctions (e.g., conscious vs. non-conscious) to the more workable categories of reflective and pre-reflective activity. We introduce an ontology of individuation, following the work of Gilbert Simondon, that allow us to see placebo interventions not as originating causal chains, but as modulators and triggers in the regulation of tensions between ongoing embodied and interpersonal processes. We describe these interrelated processes involving looping effects through three intertwined dimensions of embodiment: organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective. Finally, we defend the need to investigate therapeutic interactions in terms of participatory sense-making, going beyond the identification of individual social traits (e.g., empathy, trust) that contribute to placebo effects. We discuss resonances and differences between the enactive proposal, popular explanations such as expectations and conditioning, and other approaches based on meaning responses and phenomenological/ecological ideas.

Life's organization between matter and form: Neo-Aristotelian approaches and biosemiotics

In this paper, I discuss the neo-Aristotelian approaches, which usually reinterpret Aristotle's ideas on form and/or borrow the notion of formal cause without engaging with the broader implications of Aristotle's metaphysics. In opposition to these approaches, I claim that biosemiotics can propose an alternative view on life's form. Specifically, I examine the proposals to replace the formal cause with gene-centrism, functionalism, and structuralism. After critically addressing these approaches, I discuss the problems of reconciling Aristotelianism with the modern view of life's organization. I claim that the notion of the final cause proposes a cosmological hierarchy and that this is the main problem with applying the formal cause to biology. An alternative categorization of conceptualizing life's form involves (1) the processual identity, (2) relational property clusters, and (3) context-dependent transmission of representational units. The third category points to a semiotic basis of the form of life. In this context, I offer to readjust the focus of the problem of matter-form duality by pointing out that form is primarily an issue of the subject-object relation. Biosemiotics helps to understand the constructive role of symbolic representation in living systems, which is crucial to extend the analysis of the form from cognitive representations to external phenomena. Emergence of subjectivity and perspectivity of interactions are key elements to bridge the form and actual processes within a non-hylomorphic account. To demonstrate transitions from the physical influence of shapes to the organic recognition of forms, I address the biological studies on the synchronization of coincidental inputs and enzyme specificity.