Cooperative coordination as a social behavior: Experiments with an animal model

Willingness valued more than ability in partner choice: Insights into behavioral and ERP data

In human cooperation, people prefer to choose partners with high willingness and ability-while both are valued by partners, individuals often prioritize willingness. Two event-related potential (ERP) experiments were conducted to discern the neural processes underpinning this preference. In the first experiment, participants made a choice between two potential partners and received feedback on the selected partner's willingness to cooperate. This was followed by feedback on the partner's task performance (ability) or a gambling outcome. In contrast, the second experiment first provided feedback on ability, then presented feedback on willingness or a gambling outcome. This study revealed that a potential partner's willingness trait significantly influences individuals' emotional evaluations and monetary allocations than the ability trait. Electrophysiological data indicated that low-willingness feedback elicited a diminished feedback-related negative (FRN) and an amplified P3 compared to high-willingness feedback. In contrast, no such difference was discernible between high- and low-ability feedback. Moreover, the P3 difference from high versus low willingness was considerably more pronounced than that from gambling outcomes, whereas the difference wave between high and low ability paralleled gambling outcomes. These findings bolster the novel finding that partner willingness may provide more substantial social rewards than ability. Furthermore, this study provides the first ERP evidence of willingness and ability trait perceptions in partner choice decisions.

A new paradigm of learned cooperation reveals extensive social coordination and specific cortical activation in mice

Cooperation is a social behavior crucial for the survival of many species, including humans. Several experimental paradigms have been established to study cooperative behavior and related neural activity in different animal species. Although mice exhibit limited cooperative capacity in some behavioral paradigms, it is still interesting to explore their cooperative behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. Here, we developed a new paradigm for training and testing cooperative behavior in mice based on coordinated lever-pressing and analyzed social interactions between the animals during cooperation. We observed extensive social contact and waiting behavior in cooperating animals, with the number of such events positively correlated with the success of cooperation. Using c-Fos immunostaining and a high-speed volumetric imaging with synchronized on-the-fly scan and readout (VISoR) system, we further mapped whole-brain neuronal activity trace following cooperation. Significantly higher levels of c-Fos expression were observed in cortical areas including the frontal pole, motor cortex, anterior cingulate area, and prelimbic area. These observations highlight social interaction and coordination in cooperative behavior and provide clues for further study of the underlying neural circuitry mechanisms.

Evolution and neural representation of mammalian cooperative behavior

Cooperation is common in nature and is pivotal to the development of human society. However, the details of how and why cooperation evolved remain poorly understood. Cross-species investigation of cooperation may help to elucidate the evolution of cooperative strategies. Thus, we design an automated cooperative behavioral paradigm and quantitatively examine the cooperative abilities and strategies of mice, rats, and tree shrews. We find that social communication plays a key role in the establishment of cooperation and that increased cooperative ability and a more efficient cooperative strategy emerge as a function of the evolutionary hierarchy of the tested species. Moreover, we demonstrate that single-unit activities in the orbitofrontal and prelimbic cortex in rats represent neural signals that may be used to distinguish between the cooperative and non-cooperative tasks, and such signals are distinct from the reward signals. Both signals may represent distinct components of the internal drive for cooperation.

The social life of Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus)

The Norway rat has important impacts on our life. They are amongst the most used research subjects, resulting in ground-breaking advances. At the same time, wild rats live in close association with us, leading to various adverse interactions. In face of this relevance, it is surprising how little is known about their natural behaviour. While recent laboratory studies revealed their complex social skills, little is known about their social behaviour in the wild. An integration of these different scientific approaches is crucial to understand their social life, which will enable us to design more valid research paradigms, develop more effective management strategies, and to provide better welfare standards. Hence, I first summarise the literature on their natural social behaviour. Second, I provide an overview of recent developments concerning their social cognition. Third, I illustrate why an integration of these areas would be beneficial to optimise our interactions with them.

Experimental evidence for reciprocity in allogrooming among wild-type Norway rats

If individuals help more those who have previously helped them, stable cooperation may ensue through alternation of roles between donors and recipients. Allogrooming, which is costly to donors and beneficial to recipients, is often exchanged between social partners. Arguably, allogrooming and allopreening are the most frequently exchanged social services and have been used as a standard model of reciprocal cooperation. However, evidence for the application of reciprocity rules among social partners allogrooming each other hitherto is merely correlational. Here, we tested whether female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) apply the decision rule characterising direct reciprocity: help someone who has helped you before, by experimentally manipulating both the need for allogrooming and the behavioural response. Furthermore, we checked whether trading of grooming services is influenced by the rank of the social partner. We show that rats groom social partners reciprocally and prefer to do so up the hierarchy, i.e. they groom dominant partners more often than subordinates, while reciprocating with both. This provides experimental evidence that animals render a costly social service by applying reciprocity decision rules when showing a natural hygienic behaviour. The fact that allogrooming is more readily shown up the hierarchy may suggest an appeasing function.

A Social Reinforcement Learning Hypothesis of Mutual Reward Preferences in Rats

Although the use of neuroimaging techniques has revealed much about the neural correlates of social decision making (SDM) in humans, it remains poorly understood how social stimuli are represented, and how social decisions are implemented at the neural level in humans and in other species. To address this issue, the establishment of novel animal paradigms allowing a broad spectrum of neurobiological causal manipulations and neurophysiological recordings provides an exciting tool to investigate the neural implementation of social valuation in the brain. Here, we discuss the potential of a rodent model, Rattus norvegicus, for the understanding of SDM and its neural underpinnings. Particularly, we consider recent data collected in a rodent prosocial choice task within a social reinforcement framework and discuss factors that could drive SDM in rodents.

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as 'help anyone if helped by someone' should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation

Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.

Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate

This paper presents quantitative data on altruistic cooperation during food acquisition by Ache foragers. Cooperative activities are defined as those that entail a cost of time and energy to the donor but primarily lead to an increase in the foraging success of the recipient. Data show that Ache men and women spend about 10% of all foraging time engaged in altruistic cooperation on average, and that on some days they may spend more than 50% of their foraging time in such activities. The most time-consuming cooperative activity for both sexes is helping during the pursuit of game animals, a pattern that is probably linked to the widespread sharing of game by Ache foragers. Cooperative food acquisition and subsequent food redistribution in hunter-gatherer societies are critical behaviors that probably helped shape universal, evolved, cooperative tendencies that are well illustrated in modern experimental economics.

Rats prefer mutual rewards in a prosocial choice task

Pro-sociality, i.e., the preference for outcomes that produce benefits for other individuals, is ubiquitous in humans. Recently, cross-species comparisons of social behavior have offered important new insights into the evolution of pro-sociality. Here, we present a rodent analog of the Pro-social Choice Task that controls strategic components, de-confounds other-regarding choice motives from the animals' natural tendencies to maximize own food access and directly tests the effect of social context on choice allocation. We trained pairs of rats—an actor and a partner rat—in a double T-maze task where actors decided between two alternatives only differing in the reward delivered to the partner. The “own reward” choice yielded a reward only accessible to the actor whereas the “both reward” choice produced an additional reward for a partner (partner condition) or an inanimate toy (toy Condition), located in an adjacent compartment. We found that actors chose “both reward” at levels above chance and more often in the partner than in the toy condition. Moreover, we show that this choice pattern adapts to the current social context and that the observed behavior is stable over time.

Coaction versus reciprocity in continuous-time models of cooperation

Cooperating animals frequently show closely coordinated behaviours organized by a continuous flow of information between interacting partners. Such real-time coaction is not captured by the iterated prisoner's dilemma and other discrete-time reciprocal cooperation games, which inherently feature a delay in information exchange. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation when individuals can dynamically respond to each other's actions. We develop continuous-time analogues of iterated-game models and describe their dynamics in terms of two variables, the propensity of individuals to initiate cooperation (altruism) and their tendency to mirror their partner's actions (coordination). These components of cooperation stabilize at an evolutionary equilibrium or show oscillations, depending on the chosen payoff parameters. Unlike reciprocal altruism, cooperation by coaction does not require that those willing to initiate cooperation pay in advance for uncertain future benefits. Correspondingly, we show that introducing a delay to information transfer between players is equivalent to increasing the cost of cooperation. Cooperative coaction can therefore evolve much more easily than reciprocal cooperation. When delays entirely prevent coordination, we recover results from the discrete-time alternating prisoner's dilemma, indicating that coaction and reciprocity are connected by a continuum of opportunities for real-time information exchange.

Why cooperate? An economic perspective is not enough

Cooperation is usually explained from an economic perspective focused mainly on the tangible outcomes received by individuals that are also dependent on the behavior of others, with little reference to the actual behaviors used when cooperating. The potential consequences of social dimensions associated with cooperative behaviors are minimized in Skinnerian and game-theory models by means of anonymous subjects that behave individually while physically isolated in separate chambers. When cooperation and non-cooperation occur in the real world, however, they are often associated not only with different outcomes but also with different behaviors. Unlike non-cooperation, cooperative behaviors are usually intrinsically social, influenced by the presence and behaviors of familiar partners. Research is described that addresses whether the social dimensions of cooperative actions go beyond mere description of behaviors to also explain why cooperation occurs. One way to resolve the relative importance of economic and social factors for explanations of cooperation is to measure choice between the options of cooperation and non-cooperation. The economic perspective, linked to models derived from game theory, frames the question as a choice determined by differences in tangible outcomes such as food or money that, in evolutionary terms, are surrogates for gains in fitness. From a behavioral perspective, the choice between cooperation and non-cooperation is also determined by social dimensions associated only with cooperation. The influence of social cooperation on preference was examined by means of two rectangular chambers interconnected by a T-maze. In one chamber, pairs of laboratory rats were reinforced with saccharin solution for coordinating back-and-forth shuttling; in the second chamber, a single animal was reinforced for back-and-forth shuttling performed in isolation. With outcomes equalized between the two options, cooperation was preferred by the majority of subjects. Moreover, variation in the relative rate of reinforcement during cooperation was not a strong predictor of choice whereas the level of intra-pair coordination was positively related to preference. Implications of this result are discussed for both method and theory, including the hypothesis that the preference is influenced by intrinsic reinforcements evoked by cooperating. The consequences for evolutionary fitness would then arise not only from tangible outcomes but from the relationships that develop when cooperating even when immediate and tangible pay-offs are absent, insufficient or sub-optimal. The impact of cooperative relationships on fitness may therefore not occur immediately but in the future, and perhaps in another context, when they influence outcomes that have a significant impact on survival and reproduction.