Genome editing and assisted reproduction: curing embryos, society or prospective parents?

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Queering the genome: ethical challenges of epigenome editing in same-sex reproduction

In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of same-sex reproduction achieved through epigenome editing-an innovative and transformative technique. For the first time, I analyse the potential normativity of this disruptive approach for reproductive purposes, focusing on its implications for lesbian couples seeking genetically related offspring. Epigenome editing offers a compelling solution to the complex ethical challenges posed by traditional gene editing, as it sidesteps genome modifications and potential long-term genetic consequences. The focus of this article is to systematically analyse the bioethical issues related to the use of epigenome editing for same-sex reproduction. I critically assess the ethical acceptability of epigenome editing with reproductive purposes from multiple angles, considering harm perspectives, the comparison of ethical issues related to gene and epigenome editing, and feminist theories. This analysis reveals that epigenome editing emerges as an ethically acceptable means for lesbian couples to have genetically related children. Moreover, the experiments of a reproductive use of epigenome editing discussed in this article transcend bioethics, shedding light on the broader societal implications of same-sex reproduction. It challenges established notions of biological reproduction and prompts a reevaluation of how we define the human embryo, while poses some issues in the context of gender self-identification and family structures. In a world that increasingly values inclusivity and diversity, this article aims to reveal a progressive pathway for reproductive medicine and bioethics, as well as underscores the need for further philosophical research in this emerging and fertile domain.

An Update on the Application of CRISPR Technology in Clinical Practice

The CRISPR/Cas system, an innovative gene-editing tool, is emerging as a promising technique for genome modifications. This straightforward technique was created based on the prokaryotic adaptive immune defense mechanism and employed in the studies on human diseases that proved enormous therapeutic potential. A genetically unique patient mutation in the process of gene therapy can be corrected by the CRISPR method to treat diseases that traditional methods were unable to cure. However, introduction of CRISPR/Cas9 into the clinic will be challenging because we still need to improve the technology's effectiveness, precision, and applications. In this review, we first describe the function and applications of the CRISPR-Cas9 system. We next delineate how this technology could be utilized for gene therapy of various human disorders, including cancer and infectious diseases and highlight the promising examples in the field. Finally, we document current challenges and the potential solutions to overcome these obstacles for the effective use of CRISPR-Cas9 in clinical practice.

When Is Something an Alternative? A General Account Applied to Animal-Free Alternatives to Animal Research

The first "R" from animal research ethics prescribes the replacement of animal experiments with animal-free alternatives. However, the question of when an animal-free method qualifies as an alternative to animal experiments remains unresolved.Drawing lessons from another debate in which the word "alternative" is central, the ethical debate on alternatives to germline genome editing, this paper develops a general account of when something qualifies as an alternative to something. It proposes three ethically significant conditions that technique, method, or approach X must meet to qualify as an alternative to Y: (1) X must address the same problem as Y, under an appropriate description of that problem; (2) X must have a reasonable chance of success, compared to Y, in solving the problem; and (3) X must not be ethically unacceptable as a solution. If X meets all these conditions, its relative advantages and disadvantages determine whether it is preferable, indifferent, or dispreferable as an alternative to Y.This account is then applied to the question of whether animal-free research methods qualify as alternatives to animal research. Doing so breaks down the debate around this question into more focused (ethical and other) issues and illustrates the potential of the account.

Heritable genome editing: ethical aspects of a developing domain

In the past decade, scientific developments in human germline genome editing (GGE) have reinvigorated questions about research ethics, responsible innovation, and what it means to do good in the field of reproductive biology and medicine. In recent years, it has become part of the ethical debate on GGE whether categorical objections about (un)naturalness, dignity, respect for the gene pool as common heritage, are and should be supplemented by more pragmatic questions about safety, utility, efficacy, and potential 'misuse', which seem to become more dominant in the moral discussion. This mini-review summarizes the morally relevant aspects of the rapidly developing domain of GGE, focusing on reproductive applications and with special attention to the ethical questions pertaining to how this technology may affect the interests of those that come to be by means of it. While vital, this encompasses more than safety considerations. Taking this perspective, it will be crucial to engage with normative questions about how GGE maps on the importance of accommodating future parents' preference to have genetically related children, and how far we should go to facilitate this. Similarly, a comprehensive ethical debate about 'appropriate application' of GGE cannot shake off the more fundamental question about how notions like 'normalcy', 'quality of life', and 'disability' can be conceptualized. This is crucial in view of respecting persons whichever traits they have and in view of acceptable boundaries to parental responsibilities.

Initial heritable genome editing: mapping a responsible pathway from basic research to the clinic

Following the Second Summit on Human Gene Editing in Hong Kong in 2018, where the birth of two girls with germline genome editing was revealed, the need for a responsible pathway to the clinical application of human germline genome editing has been repeatedly emphasised. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on research ethics issues in germline genome editing by exploring key issues related to the initial applications of CRISPR in reproductive medicine. Following an overview of the current discussion on bringing germline genome editing into clinical practice, we outline the specific challenges associated with such interventions and the features that distinguish them from conventional clinical testing of new medical treatments. We then review proposed ethical requirements for initial heritable genome editing, such as the absence of reasonable alternatives, the existence of sufficient and reliable preclinical data, appropriate informed consent, requirements related to safety, and long-term follow-up.

Human Germline Genome Editing: On the Nature of Our Reasons to Genome Edit

Ever since the publication of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, bioethicists have tended to distinguish between two different ways in which reproductive technologies may have implications for the welfare of future persons. Some interventions harm or benefit particular individuals: they are "person affecting." Other interventions determine which individual, of a number of possible individuals, comes into existence: they are "identity affecting" and raise the famous "non-identity problem." For the past several decades, bioethical debate has, for the most part, proceeded on the assumption that direct genetic modification of human embryos would be person affecting. In this paper, I argue that that genome editing is highly unlikely to be person affecting for the foreseeable future and, as a result, will neither benefit nor harm edited individuals.

Legal protection of the human genome – excessive or disproportionate?

Throughout the 20th century, life expectancy in developed countries considerably increased from 40 to 70 years. This stemmed mainly from the technological advancements in medicine that have been taking place since the end of the 19th century. Although the development of contemporary clinical medicine is undoubtedly beneficial to public health, it may also entail certain hazards. Hence, both in international and national law systems one can find legal regulations setting the limits of this development and taking into account the principles of public safety in its contemporary understanding. Both the human being as a whole and the human genome are protected de jure. The article attempts to answer the question whether the currently binding genome regulations are excessive or disproportionate. The authors use the dogmatic-legal and the theoretical-legal methods in the study. The article ends with conclusions.

Gene Editing, Identity and Benefit

Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion-the benefit argument-and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought into existence even if gene editing had not been employed. Our argument relies on a standard account of comparative benefit which has recently been criticised on the grounds that it succumbs to the so-called 'pre-emption problem'. We end by considering how our argument would be affected were the standard account revised in an attempt to evade this problem. We consider three revised accounts and argue that, on all three, our critique of the benefit argument stands.

CRISPR-Cas and Its Wide-Ranging Applications: From Human Genome Editing to Environmental Implications, Technical Limitations, Hazards and Bioethical Issues

The CRISPR-Cas system is a powerful tool for in vivo editing the genome of most organisms, including man. During the years this technique has been applied in several fields, such as agriculture for crop upgrade and breeding including the creation of allergy-free foods, for eradicating pests, for the improvement of animal breeds, in the industry of bio-fuels and it can even be used as a basis for a cell-based recording apparatus. Possible applications in human health include the making of new medicines through the creation of genetically modified organisms, the treatment of viral infections, the control of pathogens, applications in clinical diagnostics and the cure of human genetic diseases, either caused by somatic (e.g., cancer) or inherited (mendelian disorders) mutations. One of the most divisive, possible uses of this system is the modification of human embryos, for the purpose of preventing or curing a human being before birth. However, the technology in this field is evolving faster than regulations and several concerns are raised by its enormous yet controversial potential. In this scenario, appropriate laws need to be issued and ethical guidelines must be developed, in order to properly assess advantages as well as risks of this approach. In this review, we summarize the potential of these genome editing techniques and their applications in human embryo treatment. We will analyze CRISPR-Cas limitations and the possible genome damage caused in the treated embryo. Finally, we will discuss how all this impacts the law, ethics and common sense.

Why human germline genome editing is incompatible with equality in an inclusive society

Human germline genome editing is increasingly being seen as acceptable provided certain conditions are satisfied. Accordingly, genetic modifications would take place on eggs or sperm (or their precursor cells) as well as very early embryos for the purpose of bringing children into existence with or without particular genetic traits. In this context, a number of already discussed and separate arguments, such as the (1) synecdoche, (2) non-identity (3) inherent equality and (4) expressivist arguments, can be brought together in the new context of examining, from an ethical perspective, some of the possible consequences of such germline genome editing. In so doing, it becomes clear that these novel procedures are incompatible with the concept of equality in value and in worth of all human beings in a genuinely inclusive society. Such equality is expressed in Article 1 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that: 'All human beings are born … equal in dignity and rights.'

The implications of the gender-based prohibitions relating to human germline genome editing in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act

RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the implications of the gender-based prohibitions relating to human germline genome editing (hGGE) in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as amended in 2008?

DESIGN

A three-phase primary research design consisting of a mixed-methods online public survey of 521 UK citizens aged 16-82 years, 13 semi-structured interviews with experts and professionals involved in the future of hGGE, and structured interviews with 21 people affected by genetic conditions. The research was conducted between March 2018 and October 2019.

RESULTS

Gender-based prohibitions in the HFE Act weaken its intent to prevent germline cells that have been altered from resulting in a pregnancy and the possible birth of people with edited genomes. This weakness could become increasingly problematic as genome editing technologies develop and social advances seek to eradicate gendered expectations and gendered binaries.

CONCLUSION

The HFE Act should be amended to avoid gender-based discrimination and the potential gender-based prohibitions have to circumvent germline genome editing being used before the technology is considered safe enough to prevent disease.

Human germline editing in the era of CRISPR-Cas: risk and uncertainty, inter-generational responsibility, therapeutic legitimacy

BACKGROUND

Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats-associated (CRISPR-Cas) technology may allow for efficient and highly targeted gene editing in single-cell embryos. This possibility brings human germline editing into the focus of ethical and legal debates again.

MAIN BODY

Against this background, we explore essential ethical and legal questions of interventions into the human germline by means of CRISPR-Cas: How should issues of risk and uncertainty be handled? What responsibilities arise regarding future generations? Under which conditions can germline editing measures be therapeutically legitimized? For this purpose, we refer to a scenario anticipating potential further development in CRISPR-Cas technology implying improved accuracy and exclusion of germline transmission to future generations. We show that, if certain concepts regarding germline editing are clarified, under such conditions a categorical prohibition of one-generation germline editing of single-cell embryos appears not to be ethically or legally justifiable.

CONCLUSION

These findings are important prerequisites for the international debate on the ethical and legal justification of germline interventions in the human embryo as well as for the harmonization of international legal standards.

Responsible Translational Pathways for Germline Gene Editing?

Purpose of Review

Continued development of gene editing techniques has raised the real possibility of clinical application of germline gene editing. These results, as well as reports of an unethical experiment which resulted in the birth of at least two children from edited embryos in 2018, have highlighted the urgency and importance of ethical issues about translational pathways for editing of human germline cells. Charting responsible translational pathways for germline gene editing requires tackling some significant and complex ethical issues.

Recent Findings

A literature on development of clinical applications of germline gene editing is emerging, and several key ethical issues are coming into focus as major challenges for responsible translational pathways.

Summary

Potential clinical utility, clinical justification, and human subjects research for germline gene editing raise outstanding ethical questions. Work on these questions will help provide guidance to researchers and clinicians and direct translational projects toward justifiable applications.

Moving Beyond 'Therapy' and 'Enhancement' in the Ethics of Gene Editing

Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations (and trepidations) about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream (or nightmare) of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context-germline intervention in reproductive medicine-issues about enhancement and eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such as intelligence, and there are more pressing (and unresolved) questions that need attention if clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility.

Ethics and Global Governance of Human Germline Genome Editing: The Problem of Techno-Scientific Colonialist Paternalism

I want to enrich the debate about the ethics and governance of human germline editing (HGE) by emphasizing an underappreciated, yet important, set of concerns regarding exclusionary practices, norms, and efforts that impede a broader discussion about the subject. The possibility for establishing a binding, global, regulatory framework is influenced by economic and geopolitical factors as well as historical processes and sociopolitical problems, such as anti-scientific social movements and the politicization of science. Likewise, it is influenced by different understanding, epistemic resources, and goals between the CRISPR/genome editing community and the rest of society. In this Perspective, I explain the concept of "techno-scientific colonialist paternalism" and why it negatively affects our discussion around HGE. I also discuss the pitfalls of scientific self-regulation, and finally, I advocate that the implementation of HGE should cease to allow time and care for a thoughtful global discussion to emerge.

Human germline genome editing is illegal in Canada, but could it be desirable for some members of the rare disease community?

Human germline genome editing may prove to be especially poignant for members of the rare disease community, many of whom are diagnosed with monogenic diseases. This community lacks broad representation in the literature surrounding genome editing, notably in Canada, yet is likely to be directly affected by eventual clinical applications of this technology. Although not generalizable, the literature does offer some commonalities regarding the experiences of rare disease patients. This manuscript seeks to contribute to the search for broader societal dialogue surrounding human germline genome editing by exploring some of those commonalities that comfort the notion that CRISPR may hold promise or be desirable for some members of this community. We first explore the legal and policy context surrounding germline genome editing, focusing closely on Canada, then provide an overview of the common challenges experienced by members of the rare disease community, and finally assess the opportunities of germline genome editing vis-à-vis rare disease as we advocate for the need to more actively engage with the community in our search for public engagement.

'Serious' factor-a relevant starting point for further debate: a response

In this reply, we wish to defend our original position and address several of the points raised by two excellent responses. The first response (De Miguel Beriain) questions the relevance of the notion of 'serious' within the context of human germline genome modification (HGGM). We argue that the 'serious' factor is relevant and that there is a need for medical and social lenses to delineate the limits of acceptability and initial permissible applications of HGGM. In this way, 'serious' acts as a starting point for further discussions and debates on the acceptability of the potential clinical translation of HGGM. Therefore, there is a pressing need to clarify its scope, from a regulatory perspective, so as to prevent individuals from using HGGM for non-therapeutic or enhancement purposes. The second response (Kalsi) criticizes the narrow interpretation of the objectivist approach and the apparent bias towards material innovations when discussing the right to benefit from scientific advancements. As an in-depth discussion of the objectivist and constructivist approaches was beyond the scope of our original paper, we chose to focus on one specific objectivist account, one which focuses on biological and scientific facts. We agree, however, with the critique that material innovations should not be the sole focus of the right to benefit from scientific advancements, which also incorporates freedom of scientific research and access to scientific knowledge scientific freedom and knowledge, including the influence of these on ethical thinking and cultures.

Germline genome editing versus preimplantation genetic diagnosis: Is there a case in favour of germline interventions?

CRISPR is widely considered to be a disruptive technology. However, when it comes to the most controversial topic, germline genome editing (GGE), there is no consensus on whether this technology has any substantial advantages over existing procedures such as embryo selection after in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Answering this question, however, is crucial for evaluating whether the pursuit of further research and development on GGE is justified. This paper explores the question from both a clinical and a moral viewpoint, namely whether GGE has any advantages over existing technologies of selective reproduction and whether GGE could complement or even replace them. In a first step, I review an argument of extended applicability. The paper confirms that there are some scenarios in which only germline intervention allows couples to have (biologically related) healthy offspring, because selection will not avoid disease. In a second step, I examine possible moral arguments in favour of genetic modification, namely that GGE could save some embryos and that GGE would provide certain benefits for a future person that PGD does not. Both arguments for GGE have limitations. With regard to the extended applicability of GGE, however, a weak case in favour of GGE should still be made.

Designing Preclinical Studies in Germline Gene Editing: Scientific and Ethical Aspects

Human germline gene editing is often debated in hypothetical terms: if it were safe and efficient, on what further conditions would it then be ethically acceptable? This paper takes another course. The key question is: how can scientists reduce uncertainty about safety and efficiency to a level that may justify initiation of first-time clinical trials? The only way to proceed is by well-designed preclinical studies. However, what kinds of investigation should preclinical studies include and what specific conditions should they satisfy in order to be considered well-designed? It is argued that multispecies and multigenerational animal studies are needed as well as human embryo editing without implantation. In order to be possible to translate to first-time clinical trials, animal studies need to satisfy strict conditions of validity. Moreover, embryo studies intended for translation to first-time clinical trials need to correspond to the animal studies in experimental design (with exception of implantation). Only in this way can uncertainty about risk for harm (safety) and prospect of benefit (efficiency) in first-time clinical trials be reduced to a modest level. If uncertainty is not reduced to such a level, first-time clinical trials in germline gene editing should not be initiated.

Is selecting better than modifying? An investigation of arguments against germline gene editing as compared to preimplantation genetic diagnosis

BACKGROUND

Recent scientific advances in the field of gene editing have led to a renewed discussion on the moral acceptability of human germline modifications. Gene editing methods can be used on human embryos and gametes in order to change DNA sequences that are associated with diseases. Modifying the human germline, however, is currently illegal in many countries but has been suggested as a 'last resort' option in some reports. In contrast, preimplantation genetic (PGD) diagnosis is now a well-established practice within reproductive medicine. Both methods can be used to prevent children from being born with severe genetic diseases.

MAIN TEXT

This paper focuses on four moral concerns raised in the debate about germline gene editing (GGE) and applies them to the practice of PGD for comparison: Violation of human dignity, disrespect of the autonomy and the physical integrity of the future child, discrimination of people living with a disability and the fear of slippery slope towards immoral usage of the technology, e.g. designing children for specific third party interests. Our analysis did not reveal any fundamental differences with regard to the four concerns.

CONCLUSION

We argue that with regard to the four arguments analyzed in this paper germline gene editing should be considered morally (at least) as acceptable as the selection of genomes on the basis of PGD. However, we also argue that any application of GGE in reproductive medicine should be put on hold until thorough and comprehensive laws have been implemented to prevent the abuse of GGE for non-medical enhancement.

Ethical Challenges of Germline Genetic Enhancement

The new reproductive technologies have opened the door to different processes of germline genetic enhancement by which the characteristics of an individual according to the interests of the agents involved could be selected during its gestation. Although the initiative is apparently oriented towards developing individuals that would excel in society, critical voices raise the concerns about that this approach would generate and need for a reflection on the ethical, social and legal implications of these techniques and their implementation in society. We reviewed the literature about these issues throughout their historical records to date, focusing on the moral arguments and non-clinical aspects that affect the legal and social environment. We have observed various trends of thought with divergent positions (proactive, preventive, and regulatory) as well as a large number of articles that try to reconcile the different approaches. This review illustrates a series of concepts from the ethics and philosophy fields which are frequently used in studies that evaluate the ethical implications of germline genetic enhancement, such as dignity, benefit, autonomy, and identity. In addition, amongst the many unresolved controversies surrounding genetic enhancement, we identify procreative beneficence, genetic disassociation, gender selection, the value of disability, embryo chimerization, and the psychosocial inequality of potentially enhanced individuals as crucial. We also develop possible scenarios for future debate. We consider especially important the definition and specification of three aspects which are essential for the deployment of new reproductive technologies: the moral status of the embryo undergoing enhancement, the legal status of the enhanced individual, and the responsibility of the agents executing the enhancement. Finally, we propose the precautionary principle as a means to navigate ethical uncertainties.

The 'serious' factor in germline modification

Current advances in assisted reproductive technologies aim to promote the health and well-being of future children. They offer the possibility to select embryos with the greatest potential of being born healthy (eg, preimplantation genetic testing) and may someday correct faulty genes responsible for heritable diseases in the embryo (eg, human germline genome modification (HGGM)). Most laws and policy statements surrounding HGGM refer to the notion of 'serious' as a core criterion in determining what genetic diseases should be targeted by these technologies. Yet, this notion remains vague and poorly defined, rendering its application challenging and decision making subjective and arbitrary. By way of background, we begin by briefly presenting two conceptual approaches to 'health' and 'disease': objectivism (ie, based on biological facts) and constructivism (ie, based on human values). The basic challenge under both is sorting out whether and to what extent social and environmental factors have a role in helping to define what qualifies as a 'serious' disease beyond the medical criteria. We then focus on how a human rights framework (eg, right to science and right to the highest attainable health) could integrate the concepts of objectivism and constructivism so as to provide guidance for a more actionable consideration of 'serious'. Ultimately, it could be argued that a human rights framework, by way of its legally binding nature and its globally accepted norms and values, provides a more universal foundation for discussions of the ethical, legal and social implications of emerging or disruptive technologies.

In risk we trust/Editing embryos and mirroring future risks and uncertainties

Tendencies and efforts have shifted from genome description, DNA mapping, and DNA sequencing to active and profound re-programming, repairing life on genetic and molecular levels in some parts of contemporary life science research. Mirroring and materializing this atmosphere, various life engineering technologies have been used and established in many areas of life sciences in the last decades. A contemporary progressive example of one such technology is DNA editing. Novel developments related to reproductive technologies, particularly embryo editing, prenatal human life engineering, and germline engineering need to be analyzed against the broader social and structural background. The crucial analytical scope for this paper is a specific field: the life-editing technologies used in reproductive medicine and performed experimentally on viable human embryos, particularly CRISPR/Cas9 technology. This text argues that germline editing technologies, as a representative part of contemporary biomedicine, are merging ideas of treatment and enhancement to avoid future risks. Using this specific life manipulation of embryos and gametes, the text analyzes these processes within the concept of power over life-biopower and the specific governing rationality that imagines, classifies, and governs contemporary societies. The text specifically focuses on the potential to create, define, and manage future risks and uncertainties related to prenatal life.

Regulating Genome Editing: For an Enlightened Democratic Governance

How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A first approach, which we refer to as "elitist," is inspired by Joshua Greene's work in moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have if they were committed to implementing public policies regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second approach, which we refer to as the democratic approach, defended by Francoise Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al., emphasizes the importance of including the public's expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favored approach-the "enlightened democracy" approach-which attempts to combine the strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses.

Lesbian motherhood and mitochondrial replacement techniques: reproductive freedom and genetic kinship

In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases where a mitochondrial DNA disease could be 'cured'. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs.

Looking into the shadow: the eugenics argument in debates on reproductive technologies and practices

Eugenics is often referred to in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices, in relation to the creation of moral boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable technologies, and acceptable and unacceptable uses of these technologies. Historians have argued that twentieth century eugenics cannot be reduced to a uniform set of practices, and that no simple lessons can be drawn from this complex history. Some authors stress the similarities between past eugenics and present reproductive technologies and practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the continuity view') in order to condemn the latter. Others focus on the differences between past and present practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the discontinuity view') in order to defend contemporary reproductive technologies. In this paper, I explore the meanings of the word 'eugenics' and the relationship between its past and present uses in terms of contemporary debates on reproductive technologies and practices. I argue that moral disagreement about present technologies originate in divergent views of condemnable and justifiable features of the past.

Why Human Germline Editing is More Problematic than Selecting Between Embryos: Ethically Considering Intergenerational Relationships

Do we have a moral obligation to genetically cure embryos rather than selecting between them? Such an obligation would be an ethical argument for human germline gene editing (hGGE) to avoid the inheritance of genetic conditions instead of using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In this article, the intuition that we do have such a moral obligation is critically evaluated. The article first develops a theoretical framework for discussing the ethical questions of hGGE. This framework is based on an exploration of the phenomenology of the germline, from both biological and philosophical points of view. It interprets the germline as an embodied intergenerational relationship that carries meanings for the parents and for the children-to-be. It relates them to previous family generations, and to their own children. Hence, the germline is a phenomenologically much richer concept than just the line of cells that carry the inheritable genetic information. Against this background, selection is compared with editing and a key moral difference is identified: editing is in effect an act of co-constructing the genome, which necessarily assumes a wider range of responsibilities that include those parts that are left unedited. Introducing hGGE into societies would hence significantly affect and change the moral structure of the intergenerational relationships. Selective implantation, on the other hand (in the context of PGD), is based on a moral choice in favour of the embryo which is to be unaffected by a disease or disability that causes suffering, rather than selecting knowingly the affected one. The claim that hGGE is in the best interests of the child-to-be counterfactually assumes the presence of a patient who has an interest in being cured. The embryo (a potential future patient) is, however, brought into existence by the same act that is also the treatment. The future children who would result from treatment by hGGE may rather have an interest in not having been treated by hGGE, since it makes the intergenerational relationships more complicated and burdensome. The question 'Is hGGE justified, or even an obligation?' is answered with a No.