Towards new concepts for a biological neuroscience of consciousness

Ultra-overt therapy: a novel medical approach centered on patient consciousness

Within the realms of human and artificial intelligence, the concepts of consciousness and comprehension are fundamental distinctions. In the clinical sphere, patient awareness regarding medication and its physiological processes plays a crucial role in determining drug efficacy and outcomes. This article introduces a novel perspective on prescription practices termed "Ultra-Overt Therapy" (UOT). A review of current supporting evidence was conducted through a non-systematic search in PubMed and Google Scholar, focusing on concepts such as the "mind-body relationship," "placebo response," "neuroscience," and "complementary medicine." Our findings, rooted in the mechanisms of the "placebo effect," the intricacies of "intersubjective therapy," the potency of "interoceptive awareness," and other domains of medical science, suggest that UOT holds theoretical promise. Future research endeavors focusing on these areas may elucidate the global impact of this method on medical treatment and patient care.

Classification of musical intervals by spiking neural networks: Perfect student in solfége classes

We investigate a spike activity of a network of excitable FitzHugh-Nagumo neurons, which is under constant two-frequency auditory signals. The neurons are supplemented with linear frequency filters and nonlinear input signal converters. We show that it is possible to configure the network to recognize a specific frequency ratio (musical interval) by selecting the parameters of the neurons, input filters, and coupling between neurons. A set of appropriately configured subnetworks with different topologies and coupling strengths can serve as a classifier for musical intervals. We have found that the selective properties of the classifier are due to the presence of a specific topology of coupling between the neurons of the network.

Aberrant temporal correlations of ongoing oscillations in disorders of consciousness on multiple time scales

Changes in neural oscillation amplitude across states of consciousness has been widely reported, but little is known about the link between temporal dynamics of these oscillations on different time scales and consciousness levels. To address this question, we analyzed amplitude fluctuation of the oscillations extracted from spontaneous resting-state EEG recorded from the patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) and healthy controls. Detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) and measures of life-time and waiting-time were employed to characterize the temporal structure of EEG oscillations on long time scales (1-20 s) and short time scales (< 1 s), in groups with different consciousness states: patients in minimally conscious state (MCS), patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and healthy subjects. Results revealed increased DFA exponents that implies higher long-range temporal correlations (LRTC), especially in the central brain area in alpha and beta bands. On short time scales, declined bursts of oscillations were also observed. All the metrics exhibited lower individual variability in the UWS or MCS group, which may be attributed to the reduced spatial variability of oscillation dynamics. In addition, the temporal dynamics of EEG oscillations showed significant correlations with the behavioral responsiveness of patients. In summary, our findings shows that loss of consciousness is accompanied by alternation of temporal structure in neural oscillations on multiple time scales, and thus may help uncover the mechanism of underlying neuronal correlates of consciousness.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-022-09852-9.

A systematic approach to brain dynamics: cognitive evolution theory of consciousness

The brain integrates volition, cognition, and consciousness seamlessly over three hierarchical (scale-dependent) levels of neural activity for their emergence: a causal or 'hard' level, a computational (unconscious) or 'soft' level, and a phenomenal (conscious) or 'psyche' level respectively. The cognitive evolution theory (CET) is based on three general prerequisites: physicalism, dynamism, and emergentism, which entail five consequences about the nature of consciousness: discreteness, passivity, uniqueness, integrity, and graduation. CET starts from the assumption that brains should have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, not as prediction machines. This emphasizes the dynamical nature of consciousness in terms of critical dynamics to account for metastability, avalanches, and self-organized criticality of brain processes, then coupling it with volition and cognition in a framework unified over the levels. Consciousness emerges near critical points, and unfolds as a discrete stream of momentary states, each volitionally driven from oldest subcortical arousal systems. The stream is the brain's way of making a difference via predictive (Bayesian) processing. Its objective observables could be complexity measures reflecting levels of consciousness and its dynamical coherency to reveal how much knowledge (information gain) the brain acquires over the stream. CET also proposes a quantitative classification of both disorders of consciousness and mental disorders within that unified framework.

From Brain-Body Function to Conscious Interactions

In this review, we discuss empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience. First, we motivate the discussion through evidence regarding the dynamic brain. Second, we review different brain-body couplings associated with conscious experience and its potential role in driving brain dynamics. Third, we introduce the machinery of multilayer networks to account for several types of interactions in brain-body systems. Then, a multilayer structure consists of two main generalizations: a formal semantic to study biological systems, and an integrative account for several signatures and models of consciousness. Finally, under this framework, we define composition of layers to account for entangled features of brain-body systems related to conscious experience. As such, a multilayer mathematical framework is highly integrative and thus may be more complete than other models. In this short review, we discuss a variety of empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience.

Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Modelling aspects of consciousness: A topological perspective

Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. In AST, the brain constructs a representation of attention taking place in its own (and others') mind ('the attention schema'). Moreover, this representation is incomplete for efficiency reasons. This inherent incompleteness of the attention schema results in the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness). Given this theory, the present paper asks whether a mind (either human or machine-based) that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation. Using a simple yet general model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we show that a complete representation of attention is not possible, since it cannot faithfully represent streams of attention. In this way, the study supports one of the core aspects of AST, that the brain's representation of its own attention is necessarily incomplete.

A Compositional Model of Consciousness Based on Consciousness-Only

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.