Empathic Accuracy and Cognitive and Affective Empathy in Young Adults With and Without Autism Spectrum Disorder

Individuals with high levels of autistic traits exhibit impaired cognitive but not affective theory of mind and empathy

Theory of mind (ToM) and empathy are considered key components of social cognition that are often impaired in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). However, it remains unclear whether individuals with high levels of autistic traits exhibit similar impairments in these two functions. This study examined the affective and cognitive domains of ToM and empathy in individuals with high levels of autistic traits. We recruited 84 participants with high levels and 78 participants with low levels of autistic traits to complete a set of self-reported checklists and performance-based tasks capturing affective and cognitive components of ToM and empathy. The results showed that participants with high levels of autistic traits exhibited significant impairments in cognitive but not in affective ToM and empathy compared with their counterparts with low levels of autistic traits. We also found that empathy impairments in people with high levels of autistic traits were confounded by alexithymia and depressive traits.

Do you feel me? Autism, empathic accuracy and the double empathy problem

LAY ABSTRACT

The assumption that autistic people lack empathy, particularly imagining how others feel, has been much debated and is now being challenged by an alternative view: the 'double empathy problem'. This suggests that non-autistic people may find it equally difficult to imagine how autistic people feel. Although this perspective is gaining popularity, research testing whether non-autistic people can accurately imagine and feel an autistic person's emotions is still limited. Our study used video clips of autistic and non-autistic people recounting emotional events to test if participants from the general population could: track the intensity of the narrators' emotions; name and feel the same emotion; match where the narrator felt the emotion and indicate how intensely they felt the emotion using a body map. Our results show that participants found it significantly harder to track autistic narrators' emotions compared to non-autistic narrator's emotions, especially when viewing clips of narrators feeling happy and sad. We also found that participants felt emotions more intensely in the body when viewing clips of autistic narrators compared to non-autistic narrators, especially when describing anger and fear. These findings support the double empathy problem and have strong implications for therapeutic and interpersonal relationships with autistic people.

Exploring Actual and Presumed Links between Accurately Inferring Contents of Other People's Minds and Prosocial Outcomes

The term "empathic accuracy" has been applied to people's ability to infer the contents of other people's minds-that is, other people's varying feelings and/or thoughts over the course of a social interaction. However, despite the ease of intuitively linking this skill to competence in helping professions such as counseling, the "empathic" prefix in its name may have contributed to overestimating its association with prosocial traits and behaviors. Accuracy in reading others' thoughts and feelings, like many other skills, can be used toward prosocial-but also malevolent or morally neutral-ends. Prosocial intentions can direct attention towards other people's thoughts and feelings, which may, in turn, increase accuracy in inferring those thoughts and feelings, but attention to others' thoughts and feelings does not necessarily heighten prosocial intentions, let alone outcomes.

Autistic adults' perspectives on appropriate empathic responses to others' emotions

Although the ability of autistic adults to recognize others' emotions has been extensively studied, less attention has been given to how they respond to these emotions. We examined two aspects of autistic and non-autistic adults' responsiveness to the emotional expressions of non-autistic actors: their perspectives on the appropriate way of responding to others' emotions and their awareness of others' perceptions of the likely appropriateness of such responses. Autistic (N = 63) and non-autistic (N = 67) adult samples viewed videos of 74 dyadic social interactions displaying different examples of 12 emotions expressed by one actor in response to the behavior of the other. After each video, participants (a) nominated the emotion expressed by the first actor, (b) offered their perspective on what would constitute an appropriate empathic response by the second actor, and (c) indicated their confidence in that response. Although the autistic group provided fewer appropriate empathic responses-operationalized via a panel's interpretations of normative responses-than the non-autistic group, within-group variability was marked, and the effect was weak and largely confined to basic emotions. Autistic individuals were, however, considerably less confident in their responses. Examination of the relationships between confidence in and the appropriateness of empathic responses provided no indication in either group of reliable discrimination of appropriate from inappropriate empathic responses or finely tuned metacognitive awareness of variations in appropriateness. In sum, autistic adults' perspectives on the appropriate empathic reactions to non-autistic adults' emotions were not unilaterally or markedly different to those of non-autistic adults.

Individual brain regulation as learned via neurofeedback is related to affective changes in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder

BACKGROUND

Emotions often play a role in neurofeedback (NF) regulation strategies. However, investigations of the relationship between the induced neuronal changes and improvements in affective domains are scarce in electroencephalography-based studies. Thus, we extended the findings of the first study on slow cortical potential (SCP) NF in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by linking affective changes to whole-brain activity during rest and regulation.

METHODS

Forty-one male adolescents with ASD were scanned twice at rest using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Between scans, half underwent NF training, whereas the other half received treatment as usual. Furthermore, parents reported on their child's affective characteristics at each measurement. The NF group had to alternatingly produce negative and positive SCP shifts during training and was additionally scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging while applying their developed regulation strategies.

RESULTS

No significant treatment group-by-time interactions in affective or resting-state measures were found. However, we found increases of resting activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and right inferior temporal gyrus as well as improvements in affective characteristics over both groups. Activation corresponding to SCP differentiation in these regions correlated with the affective improvements. A further correlation was found for Rolandic operculum activation corresponding to positive SCP shifts. There were no significant correlations with the respective achieved SCP regulation during NF training.

CONCLUSION

SCP NF in ASD did not lead to superior improvements in neuronal or affective functioning compared to treatment as usual. However, the affective changes might be related to the individual strategies and their corresponding activation patterns as indicated by significant correlations on the whole-brain level. Trial registration This clinical trial was registered at drks.de (DRKS00012339) on 20th April, 2017.

Italian adaptation of the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT): A new tool for the assessment of theory of mind and social norm understanding

The relevance of social cognition assessment has been formally described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5. However, social cognition tools evaluating different socio-cognitive components for Italian-speaking populations are lacking. The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) is a new social cognition measure that uses animations of everyday social interactions to assess (i) cognitive theory of mind, (ii) affective theory of mind, (iii) interpersonal social norm understanding, and (iv) intrapersonal social norm understanding. Previous studies have shown that the ESCoT is a sensitive measure of social cognition in healthy and clinical populations in the United Kingdom. This work aimed to adapt and validate the ESCoT in an Italian population of healthy adults. A translation-back-translation procedure was followed to create and refine the Italian version. Then, 94 healthy adults (47 females, mean age  35 ± 15.9) completed the ESCoT, a battery of conventional social cognition tests (Yoni; Reading the Mind in the Eyes Strange Stories, and Social Norm Questionnaire, SNQ) and measures of intelligence and executive functions. Reliability, convergent validity, and predictors of performance on the ESCoT were examined. Results demonstrated good reliability of the ESCoT and an association between the ESCoT scores and some traditional social cognition tests (Yoni cognitive subscale, SNQ). Hierarchical regression results showed that the ESCoT total score was associated with age. Also, the ESCoT subscore (intrapersonal social norm understanding) was associated with education. These findings support the ESCoT as a valid tool testing social norm understanding, a reliable measure of social cognition for an adult Italian population, and provides further evidence that the ESCoT is sensitive to age- and education-related changes in social cognition, and it is a task not affected by general cognitive functioning.

An Investigation of Behavioural and Self-Reported Cognitive Empathy Deficits in Adolescents With Autism Spectrum Disorders and Adolescents With Behavioural Difficulties

Deficits in empathy have been considered hallmarks in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) but are also considered to underlie antisocial behaviour associated with individuals with callous unemotional traits (CU). Research has suggested that individuals with autism spectrum disorders show more difficulties with cognitive empathy, and that individuals diagnosed with behaviours difficulties, characterised by CU traits and antisocial behaviour, demonstrate low affective empathy. In the current manuscript we present findings of two studies. The first study describes the validation of a new stimulus set developed for the empathic accuracy task, focused on its cognitive component. The second study compares the performance of 27 adolescents with ASD, 27 age matched typically developing adolescents and 17 adolescents with behavioural difficulties on the empathic accuracy task and a self-report measure of empathy. While, no differences were observed between the three groups across the empathy accuracy task, the adolescents with ASD and CD showed deficits in their cognitive empathy across the self-report measure. Adolescents with ASD showed lower scores in particularly their perspective taking abilities, whereas the adolescences with behavioural difficulties showed more difficulties with their online simulation. No differences in self-reported affective empathy across the three groups were observed. Clinical implications of the findings are discussed.