Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness

Farmed fish welfare research status in Latin America: A review

Latin America (LATAM) plays an important role in the world's production of aquatic animals and is the second most productive region in the world. Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Perú contribute 87% of LATAM aquaculture production. The fish welfare in aquaculture is of increasing public concern globally, and LATAM is no exception, growing in importance for fish farmers, authorities, and scientists. Although the topic is somewhat controversial, the welfare status of farmed fish has direct implications for their production and the sustainability of the industry. Therefore, this study analyses scientific papers on animal welfare in farmed fish, from the six countries in LATAM with the highest aquaculture production. The main objectives were to quantify the number of papers published between 2000 and 2023 on fish welfare by using scientific databases. A total of 285 papers were found for the period analysed. The country with the largest number of publications was Brazil (75.79%), followed by Chile (13.33%), Mexico (7.02%), Peru (1.75%), Ecuador, and Colombia (1.05%). Nile tilapia was the most studied species, appearing in 30.18% of the publications, with most of the studies mainly dealing with nutrition (32.28%). The growth of aquaculture is leading to joint efforts to generate knowledge on welfare issues, especially in poorly studied species with high production, to create policies that help minimize welfare risks. Given this, the insights generated by this review could be a useful addition to approaches investigating the trends and concepts of fish welfare in LATAM.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

What Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience

Debates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's discovery of trout nociceptors, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. The question of whether fish feel pain - or indeed anything at all - therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. Here, we try to bridge the divide. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify "red herring" measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P); spines disconnected from brains (S); decerebrate mammals and birds (D); and humans in unaware states (U). These "S.P.U.D. subjects" can show approach/withdrawal; react with apparent emotion; change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia; discriminate between stimuli; display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning; and even learn simple instrumental responses. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for "mental time travel" and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Because "bullet-proof" neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient; laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections; and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.

Changing dietary patterns is necessary to improve the sustainability of Western diets from a One Health perspective

Western diets are associated with multiple environmental impacts and risks to human health. European countries are gradually taking action towards the Farm to Fork Strategy, embracing a Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) perspective to promote the sustainability of food production and consumption. Although LCA enables the comprehensive assessment of environmental impacts, diet-related human health and animal welfare impacts are often underrepresented. This study proposes integrating additional indicators into LCA to evaluate the sustainability of diets under the One Health (OH) approach, which holistically considers interlinked complex health issues between humans, animals and the environment. Human health loss is estimated according to risk factors for non-communicable diseases; while animal welfare is measured as animal life years suffered, loss of animal lives and loss of morally-adjusted animal lives. The extended LCA framework is applied to men and women's reference diets in the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW); compared to three optimized dietary scenarios under nutritional constraints: 1) the national dietary guidelines, 2) a vegan diet (VD) and 3) a Mediterranean diet (MD). Men's reference diet causes greater impacts than women's across OH dimensions due to the higher food consumption, especially of ready-to-eat meals, sausages, meat, and sweetened and alcoholic beverages. Both reference diets are associated with risk factors for cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, stroke and neoplasms. Besides meat, consumption of honey, fish and seafood has the greatest impact on animal welfare, because of the high number of individuals involved. Alternative diets improve the sustainability of food consumption in NRW, although trade-offs arise: MD worsens animal suffering due to the higher fish intake; water use increases in both VD and MD due the higher intake of nuts and vegetables. Results highlight the importance of including animal welfare and human health indicators in LCA to better elucidate the potential impacts of diets characterized by the high intake of animal products, from a OH perspective.

The Olfactory Tract: Basis for Future Evolution in Response to Rapidly Changing Ecological Niches

Within the forebrain the olfactory sensory system is unique from other sensory systems both in the projections of the olfactory tract and the ongoing neurogenic potential, characteristics conserved across vertebrates. Olfaction plays a crucial role in behaviors such as mate choice, food selection, homing, escape from predators, among others. The olfactory forebrain is intimately associated with the limbic system, the region of the brain involved in learning, memory, and emotions through interactions with the endocrine system and the autonomic nervous system. Previously thought to lack a limbic system, we now know that teleost fishes process emotions, have exceptional memories, and readily learn, behaviors that are often associated with olfactory cues. The association of neuromodulatory hormones, and more recently, the immune system, with odor cues underlies behaviors essential for maintenance and adaptation within natural ecological niches. Increasingly anthropogenic perturbations affecting ecosystems are impacting teleost fishes worldwide. Here we examine the role of the olfactory tract as the neural basis for the integration of environmental cues and resulting behaviors necessary for the regulation of biotic interactions that allow for future adaptation as the climate spins out of control.

Welfare Assessment of Adult Laboratory Zebrafish: A Practical Guide

Teleost fish such as Danio rerio (zebrafish) have been successfully used in biomedical research since decades. Genetically altered fish lines obtained by state-of-the-art genetic technologies are serving as well-known model organisms. In Europe, following Directive 2010/63/EU, generation, breeding, and husbandry of new genetically altered lines of laboratory animals require governmental state approval in case pain, suffering, distress, or long-lasting harm to the offspring derived by breeding of these lines cannot be excluded. The identification and assessment of pain, distress, or harm, according to a severity classification of mild, moderate, severe, or humane endpoint, became a new challenging task for all scientists, animal technicians, and veterinarians for daily work with laboratory zebrafish. In this study, we describe the performance of the assessment of welfare parameters of selected pathologic phenotypes and abnormalities frequently found in laboratory fish facilities based on veterinary, biological, and physiological aspects by using a dedicated score sheet. In a colony of zebrafish, we evaluated the frequency of genotype-independent abnormalities observed within 3 years. We give examples for severity classification and measures once an abnormality has been identified according to the 3Rs (Replacement, Reduction and Refinement).

How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient?

There is growing interest in machine ethics in the question of whether and under what circumstances an artificial intelligence would deserve moral consideration. This paper explores a particular type of moral status that the author terms psychological moral patiency, focusing on the epistemological question of what sort of evidence might lead us to reasonably conclude that a given artificial system qualified as having this status. The paper surveys five possible criteria that might be applied: intuitive judgments, assessments of intelligence, the presence of desires and autonomous behavior, evidence of sentience, and behavioral equivalence. The author suggests that despite its limitations, the latter approach offers the best way forward, and defends a variant of that, termed the cognitive equivalence strategy. In short, this holds that an artificial system should be considered a psychological moral patient to the extent that it possesses cognitive mechanisms shared with other beings such as nonhuman animals whom we also consider to be psychological moral patients.

Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects

How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain's awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that disruption to either processing streams or awareness states perturb subjective experience. Given that the brain must predict the nature of sensory stimuli, we reason that conscious awareness is itself dependent on predictions generated by hierarchically organized forward models of the organism's internal sensory processing. The operation of these forward models requires a specialized neural architecture and hence any nervous system lacking this architecture is unable to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. This approach removes difficulties associated with extrapolations from behavioral and brain homologies typically employed in addressing whether an animal can feel. Using nociception as a model sensation, we show here that the Drosophila brain lacks the required internal neural connectivity to implement the computations required of hierarchical forward models. Consequently, we conclude that Drosophila, and those insects with similar neuroanatomy, do not subjectively experience noxious stimuli and therefore cannot feel pain.

Animal models of pain: Diversity and benefits

Chronic pain is a maladaptive neurological disease that remains a major health problem. A deepening of our knowledge on mechanisms that cause pain is a prerequisite to developing novel treatments. A large variety of animal models of pain has been developed that recapitulate the diverse symptoms of different pain pathologies. These models reproduce different pain phenotypes and remain necessary to examine the multidimensional aspects of pain and understand the cellular and molecular basis underlying pain conditions. In this review, we propose an overview of animal models, from simple organisms to rodents and non-human primates and the specific traits of pain pathologies they model. We present the main behavioral tests for assessing pain and investing the underpinning mechanisms of chronic pathological pain. The validity of animal models is analysed based on their ability to mimic human clinical diseases and to predict treatment outcomes. Refine characterization of pathological phenotypes also requires to consider pain globally using specific procedures dedicated to study emotional comorbidities of pain. We discuss the limitations of pain models when research findings fail to be translated from animal models to human clinics. But we also point to some recent successes in analgesic drug development that highlight strategies for improving the predictive validity of animal models of pain. Finally, we emphasize the importance of using assortments of preclinical pain models to identify pain subtype mechanisms, and to foster the development of better analgesics.

The Zebrafish Amygdaloid Complex - Functional Ground Plan, Molecular Delineation, and Everted Topology

In mammals and other tetrapods, a multinuclear forebrain structure, called the amygdala, forms the neuroregulatory core essential for emotion, cognition, and social behavior. Currently, higher circuits of affective behavior in anamniote non-tetrapod vertebrates (“fishes”) are poorly understood, preventing a comprehensive understanding of amygdala evolution. Through molecular characterization and evolutionary-developmental considerations, we delineated the complex amygdala ground plan of zebrafish, whose everted telencephalon has made comparisons to the evaginated forebrains of tetrapods challenging. In this radical paradigm, thirteen telencephalic territories constitute the zebrafish amygdaloid complex and each territory is distinguished by conserved molecular properties and structure-functional relationships with other amygdaloid structures. Central to our paradigm, the study identifies the teleostean amygdaloid nucleus of the lateral olfactory tract (nLOT), an olfactory integrative structure that links dopaminergic telencephalic groups to the amygdala alongside redefining the putative zebrafish olfactory pallium (“Dp”). Molecular characteristics such as the distribution of substance P and the calcium-binding proteins parvalbumin (PV) and calretinin (CR) indicate, that the zebrafish extended centromedial (autonomic and reproductive) amygdala is predominantly located in the GABAergic and isl1-negative territory. Like in tetrapods, medial amygdaloid (MeA) nuclei are defined by the presence of substance P immunoreactive fibers and calretinin-positive neurons, whereas central amygdaloid (CeA) nuclei lack these characteristics. A detailed comparison of lhx5-driven and vGLut2a-driven GFP in transgenic reporter lines revealed ancestral topological relationships between the thalamic eminence (EmT), the medial amygdala (MeA), the nLOT, and the integrative olfactory pallium. Thus, the study explains how the zebrafish amygdala and the complexly everted telencephalon topologically relate to the corresponding structures in mammals indicating that an elaborate amygdala ground plan evolved early in vertebrates, in a common ancestor of teleosts and tetrapods.

"But It's Just a Fish": Understanding the Challenges of Applying the 3Rs in Laboratory Aquariums in the UK

Adopting a social science perspective and qualitative methodology on the problem of laboratory fish welfare, this paper examines some underlying social factors and drivers that influence thinking, priorities and implementation of fish welfare initiatives and the 3Rs (Replacement, Reduction and Refinement) for fish. Drawing on original qualitative interviews with stakeholders, animal technologists and scientists who work with fish-especially zebrafish-to illustrate the case, this paper explores some key social factors influencing the take up of the 3Rs in this context. Our findings suggest the relevance of factors including ambient cultural perceptions of fish, disagreements about the evidence on fish pain and suffering, the discourse of regulators, and the experiences of scientists and animal technologists who develop and put the 3Rs into practice. The discussion is focused on the UK context, although the main themes will be pertinent around the world.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

Is "cooling then freezing" a humane way to kill amphibians and reptiles?

What is the most humane way to kill amphibians and small reptiles that are used in research? Historically, such animals were often killed by cooling followed by freezing, but this method was outlawed by ethics committees because of concerns that ice-crystals may form in peripheral tissues while the animal is still conscious, putatively causing intense pain. This argument relies on assumptions about the capacity of such animals to feel pain, the thermal thresholds for tissue freezing, the temperature-dependence of nerve-impulse transmission and brain activity, and the magnitude of thermal differentials within the bodies of rapidly-cooling animals. A review of published studies casts doubt on those assumptions, and our laboratory experiments on cane toads (Rhinella marina) show that brain activity declines smoothly during freezing, with no indication of pain perception. Thus, cooling followed by freezing can offer a humane method of killing cane toads, and may be widely applicable to other ectotherms (especially, small species that are rarely active at low body temperatures). More generally, many animal-ethics regulations have little empirical basis, and research on this topic is urgently required in order to reduce animal suffering.