The value of doing philosophy in mental health contexts

Self-knowledge as self-improvement in Plato’s dialogues and cognitive behavioural therapy

Some researchers who examine the similarities between philosophy and psychology conclude that engaging in philosophy can improve one’s mental health, instead of, or in addition to, traditional forms of therapy. This article reinforces this by establishing the relationship between self-knowledge as self-improvement in Plato’s dialogues and in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Despite multiple important points of congruence, some authors have rejected the idea that self-knowledge in Plato can be assimilated to self-knowledge in psychotherapy. Here, I argue against this criticism by focusing on three key areas of interest: (a) self-knowledge as improving one’s beliefs via objective (nonsubjective) means, (b) self-knowledge as resulting in objective (nonsubjective) outcomes, and (c) self-knowledge as progress towards the Good. I reinforce the link by demonstrating that CBT uses methods which are equally objective as those of the Platonic dialogues. I then continue by claiming that the outcome of self-knowledge in both is also equally objective. Finally, I explore the nature of their relationship. Instead of arguing that self-knowledge in CBT is a modern version of Platonic self-knowledge, I propose that although not intended to, it functions as a preparatory process for one to be able to participate in Platonic self-knowledge.

Stigma, epistemic injustice, and "looked after children": The need for a new language

This article examines the processes that contribute to the stigmatization of a group of people typically identified as "children in care" or "looked after children." In particular, we will look at the ways that we (adults, professionals, and carers) interact with these children, based on their status as both children and members of a socially marginalized and disadvantaged group, and how these modes of interaction can inhibit dialogue-a dialogue that is needed if we are to base our conceptions regarding the needs of these children on a more accurate understanding of their experiences and perspective. The problem is particularly challenging because the very terminology we use in the care community to identify this group is a product of the damaging preconceptions that have affected our interactions with its members and, we argue, it serves to reinforce those preconceptions. Using Fricker's work on epistemic injustice, in conjunction with evidence regarding how accusations of abuse and neglect of these children have been addressed in numerous cases, we illustrate the problems we have in hearing the voices of members of this group and the harmful effects this has on their own ability to understand and articulate their experiences. These problems represent "barriers to disclosure" that need to be surmounted if we are to establish a more inclusive dialogue. Currently, dialogue between these children and those of us charged to "look after" them is too often characterized by a lack of trust: not only in terms of the children feeling that their word is not taken seriously, that their claims are not likely to be believed, but also in their feeling that they cannot trust those to whom they might disclose abuse or neglect. The goals of the paper are modest in that we aim simply to open up the debate on how to meet this epistemic challenge, noting that there are specific problems that extend beyond those already identified for hearing the voices of other victims of epistemic injustice. Explicitly recognizing the nature and extent of the problem still leaves us a long way from its solution, but it is a crucial start.