The current dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry: a problematic misunderstanding

Psychosis Is Not Illness but a Survival Strategy in Severe Stress: A Proposal for an Addition to a Phenomenological Point of View

Phenomenology often looks at psychosis as a defined pathological state. In this paper, psychosis is not seen as a (pathological) state but as a way to respond in extreme stress. It is psychological functioning of the embodied and relational mind, and psychotic experience can be seen as one form of affective arousal among any other affects. Taken the point of views of Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin about the primacy of living in responsive relationships, psychotic behavior is seen as emerging in relationships that do not guarantee adequate responses and thus the subject is imposed to isolate from social relationships and developing odd behavior. If dialogical responses are guaranteed, recovery from psychotic behavior can occur. Some guidelines for such dialogues are given.

Existential Meaning of Patients with Chronic Facial Pain

Coping strategies are necessary to deal with pain, one of the most disabling conditions. Treatments are often refractory, and the elaboration of existential meaning is necessary to live with residual pain. The objective of this study was to discuss the relevance of the meaning of life in coping with refractory chronic neuropathic facial pain according to singular cases. Each patient is unique and needs a singular approach to understand and treat the pain phenomenon. Self-transcendence, existential issues and philosophical values are central concepts to assess chronic conditions and should be highlighted in medical practice these days.

[Where is going philosophy of psychiatry ?]

This contribution provides a critical outline of the current trends in the field of "philosophy of psychiatry" by following their developments in the last decade. The first part of the paper focuses on the evolution of this field from a strictly conceptual approach to a perspective more attentive to the social, practical, and clinical dimension of psychiatry. The second part of the paper points out that the need of a mutual commitment of philosophy and psychiatry is perceived according to different ways by the countries involved in this research area. The paper deals especially with the case of France, where the enthusiasm for the "new philosophy of psychiatry" has not had the same impact on the philosophical scene as in the English speaking countries. In conclusion, the paper shows that the field of philosophy of psychiatry stands as a fertile ground for new forms of interaction between the analytic, and the continental philosophical traditions. This interaction takes place, more particularly, as regards such topics as normativity, language, and interpretation.