Easy Rescues and Organ Transplantation

Opt-out paradigms for deceased organ donation are ethically incoherent

The Organ Donation Act 2019 has introduced an opt-out organ donor register in England, meaning that consent to the donation of organs upon death is presumed unless an objection during life was actively expressed. By assessing the rights of the dead over their organs, the sick to those same organs, and the role of consent in their requisition, this paper interrogates whether such paradigms for deceased organ donation are ethically justifiable. Where legal considerations are applicable, I focus on the recent changes in England as a case in point; however, this paper ultimately challenges the justifiability of opt-out systems in any form, concluding that ethical solutions to organ shortage do not lie in opt-out systems of deceased organ procurement.

Opt-Out to the Rescue: Organ Donation and Samaritan Duties

Deceased organ donation is widely considered as a case of easy rescue―that is, a case in which A may bestow considerable benefits on B while incurring negligent costs herself. Yet, the policy implications of this observation remain unclear. Drawing on Christopher H. Wellman’s samaritan account of political obligations, the paper develops a case for a so-called opt-out system, i.e., a scheme in which people are defaulted into being donors. The proposal’s key idea is that we may arrange people’s options in specific ways for the sake of others.

Why should we compensate organ donors when we can continue to take organs for free? A response to some of my critics

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective-and morally justified-means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where "market-place morality" is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves.