Scientific second-order 'nudging' or lobbying by interest groups: the battle over abdominal aortic aneurysm screening programmes

Questioning 'Informed Choice' in Medical Screening: The Role of Neoliberal Rhetoric, Culture, and Social Context

Participation in medical screening programs is presented as a voluntary decision that should be based on an informed choice. An informed choice is often emphasized to rely on three assumptions: (1) the decision-maker has available information about the benefits and harms, (2) the decision-maker can understand and interpret this information, and (3) the decision-maker can relate this information to personal values and preferences. In this article, we empirically challenge the concept of informed choice in the context of medical screening. We use document analysis to analyze and build upon findings and interpretations from previously published articles on participation in screening. We find that citizens do not receive neutral or balanced information about benefits and harms, yet are exposed to manipulative framing effects. The citizens have high expectations about the benefits of screening, and therefore experience cognitive strains when informed about the harm. We demonstrate that decisions about screening participation are informed by neoliberal arguments of personal responsibility and cultural healthism, and thus cannot be regarded as decisions based on individual values and preferences independently of context. We argue that the concept of informed choice serves as a power technology for people to govern themselves and can be considered an implicit verification of biopower.

Nudging in screening: Literature review and ethical guidance

OBJECTIVES

Nudging is the purposeful alteration of choices presented to people that aims to make them choose in predicted ways. While nudging has been used to assure high uptake and good outcome of screening programs, it has been criticized for being paternalistic, undermining free choice, and shared decision making. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to explore a) nudging strategies identified in screening, b) arguments for and against nudging; and on basis of this, to c) suggest a tentative conclusion on how to handle nudging in screening.

METHODS

Literature searches in Ovid MEDLINE and PsycINFO for combinations of screening and nudging. Screening based on content analysis of titles, abstracts, and articles.

RESULTS

239 references were identified and 109 were included. Several forms of nudging were identified: framed information, default bias, or authority bias. Uptake and public health outcome were the most important goals. Arguments for nudging were bounded rationality, unavoidability, and beneficence, while lack of transparency, crowding out of intrinsic values, and paternalism were arguments against it. The analysis indicates that nudging can be acceptable for screenings with (high quality) evidence for high benefit-harm ratio (beneficence), where nudging does not infringe other ethical principles, such as justice and non-maleficence. In particular, nudging should not only focus on attendance rates, but also on making people "better choosers."

PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

Four specific recommendations follow from the review and the analysis: 1) Nudging should be addressed in an explicit and transparent manner. 2) The means of nudging have to be in proportion to the benefit-harm ratio. 3) Disagreement on the evidence for either benefits or harms warrants special care. 4) Assessing and assuring the intended outcome of nudging appears to be crucial, as it can be context dependent.