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Ishida S, Nishitsutsumi Y, Kashioka H, Taguchi T, Shineha R. A comparative review on neuroethical issues in neuroscientific and neuroethical journals. Front Neurosci 2023; 17:1160611. [PMID: 37781239 PMCID: PMC10536163 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1160611] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 10/03/2023] Open
Abstract
This study is a pilot literature review that compares the interest of neuroethicists and neuroscientists. It aims to determine whether there is a significant gap between the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics journals and neuroscience journals. We retrieved 614 articles from two specialist neuroethics journals (Neuroethics and AJOB Neuroscience) and 82 neuroethics-focused articles from three specialist neuroscience journals (Neuron, Nature Neuroscience, and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). We classified these articles in light of the neuroethical issue in question before we compared the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics with those addressed by neuroscientists. A notable result is a parallelism between them as a general tendency. Neuroscientific articles cover most neuroethical issues discussed by philosophical ethicists and vice versa. Subsequently, there are notable discrepancies between the two bodies of neuroethics literature. For instance, theoretical questions, such as the ethics of moral enhancement and the philosophical implications of neuroscientific findings on our conception of personhood, are more intensely discussed in philosophical-neuroethical articles. Conversely, neuroscientific articles tend to emphasize practical questions, such as how to successfully integrate ethical perspectives into scientific research projects and justifiable practices of animal-involving neuroscientific research. These observations will help us settle the common starting point of the attempt at "ethics integration" in emerging neuroscience, contributing to better governance design and neuroethical practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shu Ishida
- Graduate School of Life Sciences, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Yu Nishitsutsumi
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Hideki Kashioka
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Takahisa Taguchi
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Ryuma Shineha
- Research Center on Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, Osaka University, Suita, Japan
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What drives public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement and why it matters: an exploratory study. BMC Med Ethics 2021; 22:163. [PMID: 34886854 PMCID: PMC8656088 DOI: 10.1186/s12910-021-00732-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2021] [Accepted: 11/30/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The paper represents an empirical study of public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. Moral bioenhancement implies the improvement of moral dispositions, i.e. an increase in the moral value of the actions or character of a moral agent. The views of bioethicists and scientists on this topic are present in the ongoing debate, but not the view of the public in general. In order to bridge the gap between the philosophical debate and the view of the public, we have examined attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. The participants were people from Serbia older than 15, who voluntarily completed an online questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction to moral bioenhancement, seven general questions, 25 statements about participants’ attitudes towards moral bioenhancement, and five examples of moral dilemmas. The questionnaire also included questions which were used to reveal their preference of either deontology, or utilitarianism. Participants were asked to what degree they agree or disagree with the statements. The results showed that the means used to achieve moral enhancement, the level of education, and preference for deontology or utilitarianism do have an impact on public attitudes. Using exploratory factor analysis, we isolated four factors that appear to drive the respondents' attitudes toward moral bioenhancement, we named: general—closeness, fear of change, security, and voluntariness. Each factor in relationship to other variables offers new insights that can inform policies and give us a deeper understanding of the public attitudes. We argue that looking into different facets of attitudes towards moral bioenhancement improves the debate, and expands it.
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Lara F. Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates? SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2021; 27:42. [PMID: 34189623 PMCID: PMC8241637 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-021-00318-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2020] [Accepted: 06/02/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.
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Varelius J. Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous? MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND PHILOSOPHY 2020; 23:51-59. [PMID: 31144095 PMCID: PMC7039850 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-019-09905-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person's approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described-henceforth referred to as the question whether self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous-would not appear to have received due consideration. This article takes a step towards remedying the shortage. I start by explicating the main points of departure of its argument. In the subsequent sections of the article, I consider several possible reasons for deeming self-validating neuroenhancement incompatible with autonomy. On the basis of the consideration, I propose that self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jukka Varelius
- Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History, and Political Science, University of Turku, 20014, Turku, Finland.
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Abstract
AbstractIt has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of them qualifies as a satisfactory general solution to it, a solution that could reasonably be taken to solve the problem or to suffice for dealing with it in at least most cases. Yet I also suggest that, depending on contingent empirical circumstances, the responses – either singly or together – can sometimes amount to a sufficient answer to it.
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Archer A. Are We Obliged to Enhance for Moral Perfection? THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2019; 43:490-505. [PMID: 30189039 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhy017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Suppose, we could take a pill that would turn us into morally better people. Would we have a duty to take such a pill? In recent years, a number of philosophers have discussed this issue. Most prominently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that we would have a duty to take such a pill. In this article, I wish to investigate the possible limits of a duty to take moral enhancement drugs through investigating the related question of whether it would be desirable to create a world populated entirely with morally perfect people. I argue, drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, and Michael Slote, that we have reason to be grateful that we do not live a world in which everyone is morally perfect, as this would prevent people from dedicating their lives to valuable nonmoral projects. I then argue that this thought should serve as a limitation on attempts to morally improve people through the use of technology. Finally, I explore the implications of this discussion for some of the less ambitious forms of moral enhancement currently being explored in the literature. I argue that these forms of enhancement give us no reason to worry about preventing valuable, morally imperfect ways of life. In fact, by acting as a shortcut to moral development, they might serve as an aid to help people fulfill valuable nonmoral goals in a way that is morally permissible.
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Ahlskog R. Moral Enhancement Should Target Self-Interest and Cognitive Capacity. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2017; 10:363-373. [PMID: 28890738 PMCID: PMC5569152 DOI: 10.1007/s12152-017-9331-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/10/2016] [Accepted: 04/07/2017] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Current suggestions for capacities that should be targeted for moral enhancement has centered on traits like empathy, fairness or aggression. The literature, however, lacks a proper model for understanding the interplay and complexity of moral capacities, which limits the practicability of proposed interventions. In this paper, I integrate some existing knowledge on the nature of human moral behavior and present a formal model of prosocial motivation. The model provides two important results regarding the most friction-free route to moral enhancement. First, we should consider decreasing self-interested motivation rather than increasing prosociality directly. Second, this should be complemented with cognitive enhancement. These suggestions are tested against existing and emerging evidence on cognitive capacity, mindfulness meditation and the effects of psychedelic drugs and are found to have sufficient grounding for further theoretical and empirical exploration. Furthermore, moral effects of the latter two are hypothesized to result from a diminished sense of self with subsequent reductions in self-interest.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rafael Ahlskog
- Department of Government, Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala, Sweden
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Rakić V. Compulsory administration of oxytocin does not result in genuine moral enhancement. MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND PHILOSOPHY 2017; 20:291-297. [PMID: 28247200 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-017-9762-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
The question will be raised whether oxytocin can serve as an effective moral enhancer. Different types of moral enhancement will be addressed, one of them being compulsory moral enhancement. It will be argued that oxytocin cannot serve as an effective moral enhancer if its use is being made compulsory. Hence, compulsory administration of oxytocin does not result in genuine moral enhancement. In order to demonstrate this, a stipulation of the main potentially beneficial outcomes of using oxytocin as a moral enhancer will be offered, as well as a discussion of objections to the notion that oxytocin can be an effective moral enhancer. It will be concluded that mandatory administration of oxytocin is ineffective because of a combination of two reasons: (1) mandatory administration of oxytocin renders moral reflection practically superfluous; (2) without moral reflection the beneficial outcomes of the use of oxytocin do not outweigh its drawbacks to the degree that we could speak of effective moral enhancement.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vojin Rakić
- Center for the Study of Bioethics, Institute for Social Sciences, European Division of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia.
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Holmen S. Direct Brain Interventions, Changing Values and the Argument from Objectification – a Reply to Elizabeth Shaw. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2017. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-017-9342-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Specker J, Schermer MHN, Reiner PB. Public Attitudes Towards Moral Enhancement. Evidence that Means Matter Morally. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2017; 10:405-417. [PMID: 28890740 PMCID: PMC5569135 DOI: 10.1007/s12152-017-9340-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2017] [Accepted: 07/12/2017] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
To gain insight into the reasons that the public may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used empirical tools to explore public attitudes towards these issues. Participants (N = 293) from the United States were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk and were randomly assigned to read one of several contrastive vignettes in which a 13-year-old child is described as bullying another student in school and then is offered an empathy-enhancing program. The empathy-enhancing program is described as either involving taking a pill or playing a video game on a daily basis for four weeks. In addition, participants were asked to imagine either their own child bullying another student at school, or their own child being bullied by another student. This resulted in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. In an escalating series of morally challenging questions, we asked participants to rate their overall support for the program; whether they would support requiring participation; whether they would support requiring participation of children who are at higher risk to become bullies in the future; whether they would support requiring participation of all children or even the entire population; and whether they would be willing to participate in the program themselves. We found that people were significantly more troubled by pharmacological as opposed to non-pharmacological moral enhancement interventions. The results indicate that members of the public for the greater part oppose pharmacological moral bioenhancement, yet are open to non-biomedical means to attain moral enhancement. [248 words].
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Affiliation(s)
- Jona Specker
- Department of Medical Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Erasmus Medical Center, University of Rotterdam, PO Box 2040, 3000 CA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Maartje H. N. Schermer
- Department of Medical Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Erasmus Medical Center, University of Rotterdam, PO Box 2040, 3000 CA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Peter B. Reiner
- National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, 2211 Wesbrook Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T2B5 Canada
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Why Internal Moral Enhancement Might Be politically Better than External Moral Enhancement. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2016. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-016-9273-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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