Trusted strangers: social affordances for social cohesion

Enactive behaviour settings: situating agency, normativity and transformation

Behaviour settings are sociocultural places defined by three main ecological aspects: the affordances of material structures, typical patterns of skilful action and socially situated norms. These aspects explain the observed regularities of human behaviour associated with the material characteristics of places. However, the focus of ecological theories on how individual agents attune their actions to the pre-established order of behaviour settings neglects the agents' active role in sustaining or motivating transformations in this order. We therefore propose an alternative enactive approach to behaviour settings that accounts for the role of agents as active supporters and transformers of behaviour settings. Based on the enactive concepts of agency, normativity and dialectics, we argue that agents, as participants of behaviour settings, simultaneously respond to multiple normative dimensions (e.g. biological, sensorimotor and interactive). To sustain the order of behaviour settings, agents sometimes need to inhibit other normative responses of their bodies, which sometimes is detrimental to one or many aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, agents can collectively trigger the transformation of behaviour settings. This transformation can occur dialectically as tensions between two or more norms to which human bodies respond are resolved, even if new tensions arise and the process of changing behaviour setting continues. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'.

A glimpse into social perception in light of vitality forms

The American psychoanalyst and developmental psychologist Daniel Stern's idea of vitality forms might suggest a new solution to explain how other minds are intensely expressed in their actions. Vitality forms characterize the expressive style of actions. The effective perception of vitality forms allows people to recognize the affective states and intentions of others in their actions, and could even open the possibility of properties of objects that are indicated by the given actions. Currently, neurophysiological studies present that there might be a neural mirror mechanism in the dorso-central insula (DCI), middle cingulate cortex (MCC), and other related cerebral areas, which serve to preferably perceive and deliver vitality forms of actions. In this article, possible types of vitality forms related to other minds, which have been brought to particular attention in recent years, have been collected and discussed in the following four areas: (1) Vitality forms on understanding non-verbal intention, (2) on understanding verbal intention, (3) vitality forms as grounding social cognition, and (4) as grounding social emotion. These four areas, however, might refer to an entirety of a binary actor-observer communicative landscape. In this review, we try to simplify the analysis by relying on two fundamental dimensions of criteria: first, the idea of vitality forms is conceived as the most basic way of observing subsequent higher-order dimensions of action, that is, understanding intention in the style of action. Thus, in the first two subsections, the relationships between vitality forms and their roles in understanding non-verbal and verbal intention have been discussed. Second, vitality forms could also be conceived as background conditions of all the other mental categories, that is, vitality forms can ground cognition and emotion in a social context. In the second dimension, the existence of social cognition or emotion depends on the existence of the stylistic kinematics of action. A grounding relation is used to distinguish a ground, that is, vitality forms, and its grounded mental categories. As relating with the domain of social perception, in this review, it has been discussed vitality forms possibly could ground social cognition and social emotion, respectively.

Neighborhood Walking and Social Connectedness

Neighborhood social ties matter crucially, especially during stressful life events like a global pandemic, for they represent vital sources of wellbeing and community capacity. Activities that enable community members to engage in incidental sociability and acts of “neighboring”—that is, authentic social interactions with their neighbors—warrant attention from sport and active living researchers because of their potential to bolster the social fabric of our neighborhoods and facilitate neighbors' access to important resources, such as information, material resources, and social support. Though perhaps dismissed as trivial, neighborhood walking represents a valuable and underappreciated everyday activity that fits this description, especially in an age characterized by an epidemic of social isolation and loneliness. Despite its vast potential to address the quasi-anonymity of urban life, neighborhood walking remains surprisingly underexamined as a facilitator for fostering social connectedness, the sense of connection and social bond people feel toward others. The goal of this manuscript, therefore, is to establish the conceptual grounding for how neighborhood walking strengthens social ties among neighbors to facilitate access to important coping resources. In doing so, it aims to advance a research agenda on walking that moves beyond the benefits of physical activity.

When out-groups are perceived as out of place: urban disorder sensitivity and environmental distance

BACKGROUND

These studies aimed to determine whether a stronger preference for order, structure, and predictability in the urban environment (measured by the Space Intrusion subscale of the Urban Socio-Spatial Disorder Sensitivity Scale) and a higher score on the Out-Group Visual Encroachment scale are associated with more aversive reactions towards the idea of people of another race, ethnicity, or religion settling in the neighborhood.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

Participants were recruited through online snowball sampling (pilot study) as well as from among university students. Students were also asked to send links to the study to their acquaintances. The pilot study, as well as Study 1B, were conducted online, whereas in Study 1A the paper-pencil method was used.

RESULTS

Scores on the Space Intrusion subscale and the Out-group Visual Encroachment scale were associated with outgroup negativity. Out-group Visual Encroachment was found to mediate the relationship between Space Intrusion and environmental distance toward Muslims.

CONCLUSIONS

Perceiving out-groups as out of place is a joint product of environmental features (visual cues of belonging) and characteristics of the individual (sensitivity to urban disorder). The challenge for neighborhoods in times of increased migration is how to shape the public domain to increase the chances of strangers becoming more familiar.

Being Perceived and Being "Seen": Interpersonal Affordances, Agency, and Selfhood

Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions, and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further on this foundation for understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents, the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically: there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self.

Levels and Norm-Development: A Phenomenological Approach to Enactive-Ecological Norms of Action and Perception

The enactive approach and the skilled intentionality framework are two closely related forms of radical embodied cognition that nonetheless exhibit important differences. In this paper, I focus on a conceptual disparity regarding the normative character of action and perception. Whereas the skilled intentionality framework describes the norms of action and perception as the capacity of embodied agents to become attuned (i.e., skilled intentionality) to preestablished normative frameworks (i.e., situated normativity), the enactive approach describes the same phenomenon as the enactment of norms (i.e., as sense-making) at different levels of organization that go from individual biological agents to linguistic encounters. I will argue that although both accounts accurately recognize important features of the norms of action and perception, they also have significant shortcomings. Norm-attunement accurately sees normative, ecological frameworks as the necessary set of constraints for the existence of norms at play in sociocultural bodily practices, but it fails to acknowledge the temporal and open-ended character of these norms and frameworks. Norm-enactment, by contrast, acknowledges that norms of action and perception are temporally open-ended, but fails to explicitly recognize that environmental normative frameworks are necessary for the enactment and development of all sort of norms in the interactional domain of an agent-environment system. To overcome these problems, I propose an enactive-ecological approach to norms of action and perception. This approach consists in describing norm-enactment as a result of a developmental process I call norm-development. This process describes the enactment of norms from the background of ecological, normative frameworks. These frameworks are norms enacted in the past of the interactional history of the agent-environment system that remain open to new configurations (new norms) in the present. To clarify conceptually norm-development, I appeal to Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of norms of perception, and more particularly to his concept of spatial levels. Like the enactive approach, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that perceptual norms emerge in the interactional history of the agent-environment system, but, like the skilled intentionality framework, he also posits that normative frameworks, that he calls levels, enable and constrain the emergence of perceptual norms and its development. Levels are therefore a phenomenological description of ecological normative frameworks that has been temporally constituted and that stay temporally open-ended as a fundamental requisite for the enactment and development of norms of action and perception.