Health, Happiness and Human Enhancement-Dealing with Unexpected Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation

Managing the moral expansion of medicine

Science and technology have vastly expanded the realm of medicine. The numbers of and knowledge about diseases has greatly increased, and we can help more people in many more ways than ever before. At the same time, the extensive expansion has also augmented harms, professional responsibility, and ethical concerns. While these challenges have been studied from a wide range of perspectives, the problems prevail. This article adds value to previous analyses by identifying how the moral imperative of medicine has expanded in three ways: (1) from targeting experienced phenomena, such as pain and suffering, to non-experienced phenomena (paraclinical signs and indicators); (2) from addressing present pain to potential future suffering; and (3) from reducing negative wellbeing (pain and suffering) to promoting positive wellbeing. These expansions create and aggravate problems in medicine: medicalization, overdiagnosis, overtreatment, risk aversion, stigmatization, and healthism. Moreover, they threaten to infringe ethical principles, to distract attention and responsibility from other competent agents and institutions, to enhance the power and responsibility of professionals, and to change the professional-beneficiary relationship. In order to find ways to manage the moral expansion of medicine, four traditional ways of setting limits are analyzed and dismissed. However, basic asymmetries in ethics suggest that it is more justified to address people’s negative wellbeing (pain and suffering) than their positive wellbeing. Moreover, differences in epistemology, indicate that it is less uncertain to address present pain and suffering than future wellbeing and happiness. Based on these insights the article concludes that the moral imperative of medicine has a gradient from pain and suffering to wellbeing and happiness, and from the present to the future. Hence, in general present pain and suffering have normative priority over future positive wellbeing.

Doctor, please make me freer: Capabilities enhancement as a goal of medicine

Biomedical innovations are making possible the enhancement of human capabilities. There are two philosophical stances on the role that medicine should play in this respect. On the one hand, naturalism rejects every medical intervention that goes beyond preventing and treating disease. On the other hand, welfarism advocates enhancements that foster subjective well-being. We will show that both positions have considerable shortcomings. Consequently, we will introduce a third characterization in which therapies and enhancements can be reconciled with the legitimate objectives of medicine inasmuch as they improve the capabilities that enable the freedom to pursue personal well-being.

Neurochips: Considerations from a neurosurgeon's standpoint

A neurochip comprises a small device based on the brain-machine interfaces that emulate the functioning synapses. Its implant in the human body allows the interaction of the brain with a computer. Although the data-processing speed is still slower than that of the human brain, they are being developed. There is no ethical conflict as long as it is used for neural rehabilitation or to supply impaired or missing neurological functions. However, other applications emerge as controversial.

To the best of our knowledge, there have no been publications about the neurosurgical role in the application of this neurotechnological advance. Deliberation on neurochips is primarily limited to a small circle of scholars such as neurotechnological engineers, artists, philosophers, and bioethicists. Why do we address neurosurgeons? They will be directly involved as they could be required to perform invasive procedures.

Future neurosurgeons will have to be a different type of neurosurgeon. They will be part of interdisciplinary teams interacting with computer engineers, neurobiologist, and ethicists. Although a neurosurgeon is not expected to be an expert in all areas, they have to be familiar with them; they have to be prepared to determine indications, contraindications and risks of the procedures, participating in the decision-making processes, and even collaborating in the design of devices to preserve anatomic structures. Social, economic, and legal aspects are also inherent to the neurosurgical activity; therefore, these aspects should also be considered.

Recommendations for Responsible Development and Application of Neurotechnologies

Advancements in novel neurotechnologies, such as brain computer interfaces (BCI) and neuromodulatory devices such as deep brain stimulators (DBS), will have profound implications for society and human rights. While these technologies are improving the diagnosis and treatment of mental and neurological diseases, they can also alter individual agency and estrange those using neurotechnologies from their sense of self, challenging basic notions of what it means to be human. As an international coalition of interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners, we examine these challenges and make recommendations to mitigate negative consequences that could arise from the unregulated development or application of novel neurotechnologies. We explore potential ethical challenges in four key areas: identity and agency, privacy, bias, and enhancement. To address them, we propose (1) democratic and inclusive summits to establish globally-coordinated ethical and societal guidelines for neurotechnology development and application, (2) new measures, including “Neurorights,” for data privacy, security, and consent to empower neurotechnology users’ control over their data, (3) new methods of identifying and preventing bias, and (4) the adoption of public guidelines for safe and equitable distribution of neurotechnological devices.

Neurotechnologies, Relational Autonomy, and Authenticity

The ethical debate about neurotechnologies has been largely framed around their effects on authenticity. In this paper, we investigate the concept of authenticity and associated conceptions of the self. We develop a conception of authenticity that eschews problematic essentialist or existentialist views of the self and the assumption that the authentic self transcends socialization. In our view, authenticity is a condition for self-governance and can involve either endorsement or acknowledgment. Revisiting the debate about neurotechnologies, we show why framing the ethical debate in terms of authenticity is unhelpful and argue that these ethical concerns are better understood as concerns about autonomy.

Ethics and the emergence of brain-computer interface medicine

Brain-computer interface (BCI) technology will usher in profound changes to the practice of medicine. BCI devices, broadly defined as those capable of reading brain activity and translating this into operation of a device, will offer patients and clinicians new ways to address impairments of communication, movement, sensation, and mental health. These new capabilities will bring new responsibilities and raise a diverse set of ethical challenges. One way to understand and begin to address these challenges is to view them in terms of the goals of medicine. In this chapter, different ways in which BCI technology may subserve the goals of medicine is explored. This is followed by articulation of additional goals particularly relevant to BCI technology: neural diversity, neural privacy, agency, and authenticity. The goals of medicine provide a useful ethical framework for the introduction of BCI devices into medicine.

Forensic psychiatry and neurolaw: Description, developments, and debates

Neuroscience produces a wealth of data on the relationship between brain and behavior, including criminal behavior. The research field studying the possible and actual impact of neuroscience on the law and legal practices, is called neurolaw. It is a new and rapidly developing domain of interdisciplinary research. Since forensic psychiatry has to do with both neuroscience and the law, neurolaw is of specific relevance for this psychiatric specialty. In this contribution, I will discuss three main research areas in neurolaw - revision, assessment, and intervention - and explore their relevance for forensic psychiatry. I will identify some valuable possibilities as well as some notable challenges - both technical and ethical - for forensic psychiatry regarding neurolaw developments.

Human Enhancement: Enhancing Health or Harnessing Happiness?

Human enhancement (HE) is ontologically, epistemologically, and ethically challenging and has stirred a wide range of scholarly and public debates. This article focuses on some conceptual issues with HE that have important ethical implications. In particular it scrutinizes how the concept of human enhancement relates to and challenges the concept of health. In order to do so, it addresses three specific questions: Q1. What do conceptions of HE say about health? Q2. Does HE challenge traditional conceptions of health? Q3. Do concepts of health set limits to or direct HE? Addressing Q1 reveals that HE tends to frame and form our conception of health. Thereby it challenges traditional conceptions of health (Q2). Accordingly, health does not provide strong sources for setting limits to HE (Q3). On the contrary HE seems to define and expand the concept of health. Common to the concepts of HE and health is that both depend on vague value concepts, such as happiness, well-being, or goodness. There seems to be a tendency in the HE literature to define the goal of human life in terms of what is bigger, stronger, faster, more intelligent, and more resilient. However, this is confusing "goodness" with "more" and quality with quantity. Until HE more appropriately defines happiness, HE will fail to provide a relevant compass for improving the life of human beings. On the contrary, if we let simplified conceptions of "enhancement" come to define goodness or health, we may do more harm than good. Until doing so, we may well learn from Tithonus, listen to Douglas Adams' Wowbagger, and pay attention to Virginia Woolf's Orlando. Enhanced life may not be better. The same goes for health.

Limits to human enhancement: nature, disease, therapy or betterment?

BACKGROUND

New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we should find resources to set such limits.

DISCUSSION

Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be enhanced. Explaining why it is better to become older, stronger, and more intelligent presupposes a clear conception of goodness, which is seldom provided. In particular, the qualitative better is frequently confused with the quantitative more. We may therefore not need "external" measures for setting its limits - they are available in the concept of enhancement itself. While there may be shortcomings in traditional sources of limit setting to human enhancement, such as nature, therapy, and disease, such approaches may not be necessary. The specification-of-betterment problem inherent in the conception of human enhancement itself provides means to restrict its unwarranted proliferation. We only need to demand clear, sustainable, obtainable goals for enhancement that are based on evidence, and not on lofty speculations, hypes, analogies, or weak associations. Human enhancements that specify what will become better, and provide adequate evidence, are good and should be pursued. Others should not be accepted.

Becoming more oneself? Changes in personality following DBS treatment for psychiatric disorders: Experiences of OCD patients and general considerations

Does DBS change a patient's personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson's disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients suffering from psychiatric disorders. In this paper, we present the experiences of 18 patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) who are undergoing treatment with DBS. We will also discuss the inherent difficulties of how to define and assess changes in personality, in particular for patients with psychiatric disorders. We end with a discussion of the data and how these shed new light on the conceptual debate about how to define personality.

From 'Hard' Neuro-Tools to 'Soft' Neuro-Toys? Refocussing the Neuro-Enhancement Debate

Since the 1990’s, the debate concerning the ethical, legal and societal aspects of ‘neuro-enhancement’ has evolved into a massive discourse, both in the public realm and in the academic arena. This ethical debate, however, tends to repeat the same sets of arguments over and over again. Normative disagreements between transhumanists and bioconservatives on invasive or radical brain stimulators, and uncertainties regarding the use and effectivity of nootropic pharmaceuticals dominate the field. Building on the results of an extensive European project on responsible research and innovation in neuro-enhancement (NERRI), we observe and encourage that the debate is now entering a new and, as we will argue, more realistic and societally relevant stage. This new stage concerns those technologies that enter the market as ostensibly harmless contrivances that consumers may use for self-care or entertainment. We use the examples and arguments of participants in NERRI debates to describe three case studies of such purportedly innocent ‘toys’. Based upon this empirical material, we argue that these ‘soft’ enhancement gadgets are situated somewhere in the boundary zone between the internal and the external, between the intimate and the intrusive, between the familiar and the unfamiliar, between the friendly and the scary and, in Foucauldian terms, between technologies of the self and technologies of control. Therefore, we describe their physiognomy with the help of a term borrowed from Jacques Lacan, namely as “extimate” technologies.

To dispense or not to dispense? Ethical case decision-making in pharmacy practice

In daily practice, pharmacists are regularly confronted with moral problems in which deciding what to do is not always a straightforward decision. In this contribution we show how the use of a specific method for moral deliberation can (in retrospect or prospective) aid moral judgements. We use the case of dispensing isotretinoin to demonstrate one ethical reflection method, namely the Utrecht Method.

New Perspectives on Neuroengineering and Neurotechnologies: NSF-DFG Workshop Report

GOAL

To identify and overcome barriers to creating new neurotechnologies capable of restoring both motor and sensory function in individuals with neurological conditions.

METHODS

This report builds upon the outcomes of a joint workshop between the US National Science Foundation and the German Research Foundation on New Perspectives in Neuroengineering and Neurotechnology convened in Arlington, VA, USA, November 13-14, 2014.

RESULTS

The participants identified key technological challenges for recording and manipulating neural activity, decoding, and interpreting brain data in the presence of plasticity, and early considerations of ethical and social issues pertinent to the adoption of neurotechnologies.

CONCLUSIONS

The envisaged progress in neuroengineering requires tightly integrated hardware and signal processing efforts, advances in understanding of physiological adaptations to closed-loop interactions with neural devices, and an open dialog with stakeholders and potential end-users of neurotechnology.

SIGNIFICANCE

The development of new neurotechnologies (e.g., bidirectional brain-computer interfaces) could significantly improve the quality of life of people living with the effects of brain or spinal cord injury, or other neurodegenerative diseases. Focused efforts aimed at overcoming the remaining barriers at the electrode tissue interface, developing implantable hardware with on-board computation, and refining stimulation methods to precisely activate neural tissue will advance both our understanding of brain function and our ability to treat currently intractable disorders of the nervous system.

The ethics of deep brain stimulation (DBS)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an invasive technique designed to stimulate certain deep brain regions for therapeutic purposes and is currently used mainly in patients with neurodegenerative disorders, such as Parkinson's disease. However, DBS is also used increasingly for other experimental applications, such as the treatment of psychiatric disorders (e.g. severe depression), weight reduction. Apart from its therapeutic potential, DBS can cause severe adverse effects, some that might also have a significant impact on the patient's personality and autonomy by the external stimulation of DBS which effects lie beyond the individual's control and free will. The article's purpose is to outline the procedures of DBS currently used in therapeutic and experimental applications and to discuss the ethical concerns regarding this procedure. It will address the clinical benefit-risk-ratio, the particular ethics of research in this field, and the ethical issues raised by affecting a patient's or an individual's personality and autonomous behaviour. Moreover, a potential ethical guideline, the Ulysses contract is discussed for the field of clinical application as well as the question of responsibility.

Analyzing 7000 texts on deep brain stimulation: what do they tell us?

The enormous increase in numbers of scientific publications in the last decades requires quantitative methods for obtaining a better understanding of topics and developments in various fields. In this exploratory study, we investigate the emergence, trends, and connections of topics within the whole text corpus of the deep brain stimulation (DBS) literature based on more than 7000 papers (title and abstracts) published between 1991 to 2014 using a network approach. Taking the co-occurrence of basic terms that represent important topics within DBS as starting point, we outline the statistics of interconnections between DBS indications, anatomical targets, positive, and negative effects, as well as methodological, technological, and economic issues. This quantitative approach confirms known trends within the literature (e.g., regarding the emergence of psychiatric indications). The data also reflect an increased discussion about complex issues such as personality connected tightly to the ethical context, as well as an apparent focus on depression as important DBS indication, where the co-occurrence of terms related to negative effects is low both for the indication as well as the related anatomical targets. We also discuss consequences of the analysis from a bioethical perspective, i.e., how such a quantitative analysis could uncover hidden subject matters that have ethical relevance. For example, we find that hardware-related issues in DBS are far more robustly connected to an ethical context compared to impulsivity, concrete side-effects or death/suicide. Our contribution also outlines the methodology of quantitative text analysis that combines statistical approaches with expert knowledge. It thus serves as an example how innovative quantitative tools can be made useful for gaining a better understanding in the field of DBS.

Deep brain stimulation of the nucleus accumbens and bed nucleus of stria terminalis for obsessive-compulsive disorder: a case series

BACKGROUND

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric condition defined by the presence of obsessions, compulsions, or both. It has a lifetime prevalence of 2%-3% and causes significant impairment in social and work functioning, as well as a reduced quality of life. Treatment includes pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy, but a significant number of patients fail to respond to treatment. Deep brain stimulation has shown to be a safe and effective procedure for severe, chronic, treatment-resistant OCD, and several surgical targets have been proposed for treatment, including the nucleus accumbens, the anterior limb of the internal capsule, the subthalamic nucleus, the globus pallidus, and the bed nucleus of stria terminalis.

OBJECTIVES

To report the first Italian case series of patients who underwent DBS of 2 distinct targets for OCD: nulceus accumbens and bed nulceus of stria terminalis.

METHODS

Four patients underwent DBS of the nulceus accumbens, and 4 patients underwent DBS of the bed nucleus of stria terminalis.

RESULTS

Six patients showed a significant improvement in OCD symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

DBS of these 2 structures is a safe and effective procedure for the treatment of severe, refractory OCD.

Thinking Ahead on Deep Brain Stimulation: An Analysis of the Ethical Implications of a Developing Technology

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a developing technology. New generations of DBS technology are already in the pipeline, yet this particular fact has been largely ignored among ethicists interested in DBS. Focusing only on ethical concerns raised by the current DBS technology is, albeit necessary, not sufficient. Since current bioethical concerns raised by a specific technology could be quite different from the concerns it will raise a couple of years ahead, an ethical analysis should be sensitive to such alterations, or it could end up with results that soon become dated. The goal of this analysis is to address these changing bioethical concerns, to think ahead on upcoming and future DBS concerns both in terms of a changing technology and changing moral attitudes. By employing the distinction between inherent and noninherent bioethical concerns we identify and make explicit the particular limits and potentials for change within each category, respectively, including how present and upcoming bioethical concerns regarding DBS emerge and become obsolete. Many of the currently identified ethical problems with DBS, such as stimulation-induced mania, are a result of suboptimal technology. These challenges could be addressed by technical advances, while for instance perceptions of an altered body image caused by the mere awareness of having an implant may not. Other concerns will not emerge until the technology has become sophisticated enough for new uses to be realized, such as concerns on DBS for enhancement purposes. As a part of the present analysis, concerns regarding authenticity are used as an example.

Authenticity or autonomy? When deep brain stimulation causes a dilemma

While deep brain stimulation (DBS) for patients with Parkinson's disease has typically raised ethical questions about autonomy, accountability and personal identity, recent research indicates that we need to begin taking into account issues surrounding the patients' feelings of authenticity and alienation as well. In order to bring out the relevance of this dimension to ethical considerations of DBS, I analyse a recent case study of a Dutch patient who, as a result of DBS, faced a dilemma between autonomy and authenticity. This case study is meant to point out the normatively meaningful tension patients under DBS experience between authenticity and autonomy.

Me, Myself and My Brain Implant: Deep Brain Stimulation Raises Questions of Personal Authenticity and Alienation

In this article, I explore select case studies of Parkinson patients treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS) in light of the notions of alienation and authenticity. While the literature on DBS has so far neglected the issues of authenticity and alienation, I argue that interpreting these cases in terms of these concepts raises new issues for not only the philosophical discussion of neuro-ethics of DBS, but also for the psychological and medical approach to patients under DBS. In particular, I suggest that the experience of alienation and authenticity varies from patient to patient with DBS. For some, alienation can be brought about by neurointerventions because patients no longer feel like themselves. But, on the other hand, it seems alienation can also be cured by DBS as other patients experience their state of mind as authentic under treatment and retrospectively regard their former lives without stimulation as alienated. I argue that we must do further research on the relevance of authenticity and alienation to patients treated with DBS in order to gain a deeper philosophical understanding, and to develop the best evaluative criterion for the behavior of DBS patients.