More on how and why: a response to commentaries

Population regulation and adaptive dynamics of cross-feeding

The particular importance of evolutionary studies in microbial experimental systems is that starting from the level of the metabolism of individual cells, the adaptive dynamics can be followed step by step by biochemical, genetic, and population dynamical tools. Moreover, the coincidence of evolutionary and ecological time scales helps to clarify the mutual role of ecological and evolutionary principles in predicting adaptive dynamics in general. Ecological principles define the ecological conditions under which adaptive branching can occur. This paper overviews and interprets the results of empirical and modeling studies of the evolution of metabolic cross-feeding in glucose-limited E.coli chemostats and batch cultures in the context of theories of robust coexistence and adaptive dynamics. Empirical results consistently demonstrate that the interactions between cells are mediated by the changing metabolite concentrations in the cultures and modeling confirms that these changes may control the adaptive dynamics of the clones. In consequence, the potential results of evolution can be predicted at the functional level by evolutionary flux balance analysis (evoFBA), while the genetic changes are more contingent. evoFBA follows the scheme of adaptive dynamics theory by calculating the feedback environment that changes during the evolutionary process and provides a promising tool to further investigate adaptive divergence in small microbial communities. Three general conclusions close the paper.

Natural selection according to Darwin: cause or effect?

In the 1940s, the 'modern synthesis' (MS) of Darwinism and genetics cast genetic mutation and recombination as the source of variability from which environmental events naturally select the fittest, such 'natural selection' constituting the cause of evolution. Recent biology increasingly challenges this view by casting genes as followers and awarding the leading role in the genesis of adaptations to the agency and plasticity of developing phenotypes-making natural selection a consequence of other causal processes. Both views of natural selection claim to capture the core of Darwin's arguments in On the Origin of Species. Today, historians largely concur with the MS's reading of Origin as a book aimed to prove natural selection the cause (vera causa) of adaptive change. This paper finds the evidence for that conclusion wanting. I undertake to examine the context and meaning of all Darwin's known uses of the phrase vera causa, documenting in particular Darwin's resistance to the pressure to prove natural selection a vera causa in letters written early in 1860. His resistance underlines the logical dependence of natural selection, an unobservable phenomenon, on the causal processes producing the observable events captured by the laws of inheritance, variation, and the struggle for existence, established in Chapters 1-3 of Origin.

Structuralism and Adaptationism: Friends? Or foes?

Historically, the empirical study of phenotypic diversification has fallen into two rough camps; (1) "structuralist approaches" focusing on developmental constraint, bias, and innovation (with evo-devo at the core); and (2) "adaptationist approaches" focusing on adaptation, and natural selection. Whilst debates, such as that surrounding the proposed "Extended" Evolutionary Synthesis, often juxtapose these two positions, this review focuses on the grey space in between. Specifically, here I present a novel analysis of structuralism which enables us to take a more nuanced look at the motivations behind the structuralist and adaptationist positions. This makes clear how the two approaches can conflict, and points of potential commensurability. The review clarifies (a) the value of the evo-devo approach to phenotypic diversity, but also (b) how it properly relates to other predominant approaches to the same issues in evolutionary biology more broadly.

Sperm bauplan and function and underlying processes of sperm formation and selection

The spermatozoon is a highly differentiated and polarized cell, with two main structures: the head, containing a haploid nucleus and the acrosomal exocytotic granule, and the flagellum, which generates energy and propels the cell; both structures are connected by the neck. The sperm's main aim is to participate in fertilization, thus activating development. Despite this common bauplan and function, there is an enormous diversity in structure and performance of sperm cells. For example, mammalian spermatozoa may exhibit several head patterns and overall sperm lengths ranging from ∼30 to 350 µm. Mechanisms of transport in the female tract, preparation for fertilization, and recognition of and interaction with the oocyte also show considerable variation. There has been much interest in understanding the origin of this diversity, both in evolutionary terms and in relation to mechanisms underlying sperm differentiation in the testis. Here, relationships between sperm bauplan and function are examined at two levels: first, by analyzing the selective forces that drive changes in sperm structure and physiology to understand the adaptive values of this variation and impact on male reproductive success and second, by examining cellular and molecular mechanisms of sperm formation in the testis that may explain how differentiation can give rise to such a wide array of sperm forms and functions.

Nine Levels of Explanation : A Proposed Expansion of Tinbergen's Four-Level Framework for Understanding the Causes of Behavior

Tinbergen's classic "On Aims and Methods of Ethology" (Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 20, 1963) proposed four levels of explanation of behavior, which he thought would soon apply to humans. This paper discusses the need for multilevel explanation; Huxley and Mayr's prior models, and others that followed; Tinbergen's differences with Lorenz on "the innate"; and Mayr's ultimate/proximate distinction. It synthesizes these approaches with nine levels of explanation in three categories: phylogeny, natural selection, and genomics (ultimate causes); maturation, sensitive period effects, and routine environmental effects (intermediate causes); and hormonal/metabolic processes, neural circuitry, and eliciting stimuli (proximate causes), as a respectful extension of Tinbergen's levels. The proposed classification supports and builds on Tinbergen's multilevel model and Mayr's ultimate/proximate continuum, adding intermediate causes in accord with Tinbergen's emphasis on ontogeny. It requires no modification of Standard Evolutionary Theory or The Modern Synthesis, but shows that much that critics claim was missing was in fact part of Neo-Darwinian theory (so named by J. Mark Baldwin in The American Naturalist in 1896) all along, notably reciprocal causation in ontogeny, niche construction, cultural evolution, and multilevel selection. Updates of classical examples in ethology are offered at each of the nine levels, including the neuroethological and genomic findings Tinbergen foresaw. Finally, human examples are supplied at each level, fulfilling his hope of human applications as part of the biology of behavior. This broad ethological framework empowers us to explain human behavior-eventually completely-and vindicates the idea of human nature, and of humans as a part of nature.

What's Wrong with Evolutionary Causation?

This review essay reflects on recent discussions in evolutionary biology and philosophy of science on the central causes of evolution and the structure of causal explanations in evolutionary theory. In this debate, it has been argued that our view of evolutionary causation should be rethought by including more seriously developmental causes and causes of the individual acting organism. I use Tobias Uller's and Kevin Laland's volume Evolutionary Causation as well as recent reviews of it as a starting point to reflect on the causal role of agency, individuality, and the environment in evolution. In addition, I critically discuss classical philosophical frameworks of theory change (i.e. Popper's, Kuhn's and Lakatos') used in this debate to understand changing views of evolutionary causation.

Understanding sperm physiology: Proximate and evolutionary explanations of sperm diversity

Much can be gained from the comprehensive study of a biological system. Based on what is known as Mayr's proximate-ultimate causation and the subsequent expansion to Tinbergen's four questions, biological traits can be understood by taking into account different approximations that try to explain mechanisms, development, adaptive significance or phylogeny. These, in principle, separate areas, can be integrated crossing boundaries, but bearing in mind that answers to one question would not explain a different query. Studies of sperm biology have, until now, not benefited much from this framework and potential integration. Proximate causes (particularly mechanisms) have been the subject of interest for reproductive biologists, and evolutionary explanations have been the domain of behavioural ecologists with interest in adaptive significance of traits in the context of post-copulatory sexual selection. This review will summarize opportunities for research in the different areas, focusing on sperm preparation for fertilization and suggesting possible integration within and between proximate and evolutionary studies.

Population and organismal perspectives on trait origins

Some biologists and philosophers of biology claim selection can "create" novel traits. Others claim creativity is to be found only in development. I here endorse the former claim, but take seriously and address the concerns that underlie the latter. My discussion of these issues is informed by recent work that champions the "return of the organism" to mainstream evolutionary biology, and I suggest how population and organismal perspectives on trait origins can be reconciled.

Synthesising arguments and the extended evolutionary synthesis

Synthesising arguments motivate changes to the conceptual tools, theoretical structure, and evaluatory framework employed in a given scientific domain. Recently, a broad coalition of researchers has put forward a synthesising argument in favour of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ('EES'). Often this synthesising argument is evaluated using a virtue-based approach, which construes the EES as a wholesale alternative to prevailing practice. Here I argue this virtue-based approach is not fit for purpose. Taking the central concept of niche construction as a case study, I show that an agenda-based approach better captures the pragmatic and epistemological goals of the EES synthesising argument and diagnoses areas of empirical disagreement with prevailing practice.

Beyond the modern synthesis: A framework for a more inclusive biological synthesis

Many theorists in recent years have been calling for evolutionary biology to move beyond the Modern Synthesis - the paradigm that has long provided the theoretical backbone for the discipline. Terms like "postmodern synthesis," "integrative synthesis," and "extended evolutionary synthesis" have been invoked by various critics in connection with the many recent developments that pose deep challenges - even contradictions - to the traditional model and underscore the need for an update, or a makeover. However, none of these critics, to this author's knowledge, has to date offered an explicit alternative that could provide a unifying theoretical paradigm for our vastly increased knowledge about living systems and the history of life on Earth (but see Noble 2015, 2017). This paper briefly summarizes the case against the Modern Synthesis and its many amendments over the years, and a new paradigm is proposed, called an "Inclusive Biological Synthesis," which, it is argued, can provide a more general framework for the biological sciences. The focus of this framework is the fundamental nature of life as a contingent dynamic process - an always at-risk "survival enterprise." The ongoing, inescapable challenge of earning a living in a given environmental context - biological survival and reproduction - presents an existential problem to which all biological phenomena can be related and comprehended. They and their "parts" can be analyzed in relation to ethologist Niko Tinbergen's four key questions. Some basic properties and guiding assumptions related to this alternative paradigm are also identified.

Deconstructing Evolutionary Game Theory: Coevolution of Social Behaviors with Their Evolutionary Setting

Evolution of social behaviors is one of the most fascinating and active fields of evolutionary biology. During the past half century, social evolution theory developed into a mature field with powerful tools to understand the dynamics of social traits such as cooperation under a wide range of conditions. In this article, I argue that the next stage in the development of social evolution theory should consider the evolution of the setting in which social behaviors evolve. To that end, I propose a conceptual map of the components that make up the evolutionary setting of social behaviors, review existing work that considers the evolution of each component, and discuss potential future directions. The theoretical work reviewed here illustrates how unexpected dynamics can happen when the setting of social evolution itself is evolving, such as cooperation sometimes being self-limiting. I argue that a theory of how the setting of social evolution itself evolves will lead to a deeper understanding of when cooperation and other social behaviors evolve and diversify.

Teleonomy and the proximate–ultimate distinction revisited

It is now widely accepted that living systems exhibit an internal teleology (or teleonomy), but there are conflicting views about how this should be interpreted. Colin Pittendrigh and others have defined teleonomy broadly. It encompasses all ‘proximate’ (functional) biological phenomena. In contrast, Ernst Mayr and others would limit teleonomy to an a priori ‘program’ (the genome) and exclude proximate phenomena. I argue that living systems exhibit an ex post facto, means–ends teleonomy. Purposiveness is also a property of proximate functional phenomena. Mayr’s definition would also discount the causal role of teleonomy in shaping differential survival, i.e. natural selection and evolution. Proximate and ‘ultimate’ (evolutionary) causes are deeply interpenetrated. Going forward, we must integrate the various domains of causation better.

Rethinking Causation in Cancer with Evolutionary Developmental Biology

Despite the productivity of basic cancer research, cancer continues to be a health burden to society because this research has not yielded corresponding clinical applications. Many proposed solutions to this dilemma have revolved around implementing organizational and policy changes related to cancer research. Here I argue for a different solution: a new conceptualization of causation in cancer. Neither the standard molecular biomarker approaches nor evolutionary biology approaches to cancer fully capture its complex causal dynamics, even when considered jointly. These approaches map on to Ernst Mayr's proximate-ultimate distinction, which is an inadequate conceptualization of causation in biological systems and makes it difficult to connect developmental and evolutionary viewpoints. I propose looking to evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) to overcome the distinction and integrate the proximate and ultimate causal frameworks. I use the concepts of modularity and evolvability to show how an EvoDevo perspective can be manifested in cancer translational research. This perspective on causation in cancer is better suited for integrating the complexity of current empirical results and can facilitate novel developments in the investigation and clinical treatment of cancer.

Evolutionary demography of age at last birth: integrating approaches from human behavioural ecology and cultural evolution

Cultural evolutionary theory and human behavioural ecology offer different, but compatible approaches to understanding human demographic behaviour. For much of their 30 history, these approaches have been deployed in parallel, with few explicit attempts to integrate them empirically. In this paper, we test hypotheses drawn from both approaches to explore how reproductive behaviour responds to cultural changes among Mosuo agriculturalists of China. Specifically, we focus on how age at last birth (ALB) varies in association with temporal shifts in fertility policies, spatial variation and kinship ecologies. We interpret temporal declines in ALB as plausibly consistent with demographic front-loading of reproduction in light of fertility constraints and later ages at last birth in matrilineal populations relative to patrilineal ones as consistent with greater household cooperation for reproductive purposes in the former. We find little evidence suggesting specific transmission pathways for the spread of norms regulating ALB, but emphasize that the rapid pace of change strongly suggests that learning processes were involved in the general decline in ALB over time. The different predictions of models we employ belie their considerable overlap and the potential for a synthetic approach to generate more refined tests of evolutionary hypotheses of demographic behaviour.This article is part of the theme issue 'Bridging cultural gaps: interdisciplinary studies in human cultural evolution'.

Molecular investigation of genetic assimilation during the rapid adaptive radiations of East African cichlid fishes

Adaptive radiations are characterized by adaptive diversification intertwined with rapid speciation within a lineage resulting in many ecologically specialized, phenotypically diverse species. It has been proposed that adaptive radiations can originate from ancestral lineages with pronounced phenotypic plasticity in adaptive traits, facilitating ecologically driven phenotypic diversification that is ultimately fixed through genetic assimilation of gene regulatory regions. This study aimed to investigate how phenotypic plasticity is reflected in gene expression patterns in the trophic apparatus of several lineages of East African cichlid fishes, and whether the observed patterns support genetic assimilation. This investigation used a split brood experimental design to compare adaptive plasticity in species from within and outside of adaptive radiations. The plastic response was induced in the crushing pharyngeal jaws through feeding individuals either a hard or soft diet. We find that nonradiating, basal lineages show higher levels of adaptive morphological plasticity than the derived, radiated lineages, suggesting that these differences have become partially genetically fixed during the formation of the adaptive radiations. Two candidate genes that may have undergone genetic assimilation, gif and alas1, were identified, in addition to alterations in the wiring of LPJ patterning networks. Taken together, our results suggest that genetic assimilation may have dampened the inducibility of plasticity related genes during the adaptive radiations of East African cichlids, flattening the reaction norms and canalizing their feeding phenotypes, driving adaptation to progressively more narrow ecological niches.

Domestication as a model system for the extended evolutionary synthesis

One of the challenges in evaluating arguments for extending the conceptual framework of evolutionary biology involves the identification of a tractable model system that allows for an assessment of the core assumptions of the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). The domestication of plants and animals by humans provides one such case study opportunity. Here, I consider domestication as a model system for exploring major tenets of the EES. First I discuss the novel insights that niche construction theory (NCT, one of the pillars of the EES) provides into the domestication processes, particularly as they relate to five key areas: coevolution, evolvability, ecological inheritance, cooperation and the pace of evolutionary change. This discussion is next used to frame testable predictions about initial domestication of plants and animals that contrast with those grounded in standard evolutionary theory, demonstrating how these predictions might be tested in multiple regions where initial domestication took place. I then turn to a broader consideration of how domestication provides a model case study consideration of the different ways in which the core assumptions of the EES strengthen and expand our understanding of evolution, including reciprocal causation, developmental processes as drivers of evolutionary change, inclusive inheritance, and the tempo and rate of evolutionary change.

Ultimate and proximate explanations of strong reciprocity

Strong reciprocity (SR) has recently been subject to heated debate. In this debate, the "West camp" (West et al. in Evol Hum Behav 32(4):231-262, 2011), which is critical of the case for SR, and the "Laland camp" (Laland et al. in Science, 334(6062):1512-1516, 2011, Biol Philos 28(5):719-745, 2013), which is sympathetic to the case of SR, seem to take diametrically opposed positions. The West camp criticizes advocates of SR for conflating proximate and ultimate causation. SR is said to be a proximate mechanism that is put forward by its advocates as an ultimate explanation of human cooperation. The West camp thus accuses advocates of SR for not heeding Mayr's original distinction between ultimate and proximate causation. The Laland camp praises advocates of SR for revising Mayr's distinction. Advocates of SR are said to replace Mayr's uni-directional view on the relation between ultimate and proximate causes by the bi-directional one of reciprocal causation. The paper argues that both the West camp and the Laland camp misrepresent what advocates of SR are up to. The West camp is right that SR is a proximate cause of human cooperation. But rather than putting forward SR as an ultimate explanation, as the West camp argues, advocates of SR believe that SR itself is in need of ultimate explanation. Advocates of SR tend to take gene-culture co-evolutionary theory as the correct meta-theoretical framework for advancing ultimate explanations of SR. Appearances notwithstanding, gene-culture coevolutionary theory does not imply Laland et al.'s notion of reciprocal causation. "Reciprocal causation" suggests that proximate and ultimate causes interact simultaneously, while advocates of SR assume that they interact sequentially. I end by arguing that the best way to understand the debate is by disambiguating Mayr's ultimate-proximate distinction. I propose to reserve "ultimate" and "proximate" for different sorts of explanations, and to use other terms for distinguishing different kinds of causes and different parts of the total causal chain producing behavior.

Human niche, human behaviour, human nature

The concept of a 'human nature' or 'human natures' retains a central role in theorizing about the human experience. In Homo sapiens it is clear that we have a suite of capacities generated via our evolutionary past, and present, and a flexible capacity to create and sustain particular kinds of cultures and to be shaped by them. Regardless of whether we label these capacities 'human natures' or not, humans occupy a distinctive niche and an evolutionary approach to examining it is critical. At present we are faced with a few different narratives as to exactly what such an evolutionary approach entails. There is a need for a robust and dynamic theoretical toolkit in order to develop a richer, and more nuanced, understanding of the cognitively sophisticated genus Homo and the diverse sorts of niches humans constructed and occupied across the Pleistocene, Holocene, and into the Anthropocene. Here I review current evolutionary approaches to 'human nature', arguing that we benefit from re-framing our investigations via the concept of the human niche and in the context of the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). While not a replacement of standard evolutionary approaches, this is an expansion and enhancement of our toolkit. I offer brief examples from human evolution in support of these assertions.

Dual Causality and the Autonomy of Biology

Ernst Mayr's concept of dual causality in biology with the two forms of causes (proximate and ultimate) continues to provide an essential foundation for the philosophy of biology. They are equivalent to functional (=proximate) and evolutionary (=ultimate) causes with both required for full biological explanations. The natural sciences can be classified into nomological, historical nomological and historical dual causality, the last including only biology. Because evolutionary causality is unique to biology and must be included for all complete biological explanations, biology is autonomous from the physical sciences.

Answering evolutionary questions: A guide for mechanistic biologists

The questions and methods of molecular biology and evolutionary biology are clearly distinct, yet a unified approach can lead to deep insights. Unfortunately, attempts to unify these approaches are fraught with pitfalls. In this informal series of questions and answers, we offer the mechanistically oriented biologist a set of steps to come up with evolutionarily reasonable and meaningful hypotheses. We emphasize the critical power and importance of carefully constructed null hypotheses, and we illustrate our ideas with examples representing a range of topics, from the biology of aging, to protein structure, to speciation, and more. We also stress the importance of mathematics as the lingua franca for biologists of all stripes, and encourage mechanistic biologists to seek out quantitative collaborators to build explicit mathematical models, making their assumptions explicit, and their logic clear and testable. Biologists in all realms of inquiry stand to gain from strong bridges between our disciplines.

Mothers Make a Difference: Mothers Develop Weaker Bonds with Immature Sons than Daughters

Among mammals, individuals form strong social bonds preferentially with their kin. Differences in these relationships are linked to differential kin availability due to sex-specific dispersal patterns, but there is some indication that differential bonding among sexes already occurs prior to maturation. However, little is known about how these patterns arise during individual development. Here we investigated sex differences in the development of mother-offspring bonds in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Our results revealed that mothers showed sex-biased bonding toward their offspring. Sons had a distinctly higher probability of receiving aggression from their mothers than did daughters in the first year of life, while no differences were found with respect to affiliative interactions. After the first year, probabilities of all affiliative and aggressive behaviours investigated were higher for daughters than for sons, although generally declining. Furthermore, sons spending less time with their mother and receiving more maternal aggression tended to disperse earlier. The results of our study suggest that mothers influence their bonding strength with offspring by interacting less affiliative with sons than daughters.

Beliefs as Self-Sustaining Networks: Drawing Parallels Between Networks of Ecosystems and Adults' Predictions

In this paper, we argue that beliefs share common properties with the self-sustaining networks of complex systems. Matching experiences are said to couple with each other into a mutually reinforcing network. The goal of the current paper is to spell out and develop these ideas, using our understanding of ecosystems as a guide. In Part 1 of the paper, we provide theoretical considerations relevant to this new conceptualization of beliefs, including the theoretical overlap between energy and meaning. In Part 2, we discuss the implications of this new conceptualization on our understanding of belief emergence and belief change. Finally, in Part 3, we provide an analytical mapping between beliefs and the self-sustaining networks of ecosystems, namely by applying to behavioral data a measure developed for ecosystem networks. Specifically, average accuracies were subjected to analyses of uncertainty (H) and average mutual information. The ratio between these two values yields degree of order, a measure of how organized the self-sustained network is. Degree of order was tracked over time and compared to the amount of explained variance returned by a categorical non-linear principal components analysis. Finding high correspondence between the two measures of order, together with the theoretical groundwork discussed in Parts 1 and 2, lends preliminary validity to our theory that beliefs have important similarities to the structural characteristics of self-sustaining networks.

Embodied cognition and circular causality: on the role of constitutive autonomy in the reciprocal coupling of perception and action

The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents has been firmly established: perceptions guide action but so too do actions influence what is perceived. While much has been said on the implications of this for the agent's external behavior, less attention has been paid to what it means for the internal bodily mechanisms which underpin cognitive behavior. In this article, we wish to redress this by reasserting that the relationship between cognition, perception, and action involves a constitutive element as well as a behavioral element, emphasizing that the reciprocal link between perception and action in cognition merits a renewed focus on the system dynamics inherent in constitutive biological autonomy. Our argument centers on the idea that cognition, perception, and action are all dependent on processes focussed primarily on the maintenance of the agent's autonomy. These processes have an inherently circular nature-self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining-and our goal is to explore these processes and suggest how they can explain the reciprocity of perception and action. Specifically, we argue that the reciprocal coupling is founded primarily on their endogenous roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. Furthermore, the coupling occurs first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent's organismic embodiment. Finally, we consider how homeostasis and the related concept of allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.

The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions

Scientific activities take place within the structured sets of ideas and assumptions that define a field and its practices. The conceptual framework of evolutionary biology emerged with the Modern Synthesis in the early twentieth century and has since expanded into a highly successful research program to explore the processes of diversification and adaptation. Nonetheless, the ability of that framework satisfactorily to accommodate the rapid advances in developmental biology, genomics and ecology has been questioned. We review some of these arguments, focusing on literatures (evo-devo, developmental plasticity, inclusive inheritance and niche construction) whose implications for evolution can be interpreted in two ways—one that preserves the internal structure of contemporary evolutionary theory and one that points towards an alternative conceptual framework. The latter, which we label the 'extended evolutionary synthesis' (EES), retains the fundaments of evolutionary theory, but differs in its emphasis on the role of constructive processes in development and evolution, and reciprocal portrayals of causation. In the EES, developmental processes, operating through developmental bias, inclusive inheritance and niche construction, share responsibility for the direction and rate of evolution, the origin of character variation and organism-environment complementarity. We spell out the structure, core assumptions and novel predictions of the EES, and show how it can be deployed to stimulate and advance research in those fields that study or use evolutionary biology.

A Philosophical Perspective on Evolutionary Systems Biology

Evolutionary systems biology (ESB) is an emerging hybrid approach that integrates methods, models, and data from evolutionary and systems biology. Drawing on themes that arose at a cross-disciplinary meeting on ESB in 2013, we discuss in detail some of the explanatory friction that arises in the interaction between evolutionary and systems biology. These tensions appear because of different modeling approaches, diverse explanatory aims and strategies, and divergent views about the scope of the evolutionary synthesis. We locate these discussions in the context of long-running philosophical deliberations on explanation, modeling, and theoretical synthesis. We show how many of the issues central to ESB's progress can be understood as general philosophical problems. The benefits of addressing these philosophical issues feed back into philosophy too, because ESB provides excellent examples of scientific practice for the development of philosophy of science and philosophy of biology.

Engineering and Biology: Counsel for a Continued Relationship

Biologists frequently draw on ideas and terminology from engineering. Evolutionary systems biology-with its circuits, switches, and signal processing-is no exception. In parallel with the frequent links drawn between biology and engineering, there is ongoing criticism against this cross-fertilization, using the argument that over-simplistic metaphors from engineering are likely to mislead us as engineering is fundamentally different from biology. In this article, we clarify and reconfigure the link between biology and engineering, presenting it in a more favorable light. We do so by, first, arguing that critics operate with a narrow and incorrect notion of how engineering actually works, and of what the reliance on ideas from engineering entails. Second, we diagnose and diffuse one significant source of concern about appeals to engineering, namely that they are inherently and problematically metaphorical. We suggest that there is plenty of fertile ground left for a continued, healthy relationship between engineering and biology.

Androgen modulation of social decision-making mechanisms in the brain: an integrative and embodied perspective

Apart from their role in reproduction androgens also respond to social challenges and this response has been seen as a way to regulate the expression of behavior according to the perceived social environment (Challenge hypothesis, Wingfield et al., 1990). This hypothesis implies that social decision-making mechanisms localized in the central nervous system (CNS) are open to the influence of peripheral hormones that ultimately are under the control of the CNS through the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis. Therefore, two puzzling questions emerge at two different levels of biological analysis: (1) Why does the brain, which perceives the social environment and regulates androgen production in the gonad, need feedback information from the gonad to adjust its social decision-making processes? (2) How does the brain regulate gonadal androgen responses to social challenges and how do these feedback into the brain? In this paper, we will address these two questions using the integrative approach proposed by Niko Tinbergen, who proposed that a full understanding of behavior requires its analysis at both proximate (physiology, ontogeny) and ultimate (ecology, evolution) levels.

On evolutionary causes and evolutionary processes

In this essay I consider how biologists understand 'causation' and 'evolutionary process', drawing attention to some idiosyncrasies in the use of these terms. I suggest that research within the evolutionary sciences has been channeled in certain directions and not others by scientific conventions, many of which have now become counterproductive. These include the views (i) that evolutionary processes are restricted to those phenomena that directly change gene frequencies, (ii) that understanding the causes of both ecological change and ontogeny is beyond the remit of evolutionary biology, and (iii) that biological causation can be understood by a dichotomous proximate-ultimate distinction, with developmental processes perceived as solely relevant to proximate causation. I argue that the notion of evolutionary process needs to be broadened to accommodate phenomena such as developmental bias and niche construction that bias the course of evolution, but do not directly change gene frequencies, and that causation in biological systems is fundamentally reciprocal in nature. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: In Honor of Jerry Hogan.

The niche construction perspective: a critical appraisal

Niche construction refers to the activities of organisms that bring about changes in their environments, many of which are evolutionarily and ecologically consequential. Advocates of niche construction theory (NCT) believe that standard evolutionary theory fails to recognize the full importance of niche construction, and consequently propose a novel view of evolution, in which niche construction and its legacy over time (ecological inheritance) are described as evolutionary processes, equivalent in importance to natural selection. Here, we subject NCT to critical evaluation, in the form of a collaboration between one prominent advocate of NCT, and a team of skeptics. We discuss whether niche construction is an evolutionary process, whether NCT obscures or clarifies how natural selection leads to organismal adaptation, and whether niche construction and natural selection are of equivalent explanatory importance. We also consider whether the literature that promotes NCT overstates the significance of niche construction, whether it is internally coherent, and whether it accurately portrays standard evolutionary theory. Our disagreements reflect a wider dispute within evolutionary theory over whether the neo-Darwinian synthesis is in need of reformulation, as well as different usages of some key terms (e.g., evolutionary process).

Tinbergen's four questions: an appreciation and an update

This year is the 50th anniversary of Tinbergen's (1963) article 'On aims and methods of ethology', where he first outlined the four 'major problems of biology'. The classification of the four problems, or questions, is one of Tinbergen's most enduring legacies, and it remains as valuable today as 50 years ago in highlighting the value of a comprehensive, multifaceted understanding of a characteristic, with answers to each question providing complementary insights. Nonetheless, much has changed in the intervening years, and new data call for a more nuanced application of Tinbergen's framework. The anniversary would seem a suitable opportunity to reflect on the four questions and evaluate the scientific work that they encourage.

More on how and why: a response to commentaries

We are grateful to the commentators for taking the time to respond to our article. Too many interesting and important points have been raised for us to tackle them all in this response, and so in the below we have sought to draw out the major themes. These include problems with both the term 'ultimate causation' and the proximate-ultimate causation dichotomy more generally, clarification of the meaning of reciprocal causation, discussion of issues related to the nature of development and phenotypic plasticity and their roles in evolution, and consideration of the need for an extended evolutionary synthesis.

Specific-gene studies of evolutionary mechanisms in an age of genome-wide surveying

The molecular tools of genomics have great power to reveal patterns of genetic difference within or among species, but must be complemented by the mechanistic study of the genetic variants found if these variants' evolutionary meaning is to be well understood. Central to this purpose is knowledge of the organisms' genotype-phenotype-environment interactions, which embody biological adaptation and constraint and thus drive natural selection. The history of this approach is briefly reviewed. Strategies embracing the complementarity of genomics and specific-gene studies in evolution are considered. Implementation of these strategies, and examples showing their feasibility and power, are discussed. Initial generalizations emphasize: (1) reproducibility of adaptive mechanisms; (2) evolutionary co-importance of variation in protein sequences and expression; (3) refinement of rudimentary molecular functions as an origin of evolutionary innovations; (4) identification of specific-gene mechanisms as underpinnings of genomic or quantitative genetic variation; and (5) multiple forms of adaptive or constraining epistasis among genes. Progress along these lines will advance understanding of evolution and support its use in addressing urgent medical and environmental applications.