Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

A Commentary on Fasting of Nonclinical Research Animals

This commentary discusses the implementation of fasting in nonclinical animal experimental subjects. The short-term removal of food from cages of experimental animals is in all respects innocuous. The term "stress" is ill-defined and the statutes and regulations governing animal research laboratories that exert their authority in the performance of their operations do so without substantive grounds to base compliance. The legislative and administrative history of the implementation of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) has evolved into the development of laboratory management strategies that focus on the reduction of the biological cost of stress to the animals and the determination of when subclinical stress (eustress) becomes distress. Animal welfare is based on the tenet that in laboratories conducting animal research in compliance with Good Laboratory Practices (Title 21 USC, Chapter 13,§58), it is the study protocol and the study director that establish procedures and processes that are approved by each Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee to ensure the humane care and use of animals in research, teaching, and testing and to ensure compliance with guidelines and regulations. This approval process establishes the justification of eustress in the environment that do not rise to the threshold of distress under the AWA.

Caring animals and the ways we wrong them

Many nonhuman animals have the emotional capacities to form caring relationships that matter to them, and for their immediate welfare. Drawing from care ethics, we argue that these relationships also matter as objectively valuable states of affairs. They are part of what is good in this world. However, the value of care is precarious in human-animal interactions. Be it in farming, research, wildlife 'management', zoos, or pet-keeping, the prevention, disruption, manipulation, and instrumentalization of care in animals by humans is ubiquitous. We criticize a narrow conception of welfare that, in practice, tends to overlook non-experiential forms of harm that occur when we interfere with caring animals. Additionally, we point out wrongs against caring animals that are not just unaccounted for but denied by even an expansive welfare perspective: The instrumentalization of care and caring animals in systems of use can occur as a harmless wrong that an approach purely focused on welfare may, in fact, condone. We should therefore adopt an ethical perspective that goes beyond welfare in our dealings with caring animals.

Life, Death, and Humanity in Veterinary Medicine: Is it Time to Embrace the Humanities in Veterinary Education?

Medical humanities is a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary field of study that has experienced explosive growth in the United States since the 1960s. Two key components of medical humanities include first, the use of literature, poetry, and visual arts in the education of medical students, and second, the representation or examination of medical culture by scholars in the humanities, arts, and social sciences such as literary and film creators, sociologists, and anthropologists. The American Association of Medical Colleges recently reported that as of 2018, approximately 94% of medical schools had core or elective humanities offerings in their curricula. The examination of the medical milieu by scholars across the humanities has resulted in the emergence of important specialty fields such as end-of-life care, disability studies, and health disparities research. Veterinary medicine has been slow to embrace the humanities as relevant to our profession and to the education of our students. Only sporadic, isolated attempts to document the value of the arts and humanities can be found in the veterinary literature, and valuable observations on our profession made by scholars in diverse disciplines of the humanities are largely buried in publications not often accessed by veterinarians. Here a case is made that the time is right for the emergence of a more cohesive field of veterinary humanities. Embracing the observations of humanities scholars who engage with our profession, and appreciating the ways in which the humanities themselves are effective tools in the education of veterinary professionals, will bring many benefits to our evolving profession.

Ethical considerations regarding animal experimentation

Animal experimentation is widely used around the world for the identification of the root causes of various diseases in humans and animals and for exploring treatment options. Among the several animal species, rats, mice and purpose-bred birds comprise almost 90% of the animals that are used for research purpose. However, growing awareness of the sentience of animals and their experience of pain and suffering has led to strong opposition to animal research among many scientists and the general public. In addition, the usefulness of extrapolating animal data to humans has been questioned. This has led to Ethical Committees' adoption of the 'four Rs' principles (Reduction, Refinement, Replacement and Responsibility) as a guide when making decisions regarding animal experimentation. Some of the essential considerations for humane animal experimentation are presented in this review along with the requirement for investigator training. Due to the ethical issues surrounding the use of animals in experimentation, their use is declining in those research areas where alternative in vitro or in silico methods are available. However, so far it has not been possible to dispense with experimental animals completely and further research is needed to provide a road map to robust alternatives before their use can be fully discontinued.

Nonhuman Value: A Survey of the Intrinsic Valuation of Natural and Artificial Nonhuman Entities

To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue.

Caring animals and care ethics

Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract its core commitments to what is required for moral care: emotional motivation that enables the intentional meeting of another's needs, and forward-looking responsibility in particular relationships. What is not required, I argue, are metarepresentational capacities or the ability to scrutinize one's reasons for action, and thus being retrospectively accountable. This minimal account of moral care is illustrated by moral practices of parental care seen in many nonhuman animal species. In response to the worry that parental care in nonhuman animals lacks all evaluation and is therefore nonmoral I point to cultural differences in human parenting and to normativity in nonhuman animals.

The question of animal emotions

Do animals, including invertebrates, have felt emotions and does this morally matter?

Commentary on emotion in sharks

While studying the behaviour of a community of blackfin reef sharks, there was a four month long episode during which the entire company of residents and their visitors showed evidence of feeling a negative emotion towards me. They directed a variety of menacing gestures towards me, and their behaviour escalated until they began battering my kayak on my arrival in their range. Underwater, three would have slammed me personally had I not fought them off. Their behaviour suggested that their cognitive functions are complex, for they held their negative attitude in mind long-term. Two years later, under different conditions, they conveyed, via body language, a positive emotion. Social learning, social buffering, and emotional contagion were also displayed in their actions.

Socrates in the fMRI Scanner: The Neurofoundations of Morality and the Challenge to Ethics

The neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. First, it is transforming the view of human morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influence moral behavior. Second, some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. Both claims have some truth but are also overstated. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood together, although with different caveats, under the label of "neurofoundationalism." Whereas the neuroscientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly valuable if we avoid neuroessentialistic portraits, the empirical disruption of normative ethics seems less plausible. The neuroscience of morality, however, is providing relevant evidence that any empirically informed ethical theory needs to critically consider. Although neuroethics is not going to bridge the is-ought divide, it may establish certain facts that require us to rethink the way we achieve our ethical aspirations.

How Dogs Perceive Humans and How Humans Should Treat Their Pet Dogs: Linking Cognition With Ethics

Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In this sense, the human-animal relationship is nothing we should romanticize: it comes with clear power relations and thus with a set of responsibilities on the side of those who exercise this power. This holds, despite the fact that we like to think about our dogs as human’s best friend. Dogs have been part of human societies for longer than any other domestic species. Like no other species they exemplify the role of companion animals. Relationships with pet dogs are both very widespread and very intense, often leading to strong attachments between owners or caregivers and animals and to a treatment of these dogs as family members or even children. But how does this relationship look from the dogs’ perspective? How do they perceive the humans they engage with? What responsibilities and duties arise from the kind of mutual understanding, attachment, and the supposedly “special” bonds we form with them? Are there ethical implications, maybe even ethical implications beyond animal welfare? The past decades have seen an upsurge of research from comparative cognition on pet dogs’ cognitive and social skills, especially in comparison with and reference to humans. We will therefore set our discussion about the nature and ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship against the background of the current empirical knowledge on dog (social) cognition. This allows us to analyze the human–dog relationship by applying an interdisciplinary approach that starts from the perspective of the dog to ultimately inform the perspective of humans. It is our aim to thereby identify ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship that have been overlooked so far.

Moving Beyond the Absence of Pain and Distress: Focusing on Positive Animal Welfare

For many years, researchers, veterinarians, animal ethics committees, and regulators have focused on minimizing pain and distress as a primary goal of refinement when working with animals in science. More recent publications as well as a shift in animal ethics and public opinion have emphasized promotion of positive affective states, culminating in the concept of positive animal welfare. Robust measures are required to know when positive animal welfare states are occurring, and a number of measures are proposed and discussed. Regardless of whether there are newer methods available that focus exclusively on measuring positive affective states, consistent consideration of research animal behavioral programs, refinement, and adopting periodic stand-alone animal welfare assessments for all species involved will help to push the care and practices of research animals towards an increased focus on positive animal welfare.

I Am a Compassionate Conservation Welfare Scientist: Considering the Theoretical and Practical Differences Between Compassionate Conservation and Conservation Welfare

Compassionate Conservation and Conservation Welfare are two disciplines whose practitioners advocate consideration of individual wild animals within conservation practice and policy. However, they are not, as is sometimes suggested, the same. Compassionate Conservation and Conservation Welfare are based on different underpinning ethics, which sometimes leads to conflicting views about the kinds of conservation activities and decisions that are acceptable. Key differences between the disciplines appear to relate to their views about which wild animals can experience harms, the kinds of harms they can experience and how we can know about and confidently evidence those harms. Conservation Welfare scientists seek to engage with conservation scientists with the aim of facilitating ongoing incremental improvements in all aspects of conservation, i.e., minimizing harms to animals. In contrast, it is currently unclear how the tenets of Compassionate Conservation can be used to guide decision-making in complex or novel situations. Thus, Conservation Welfare may offer modern conservationists a more palatable approach to integrating evidence-based consideration of individual sentient animals into conservation practice and policy.

How to Recognize Animals' Vulnerability: Questioning the Orthodoxies of Moral Individualism and Relationalism in Animal Ethics

Simple Summary

Many animal ethicists consider cognitive capacities as being the basis for the moral status of an animal. On this view, animals that have, for instance, complex experiences, future preferences, or at least the ability to suffer, impose an obligation on us. Those beings that do not share these capacities do not have a moral status. This would also apply to embryos, infants, or severely cognitively impaired humans, but this seems to be at odds with many of our shared ethical intuitions. As a response, so-called relationalists argue that our different relations to different kinds of beings form the basis for moral obligations. However, on this view, it remains unclear (a) why it is particularly our relations to kinds of animals that are morally relevant; and (b) how we can criticize and change these relations. This paper seeks to combine both accounts of animal ethics to overcome these pitfalls. It argues that it is individual vulnerability that forms the basis of moral obligations, but that social structures and relations pre-determine how we perceive and recognize vulnerability. However, particular relationships with animals as well as open possibilities to treat animals in different ways (e.g., to treat a dairy cow not as a mere resource) render critique and change of current practices possible.

Abstract

This paper presents vulnerability and the social structures surrounding recognition of vulnerability as fundamental elements of animal ethics. Theories in the paradigm of moral individualism often treat individual rational capacities as the basis of moral considerability. However, this implies that individuals without such capacities (such as human or nonhuman infants) are excluded even though we grant them special protection in our lived morality. It also means that moral agents are pictured as disembodied, impartial observers, independent of social relations and particular relationships. Relationalists take moral obligations to be rooted in different kinds of beings. However, relationalism runs the risk of losing the individual animal and her capacities. It cannot also it adequately explain what forms different kinds of being, or the constitution of normativity through relations. Moreover, it lacks resources to explain how critique and change are possible. This paper argues that vulnerability and its recognition are the source of our moral obligations to animals. It seeks to combine individualist and relationalist arguments by using a social ontology of the bodily individual which can be applied to human agents and to any vulnerable being. Social structures predetermine the ways in which we perceive and recognize the vulnerability of living beings. However, we are not fully determined by these structures; particular relationships and direct encounters with individual animals as well as the open possibilities of treating animals differently that are immanent in common practices render critique and change of current conditions possible.

Farm Animal Cognition-Linking Behavior, Welfare and Ethics

Farm animal welfare is a major concern for society and food production. To more accurately evaluate animal farming in general and to avoid exposing farm animals to poor welfare situations, it is necessary to understand not only their behavioral but also their cognitive needs and capacities. Thus, general knowledge of how farm animals perceive and interact with their environment is of major importance for a range of stakeholders, from citizens to politicians to cognitive ethologists to philosophers. This review aims to outline the current state of farm animal cognition research and focuses on ungulate livestock species, such as cattle, horses, pigs and small ruminants, and reflects upon a defined set of cognitive capacities (physical cognition: categorization, numerical ability, object permanence, reasoning, tool use; social cognition: individual discrimination and recognition, communication with humans, social learning, attribution of attention, prosociality, fairness). We identify a lack of information on certain aspects of physico-cognitive capacities in most farm animal species, such as numerosity discrimination and object permanence. This leads to further questions on how livestock comprehend their physical environment and understand causal relationships. Increasing our knowledge in this area will facilitate efforts to adjust husbandry systems and enrichment items to meet the needs and preferences of farm animals. Research in the socio-cognitive domain indicates that ungulate livestock possess sophisticated mental capacities, such as the discrimination between, and recognition of, conspecifics as well as human handlers using multiple modalities. Livestock also react to very subtle behavioral cues of conspecifics and humans. These socio-cognitive capacities can impact human-animal interactions during management practices and introduce ethical considerations on how to treat livestock in general. We emphasize the importance of gaining a better understanding of how livestock species interact with their physical and social environments, as this information can improve housing and management conditions and can be used to evaluate the use and treatment of animals during production.