What we worry about when we worry about the ethics of clinical research

Clarifying the concept of the "Social" in risk assessments for human subjects research

International guidelines for the conduct of research with human participants, such as those put forth by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS, 2002), recommend that research review committees account for social risk and benefits to society in their review of proposed research. What do the concepts of the "social" and "society" mean in the context of the review of human participants research? Here we analyze concepts of social and society to define the terms: social harm, social risk, social benefit, and benefits to society. We argue that use of these terms invite more questions than answers and beg for difficult empirical research to determine the nature, likelihood, and magnitude of this category of risk and benefit. Until more research is done and these questions are answered, we advise reviewers to adopt an attitude of provisionalism and caution in their review of specifically "social" risks and benefits and "benefits to society."

Misleading by Omission: Rethinking the Obligation to Inform Research Subjects about Funding Sources

Informed consent requirements for medical research have expanded over the past half-century. The Declaration of Helsinki now includes an explicit positive obligation to inform subjects about funding sources. This is problematic in a number of ways and seems to oblige researchers to disclose information irrelevant to most consent decisions. It is argued here that such a problematic obligation involves an "informational fallacy." The aim in the second part of the paper is to provide a better approach to making sense of how a failure to inform about funding sources wrongs subjects: by making appeals to obligations to refrain from misleading by omission. This alternative approach-grounded in a general obligation to refrain from misleading, an obligation that is independent of informed consent-provides a basis for a norm that protects subjects' interests, without the informational fallacy. The approach developed here avoids the problems identified with the currently specified general obligation to inform about funding sources.

Should protections for research with humans who cannot consent apply to research with nonhuman primates?

Research studies and interventions sometimes offer potential benefits to subjects that compensate for the risks they face. Other studies and interventions, which I refer to as "nonbeneficial" research, do not offer subjects a compensating potential for benefit. These studies and interventions have the potential to exploit subjects for the benefit of others, a concern that is especially acute when investigators enroll individuals who are unable to give informed consent. US regulations for research with human subjects attempt to address this concern by mandating strict protections for nonbeneficial research with subjects who cannot consent. Typically, humans who cannot consent, such as children, may be enrolled in nonbeneficial research only when it poses low risks and has the potential to gather information of sufficient value to justify the risks, an appropriate surrogate gives permission on the individual's behalf and the individual agrees (assents). In contrast, US regulations for nonbeneficial research with nonhuman primates do not include these protections, even though it too involves subjects who cannot consent and who face risks for the benefit of others. Is this difference in regulatory protections justified? Or does the principle of fairness-treat like cases alike-imply that regulations for nonbeneficial research with nonhuman primates should include protections similar to those that apply to nonbeneficial research with humans who cannot consent?

Challenging research on human subjects: justice and uncompensated harms

Ethical challenges to certain aspects of research on human subjects are not uncommon; examples include challenges to first-in-human trials (Chapman in J Clin Res Bioethics 2(4):1-8, 2011), certain placebo controlled trials (Anderson in J Med Philos 31:65-81, 2006; Anderson and Kimmelman in Kennedy Inst Ethics J 20(1):75-98, 2010) and "sham" surgery (Macklin in N Engl J Med 341:992-996, 1999). To date, however, there are few challenges to research when the subjects are competent and the research is more than minimal risk with no promise of direct benefit. The principal reason given for allowing research that is more than minimal risk without benefit is that we should respect the autonomy of competent subjects. I argue that though the moral intuitions informing respect for autonomy are sound, there is another set of intuitions regarding what we take to be just treatment of another when one agent knowingly causes or allows suffering on another agent. I argue that concerns generated by commutative justice serve as limitations on permissible research. I highlight our intuitions informing this notion of justice by appealing to work done on theodicy; what counts as a morally sufficient reason for God to allow suffering in humans is applicable also to the researcher-subject relationship. I conclude that all human subjects who are exposed to more than minimal risk research should enjoy the same actual protections (e.g., subpart D) as those given subjects who cannot consent.