Subjective measures of unconscious knowledge of concepts

Distinguishing the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge in evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus (CS) subsequent to its repeated pairing with a valent stimulus (US). Two studies that bring new light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC were conducted. We developed an innovative method motivated by higher order and integration theories of consciousness to distinguish between the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge about the pairings. On each trial of the awareness test, participants had to indicate the valence of the US associated with a given CS and to make a 'structural knowledge attribution' by reporting the basis of their response. Valence identification accuracy was used to evaluate knowledge while the knowledge attribution was used to measure the conscious status of knowledge. Memory attribution indicated conscious knowledge about the pairings while feeling-based and random attributions indicated unconscious knowledge. A meta-analysis of the two studies revealed that valence identification accuracy was above chance level for memory and feeling-based attributions but not for the random attribution. EC was found in the three attributions. While EC effect size was medium for the memory attribution it was small for feeling-based and random attributions. Moreover, Experiment 2 included a delayed test. EC was still present 24 h after the conditioning took place. The results obtained for memory and feeling-based attributions suggest that both conscious and unconscious knowledge may underlie EC. The results obtained for random attribution suggest that EC may also occur without any knowledge of US valence.

Explicit instruction of rules interferes with visuomotor skill transfer

In the present study, we examined the effects of explicit knowledge, obtained through instruction or spontaneous detection, on the transfer of visuomotor sequence learning. In the learning session, participants learned a visuomotor sequence, via trial and error. In the transfer session, the order of the sequence was reversed from that of the learning session. Before the commencement of the transfer session, some participants received explicit instruction regarding the reversal rule (i.e., Instruction group), while the others did not receive any information and were sorted into either an Aware or Unaware group, as assessed by interview conducted after the transfer session. Participants in the Instruction and Aware groups performed with fewer errors than the Unaware group in the transfer session. The participants in the Instruction group showed slower speed than the Aware and Unaware groups in the transfer session, and the sluggishness likely persisted even in late learning. These results suggest that explicit knowledge reduces errors in visuomotor skill transfer, but may interfere with performance speed, particularly when explicit knowledge is provided, as opposed to being spontaneously discovered.

Effects of learning duration on implicit transfer

Implicit learning and transfer in sequence acquisition play important roles in daily life. Several previous studies have found that even when participants are not aware that a transfer sequence has been transformed from the learning sequence, they are able to perform the transfer sequence faster and more accurately; this suggests implicit transfer of visuomotor sequences. Here, we investigated whether implicit transfer could be modulated by the number of trials completed in a learning session. Participants learned a sequence through trial and error, known as the m × n task (Hikosaka et al. in J Neurophysiol 74:1652-1661, 1995). In the learning session, participants were required to successfully perform the same sequence 4, 12, 16, or 20 times. In the transfer session, participants then learned one of two other sequences: one where the button configuration Vertically Mirrored the learning sequence, or a randomly generated sequence. Our results show that even when participants did not notice the alternation rule (i.e., vertical mirroring), their total working time was less and their total number of errors was lower in the transfer session compared with those who performed a Random sequence, irrespective of the number of trials completed in the learning session. This result suggests that implicit transfer likely occurs even over a shorter learning duration.

Implicit transfer of spatial structure in visuomotor sequence learning

Implicit learning and transfer in sequence learning are essential in daily life. Here, we investigated the implicit transfer of visuomotor sequences following a spatial transformation. In the two experiments, participants used trial and error to learn a sequence consisting of several button presses, known as the m×n task (Hikosaka et al., 1995). After this learning session, participants learned another sequence in which the button configuration was spatially transformed in one of the following ways: mirrored, rotated, and random arrangement. Our results showed that even when participants were unaware of the transformation rules, accuracy of transfer session in the mirrored and rotated groups was higher than that in the random group (i.e., implicit transfer occurred). Both those who noticed the transformation rules and those who did not (i.e., explicit and implicit transfer instances, respectively) showed faster performance in the mirrored sequences than in the rotated sequences. Taken together, the present results suggest that people can use their implicit visuomotor knowledge to spatially transform sequences and that implicit transfers are modulated by a transformation cost, similar to that in explicit transfer.

Implicit transfer of reversed temporal structure in visuomotor sequence learning

Some spatio-temporal structures are easier to transfer implicitly in sequential learning. In this study, we investigated whether the consistent reversal of triads of learned components would support the implicit transfer of their temporal structure in visuomotor sequence learning. A triad comprised three sequential button presses ([1][2][3]) and seven consecutive triads comprised a sequence. Participants learned sequences by trial and error, until they could complete it 20 times without error. Then, they learned another sequence, in which each triad was reversed ([3][2][1]), partially reversed ([2][1][3]), or switched so as not to overlap with the other conditions ([2][3][1] or [3][1][2]). Even when the participants did not notice the alternation rule, the consistent reversal of the temporal structure of each triad led to better implicit transfer; this was confirmed in a subsequent experiment. These results suggest that the implicit transfer of the temporal structure of a learned sequence can be influenced by both the structure and consistency of the change.

Subliminal understanding of negation: unconscious control by subliminal processing of word pairs

A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun of the pair--even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using a grey-scale contrast method of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-response links established during conscious rehearsal.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

Effects of learning with explicit elaboration on implicit transfer of visuomotor sequence learning

Intervals between stimuli and/or responses have significant influences on sequential learning. In the present study, we investigated whether transfer would occur even when the intervals and the visual configurations in a sequence were drastically changed so that participants did not notice that the required sequences of responses were identical. In the experiment, two (or three) sequential button presses comprised a "set," and nine (or six) consecutive sets comprised a "hyperset." In the first session, participants learned either a 2 × 9 or 3 × 6 hyperset by trial and error until they completed it 20 times without error. In the second block, the 2 × 9 (3 × 6) hyperset was changed into the 3 × 6 (2 × 9) hyperset, resulting in different visual configurations and intervals between stimuli and responses. Participants were assigned into two groups: the Identical and Random groups. In the Identical group, the sequence (i.e., the buttons to be pressed) in the second block was identical to that in the first block. In the Random group, a new hyperset was learned. Even in the Identical group, no participants noticed that the sequences were identical. Nevertheless, a significant transfer of performance occurred. However, in the subsequent experiment that did not require explicit trial-and-error learning in the first session, implicit transfer in the second session did not occur. These results indicate that learning with explicit elaboration strengthens the implicit representation of the sequence order as a whole; this might occur independently of the intervals between elements and enable implicit transfer.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

Acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody

An experiment explored the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody in a second language under incidental and intentional learning conditions. Semantic prosody is the conotational coloring of the semantics of a word, largely uncaptured by dictionary definitions. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we revealed that both conscious and unconscious knowledge were involved in the acquisition of semantic prosody. Intentional learning resulted in similar unconscious but more conscious knowledge than incidental learning. The results are discussed in terms of second language learning and the nature of unconscious knowledge.

How does prior knowledge affect implicit and explicit concept learning?

Two experiments investigated the effect of prior knowledge on implicit and explicit learning. Implicit as opposed to explicit learning is sometimes characterized as unselective or purely statistical. During training, one group of participants was presented with category exemplars whose features could be tied together by integrative knowledge, whereas another group saw category exemplars with unrelated feature combinations. Half of the participants in each group learned these categories under a secondary-task condition (meant to discourage explicit learning), and the remaining half performed the categorization task under a single-task condition (meant to favour explicit learning). In a test phase, participants classified only the individual features of the training exemplars. Secondary- as opposed to single-task conditions impaired explicit but not implicit knowledge (as determined by subjective measures). Importantly, prior knowledge resulted in increased amounts of both implicit and explicit knowledge.

Subjective measures of unconscious knowledge

The chapter gives an overview of the use of subjective measures of unconscious knowledge. Unconscious knowledge is knowledge we have, and could very well be using, but we are not aware of. Hence appropriate methods for indicating unconscious knowledge must show that the person (a) has knowledge but (b) does not know that she has it. One way of determining awareness of knowing is by taking confidence ratings after making judgments. If the judgments are above baseline but the person believes they are guessing (guessing criterion) or confidence does not relate to accuracy (zero-correlation criterion) there is evidence of unconscious knowledge. The way these methods can deal with the problem of bias is discussed, as is the use of different types of confidence scales. The guessing and zero-correlation criteria show whether or not the person is aware of knowing the content of the judgment, but not whether the person is aware of what any knowledge was that enabled the judgment. Thus, a distinction is made between judgment and structural knowledge, and it is shown how the conscious status of the latter can also be assessed. Finally, the use of control over the use of knowledge as a subjective measure of judgment knowledge is illustrated. Experiments using artificial grammar learning and a serial reaction time task explore these issues.

First- and third-person approaches in implicit learning research

How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is "We just ask them"! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain.

Measuring unconscious knowledge: distinguishing structural knowledge and judgment knowledge

This paper investigates the dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unconscious and conscious knowledge of structure (structural knowledge). Structural knowledge was contrasted to knowledge of whether an item has that structure (judgment knowledge). For both structural and judgment knowledge, conscious awareness was assessed using subjective measures. It was found that unconscious structural knowledge could lead to both conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge. When structural knowledge was unconscious, there was no tendency for judgment knowledge to become more conscious over time. Furthermore, conscious rather than unconscious structural knowledge produced more consistent errors in judgments, was facilitated by instructions to search for rules, and after such instructions was harmed by a secondary task. The dissociations validate the use of these subjective measures of conscious awareness.