Analysis of Multilevel Replicator Dynamics for General Two-Strategy Social Dilemma

The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay

Understanding the conditions for maintaining cooperation in groups of unrelated individuals despite the presence of non-cooperative members is a major research topic in contemporary biological, sociological, and economic theory. The N-person snowdrift game models the type of social dilemma where cooperative actions are costly, but there is a reward for performing them. We study this game in a scenario where players move between play groups following the casual group dynamics, where groups grow by recruiting isolates and shrink by losing individuals who then become isolates. This describes the size distribution of spontaneous human groups and also the formation of sleeping groups in monkeys. We consider three scenarios according to the probability of isolates joining a group. We find that for appropriate choices of the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation and the aggregation-disaggregation ratio in the formation of casual groups, free-riders can be completely eliminated from the population. If individuals are more attracted to large groups, we find that cooperators persist in the population even when the mean group size diverges. We also point out the remarkable similarity between the replicator equation approach to public goods games and the trait group formulation of structured demes.

Evolutionary dynamics within and among competing groups

Biological and social systems are structured at multiple scales, and the incentives of individuals who interact in a group may diverge from the collective incentive of the group as a whole. Mechanisms to resolve this tension are responsible for profound transitions in evolutionary history, including the origin of cellular life, multicellular life, and even societies. Here, we synthesize a growing literature that extends evolutionary game theory to describe multilevel evolutionary dynamics, using nested birth-death processes and partial differential equations to model natural selection acting on competition within and among groups of individuals. We analyze how mechanisms known to promote cooperation within a single group-including assortment, reciprocity, and population structure-alter evolutionary outcomes in the presence of competition among groups. We find that population structures most conducive to cooperation in multiscale systems can differ from those most conducive within a single group. Likewise, for competitive interactions with a continuous range of strategies we find that among-group selection may fail to produce socially optimal outcomes, but it can nonetheless produce second-best solutions that balance individual incentives to defect with the collective incentives for cooperation. We conclude by describing the broad applicability of multiscale evolutionary models to problems ranging from the production of diffusible metabolites in microbes to the management of common-pool resources in human societies.

Evolutionarily stable strategy analysis and its links to demography and genetics through invasion fitness

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price took off in part because it often does not require explicit assumptions about the genetics and demography of a population in contrast to population genetic models. Though this simplicity is useful, it obscures the degree to which ESS analysis applies to populations with more realistic genetics and demography: for example, how does ESS analysis handle complexities such as kin selection, group selection and variable environments when phenotypes are affected by multiple genes? In this paper, I review the history of the ESS concept and show how early uncertainty about the method lead to important mathematical theory linking ESS analysis to general population genetic models. I use this theory to emphasize the link between ESS analysis and the concept of invasion fitness. I give examples of how invasion fitness can measure kin selection, group selection and the evolution of linked modifier genes in response to variable environments. The ESSs in these examples depend crucially on demographic and genetic parameters, which highlights how ESS analysis will continue to be an important tool in understanding evolutionary patterns as new models address the increasing abundance of genetic and long-term demographic data in natural populations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Assortment and Reciprocity Mechanisms for Promotion of Cooperation in a Model of Multilevel Selection

In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked social interactions, other-regarding preferences considering the payoffs of others, reciprocity rules to establish cooperation as a social norm, and multilevel selection involving simultaneous competition between individuals favoring cheaters and competition between groups favoring cooperators. In this paper, we build on recent work studying PDE replicator equations for multilevel selection to understand how within-group mechanisms of assortment, other-regarding preferences, and both direct and indirect reciprocity can help to facilitate cooperation in concert with evolutionary competition between groups. We consider a group-structured population in which interactions between individuals consist of Prisoners' Dilemma games and study the dynamics of multilevel competition determined by the payoffs individuals receive when interacting according to these within-group mechanisms. We find that the presence of each of these mechanisms acts synergistically with multilevel selection for the promotion of cooperation, decreasing the strength of between-group competition required to sustain long-time cooperation and increasing the collective payoff achieved by the population. However, we find that only other-regarding preferences allow for the achievement of socially optimal collective payoffs for Prisoners' Dilemma games in which average payoff is maximized by an intermediate mix of cooperators and defectors. For the other three mechanisms, the multilevel dynamics remain susceptible to a shadow of lower-level selection, as the collective outcome fails to exceed the payoff of the all-cooperator group.

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of clonal multicellular life cycles

The evolution of multicellular life cycles is a central process in the course of the emergence of multicellularity. The simplest multicellular life cycle is comprised of the growth of the propagule into a colony and its fragmentation to give rise to new propagules. The majority of theoretical models assume selection among life cycles to be driven by internal properties of multicellular groups, resulting in growth competition. At the same time, the influence of interactions between groups on the evolution of life cycles is rarely even considered. Here, we present a model of colonial life cycle evolution taking into account group interactions. Our work shows that the outcome of evolution could be coexistence between multiple life cycles or that the outcome may depend on the initial state of the population – scenarios impossible without group interactions. At the same time, we found that some results of these simpler models remain relevant: evolutionary stable strategies in our model are restricted to binary fragmentation – the same class of life cycles that contains all evolutionarily optimal life cycles in the model without interactions. Our results demonstrate that while models neglecting interactions can capture short-term dynamics, they fall short in predicting the population-scale picture of evolution.

A PDE Model for Protocell Evolution and the Origin of Chromosomes via Multilevel Selection

The evolution of complex cellular life involved two major transitions: the encapsulation of self-replicating genetic entities into cellular units and the aggregation of individual genes into a collectively replicating genome. In this paper, we formulate a minimal model of the evolution of proto-chromosomes within protocells. We model a simple protocell composed of two types of genes: a "fast gene" with an advantage for gene-level self-replication and a "slow gene" that replicates more slowly at the gene level, but which confers an advantage for protocell-level reproduction. Protocell-level replication capacity depends on cellular composition of fast and slow genes. We use a partial differential equation to describe how the composition of genes within protocells evolves over time under within-cell and between-cell competition, considering an infinite population of protocells that each contain infinitely many genes. We find that the gene-level advantage of fast replicators casts a long shadow on the multilevel dynamics of protocell evolution: no level of between-protocell competition can produce coexistence of the fast and slow replicators when the two genes are equally needed for protocell-level reproduction. By introducing a "dimer replicator" consisting of a linked pair of the slow and fast genes, we show analytically that coexistence between the two genes can be promoted in pairwise multilevel competition between fast and dimer replicators, and provide numerical evidence for coexistence in trimorphic competition between fast, slow, and dimer replicators. Our results suggest that dimerization, or the formation of a simple chromosome-like dimer replicator, can help to overcome the shadow of lower-level selection and work in concert with deterministic multilevel selection in protocells featuring high gene copy number to allow for the coexistence of two genes that are complementary at the protocell level but compete at the level of individual gene-level replication. These results for the PDE model complement existing results on the benefits of dimerization in the case of low genetic copy number, for which it has been shown that genetic linkage can help to overcome the stochastic loss of necessary genetic templates.

Long-time behavior of a PDE replicator equation for multilevel selection in group-structured populations

In many biological systems, natural selection acts simultaneously on multiple levels of organization. This scenario typically presents an evolutionary conflict between the incentive of individuals to cheat and the collective incentive to establish cooperation within a group. Generalizing previous work on multilevel selection in evolutionary game theory, we consider a hyperbolic PDE model of a group-structured population, in which members within a single group compete with each other for individual-level replication; while the group also competes against other groups for group-level replication. We derive a threshold level of the relative strength of between-group competition such that defectors take over the population below the threshold while cooperation persists in the long-time population above the threshold. Under stronger assumptions on the initial distribution of group compositions, we further prove that the population converges to a steady state density supporting cooperation for between-group selection strength above the threshold. We further establish long-time bounds on the time-average of the collective payoff of the population, showing that the long-run population cannot outperform the payoff of a full-cooperator group even in the limit of infinitely-strong between-group competition. When the group replication rate is maximized by an intermediate level of within-group cooperation, individual-level selection casts a long shadow on the dynamics of multilevel selection: no level of between-group competition can erase the effects of the individual incentive to defect. We further extend our model to study the case of multiple types of groups, showing how the games that groups play can coevolve with the level of cooperation.

Collective predator evasion: Putting the criticality hypothesis to the test

According to the criticality hypothesis, collective biological systems should operate in a special parameter region, close to so-called critical points, where the collective behavior undergoes a qualitative change between different dynamical regimes. Critical systems exhibit unique properties, which may benefit collective information processing such as maximal responsiveness to external stimuli. Besides neuronal and gene-regulatory networks, recent empirical data suggests that also animal collectives may be examples of self-organized critical systems. However, open questions about self-organization mechanisms in animal groups remain: Evolutionary adaptation towards a group-level optimum (group-level selection), implicitly assumed in the "criticality hypothesis", appears in general not reasonable for fission-fusion groups composed of non-related individuals. Furthermore, previous theoretical work relies on non-spatial models, which ignore potentially important self-organization and spatial sorting effects. Using a generic, spatially-explicit model of schooling prey being attacked by a predator, we show first that schools operating at criticality perform best. However, this is not due to optimal response of the prey to the predator, as suggested by the "criticality hypothesis", but rather due to the spatial structure of the prey school at criticality. Secondly, by investigating individual-level evolution, we show that strong spatial self-sorting effects at the critical point lead to strong selection gradients, and make it an evolutionary unstable state. Our results demonstrate the decisive role of spatio-temporal phenomena in collective behavior, and that individual-level selection is in general not a viable mechanism for self-tuning of unrelated animal groups towards criticality.