The 'Self' Aspects: the Sense of the Existence, Identification, and Location

The self and conscious experience

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary

Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.

Reducing and deducing the structures of consciousness through meditation

According to many first-person accounts, consciousness comprises a subject-object structure involving a mental action or attitude starting from the “subjective pole” upon an object of experience. In recent years, many paradigms have been developed to manipulate and empirically investigate the object of consciousness. However, well-controlled investigation of subjective aspects of consciousness has been more challenging. One way, subjective aspects of consciousness are proposed to be studied is using meditation states that alter its subject-object structure. Most work to study consciousness in this way has been done using Buddhist meditation traditions and techniques. There is another meditation tradition that has been around for at least as long as early Buddhist traditions (if not longer) with the central goal of developing a fine-grained first-person understanding of consciousness and its constituents by its manipulation through meditation, namely the Tantric tradition of Yoga. However, due to the heavy reliance of Yogic traditions on the ancient Indian Samkhya philosophical system, their insights about consciousness have been more challenging to translate into contemporary research. Where such translation has been attempted, they have lacked accompanying phenomenological description of the procedures undertaken for making the precise subject-object manipulations as postulated. In this paper, I address these issues by first detailing how Tantric Yoga philosophy can be effectively translated as a systematic phenomenological account of consciousness spanning the entirety of the subject-object space divided into four “structures of consciousness” from subject to object. This follows from the work of the 20th century polymath and founder of the Tantric Yoga school of Ananda Marga, Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, who expounded on the “cognitivization” of Samkhya philosophy. I then detail stepwise meditation procedures that make theoretical knowledge of these structures of consciousness a practical reality to a Tantric Yoga meditator in the first-person. This is achieved by entering meditative states through stepwise experiential reduction of the structures of consciousness from object to subject, as part of their meditative goal of “self-realization.” I end by briefly discussing the overlap of these putative meditation states with proposed states from other meditation traditions, and how these states could help advance an empirical study of consciousness.

Fish self-awareness: limits of current knowledge and theoretical expectations

Animal self-awareness is divided into three levels: bodily, social, and introspective self-awareness. Research has focused mainly on the introspection of so-called higher organisms such as mammals. Herein, we turn our attention to fish and provide opinions on their self-awareness based on a review of the scientific literature. Our specific aims are to discuss whether fish (A) could have a neural substrate supporting self-awareness and whether they display signs of (B) social and (C) introspective self-awareness. The present knowledge does not exclude the possibility that fish could have a simple neocortex or other structures that support certain higher cognitive processes, as the function of the primate cerebral cortex can be replaced by other neurological structures. Fish are known to display winner, loser, and audience effects, which could be interpreted as signs of social self-awareness. The audience effect may be explained not only by ethological cost and benefit theory but also by the concept of public self-awareness, which comes from human studies. The behavioural and neural manifestations of depression may be induced in fish under social subordination and may be viewed as certain awareness of a social status. The current findings on fish introspective self-awareness have been debated in the scientific community and, therefore, demand replication to provide more evidence. Further research is needed to verify the outlined ideas; however, the current knowledge indicates that fish are capable of certain higher cognitive processes, which raises questions and implications regarding ethics and welfare in fish-related research and husbandry.

Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing for post-traumatic stress disorder from the perspective of three-dimensional model of the experiential selfhood

Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy is included in many international trauma treatment guidelines and is also shortlisted as an evidence-based practice for the treatment of psychological trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). However, its neurobiological mechanisms have not yet been fully understood. In this brief article we propose a hypothesis that a recently introduced neurophysiologically based three-dimensional construct model for experiential selfhood may help to fill this gap by providing the necessary neurobiological rationale of EMDR. In support of this proposal we briefly overview the neurophysiology of eye movements and the triad selfhood components, as well as EMDR therapy neuroimaging studies.