Assessing the value of transgenic crops

The ethical concerns about transgenic crops

It is generally accepted that transgenesis can improve our knowledge of natural processes, but also leads to agricultural, industrial or socio-economical changes which could affect human society at large and which may, consequently, require regulation. It is often stated that developing countries are most likely to benefit from plant biotechnology and are at the same time most likely to be affected by the deployment of such new technologies. Therefore, ethical questions related to such biotechnology probably also need to be addressed. We first illustrate how consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories of ethics can be applied to the genetically modified organism debate, namely consequentialism, autonomy/consent ethics (i.e. self-determination of people regarding matters that may have an effect on these people) and virtue ethics (i.e. whether an action is in adequacy with ideal traits). We show that these approaches lead to highly conflicting views. We have then refocused on moral 'imperatives', such as freedom, justice and truth. Doing so does not resolve all conflicting views, but allows a gain in clarity in the sense that the ethical concerns are shifted from a technology (and its use) to the morality or amorality of various stakeholders of this debate.

Epistemological depth in a GM crops controversy

This paper examines the scientific controversy over the yields of genetically modified [GM] crops as a case study in epistemologically deep disagreements. Appeals to "the evidence" are inadequate to resolve such disagreements; not because the interlocutors have radically different metaphysical views (as in cases of incommensurability), but instead because they assume rival epistemological frameworks and so have incompatible views about what kinds of research methods and claims count as evidence. Specifically, I show that, in the yield debate, proponents and opponents of GM crops cite two different sets of claims as evidence, which correspond to two rival epistemological frameworks, classical experimental epistemology and Nancy Cartwright's evidence for use. I go on to argue that, even if both sides of the debate accepted Cartwright's view, they might still disagree over what counts as evidence, because evidence for use ties standards of evidence to what is sometimes called the "context of application."

Property rights and genetic engineering: developing nations at risk

Eighty percent of (commercial) genetically engineered seeds (GES) are designed only to resist herbicides. Letting farmers use more chemicals, they cut labor costs. But developing nations say GES cause food shortages, unemployment, resistant weeds, and extinction of native cultivars when "volunteers" drift nearby. While GES patents are reasonable, this paper argues many patent policies are not. The paper surveys GE technology, outlines John Locke's classic account of property rights, and argues that current patent policies must be revised to take account of Lockean ethical constraints. After answering a key objection, it provides concrete suggestions for implementing its ethical conclusions.