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Lara F. Neurorehabilitation of Offenders, Consent and Consequentialist Ethics. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2023. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-022-09510-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/10/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
The new biotechnology raises expectations for modifying human behaviour through its use. This article focuses on the ethical analysis of the not so remote possibility of rehabilitating criminals by means of neurotechnological techniques. The analysis is carried out from a synthetic position of, on the one hand, the consequentialist conception of what is right and, on the other hand, the emphasis on individual liberties. As a result, firstly, the ethical appropriateness of adopting a general predisposition for allowing the neurorehabilitation of prisoners only if it is safe and if they give their consent will be defended. But, at the same time, reasons will be given for requiring, in certain circumstances, the exceptional use of neurotechnology to rehabilitate severely psychopathic prisoners, even against their will, from the same ethical perspective.
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Münch R, Walter H, Müller S. Should Behavior Harmful to Others Be a Sufficient Criterion of Mental Disorders? Conceptual Problems of the Diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Pedophilic Disorder. Front Psychiatry 2020; 11:558655. [PMID: 33093836 PMCID: PMC7523554 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.558655] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/03/2020] [Accepted: 08/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Generally, diseases are primarily harmful to the individual herself; harm to others may or may not be a secondary effect of diseases (e.g., in case of infectious diseases). This is also true for mental disorders. However, both ICD-10 and DSM-5 contain two diagnoses which are primarily defined by behavior harmful to others, namely Pedophilic Disorder and Antisocial (or Dissocial) Personality Disorder (ASPD or DPD). Both diagnoses have severe conceptual problems in the light of general definitions of mental disorder, like the definition in DSM-5 or Wakefield's "harmful dysfunction" model. We argue that in the diagnoses of Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD the criterion of harm to the individual is substituted by the criterion of harm to others. Furthermore, the application of the criterion of dysfunction to these two diagnoses is problematic because both heavily depend on cultural and social norms. Therefore, these two diagnoses fall outside the general disease concept and even outside the general concept of mental disorders. We discuss whether diagnoses which primarily or exclusively ground on morally wrong, socially inacceptable, or criminal behavior should be eliminated from ICD and DSM. On the one side, if harming others is a sufficient criterion of a mental disorder, the "evil" is pathologized. On the other side, there are practical reasons for keeping these diagnoses: first for having an official research frame, second for organizing and financing treatment and prevention. We argue that the criteria set of Pedophilic Disorder should be reformulated in order to make it consistent with the general definition of mental disorder in DSM-5. This diagnosis should only be applicable to individuals that are distressed or impaired by it, but not solely based on behavior harmful to others. For ASPD, we conclude that the arguments for eliminating it from the diagnostic manuals overweigh the arguments for keeping it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ricarda Münch
- Research Division of Mind and Brain, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, CCM, Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Corporate Member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Berlin Institute of Health, Berlin, Germany
| | - Henrik Walter
- Research Division of Mind and Brain, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, CCM, Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Corporate Member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Berlin Institute of Health, Berlin, Germany
| | - Sabine Müller
- Research Division of Mind and Brain, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, CCM, Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Corporate Member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Berlin Institute of Health, Berlin, Germany
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Baccarini E, Malatesti L. The moral bioenhancement of psychopaths. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2017; 43:697-701. [PMID: 28356492 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103537] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2016] [Revised: 02/23/2017] [Accepted: 03/06/2017] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can justify to a psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the application of this prescription to other psychopaths.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elvio Baccarini
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia
| | - Luca Malatesti
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia
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Botha R, Louw D, Loots S. Psychopathy and its relation to personality psychopathology in a South African female forensic context. SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2017. [DOI: 10.1177/0081246317715351] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
There is a paucity of research about personality pathology among female offenders. This study aims to address this gap in the forensic psychology empirical base by examining the relationship between female psychopathy, as measured by the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised, and personality disorders, as measured by the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III in a South African forensic context. Participants included 108 purposively sampled female offenders incarcerated in South Africa. The Kruskal–Wallis H test and Mann–Whitney U test revealed a number of significant differences in levels of personality pathology between groups. Importantly, the results support international findings that significantly higher rates of Cluster B personality pathology are found among psychopathic offenders compared to non-psychopathic offenders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Botha
- Midrand Graduate Institute, South Africa
| | - Dap Louw
- University of the Free State, South Africa
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Ortega-Escobar J, Alcázar-Córcoles MÁ, Puente-Rodríguez L, Peñaranda-Ramos E. Psychopathy: Legal and neuroscientific aspects. ANUARIO DE PSICOLOGÍA JURÍDICA 2017. [DOI: 10.1016/j.apj.2017.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022] Open
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Antisocial Personality Disorder and Pathological Narcissism in Prolonged Conflicts and Wars of the 21st Century. Disaster Med Public Health Prep 2015; 10:118-28. [PMID: 26456397 DOI: 10.1017/dmp.2015.113] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
The end of the Cold War brought with it many protracted internal conflicts and wars that have lasted for decades and whose persistent instability lies at the heart of both chronic nation-state and regional instability. Responsibility for these chronically failed states has been attributed to multiple unresolved root causes. With previous governance and parties to power no longer trusted or acceptable, the vacuum of leadership in many cases has been filled with "bad leadership." This Concept piece argues that in a number of cases opportunistic leaders, suffering from severe antisocial character disorders, have emerged first as saviors and then as despots, or as common criminals claiming to be patriots, sharing a psychological framework that differs little from those responsible for World War II and the Cold War that followed. I describe the identifying characteristics of this unique and poorly understood subset of the population who are driven to seek the ultimate opportunity to control, dictate, and live out their fantasies of power on the world scene and discuss why their destructive actions remain unabated in the 21st century. Their continued antisocial presence, influence, and levels of violence must be seen as a global security and strategic issue that is not amenable to conventional diplomatic interventions, negotiations, mediations, or international sanctions.
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Pugh J, Maslen H. 'Drugs That Make You Feel Bad'? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions. CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 2015; 11:499-522. [PMID: 29104701 PMCID: PMC5664325 DOI: 10.1007/s11572-015-9383-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
In many jurisdictions, an offender's remorse is considered to be a relevant factor to take into account in mitigation at sentencing. The growing philosophical interest in the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice raises an important question about such remorse-based mitigation: to what extent should technologically facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To motivate this question, we begin by sketching a tripartite account of remorse that distinguishes cognitive, affective and motivational elements of remorse. We then describe a number of neurointerventions that might plausibly be used to enhance abilities that are relevant to these different elements of remorse. Having described what we term the 'moral value' view of the justification of remorse-based mitigation (according to which remorse-based mitigation is justified insofar as mitigation serves as a deserved form of response to the moral value of the offender's remorse), we then consider whether using neurointerventions to facilitate remorse would undermine its moral value, and thus make it inappropriate to honour such remorse in the criminal justice system. We respond to this question by claiming that the form of moral understanding that is incorporated into a genuinely remorseful response grounds remorse's moral value. In view of this claim, we conclude by arguing that neurointerventions need not undermine remorse's moral value on this approach, and that the remorse that such interventions might facilitate could also be authentic to the recipient of the neurointerventions that we discuss.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Pugh
- Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT UK
| | - Hannah Maslen
- Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT UK
- Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, 34 Broad Street, Oxford, OX1 3BD UK
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Wagner NF, Northoff G. A fallacious jar? The peculiar relation between descriptive premises and normative conclusions in neuroethics. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2015; 36:215-235. [PMID: 25985843 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-015-9330-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
Ethical questions have traditionally been approached through conceptual analysis. Inspired by the rapid advance of modern brain imaging techniques, however, some ethical questions appear in a new light. For example, hotly debated trolley dilemmas have recently been studied by psychologists and neuroscientists alike, arguing that their findings can support or debunk moral intuitions that underlie those dilemmas. Resulting from the wedding of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics has emerged as a novel interdisciplinary field that aims at drawing conclusive relationships between neuroscientific observations and normative ethics. A major goal of neuroethics is to derive normative ethical conclusions from the investigation of neural and psychological mechanisms underlying ethical theories, as well as moral judgments and intuitions. The focus of this article is to shed light on the structure and functioning of neuroethical arguments of this sort, and to reveal particular methodological challenges that lie concealed therein. We discuss the methodological problem of how one can--or, as the case may be, cannot--validly infer normative conclusions from neuroscientific observations. Moreover, we raise the issue of how preexisting normative ethical convictions threaten to invalidate the interpretation of neuroscientific data, and thus arrive at question-begging conclusions. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that current neuroethics rightly presumes that moral considerations about actual human lives demand empirically substantiated answers. Therefore, in conclusion, we offer some preliminary reflections on how the discussed methodological challenges can be met.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nils-Frederic Wagner
- Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Research Unit, University of Ottawa Institute of Mental Health Research, Ottawa, Canada,
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Jotterand F. Psychopathy, neurotechnologies, and neuroethics. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2014; 35:1-6. [PMID: 24464085 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-014-9280-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Fabrice Jotterand
- Department of Health Care Ethics, Rueckert-Hatman College of Health Professions, Regis University, 3333 Regis Boulevard, G-5, Denver, CO, 80221, USA,
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