The cognitive based approach of capacity assessment in psychiatry: a philosophical critique of the MacCAT-T

Mental capacity assessment in the multi-professional real world: a qualitative study of six areas of uncertainty

Background

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 of England and Wales is a ground-breaking piece of legislation with reach into healthcare, social care and legal settings. Professionals have needed to develop skills to assess mental capacity and handle malign influence, but it is unclear how assessments are implemented in real world settings. Our previously reported survey found professionals juggling competing resources in complex systems, often struggling to stay up to date with law.The current follow-up study uses one-to-one interviews of professionals to characterise in detail six areas of uncertainty faced when assessing mental capacity, whilst suggesting ways to make improvements.

Methods

Forty-four healthcare, social care and legal professionals were interviewed, using a semi-structured topic guide. Transcripts were analysed using framework analysis: a qualitative technique built to investigate healthcare policy.

Results

Our topic guide generated 21 themes. In relation to the six areas of uncertainty: 1) Many participants stressed the importance of capturing a holistic view, adding that their own profession was best-placed for this - although a medical diagnosis was often needed. 2) The presumption of capacity was a laudable aim, though not always easy to operationalise and occasionally being open to abuse. 3) There was cautious interest in psychometric testing, providing a cognitive context for decisions. 4) Undue influence was infrequent, but remained under-emphasised in training. 5) Multi-professional assessments were common, despite doubts about fitting these within local resources and the law. 6) Remote assessment was generally acceptable, if inadequate for identifying coercion.

Conclusions

Practical constraints and competing demands were reported by professionals working within real world systems. Assessment processes must be versatile, equally applicable in routine and emergency settings, across diverse decisional types, for both generalist and specialist assessors, and able to handle coercion. Recognising these challenges will guide development of best practices in assessment and associated policy.

Decision making capacity for treatment in psychiatric inpatients: a systematic review and meta-analysis

Decision-making capacity (DMC) among psychiatric inpatients is a pivotal clinical concern. A review by Okai et al. (2007) suggested that most psychiatric inpatients have DMC for treatment, and its assessment is reliable. Nevertheless, the high heterogeneity and mixed results from other studies mean there is considerable uncertainty around this topic. This study aimed to update Okai's research by conducting a systematic review with meta-analysis to address heterogeneity. We performed a systematic search across four databases, yielding 5351 results. We extracted data from 20 eligible studies on adult psychiatric inpatients, covering DMC assessments from 2006 to May 2022. A meta-analysis was conducted on 11 papers, and a quality assessment was performed. The study protocol was registered on PROSPERO (ID: CRD42022330074). The proportion of patients with DMC for treatment varied widely based on treatment setting, the specific decision and assessment methods. Reliable capacity assessment was feasible. The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), Global Assessment of Function (GAF), and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) predicted clinical judgments of capacity. Schizophrenia and bipolar mania were linked to the highest incapacity rates, while depression and anxiety symptoms were associated with better capacity and insight. Unemployment was the only sociodemographic factor correlated with incapacity. Assessing mental capacity is replicable, with most psychiatric inpatients able to make treatment decisions. However, this capacity varies with admission stage, formal status (involuntary or voluntary), and information provided. The severity of psychopathology is linked to mental capacity, though detailed psychopathological data are limited.

Mental capacity in practice part 1: how do we really assess capacity?

Significant problems exist in understanding and implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) despite it having been in place in England and Wales for more than 15 years. Although many guidelines exist on the assessment of capacity, it is difficult to apply such guidance in practice, given the complexity of actual situations. We may know the stages of the test for capacity, but do we really understand what they mean and how to assess them? In this, the first of two articles examining the MCA and challenges in its application, we add to existing legal guidance to explore capacity assessment in detail using a clinical scenario, and use case law and case studies to illustrate the subtleties and difficulties that may arise.

Empowering patients with dementia to make legally effective decisions: a randomized controlled trial on enhancing capacity to consent to treatment

Objectives: As our society ages, the incidence of age-related diseases increases and with it the number of medical treatments that require informed consent. Capacity to consent is often categorically questioned in persons with dementia (PwD) without appropriate assessment, depriving them of their right to autonomous decision-making. Supportive structures for PwD that comply with legal requirements are lacking. The EmMa project tried to overcome this shortcoming by developing and testing possible supportive measures to enhance the informed consent process for PwD.Method: These enhanced consent procedures (ECPs) were tested in a randomized controlled trial with 40 PwD. It was hypothesized that strengths-based ECPs could improve capacity to consent to a drug treatment in PwD as measured with a semi-structured interview.Results: Against the expectations, no effect of the ECPs on capacity to consent could be found, but the ECPs improved understanding of information in PwD.Conclusion: To empower PwD in clinical settings, however, all aspects of capacity to consent should be targeted with specific aids that are implemented carefully and selectively. More research on possible aids for ECPs is urgently needed in order to enable ethically and legally robust informed consent. In particular, effective ways to improve both reasoning and appreciation are yet to be found.

[Capable or incapable of giving consent? Assessing a patient's capacity to consent: Procedures and challenges in daily clinical practice]

BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES

The capacity of patients to give consent (CTC) is an indispensable prerequisite for informed consent to medical measures. When there is doubt about a patient's CTC, careful assessment is therefore required. Despite a broad theoretical discussion about the conception of CTC and possible procedures for its assessment, there is often a lack of orientation towards binding standardized procedural guidelines in everyday clinical practice. As a consequence, the results of CTC assessments are inconsistent, revealing both interdisciplinary and interindividual variability. In order to improve the quality of CTC assessment, more detailed knowledge about the procedures as well as the problems of CTC testing is needed. Therefore, the aim of this explorative telephone survey was to get an impression of the actual procedures that clinicians apply when in doubt about a patient's CTC. In particular, participants in the survey were asked about the weighting of individual CTC criteria and the difficulties with their application.

METHODS

Based on structured questionnaires, telephone interviews with 26 physicians working in German hospitals in the fields of neurology, anaesthesiology, surgery, internal medicine, gynaecology, and reconstructive/aesthetic surgery were conducted. The answers were documented using the paper-and-pencil method, and answers to open questions were summarized with the help of a qualitative data analysis software and a thematic coding scheme.

RESULTS

The majority of respondents reported that "sometimes to very often" they had doubts about their patients' CTC, with the examination being mostly conducted in an individual approach without formalized, standardized specifications. Regarding the question about the weighting of the seven assessment criteria proposed in the questionnaire, their importance was predominantly evaluated as being in the range of "partially important" to "very important". Difficulties in the clinical assessment were indicated in relation to the patients themselves, the relationship between physicians and patients, and the assessment situation. The perception of difficulties in the examination of CTC is apparently independent of the relevance attributed to the specific criterion for CTC.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Overall, the results show a high level of agreement with the relevance of the seven CTC criteria included in the survey, but at the same time revealed various verification difficulties. Some of the respondents would like to have more support in determining their patients' CTC. The survey results suggest that precise training and adequate time resources are paramount to this sensitive medical context.

Key components of the mental capacity assessment of patients with anorexia nervosa: a study of three countries

BACKGROUND

Patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) often refuse treatment despite their extremely low nutritional status. This study investigated the methods of assessing the mental capacity of patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) who refuse treatment by physicians in Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (USA). It also identified the key points of the assessment.

METHODS

A questionnaire survey using a case vignette was conducted among physicians (Japan, n = 53; UK, n = 85; USA, n = 85) who treat eating disorders.

RESULTS

A total of 23% of physicians in Japan, 32% in the UK, and 35% in the USA reported that they believe patients with AN lack the capacity to make appropriate decisions. Physicians who considered patients with AN to have an impaired mental capacity placed significantly more emphasis on the level of psychopathological values, which are values caused by AN (and can be changed by recovery) that affect the ability to be rational, when assessing the mental capacity of these patients. Conversely, physicians who considered patients with AN to have full mental capacity placed significantly more weight on the ability to express a choice or preference.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be necessary to add the level of psychopathological values to the assessment of the mental capacity in relation to obesity fears and emotional disturbances of Patients with AN because emotions caused by psychopathological values strongly influence decision-making. By considering the level of psychopathological values, it may be feasible to reflect the actual situation during the assessment of the mental capacity of those who refuse AN treatment, thus making it more likely to overcome ethical dilemmas.

Reconsidering Informed Consent for Trans-Identified Children, Adolescents, and Young Adults

In less than a decade, the western world has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the numbers of children and adolescents seeking gender transition. Despite the precedent of years of gender-affirmative care, the social, medical and surgical interventions are still based on very low-quality evidence. The many risks of these interventions, including medicalizing a temporary adolescent identity, have come into a clearer focus through an awareness of detransitioners. The risks of gender-affirmative care are ethically managed through a properly conducted informed consent process. Its elements-deliberate sharing of the hoped-for benefits, known risks and long-term outcomes, and alternative treatments-must be delivered in a manner that promotes comprehension. The process is limited by: erroneous professional assumptions; poor quality of the initial evaluations; and inaccurate and incomplete information shared with patients and their parents. We discuss data on suicide and present the limitations of the Dutch studies that have been the basis for interventions. Beliefs about gender-affirmative care need to be separated from the established facts. A proper informed consent process can both prepare parents and patients for the difficult choices that they must make and can ease professionals' ethical tensions. Even when properly accomplished, however, some clinical circumstances exist that remain quite uncertain.

The relationship of caffeinated beverages with depressive symptoms and decision-making

BACKGROUND: Caffeine can affect depressive symptoms and decision-making. OBJECTIVE: This study aims to examine the relationship between caffeinated beverages consumption with depressive symptoms and decision-making styles. METHODS: This cross-sectional study was conducted with 432 adults working in office environment. The questionnaire consisting of individuals’ socio-demographic attributes, the frequency and the amount of caffeinated beverages consumption, the “Epidemiological Research Center-Depression (CES-D) Scale” and the “Decision-Making Styles Scale” were used. The frequency and amount of caffeinated beverages were determined using the food frequency questionnaire (FFQ). The participants were asked to choose which cup/mug they prefer to drink their caffeinated beverages and what amount they consume that beverage at a time. All the data were collected using online platforms. RESULTS: In the study, 76.7%of the participants were female and the mean age was 31.5±8.0 years. The average daily total caffeine intake of the participants was 425.8±461.4 mg and the total CES-D scale score was 17.7±11.2 points. It was found that as the amount of caffeine consumed increased, intuitive decision-making decreased and depressive symptoms increased (p <  0.05). In linear regression analysis, total caffeine consumption was found to be a significant predictor for the intuitive decision-making score (B: –0.151; p:0.002). When caffeine consumption is controlled, intuitive and rational decision making decreases with increasing depressive symptoms while addiction and avoidance decision making increased (p <  0.05). CONCLUSIONS: As a result, the amount of caffeine consumed daily was related to intuitive decision-making but did not effect depression. It has been observed that depressive symptoms affect decision-making styles in different ways. To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the effects of caffeine consumption on depression and decision-making styles. Accordingly, future studies may focus on the link between caffeine consumption, depression, and decision-making styles in larger populations and the mechanisms that influence this relationship.

Applying decision-making capacity criteria in practice: A content analysis of court judgments

BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES

Many jurisdictions use a functional model of capacity with similar legal criteria, but there is a lack of agreed understanding as to how to apply these criteria in practice. We aimed to develop a typology of capacity rationales to describe court practice in making capacity determinations and to guide professionals approaching capacity assessments.

METHODS

We analysed all published cases from courts in England and Wales [Court of Protection (CoP) judgments, or Court of Appeal cases from the CoP] containing rationales for incapacity or intact capacity(n = 131). Qualitative content analysis was used to develop a typology of capacity rationales or abilities. Relationships between the typology and legal criteria for capacity [Mental Capacity Act (MCA)] and diagnoses were analysed.

RESULTS

The typology had nine categories (reliability: kappa = 0.63): 1) to grasp information or concepts, 2) to imagine/ abstract, 3) to remember, 4) to appreciate, 5) to value/ care, 6) to think through the decision non-impulsively, 7) to reason, 8) to give coherent reasons, and 9) to express a stable preference. Rationales most frequently linked to MCA criterion 'understand' were ability to grasp information or concepts (43%) or to appreciate (42%), and to MCA criterion 'use or weigh' were abilities to appreciate (45%) or to reason (32%). Appreciation was the most frequently cited rationale across all diagnoses. Judges often used rationales without linking them specifically to any MCA criteria (42%).

CONCLUSIONS

A new typology of rationales could bridge the gap between legal criteria for decision-making capacity and phenomena encountered in practice, increase reliability and transparency of assessments, and provide targets for decision-making support.

Mental Capacity, Decision-Making and Emotion Dysregulation in Severe Enduring Anorexia Nervosa

Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa (SE-AN) is a chronic eating disorder characterized by long-term starvation and its physical and psychological sequelae, and severe loss of quality of life. Interactions between neurobiological changes caused by starvation, vulnerability (personality) traits, and eating behaviors play a role. Several other factors, such as increased fear and decreased social cognition, have also been found in relation to SE-AN. With this in mind, we aim to add to the understanding of SE-AN by introducing the concept of mental capacity (MC), which refers to the ability to understand and process information-both on a cognitive and an emotional level-and then make a well-informed choice. MC may be an important construct within the context of SE-AN. Furthermore, we will argue how impaired decision-making processes may underlie, fuel, or contribute to limited MC in SE-AN. We will speculate on the importance of dysfunctional emotion processing and anxiety-related processes (e.g., a high intolerance of uncertainty) and their potential interaction with decision-making. Lastly, we will propose how these aspects, which to our knowledge have previously received little attention, may advise research and treatment or help in dealing with the "want but cannot" situation of life-threatening AN.

Dementia, Treatment Decisions, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities. A New Framework for Old Problems

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been at the center of considerable debate in the field of mental health. The discussion has caught up in particular after the publication of General Comment No. 1 in which the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities proposes a particularly radical interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention. Such a document has triggered skeptic and at times hostile reactions especially by psychiatrists, together with some positive comments. In this context, there is sometimes the tendency to focus only on the problematic aspects of the rights and support based model proposed by the CRPD and its Committee, forgetting that also "pre-CRPD" legislations on legal capacity present significant shortcomings. In this contribution I focus on the paradigmatic case of treatment decisions of people living with dementia with the aim to show how a number of provisions emerging from the CRPD and General Comment No. 1 can contribute to overcome the issues characterizing the traditional model of legal capacity and consent to treatment. First, I provide a brief overview of the provisions contained in the CRPD and General Comment No.1, summarizing the debate in this area. Then, I move to the case of treatment decisions of people living with dementia, analysing the main issues posed by the traditional model of capacity still characterizing European legislations. I will show how such problems and the solutions previously advanced by academics and practitioners resound in many ways with those identified by the CRPD and its Committee. In the second part, I analyse one by one the main provisions proposed by the CRPD and the Committee, studying how they can be applied in the area of treatment decisions of people living with dementia. In this context I point out the possible interpretations of the various provisions and their pros and cons, also referring to ongoing initiatives providing an insight on how such norms might work in practice.

Age, psychiatry admission status and linear mental capacity for treatment decisions

The relationship between age and mental capacity among psychiatry inpatients is not fully understood. We aimed to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions in voluntary and involuntary psychiatry inpatients in Ireland and, in this analysis of our data-set, to elucidate the linear relationship, if any, between linear (as opposed to categorical) mental capacity and age. We used the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients (176 voluntary and 39 involuntary) in four psychiatry admission units in Ireland. Mean age was 46.2 years and majorities were male (58.1%), never married (74.0%), unemployed (64.2%) and of Irish ethnicity (87.0%). The most common primary diagnoses were schizophrenia and related disorders (42.8%) followed by affective disorders (36.7%). On multi-variable linear regression analysis, linear mental capacity was significantly associated with voluntary admission status, being employed, having a primary diagnosis other than schizophrenia or a related disorder, and younger age. Together, these factors accounted for 44.4% of the variance in mental capacity between participants. Overall, while increased age is associated with diminished mental capacity, other factors appear more significant, including involuntary admission status which is likely an indicator of symptom severity. There is a need for further research to (a) elucidate the relationships between the significant factors identified in this study and the cognitive status of patients (which impacts on assessments of mental capacity); (b) identify and elucidate other factors of likely relevance to mental capacity (e.g. medical illness, medication use); and (c) translate these findings into targeted interventions to support decision-making in clinical practice among psychiatry inpatients, especially those with involuntary status.

Concordance of mental capacity assessments based on legal and clinical criteria: A cross-sectional study of psychiatry inpatients

This study aimed to compare assessments of mental capacity based on legal criteria with assessments based on clinical criteria among psychiatry inpatients to establish the concordance, if any, between these two approaches to assessing mental capacity. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients (176 voluntary and 39 involuntary) in four psychiatry admission units in Ireland using both legal criteria (Ireland's Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015) and clinical criteria (the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment; MacCAT-T). Over one third of participants (34.9%) lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions according to the legal criteria. Mental incapacity was associated with involuntary admission status, being unemployed, a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related disorder, and older age. Patients who lacked mental capacity according to the legislation scored significantly lower on all subscales of the MacCAT-T than patients who had mental capacity. We conclude that mental capacity assessments based on legal criteria correlate closely with those based on clinical criteria. These findings support current legal definitions of mental incapacity in Ireland and other jurisdictions with similar legislation (e.g. England and Wales).

Categorical mental capacity for treatment decisions among psychiatry inpatients in Ireland

This study aimed to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions among psychiatry inpatients in Ireland and explore the relationship, if any, between mental capacity and various demographics and clinical variables. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients in four psychiatry admission units. Almost half of the participants were female and the most common diagnoses were schizophrenia or a related disorder and affective disorders. Overall, 1.9% of participants lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions; 50.7% had partial mental capacity; and 47.4% had full mental capacity. These proportions did not differ between female and male patients. On multi-variable regression analysis, greater mental capacity was significantly associated with, in order of strength of association, voluntary admission status, Irish ethnicity, being employed and younger age. However, while these relationships were statistically significant (i.e. were unlikely to have occurred by chance), together they accounted for just 27.6% of the variance in mental capacity between participants (i.e. they were not very strong). The relatively high rate of "partial mental capacity" identified in our work suggests that decision-making supports are likely to be of substantial importance in assisting psychiatry inpatients making decisions about treatment, especially involuntary inpatients whose mental capacity is especially likely to be impaired. Future research could usefully clarify and quantify the role of cognitive and other factors in relation to the unexplained variance (72.4%) in mental capacity identified in this study; and explore which models of supported decision-making are most likely to assist the substantial proportion (50.7%) of psychiatry inpatients who have partial mental capacity for treatment decisions, as well as the minority lacking such mental capacity (1.9%).

How should the law determine capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia?

This article critically assesses the way a certain court has determined the capacity of a person diagnosed with anorexia to refuse medical treatment. It is shown that when making this determination, the court has adopted a process of circular reasoning, meaning anyone with the diagnosis will be found to lack capacity to refuse its treatment. This circular reasoning means that indicia of capacity that ought to be considered by the court is ignored. The result is a procedure in which the anorexic patient has no voice, and an outcome against which he or she has no effective legal recourse. This problem, it is argued, can be overcome in two ways. Firstly, courts must make sure that the 'functional' test of capacity is properly applied, meaning any finding of incapacity must rest on evidenced deficits in decision-making ability. Secondly, courts must properly engage with the subjective reasoning of the person making the treatment refusal.

Who can decide? Prevalence of mental incapacity for treatment decisions in medical and surgical hospital inpatients in Ireland

BACKGROUND

The prevalence of mental incapacity for treatment decisions among medical and surgical hospital inpatients is poorly understood or not known in many countries, including Ireland.

AIM

To assess the prevalence of mental incapacity in hospital inpatients in Ireland.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional observational study of mental incapacity for treatment decisions.

METHODS

We assessed mental capacity in 300 randomly selected hospital inpatients in 2 general hospitals in Dublin (urban) and Portlaoise (rural), in Ireland, using the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T).

RESULTS

Mean MacCAT-T score was 14.80 (SD: 8.40) out of a possible maximum of 20 (with a higher score indicating greater mental capacity). Over one quarter of participants (27.7%; n = 83) lacked the mental capacity for treatment decisions; 1.7% (n = 5) had partial capacity and 70.7% (n = 212) had full capacity. Scores for each of the four sub-scales of the MacCAT-T were generally consistent across the four key areas of understanding, appreciation, reasoning and expressing a choice.

CONCLUSIONS

Mental incapacity for treatment decisions is common in medical and surgical hospital inpatients in Ireland. This issue both merits and requires greater attention in clinical practice, research and legislation.

Assessment of mental capacity to consent to treatment in anorexia nervosa: A comparison of clinical judgment and MacCAT-T and consequences for clinical practice

Informed consent requires adequate mental capacity to consent to treatment. Mental capacity (MC) to consent to treatment refers to the ability to make medical decisions. MC is assessed in a general psychiatric interview, but this clinical assessment is known to overestimate mental capacity in patients and the inter rater reliability is low. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) has emerged as the gold standard to assess mental capacity to consent to treatment. The MacCAT-T is a semi-structured interview designed to aid clinicians in this assessment and has shown good inter rater reliability in patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders, but has hardly been studied in patients with anorexia nervosa. Patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) regularly avoid treatment, even when severely ill and discussion includes assessing MC to consent to treatment. The aim of this study is to compare clinical judgment and the MacCAT-T in evaluating MC in patients with AN which in turn may influence use of the MacCAT-T in daily practice. In a sample of 70 consecutively referred severely ill patients with AN with a mean BMI of 15.5 kg/m² and a mean duration of illness of 8.6 years, clinical assessment of MC by experienced psychiatrists and the outcome of the MacCAT-T interview were compared. Agreement (κ-value) was calculated. Agreement between clinical assessment and outcome of the MacCAT-T was questionable (κ 0.23). Unlike in other psychiatric populations, clinicians judged a high proportion of patients with AN as having diminished MC. The MacCAT-T can be useful in assessing MC in AN when used in addition to clinical judgment to aid clinicians in complex cases. Why clinicians judge a relatively high proportion of patients with AN as having diminished MC, in contrast to lower proportions in other psychiatric disorders, is an area in need of further research.

Euthanasia and assisted suicide for people with an intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder: an examination of nine relevant euthanasia cases in the Netherlands (2012-2016)

BACKGROUND

Euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) have been legally possible in the Netherlands since 2001, provided that statutory due care criteria are met, including: (a) voluntary and well-considered request; (b) unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement; (c) informing the patient; (d) lack of a reasonable alternative; (e) independent second physician's opinion. 'Unbearable suffering' must have a medical basis, either somatic or psychiatric, but there is no requirement of limited life expectancy. All EAS cases must be reported and are scrutinised by regional review committees (RTE). The purpose of this study was to investigate whether any particular difficulties arise when the EAS due care criteria are applied to patients with an intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorder.

METHODS

The 416 case summaries available on the RTE website (2012-2016) were searched for intellectual disability (6) and autism spectrum disorder (3). Direct content analysis was used on these nine cases.

RESULTS

Assessment of decisional capacity was mentioned in eight cases, but few details given; in two cases, there had been uncertainty or disagreement about capacity. Two patients had progressive somatic conditions. For most, suffering was due to an inability to cope with changing circumstances or increasing dependency; in several cases, suffering was described in terms of characteristics of living with an autism spectrum disorder, rather than an acquired medical condition. Some physicians struggled to understand the patient's perspective. Treatment refusal was a common theme, leading physicians to conclude that EAS was the only remaining option. There was a lack of detail on social circumstances and how patients were informed about their prognosis.

CONCLUSIONS

Autonomy and decisional capacity are highly complex for patients with intellectual disabilities and difficult to assess; capacity tests in these cases did not appear sufficiently stringent. Assessment of suffering is particularly difficult for patients who have experienced life-long disability. The sometimes brief time frames and limited number of physician-patient meetings may not be sufficient to make a decision as serious as EAS. The Dutch EAS due care criteria are not easily applied to people with intellectual disabilities and/or autism spectrum disorder, and do not appear to act as adequate safeguards.

Is decision-making capacity an "essentially contested" concept in pediatrics?

Key legislations in many countries emphasize the importance of involving children in decisions regarding their own health at a level commensurate with their age and capacities. Research is engaged in developing tools to assess capacity in children in order to facilitate their responsible involvement. These instruments, however, are usually based on the cognitive criteria for capacity assessment as defined by Appelbaum and Grisso and thus ill adapted to address the life-situation of children. The aim of this paper is to revisit and critically reflect upon the current definitions of decision-making capacity. For this purpose, we propose to see capacity through the lens of essential contestability as it warns us against any reification of what it means to have capacity. Currently, capacity is often perceived of as a mental or cognitive ability which somehow resides within the person, obscuring the fact that capacity is not just an objective property which can be assessed, but always operates within a dominant cultural framework that "creates" that same capacity and defines the threshold between capable and incapable in a specific situation. Defining capacity as an essentially contested concept means using it in a questioning mode and giving space to alternative interpretations that might inform and advance the debate surrounding decision-making.

Emotion and Value in the Evaluation of Medical Decision-Making Capacity: A Narrative Review of Arguments

Ever since the traditional criteria for medical decision-making capacity (understanding, appreciation, reasoning, evidencing a choice) were formulated, they have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of emotions or values that seem, according to the critics and in line with clinical experiences, essential to decision-making capacity. The aim of this paper is to provide a nuanced and structured overview of the arguments provided in the literature emphasizing the importance of these factors and arguing for their inclusion in competence evaluations. Moreover, a broader reflection on the findings of the literature is provided. Specific difficulties of formulating and measuring emotional and valuational factors are discussed inviting reflection on the possibility of handling relevant factors in a more flexible, case-specific, and context-specific way rather than adhering to a rigid set of operationalized criteria.

Cross-Cultural Adaptations of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment in Iran

Background

According to general ethical and legal principles, valid consent must be obtained before starting any procedure.

Objectives

Due to the lack of a standard tool for assessing patients’ capacity to consent to medical treatment in Iran, the present study was carried out aiming to devise a Persian version of a cross-cultural adaptation of the MacArthur competence assessment tool.

Patients and Methods

By reviewing different methods of cultural translation and adaptation for assessment tools, and due to the lack of consensus on its processes, we selected Wild’s model as one of the most comprehensive methods in this regard. Wild’s (2005) 10-stage model includes preparation, forward translation, reconciliation of the forward translation, back translation of reconciliation, back translation review, cognitive debriefing and cognitive review, and finalization, proofreading and final reporting. Using this model, we translated the MacArthur assessment tool and made it adaptable to Iranian patients.

Results

The MacArthur assessment tool is not dependent on any specific culture and language. As a result, if translation and its scientific adaptation are done based on an integrated and detailed model, the tool can be used for every culture and language. In other words, this tool is not culture-specific; so, it is applicable in cases where a translation is needed, and it can be culturally adapted to suit different societies.

Conclusions

In the present study, we are able to focus on and prove the efficacy and benefits of this measurement tool.

Do we need a threshold conception of competence?

On the standard view we assess a person's competence by considering her relevant abilities without reference to the actual decision she is about to make. If she is deemed to satisfy certain threshold conditions of competence, it is still an open question whether her decision could ever be overruled on account of its harmful consequences for her ('hard paternalism'). In practice, however, one normally uses a variable, risk dependent conception of competence, which really means that in considering whether or not to respect a person's decision-making authority we weigh her decision on several relevant dimensions at the same time: its harmful consequences, its importance in terms of the person's own relevant values, the infringement of her autonomy involved in overruling it, and her decision-making abilities. I argue that we should openly recognize the multi-dimensional nature of this judgment. This implies rejecting both the threshold conception of competence and the categorical distinction between hard and soft paternalism.

Mental capacity to consent to treatment in anorexia nervosa: explorative study

BACKGROUND

Mental capacity to consent to treatment in anorexia nervosa is a neglected area in clinical decision-making.

AIMS

To examine clinical and neuropsychological parameters associated with diminished mental capacity in anorexia nervosa.

METHOD

An explorative study was conducted in 70 adult female patients with severe anorexia nervosa. Mental capacity to consent to treatment was assessed by experienced psychiatrists. Further measurements included the MacCAT-T (to assess mental capacity status), a range of clinical measures (body mass index (BMI) and comorbidity) and neuropsychological tests assessing decision-making, central coherence and set-shifting capacity.

RESULTS

Diminished mental capacity occurs in a third of patients with severe anorexia nervosa and is associated with a low BMI, less appreciation of illness and treatment, previous treatment for anorexia nervosa, low social functioning and poor set shifting.

CONCLUSIONS

Assessment of diminished mental capacity in anorexia nervosa requires careful evaluation of not only BMI, but also the degree of appreciation of illness and treatment, history and the tendency to have a rigid thinking style.

DECLARATION OF INTEREST

None.

COPYRIGHT AND USAGE

© The Royal College of Psychiatrists 2016. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Non-Commercial, No Derivatives (CC BY-NC-ND) licence.

Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in Bipolar Affective Disorder - Self-binding directives and self-determination

For people with Bipolar Affective Disorder, a self-binding (advance) directive (SBD), by which they commit themselves to treatment during future episodes of mania, even if unwilling, can seem the most rational way to deal with an imperfect predicament. Knowing that mania will almost certainly cause enormous damage to themselves, their preferred solution may well be to allow trusted others to enforce treatment and constraint, traumatic though this may be. No adequate provision exists for drafting a truly effective SBD and efforts to establish such provision are hampered by very valid, but also paralysing ethical, clinical and legal concerns. Effectively, the autonomy and rights of people with bipolar are being 'protected' through being denied an opportunity to protect themselves. From a standpoint firmly rooted in the clinical context and experience of mania, this article argues that an SBD, based on a patient-centred evaluation of capacity to make treatment decisions (DMC-T) and grounded within the clinician-patient relationship, could represent a legitimate and ethically coherent form of self-determination. After setting out background information on fluctuating capacity, mania and advance directives, this article proposes a framework for constructing such an SBD, and considers common objections, possible solutions and suggestions for future research.

Compulsory treatment in anorexia nervosa: a review

OBJECTIVE

Compulsory in-patient refeeding of patients with severe anorexia nervosa (AN) has caused considerable controversy. The effects of such treatment on longer-term outcome are not well known. The objective of this article is to review the evidence on the outcome of compulsory treatment for AN.

METHOD

Three large databases were searched for studies regarding compulsory treatment in AN.

RESULTS

Detained patients have more severe symptoms and comorbidity and a longer duration of inpatient stay. In the short term compulsory refeeding in AN appears to be beneficial, but the longer term effects remain uncertain. Clinicians report no worsening of the therapeutic relationship after compulsory treatment.

DISCUSSION

In severe cases of AN where the patient refuses life-saving treatment compulsory treatment needs to be considered. Future research should focus on the longer term effects of compulsory treatment and also on questions related to mental capacity in AN.

Decision-making capacity should not be decisive in emergencies

Examples of patients with anorexia nervosa, depression or borderline personality disorder who have decision-making capacity as currently operationalized, but refuse treatment, are discussed. It appears counterintuitive to respect their treatment refusal because their wish seems to be fuelled by their illness and the consequences of their refusal of treatment are severe. Some proposed solutions have focused on broadening the criteria for decision-making capacity, either in general or for specific patient groups, but these adjustments might discriminate against particular groups of patients and render the process less transparent. Other solutions focus on preferences expressed when patients are not ill, but this information is often not available. The reason for such difficulties with assessing decision-making capacity is that the underlying psychological processes of normal decision-making are not well known and one cannot differentiate between unwise decisions caused by an illness or other factors. The proposed alternative, set out in this paper, is to allow compulsory treatment of patients with decision-making capacity in cases of an emergency, if the refusal is potentially life threatening, but only for a time-limited period. The argument is also made for investigating hindsight agreement, in particular after compulsory measures.

Depression and decision-making capacity for treatment or research: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Psychiatric disorders can pose problems in the assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC). This is so particularly where psychopathology is seen as the extreme end of a dimension that includes normality. Depression is an example of such a psychiatric disorder. Four abilities (understanding, appreciating, reasoning and ability to express a choice) are commonly assessed when determining DMC in psychiatry and uncertainty exists about the extent to which depression impacts capacity to make treatment or research participation decisions.

METHODS

A systematic review of the medical ethical and empirical literature concerning depression and DMC was conducted. Medline, EMBASE and PsycInfo databases were searched for studies of depression and consent and DMC. Empirical studies and papers containing ethical analysis were extracted and analysed.

RESULTS

17 publications were identified. The clinical ethics studies highlighted appreciation of information as the ability that can be impaired in depression, indicating that emotional factors can impact on DMC. The empirical studies reporting decision-making ability scores also highlighted impairment of appreciation but without evidence of strong impact. Measurement problems, however, looked likely. The frequency of clinical judgements of lack of DMC in people with depression varied greatly according to acuity of illness and whether judgements are structured or unstructured.

CONCLUSIONS

Depression can impair DMC especially if severe. Most evidence indicates appreciation as the ability primarily impaired by depressive illness. Understanding and measuring the appreciation ability in depression remains a problem in need of further research.

Physician-assisted suicide in psychiatry and loss of hope

In the Netherlands, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are considered acceptable medical practices in specific circumstances. The majority of cases of euthanasia and PAS involve patients suffering from cancer. However, in 1994 the Dutch Supreme Court in the so-called Chabot-case ruled that "the seriousness of the suffering of the patient does not depend on the cause of the suffering", thereby rejecting a distinction between physical (or somatic) and mental suffering. This opened the way for further debate about the acceptability of PAS in cases of serious and refractory mental illness. An important objection against offering PAS to mentally ill patients is that this might reinforce loss of hope, and demoralization. Based on an analysis of a reported case, this argument is evaluated. It is argued that offering PAS to a patient with a mental illness who suffers unbearably, enduringly and without prospect of relief does not necessarily imply taking away hope and can be ethically acceptable.

Physician-assisted suicide of patients with dementia. A medical ethical analysis with a special focus on patient autonomy

For many years there has been a controversial international debate on physician-assisted suicide (PAS). While proponents of PAS regularly refer to the unbearable suffering and the right of self-determination of incurably ill patients, critics often warn about the diverse risks of abuse. In our article, we aim to present ethical arguments for and against PAS for patients in an early stage of dementia. Our focus shall be on ethical questions of autonomy, conceptual and empirical findings on competence and the assessment of mental capacity to make health care decisions. While the capacity to make health care decisions represents an ethically significant precondition for PAS, it becomes more and more impaired in the course of the dementia process. We present conditions that should be met in order to ethically justify PAS for patients with dementia. From both a psychiatric and an ethical perspective, a thorough differential diagnosis and an adequate medical and psychosocial support for patients with dementia considering PAS and their relatives should be guaranteed. If, after due deliberation, the patient still wishes assistance with suicide, a transparent and documented assessment of competence should be conducted by a professional psychiatrist.

Capacity, value neutrality and the ability to consider the future

Calls for the adoption of a universal capacity approach to replace dedicated mental health law are motivated by the idea that the measures designed to protect patient autonomy in legislation such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 should apply to everyone, including people with a psychiatric diagnosis. In this article it is argued that a diachronic perspective on questions of mental capacity is necessary if capacity law is to play this broader role, but that employing this perspective in assessments of capacity undermines central patient autonomy preserving features of the legislation, which presents a moral dilemma.

Unreasonable reasons: normative judgements in the assessment of mental capacity

The recent Mental Capacity Act (2005) sets out a test for assessing a person's capacity to make treatment choices. In some cases, particularly in psychiatry, it is unclear how the criteria ought to be interpreted and applied by clinicians. In this paper, I argue that this uncertainty arises because the concept of capacity employed in the Act, and the diagnostic tools developed to assist its assessment, overlook the inherent normativity of judgements made about whether a person is using or weighing information in the decision-making process. Patients may fail on this criterion to the extent that they do not appear to be handling the information given in an appropriate way, on account of a mental impairment disrupting the way the decision process ought to proceed. Using case law and clinical examples, I describe some of the normative dimensions along which judgements of incapacity can be made, namely epistemic, evaluative and affective dimensions. Such judgements are complex and the normative standards by which a clinician may determine capacity cannot be reduced to a set of criteria. Rather, in recognizing this normativity, clinicians may better understand how clinical judgements are structured and what kinds of assumption may inform their assessment.

Depression, possibilities, and competence: a phenomenological perspective

Competent decision-making is required for informed consent. In this paper, I aim, from a phenomenological perspective, to identify the specific facets of competent decision-making that may form a challenge to depressed patients. On a phenomenological account, mood and emotions are crucial to the way in which human beings encounter the world. More precisely, mood is intimately related to the options and future possibilities we perceive in the world around us. I examine how possibilities should be understood in this context, and how, in depression, decision-making might be compromised. I suggest that, based on this analysis, a specific emphasis and alertness in assessments of competence in depressed patients is called for. In fact, close attention should be paid to the range of future possibilities depressed patients are able to perceive. In addition, providing environmental cues to these patients might be one way of enhancing their decision-making capacity. The practical suggestions arrived at are open to empirical research.

Mental capacity in psychiatric patients: Systematic review

BACKGROUND

Mental capacity is central to legal and ethical debates on the use of compulsion in psychiatry.

AIMS

To describe the clinical epidemiology of mental incapacity in patients with psychiatric disorders, including interrater reliability of assessments, frequency in the psychiatric population and associations of mental incapacity.

METHOD

Cross-sectional studies of capacity to consent to treatment for psychiatric patients were systematically reviewed from Medline, EMBASE and PsycInfo databases. Information on the reliability of assessments, frequency and associations of mental incapacity was extracted.

RESULTS

Out of 37 papers reviewed, 29 different capacity assessment tools were identified. Studies were highly heterogeneous in their measurement and definitions of capacity. Interrater reliabilities between tools were high. Studies indicate incapacity is common (median 29%) but the majority of psychiatric in-patients are capable of making treatment decisions. Psychosis, severity of symptoms, involuntary admission and treatment refusal were the strongest risk factors for incapacity.

CONCLUSIONS

Mental capacity can be reliably assessed. The majority of psychiatric in-patients have capacity, and socio-demographic variables do not have a major impact but clinical ones do.