Priority setting in health care: on the relation between reasonable choices on the micro-level and the macro-level

On the Anatomy of Health-related Actions for Which People Could Reasonably be Held Responsible: A Framework

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities.

Can clinical ethics committees be legitimate actors in bedside rationing?

Background

Rationing and allocation decisions at the clinical level – bedside rationing – entail complex dilemmas that clinicians and managers often find difficult to handle. There is a lack of mechanisms and aids for promoting fair decisions, especially in hard cases. Reports indicate that clinical ethics committees (CECs) sometimes handle cases that involve bedside rationing dilemmas. Can CECs have a legitimate role to play in bedside rationing?

Main text

Aided by two frameworks for legitimate priority setting, we discuss how CECs can contribute to enhanced epistemic, procedural and political legitimacy in bedside rationing decisions. Drawing on previous work we present brief case vignettes and outline several potential roles that CECs may play, and then discuss whether these might contribute to rationing decisions becoming legitimate. In the process, key prerequisites for such legitimacy are identified. Legitimacy places demands on aspects such as the CEC’s deliberation process, the involvement of stakeholders, transparency of process, the opportunity to appeal decisions, and the competence of CEC members. On these conditions, CECs can help strengthen the legitimacy of some of the rationing decisions clinicians and managers have to make.

Conclusions

On specified conditions, CECs can have a well-justified advisory role to play in order to enhance the legitimacy of bedside rationing decisions.

Procedural justice and the individual participant in priority setting: Doctors' experiences

In this study we describe, synthesise, and discuss the experiences and views of doctors who participate as technical experts in health care priority setting, reflect on the ethical significance of the challenges to procedural and distributive justice they encounter, and propose an empirically derived practical approach to improving the fairness of the process. Between August 2015 and July 2016 we conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 20 doctors in NSW, Australia, purposively selected on the basis of their participation in macroallocation. Participant selection, data collection, and analysis were carried out according to the principles of grounded moral analysis, an empirical bioethics methodology closely based on grounded theory. The doctors we interviewed attached ethical significance to a broad range of procedural concerns that militated both against the prospect of distributive justice and against their own wellbeing: unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation, sexist behaviours and structures, rewards for rule-breakers, cynical and insincere practices, waste, duplication, and inefficiency, and being taken for granted. On the basis of our data, we hypothesise that the institutional conditions for macroallocation do not support the care of medical participants in deliberations. Evaluating our findings against the 'accountability for reasonableness' framework of Daniels and Sabin, we expose as incompatible with the conditions for procedural justice processes that treat participants in macroallocation unfairly or cause them to have moral unease about the justice of the enterprise. We suggest a supplementary procedure that positions commitment to the care and just treatment of participants as a foundation of any macroallocation procedure.

Microlevel Prioritizations and Incommensurability

This article addresses the prioritization questions that arise when people attempt to institutionalize reasonable ethical principles and create guidelines for microlevel decisions. I propose that this instantiates an incommensurability problem, and suggest two different kinds of practical solutions for dealing with this issue.

The values and ethical commitments of doctors engaging in macroallocation: a qualitative and evaluative analysis

BACKGROUND

In most socialised health systems there are formal processes that manage resource scarcity and determine the allocation of funds to health services in accordance with their priority. In this analysis, part of a larger qualitative study examining the ethical issues entailed in doctors' participation as technical experts in priority setting, we describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who engage in priority setting and make an empirically derived contribution towards the identification of an ethical framework for doctors' macroallocation work.

METHOD

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 doctors, each of whom participated in macroallocation at one or more levels of the Australian health system. Our sampling, data-collection, and analysis strategies were closely modelled on grounded moral analysis, an iterative empirical bioethics methodology that employs contemporaneous interchange between the ethical and empirical to support normative claims grounded in practice.

RESULTS

The values held in common by the doctors in our sample related to the domains of personal ethics ('taking responsibility' and 'persistence, patience, and loyalty to a cause'), justice ('engaging in distributive justice', 'equity', and 'confidence in institutions'), and practices of argumentation ('moderation' and 'data and evidence'). Applying the principles of grounded moral analysis, we identified that our participants' ideas of the good in macroallocation and their normative insights into the practice were strongly aligned with the three levels of Paul Ricoeur's 'little ethics': 'aiming at the "good life" lived with and for others in just institutions'.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest new ways of understanding how doctors' values might have procedural and substantive impacts on macroallocation, and challenge the prevailing assumption that doctors in this milieu are motivated primarily by deontological considerations. Our empirical bioethics approach enabled us to identify an ethical framework for medical work in macroallocation that was grounded in the values and ethical intuitions of doctors engaged in actions of distributive justice. The concordance between Ricoeur's 'little ethics' and macroallocation practitioners' experiences, and its embrace of mutuality, suggest that it has the potential to guide practice, support ethical reflection, and harmonise deliberative practices amongst actors in macroallocation generally.

What Factors Do Allied Health Take Into Account When Making Resource Allocation Decisions?

BACKGROUND

Allied health comprises multiple professional groups including dietetics, medical radiation practitioners, occupational therapists, optometrists and psychologists. Different to medical and nursing, Allied health are often organized in discipline specific departments and allocate budgets within these to provide services to a range of clinical areas. Little is known of how managers of allied health go about allocating these resources, the factors they consider when making these decisions, and the sources of information they rely upon. The purpose of this study was to identify the key factors that allied health consider when making resource allocation decisions and the sources of information they are based upon.

METHODS

Four forums were conducted each consisting of case studies, a large group discussion and two hypothetical scenarios to elicit data. A thematic content analysis commenced during post-forum discussions of key factors by forum facilitators. These factors were then presented to an expert working party for further discussion and refinement. Transcripts were generated of all data recordings and a detailed thematic analysis was undertaken by one author to ensure coded data matched the initial thematic analysis.

RESULTS

Twelve factors affecting the decision-making of allied health managers and clinicians were identified. One of these factors was disendorsed by the expert working party. The 11 remaining factors can be considered to be key decision-making principles that should be consistently applied to resource allocation. These principles were clustered into three overarching themes of readiness, impact and appropriateness.

CONCLUSION

Understanding these principles now means further research can be completed to more effectively integrate research evidence into health policy and service delivery, create partnerships among policy-makers, managers, service providers and researchers, and to provide support to answer difficult questions that policy-makers, managers and service providers face.

Action Guide for Addressing Ethical Challenges of Resource Allocation Within Community-Based Healthcare Organizations

This article proposes an action guide to making decisions regarding the ethical allocation of resources that affect access to healthcare services offered by community-based healthcare organizations. Using the filter of empirical data from a study of decision making in two community-based healthcare organizations, we identify potentially relevant conceptual guidance from a review of frameworks and action guides in the public health, health policy, and organizational ethics literature. We describe the development of this action guide. We used data from a prior empirical study of the values that influence decision making about the allocation of resources in particular types of community-based healthcare organizations. We evaluated, organized, and specified the conceptual guidance we found in 14 frameworks for ethical decision making. The result is an action guide that includes four domains that are relevant to the context of the decision to be made, eight domains that are relevant to the process of the decision to be made, and 15 domains that are relevant to the criteria of the decision to be made. We demonstrate the potential use of this action guide by walking through an illustrative resource allocation decision. The action guide provides community-based healthcare organizations with a conceptually grounded, empirically informed framework for ethical decision making.

Just healthcare and human flourishing: Why resource allocation is not just enough

Over many years, different theories have been developed to guide the social practices and policies of institutions so that they demonstrate equal concern and respect for all, and satisfy the requirements of justice. Although the normative principles described in a theory may support just institutions, whether this results in just outcomes will depend on how the decisions that implement the principles are made and actioned. As a societal institution charged with caring for people, ensuring just outcomes is a distinct concern in healthcare. Relationships within this institution are constitutive of human flourishing and are also important to justice. Yet, it is not possible to create, maintain or evaluate interpersonal relationships in the same manner as institutions because rather than being universal and impartial, they are particular and partial. Consequently, the link between theories of justice that guide decision-making in relation to structures or institutions, and the relationships that influence those with a proximate effect on individuals, is not explicit. To address this gap, this article argues that a focus on human flourishing provides a nexus between the decision-making for just institutions and just outcomes for individuals.

Rationing conscience

Decisions about allocation of limited healthcare resources are frequently controversial. These decisions are usually based on careful analysis of medical, scientific and health economic evidence. Yet, decisions are also necessarily based on value judgements. There may be differing views among health professionals about how to allocate resources or how to evaluate existing evidence. In specific cases, professionals may have strong personal views (contrary to professional or societal norms) that treatment should or should not be provided. Could these disagreements rise to the level of a conscientious objection? If so, should conscientious objections to existing allocation decisions be accommodated? In the first part of this paper, I assess whether resource allocation could be a matter of conscience. I analyse conceptual and normative models of conscientious objection and argue that rationing could be a matter for conscience. I distinguish between negative and positive forms: conscientious non-treatment and conscientious treatment. In the second part of the paper, I identify distinctive challenges for conscientious objections to resource allocation. Such objections are almost always inappropriate.

Indeterminacy and the principle of need

The principle of need-the idea that resources should be allocated according to need-is often invoked in priority setting in the health care sector. In this article, I argue that a reasonable principle of need must be indeterminate, and examine three different ways that this can be dealt with: appendicizing the principle with further principles, imposing determinacy, or empowering decision makers. I argue that need must be conceptualized as a composite property composed of at least two factors: health shortfall and capacity to benefit. When one examines how the different factors relate to each other, one discovers that this is sometimes indeterminate. I illustrate this indeterminacy in this article by applying the small improvement argument. If the relation between the factors are always determinate, the comparative relation changes by a small adjustment. Yet, if two needs are dissimilar but of seemingly equal magnitude, the comparative relation does not change by a small adjustment of one of the factors. I then outline arguments in favor of each of the three strategies for dealing with indeterminacy, but also point out that all strategies have significant shortcomings. More research is needed concerning how to deal with this indeterminacy, and the most promising path seems to be to scrutinize the position of the principle of need among a plurality of relevant principles for priority setting in the health care sector.