The Gendered Relationship Between (Old and New Forms of) Employment Instability and Union Dissolution

Family Life Courses, Uncertain Futures, and the Changing World of Work: State-of-the-Art and Prospects

Labour markets in post-industrial countries have been undergoing tremendous transformations in the last two decades, substantially changing the conditions in which young adults take family decisions and raise children. Whilst these changes create new opportunities, they also generate risks which potentially foster uncertain futures and affect individuals' opportunities to earn income, provide care for family members, and make long-term commitments. This Special Issue aims to stimulate the debate on the effects of rapid labour market transformations and growing uncertainty on families in contemporary wealthiest countries. Its articles suggest that economic uncertainty, the threat of unemployment or precarious employment, and financial difficulties lead to fertility postponement and increase the risk of union disruption. These effects intensify when labour market deregulation goes in tandem with labour market dualization and become more pronounced during periods of economic hardship, such as economic recessions or the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the effects of economic activity on family-related behaviours have become less gendered as women increasingly gain economic independence. Finally, it appears that highly educated workers and members of the upper social classes face increasingly better conditions for realising their fertility intentions than their lower-educated counterparts and those of the lower social classes. In this introductory article, we review the theoretical premises and the empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive background on what labour force participation and its conditions imply for family life courses. We then introduce the articles collected in this Special Issue and conclude with a discussion on prospects for future research.

Childbearing across partnerships in Italy: Prevalence, demographic correlates, and social gradient

Studies of childbearing across partnerships-having children with more than one partner-have generally focused on countries with relatively high separation rates. We complement this previous research with analyses for Italy using nationally representative, retrospective data and event-history techniques. This study offers three key findings. First, we detected a non-negligible share of childbearing across partnerships, although at substantially lower levels relative to other wealthy countries (5 per cent of parents aged 25-54 with at least two children). Second, multivariate analyses revealed an impressive similarity to the demographic correlates found elsewhere. Finally, we showed that childbearing across partnerships was initiated by the 'social vanguard' of new family behaviours but then diffused among the least well-off. Overall, this paper adds to the growing literature on childbearing across partnerships by showing the phenomenon to be demographically and sociologically relevant, even in countries with strong family ties and a limited diffusion of union dissolution.

Less Partnering, Less Children, or Both? Analysis of the Drivers of First Birth Decline in Finland Since 2010

In the 2010s, fertility has declined in the Nordic countries, most strikingly in Finland, and first births drive the decline. It remains unclear whether this decline results from decreased fertility within unions, changing union dynamics, or both. Thus, we investigated changes in the union–first birth dynamics from 2000 through 2018 in Finland using full-coverage population register data and an incidence-based multistate model. To do so, we calculated the yearly age-specific transition probabilities across states of single, cohabitation, marriage, and first births among 15- to 45-year-old childless men and women. We found lower fertility rates in unions after 2010, increasing dissolution rates amongst cohabiting couples, and long-term declines in the transition to marriage. Counterfactual simulations showed that, for the decline in first births since 2010, fertility within unions matters more (three-quarters) than union dynamics (one-quarter): that is, lower fertility in cohabitating and married individuals explained 42% and 13% of the decline, respectively, and decreasing fertility rates among couples entering cohabitation explained a further 17%. Decreasing marriage (19%) and cohabitation rates (2–4%) as well as higher union dissolution rates (6%) explained a smaller share of the first birth decline. The decline in first births was somewhat sharper among the lower social strata, but across strata the decreasing first birth transitions in unions explained most of the decline. To conclude, while changing union dynamics provide a partial explanation, postponing or foregoing fertility within unions represents the primary reason for the fertility decline.