Service motives and profit incentives among physicians

Why physicians are lousy gatekeepers: Sicklisting decisions when patients have private information on symptoms

In social insurance systems that grant workers paid sick leave, physicians act as gatekeepers, supposedly granting sickness certificates to the sick and not to shirkers. Previous research has emphasized the physician's superior ability to judge patients' need of treatment and potential collusion with the patient vis-á-vis an insurer. What is less well understood is the role of patients' private information. We explore the case where patients have private information about the presence of nonverifiable symptoms. Anyone can then claim to experience such symptoms, reducing physicians' ability to distinguish between sick patients and shirkers. Doubting a patients' reported symptoms may prevent good medical treatment of the truly sick. We show that for all parameter values, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that some physicians trust all claims of nonverifiable symptoms, sicklisting shirkers as well as sick; for many values, every physician is trusting. In particular, if physician strategies are observable by patients, extremely strong gatekeeping preferences are required to make physicians mistrust. To limit unwarranted sicklisting, policies reducing the benefits of shirking for healthy workers may be better suited than attempts to convince physicians to be strict.

Workload in Norwegian general practice 2018 - an observational study

Background

Rising workload in general practice has been a recent cause for concern in several countries; this is also the case in Norway. Long working hours and heavy workload seem to affect recruitment and retention of regular general practitioners (RGPs). We investigated Norwegian RGPs’ workload in terms of time used on patient-related office work, administrative work, municipality tasks and other professional activities in relation to RGPs, and gender, age, employment status and size of municipality.

Methods

In early 2018, an electronic survey was sent to all 4716 RGPs in Norway. In addition to demographic background, the RGP reported minutes per day used on various tasks in the RGP practice prospectively during 1 week. Working time also included additional tasks in the municipality, other professional work and on out-of-hours primary health care. Differences were analysed by chi square test, independent t-tests, and one-way ANOVA.

Results

Among 1876 RGPs (39.8%), the mean total working hours per week was 55.6, while the mean for regular number of working hours was 49.0 h weekly. Men worked 1.5 h more than women (49.7 vs. 48.2 h, p = 0.010). Self-employed RGPs work more than salaried RGPs (49.3 vs. 42.5 h, p < 0.001), and RGPs age 55–64 years worked more than RGPs at age 30–39 (51.1 vs. 47.3 h, p < 0.001). 54.1% of the regular working hours was used on face-to-face patient work.

Conclusions

Norwegian RGPs have long working hours compared to recommended regular working hours in Norway, with small gender differences. Only half of the working time is used on face-to-face consultations. There seems to be a trend of increasing workload among Norwegian GPs, at the cost of direct patient contact. Further research should address identifying factors that can reduce long working hours.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12913-019-4283-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Assessing the role of GPs in Nordic health care systems

Purpose This paper examines the changing role of general practitioners (GPs) in Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. It aims to explore the "gate keeping" role of GPs in the face of current changes in the health care delivery systems in these countries. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from existing literature, interviews with GPs, hospital specialists and representatives of Danish regions and Norwegian Medical Association. Findings The paper contends that in all these changes, the position of the GPs in the medical division of labor has been strengthened, and patients now have increased and broadened access to choice. Research limitations/implications Health care cost and high cancer mortality rates have forced Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark to rethink their health care systems. Several attempts have been made to reduce health care cost through market reform and by strenghtening the position of GPs. The evidence suggests that in Norway and Denmark, right incentives are in place to achieve this goal. Sweden is not far behind. The paper has limitations of a small sample size and an exclusive focus on GPs. Practical implications Anecdotal evidence suggests that physicians are becoming extremely unhappy. Understanding the changing status of primary care physicians will yield valuable information for assessing the effectiveness of Nordic health care delivery systems. Social implications This study has wider implications of how GPs see their role as potential gatekeepers in the Nordic health care systems. The role of GPs is changing as a result of recent health care reforms. Originality/value This paper contends that in Norway and Denmark, right incentives are in place to strengthen the position of GPs.

The effects of introducing an electronic prescription system with no copayments

BACKGROUND

To examine the impact of introducing an electronic prescription system with no copayments on the number of prescriptions, the size of prescriptions, and the number of visits and phone calls to primary physicians.

METHODS

Fixed regression models using monthly data on per capita prescriptions claims and consultations between 2009 and 2013 at the municipality level, before and after the introduction of the electronic prescription system.

RESULTS

The electronic prescription system with no copayment increased the number of prescriptions by between 6.0 and 8.1 %. It decreased the average size of each prescription, but it did not decrease the number of consultations.

CONCLUSION

The reduced direct and indirect costs of obtaining prescriptions after the introduction of the electronic prescription system changed the financial incentives facing the patients and physicians. This led to significant changes in the level and size of prescriptions and illustrates the importance of financial incentives.

Supply and demand in physician markets: a panel data analysis of GP services in Australia

To understand the trends in any physician services market it is necessary to understand the nature of both supply and demand, but few studies have jointly examined supply and demand in these markets. This study uses aggregate panel data on general practitioner (GP) services at the Statistical Local Area level in Australia spanning eight years to estimate supply and demand equations for GP services. The structural equations of the model are estimated separately using population-weighted fixed effects panel modelling with the two stage least squares formulation of the generalised method of moments approach (GMM (2SLS)). The estimated price elasticity of demand of [Formula: see text] is comparable with other studies. The direct impact of GP density on demand, while significant, proves almost immaterial in the context of near vertical supply curves. Supply changes are therefore due to shifts in the position of the curves, partly determined by a time trend. The model is validated by comparing post-panel model predictions with actual market outcomes over a period of three years and is found to provide surprisingly accurate projections over a period of significant policy change. The study confirms the need to jointly consider supply and demand in exploring the behaviour of physician services markets.

Health inequalities and regional specific scarcity in primary care physicians: ethical issues and criteria

OBJECTIVES

A substantial body of evidence supports the beneficial health impact of an increase in primary care physicians for underserved populations. However, given that in many countries primary care physician shortages persist, what options are available to distribute physicians and how can these be seen from an ethical perspective?

METHODS

A literature review was performed on the topic of primary care physician distribution. An ethical discussion of conceivable options for decision makers that applied prominent theories of ethics was held.

RESULTS

Examples of distributing primary care physicians were categorised into five levels depending upon levels of incentive or coercion. When analysing these options through theories of ethics, contrasting, and even controversial, moral issues were identified. However, the different morally salient criteria identified are of prima facie value for decision makers.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion provides clear criteria for decision makers to consider when addressing primary care physician shortages. Yet, decision makers will still need to assess specific situations by these criteria to ensure that any decisions they make are morally justifiable.

Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives?

A longitudinal analysis of married physicians labor supply is carried out on Norwegian data from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation implies that physicians can choose among 10 different job packages which are a combination of part time/full time, hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not working. Their current choice is influenced by past available options due to a habit persistence parameter in the utility function. In the estimation we take into account the budget constraint, including all features of the tax system. Our results imply that an overall wage increase or less progressive taxation moves married physicians toward full time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. But the overall and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors are rather low compared to previous estimates.

Remuneration and organization in general practice: do GPs prefer private practice or salaried positions?

OBJECTIVE

In Norway the default payment option for general practice is a patient list system based on private practice, but other options exist. This study aimed to explore whether general practitioners (GPs) prefer private practice or salaried positions.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional online survey (QuestBack).

SETTING

General practice in Norway.

INTERVENTION

Participants were asked whether their current practice was based on (1) private practice in which the GP holds office space, equipment, and employs the staff, (2) private practice in which the GPs hire office space, equipment, or staff from the municipality, (3) salary with bonus arrangements, or (4) salary without bonus arrangement. Furthermore, they were asked which of these options they would prefer if they could choose.

SUBJECTS

GPs in Norway (n = 3270).

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Proportion of GPs who preferred private practice.

RESULTS

Responses were obtained from 1304 GPs (40%). Among these, 75% were currently in private practice, 18% in private practice with some services provided by the municipality, 4% had a fixed salary plus a proportion of service fees, whereas 3% had salary only. Corresponding figures for the preferred option were 52%, 26%, 16%, and 6%, respectively. In multivariate logistic regression analysis, size of municipality, specialty attainment, and number of patients listed were associated with preference for private practice.

CONCLUSION

The majority of Norwegian GPs had and preferred private practice, but a significant minority would prefer a salaried position. The current private practice based system in Norway seems best suited to the preferences of experienced GPs in urban communities.

Does an activity based remuneration system attract young doctors to general practice?

BACKGROUND

The use of increasingly complex payment schemes in primary care may represent a barrier to recruiting general practitioners (GP). The existing Norwegian remuneration system is fully activity based - 2/3 fee-for-service and 1/3 capitation. Given that the system has been designed and revised in close collaborations with the medical association, it is likely to correspond - at least to some degree - with the preferences of current GPs (men in majority). The objective of this paper was to study which preferences that young doctors (women in majority), who are the potential entrants to general practice have for activity based vs. salary based payment systems.

METHODS

In November-December 2010 all last year medical students and all interns in Norway (n = 1.562) were invited to participate in an online survey. The respondents were asked their opinion on systems of remuneration for GPs; inclination to work as a GP; risk attitude; income preferences; work pace tolerance. The data was analysed using one-way ANOVA and multinomial logistic regression analysis.

RESULTS

A total of 831 (53%) responded. Nearly half the sample (47%) did not consider the remuneration system to be important for their inclination to work as GP; 36% considered the current system to make general practice more attractive, while 17% considered it to make general practice less attractive. Those who are attracted by the existing system were men and those who think high income is important, while those who are deterred by the system are risk averse and less happy with a high work pace. On the question of preferred remuneration system, half the sample preferred a mix of salary and activity based remuneration (the median respondent would prefer a 50/50 mix). Only 20% preferred a fully activity based system like the existing one. A salary system was preferred by women, and those less concerned with high income, while a fully activity based system was preferred by men, and those happy with a high work pace.

CONCLUSIONS

Given a concern about low recruitment to general practice in Norway, and the fact that an increasing share of medical students is women, we were interested in the extent to which the current Norwegian remuneration system correspond with the preferences of potential GPs. This study suggests that an existing remuneration mechanism has a selection effect on who would like to become a GP. Those most attracted are income motivated men. Those deterred are risk averse, and less happy with a high work pace. More research is needed on the extent to which experienced GPs differ along the questions we asked potential GPs, as well as studying the relative importance of other attributes than payment schemes.

Market conditions and general practitioners' referrals

We study how market conditions influence referrals of patients by general practitioners (GPs). We set up a model of GP referral for the Norwegian health care system, where a GP receives capitation payment based on the number of patients in his practice, as well as fee-for-service reimbursements. A GP may accept new patients or close the practice to new patients. We model GPs as partially altruistic, and compete for patients. We show that a GP operating in a more competitive market has a higher referral rate. To compete for patients and to retain them, a GP satisfies patients' requests for referrals. Furthermore, a GP who faces a patient shortage will refer more often than a GP who does not. Tests with Norwegian GP radiology referral data support our theory.

Incentives in primary care and their impact on potentially avoidable hospital admissions

Financial incentives in primary care have been introduced with the purpose of improving appropriateness of care and containing demand. We usually observe pay-for-performance programs, but alternatives, such as pay-for-participation in improvement activities and pay-for-compliance with clinical guidelines, have also been implemented. Here, we assess the influence of different programs that ensure extra payments to GPs for containing avoidable hospitalisations. Our dataset covers patients and GPs of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for the year 2005. By separating pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs, we estimate the impact of different financial incentives on the probability of avoidable hospitalisations. As dependent variable, we consider two different sets of conditions for which timely and effective primary care should be able to limit the need for hospital admission. The first is based on 27 medical diagnostic related groups that Emilia-Romagna identifies as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care, while the second refers to the internationally recognised ambulatory care-sensitive conditions. We show that pay-for-performance schemes may have a significant effect over aggregate indicators of appropriateness, while the effectiveness of pay-for-participation schemes is adequately captured only by taking into account subpopulations affected by specific diseases. Moreover, the same scheme produces different effects on the two sets of indicators used, with performance improvements limited to the target explicitly addressed by the Italian policy maker. This evidence is consistent with the idea that a "tunnel vision" effect may occur when public authorities monitor specific sets of objectives as proxies for more general improvements in the quality of health care delivered.

Competition in general practice: prescriptions to the elderly in a list patient system

Income motivation among general practitioners (GPs) is frequently discussed in the health economics literature. The question addressed in the present study on reimbursement drugs and addictive drugs is whether increased competition among GPs, which is part of a declared health policy to improve efficiency, contributes to more prescriptions for the elderly. The dataset comprises registered data of all prescribed drugs dispensed at pharmacies from the Norwegian Prescription Database merged with data on GPs. In choosing a method, particular attention is given to the fact that patients tend to be attracted to GPs who fit their preferences. Hence, we treat the composition of the patient list as endogenous. The results indicate that the stronger competition a GP faces, the more drugs are prescribed, which implies that GPs' prescription style may conflict with their role as gatekeepers, and even worse, it may be a hazard to patients' health.