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Cassinadri G, Ienca M. Non-voluntary BCI explantation: assessing possible neurorights violations in light of contrasting mental ontologies. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2024:jme-2023-109830. [PMID: 39117588 DOI: 10.1136/jme-2023-109830] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 05/28/2024] [Indexed: 08/10/2024]
Abstract
In research involving patients with implantable brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), there is a regulatory gap concerning post-trial responsibilities and duties of sponsors and investigators towards implanted patients. In this article, we analyse the case of patient R, who underwent non-voluntary explantation of an implanted BCI, causing a discontinuation in her sense of agency and self. To clarify the post-trial duties and responsibilities involved in this case, we first define the ontological status of the BCI using both externalist (EXT) and internalist (INT) theories of cognition. We then give particular focus to the theories of extended and embedded cognition, hence considering the BCI either as a constitutive component of the patient's mind or as a causal supporter of her brain-based cognitive capacities. We argue that patient R can legitimately be considered both as an embedded and extended cognitive agent. Then, we analyse whether the non-voluntary explantation violated patient R's (neuro)rights to cognitive liberty, mental integrity, psychological continuity and mental privacy. We analyse whether and how different mental ontologies may imply morally relevant differences in interpreting these prima facie neurorights violations and the correlational duties of sponsors and investigators. We conclude that both mental ontologies support the identification of emerging neurorights of the patient and give rise to post-trial obligations of sponsors and investigators to provide for continuous technical maintenance of implanted BCIs that play a significant role in patients' agency and sense of self. However, we suggest that externalist mental ontologies better capture patient R's self-conception and support the identification of a more granular form of mental harm and associated neurorights violation, thus eliciting stricter post-trial obligations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guido Cassinadri
- Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy
- Institute for History and Ethics of Medicine, School of Medicine and Health; School of Social Science and Technology, Technical University of Munich, Munchen, Germany
| | - Marcello Ienca
- Institute for History and Ethics of Medicine, School of Medicine and Health; School of Social Science and Technology, Technical University of Munich, Munchen, Germany
- College of Humanities, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
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2
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Susser D, Cabrera LY. Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy? AJOB Neurosci 2024; 15:122-133. [PMID: 37017379 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2188275] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/06/2023]
Abstract
The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.
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Wexler A. At the Crossroads of Neuroethics and Policy: Navigating Neurorights and Neurotechnology Governance. AJOB Neurosci 2024; 15:77-79. [PMID: 38568700 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2024.2330570] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/05/2024]
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Bublitz JC. What an International Declaration on Neurotechnologies and Human Rights Could Look like: Ideas, Suggestions, Desiderata. AJOB Neurosci 2024; 15:96-112. [PMID: 37921859 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2270512] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2023]
Abstract
International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about "neurorights" which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument.
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Cornejo-Plaza MI, Cippitani R, Pasquino V. Chilean Supreme Court ruling on the protection of brain activity: neurorights, personal data protection, and neurodata. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1330439. [PMID: 38476399 PMCID: PMC10929545 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1330439] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2023] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
This paper discusses a landmark ruling by the Chilean Supreme Court of August 9, 2023 dealing with the right to mental privacy, originated with an action for constitutional protection filed on behalf of Guido Girardi Lavin against Emotiv Inc., a North American company based in San Francisco, California that is commercializing the device "Insight." This wireless device functions as a headset with sensors that collect information about the brain's electrical activity (i.e., neurodata). The discussion revolves around whether neurodata can be considered personal data and whether they could be classified into a special category. The application of the present legislation on data (the most obsolete, such as the Chilean law, and the most recent EU law) does not seem adequate to protect neurodata. The use of neurodata raises ethical and legal concerns that are not fully addressed by current regulations on personal data protection. Despite not being necessarily considered personal data, neurodata represent the most intimate aspects of human personality and should be protected in light of potential new risks. The unique characteristics of neurodata, including their interpretive nature and potential for revealing thoughts and intentions, pose challenges for regulation. Current data protection laws do not differentiate between different types of data based on their informational content, which is relevant for protecting individual rights. The development of new technologies involving neurodata requires particular attention and careful consideration to prevent possible harm to human dignity. The regulation of neurodata must account for their specific characteristics and the potential risks they pose to privacy, confidentiality, and individual rights. The answer lies in the reconfiguration of human rights known as "neurorights" that goes beyond the protection of personal data.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Roberto Cippitani
- Department of the Constitutional Law, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain
- Instituto Nacional de Estudios de Derecho Penal, Mexico City, Mexico
- Institute of Applied Physics, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Florence, Italy
- Department of Law, Università degli Studi di Perugia, Perugia, Italy
| | - Vincenzo Pasquino
- Department of Law, Università degli Studi di Perugia, Perugia, Italy
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González-Tapia MI. Virtual emotions and Criminal Law. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1260425. [PMID: 38022971 PMCID: PMC10643869 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1260425] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2023] [Accepted: 10/12/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023] Open
Abstract
This article examines the role that Criminal Law should play in regulating the non-therapeutic use of immersive Virtual Reality (VR), specifically its massive use by consumers. The starting point has been to consider VR as an intermediate risk scenario, for the purposes of Criminal Law, between the criminality entirely generated in the physical world and that developed in the 2D digital environments [cybercrimes and criminality linked to social networks and persuasive Artificial Intelligence (AI)]. Firstly, specialize literature has been analyzed to establish the nature of virtual reality. From a technical standpoint, virtual reality is a neurotechnology infused with high-risk artificial intelligence; an inseparable synthesis of non-invasive neurotechnology and a set of AI systems, considered high-risk for the fundamental rights of citizens. From the perspective of its functioning, VR is a "transformative" neurotechnology capable of altering what people perceive as reality. This is possible, because its realism lies in the emotional immersion of the user in the virtual experience, similarly to how our brain functions. Therefore, the key idea in the immersive functioning of virtual reality is its capacity to evoke and modify human emotions, which results its greater harmful potential compared to the 2D environment. From there, three central and specific areas of (legally unaddressed) risk arise: (1) the special comprehensive nature of the data collected and stored during its use; (2) its ability to mentally reproduce the "physical" experience of the avatar in the user; and (3) its significant capacity to manipulate individuals. Secondly, the paper examines both the reported cases and the foreseeable criminality in virtual worlds or "proto-metaverse," focusing on the three risk areas, and exemplifying them with attacks on mental privacy, sexual freedom, and consumer manipulation. Finally, it is proposed that Criminal Law should also intervene (as soon as possible) to define the "red lines" of massive virtual reality use by citizens. With a democratic and human-centered approach, a basic legal framework is outlined for the criminalization of specific harms and risks associated with virtual reality, adapting the existing legal framework as necessary.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Isabel González-Tapia
- Department of Civil, Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Faculty of Law and Business, University of Córdoba, Córdoba, Spain
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Ishida S, Shineha R. In Defense of the Cultural Insensitivity of Neurorights. AJOB Neurosci 2023; 14:385-387. [PMID: 37856338 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2257158] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2023]
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Yuste R. Advocating for neurodata privacy and neurotechnology regulation. Nat Protoc 2023; 18:2869-2875. [PMID: 37697107 DOI: 10.1038/s41596-023-00873-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2023] [Accepted: 07/27/2023] [Indexed: 09/13/2023]
Abstract
The ability to record and alter brain activity by using implantable and nonimplantable neural devices, while poised to have significant scientific and clinical benefits, also raises complex ethical concerns. In this Perspective, we raise awareness of the ability of artificial intelligence algorithms and data-aggregation tools to decode and analyze data containing highly sensitive information, jeopardizing personal neuroprivacy. Voids in existing regulatory frameworks, in fact, allow unrestricted decoding and commerce of neurodata. We advocate for the implementation of proposed ethical and human rights guidelines, alongside technical options such as data encryption, differential privacy and federated learning to ensure the protection of neurodata privacy. We further encourage regulatory bodies to consider taking a position of responsibility by categorizing all brain-derived data as sensitive health data and apply existing medical regulations to all data gathered via pre-registered neural devices. Lastly, we propose that a technocratic oath may instill a deontology for neurotechnology practitioners akin to what the Hippocratic oath represents in medicine. A conscientious societal position that thoroughly rejects the misuse of neurodata would provide the moral compass for the future development of the neurotechnology field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rafael Yuste
- Neurotechnology Center, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA.
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Gilbert F, Russo I. Making the Cut: What Could Be Evidence for a 'Minimal Definition of the Neurorights'? AJOB Neurosci 2023; 14:382-384. [PMID: 37856339 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2257200] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2023]
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12
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Ishida S, Nishitsutsumi Y, Kashioka H, Taguchi T, Shineha R. A comparative review on neuroethical issues in neuroscientific and neuroethical journals. Front Neurosci 2023; 17:1160611. [PMID: 37781239 PMCID: PMC10536163 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1160611] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 10/03/2023] Open
Abstract
This study is a pilot literature review that compares the interest of neuroethicists and neuroscientists. It aims to determine whether there is a significant gap between the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics journals and neuroscience journals. We retrieved 614 articles from two specialist neuroethics journals (Neuroethics and AJOB Neuroscience) and 82 neuroethics-focused articles from three specialist neuroscience journals (Neuron, Nature Neuroscience, and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). We classified these articles in light of the neuroethical issue in question before we compared the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics with those addressed by neuroscientists. A notable result is a parallelism between them as a general tendency. Neuroscientific articles cover most neuroethical issues discussed by philosophical ethicists and vice versa. Subsequently, there are notable discrepancies between the two bodies of neuroethics literature. For instance, theoretical questions, such as the ethics of moral enhancement and the philosophical implications of neuroscientific findings on our conception of personhood, are more intensely discussed in philosophical-neuroethical articles. Conversely, neuroscientific articles tend to emphasize practical questions, such as how to successfully integrate ethical perspectives into scientific research projects and justifiable practices of animal-involving neuroscientific research. These observations will help us settle the common starting point of the attempt at "ethics integration" in emerging neuroscience, contributing to better governance design and neuroethical practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shu Ishida
- Graduate School of Life Sciences, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Yu Nishitsutsumi
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Hideki Kashioka
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Takahisa Taguchi
- Center for Information and Neural Networks, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Suita, Japan
| | - Ryuma Shineha
- Research Center on Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, Osaka University, Suita, Japan
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Cornejo-Plaza MI, Saracini C. On pharmacological neuroenhancement as part of the new neurorights' pioneering legislation in Chile: a perspective. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1177720. [PMID: 37533709 PMCID: PMC10393253 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1177720] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2023] [Accepted: 06/29/2023] [Indexed: 08/04/2023] Open
Abstract
The so-called neurorights are emerging human rights, or rather reconfigurations of already existing human rights, seeking to address the impact of the possible misuse of neurotechnologies, which have the potential to become more invasive and harmful in the future if not regulated. The aim of specifying neurorights is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual in the face of neurotechnological advances. Recently, Chile proposed a Constitutional reform inspired by the neurorights, opening a debate. One of the proposed neurorights is fair and equitable access to cognitive enhancement, which will be the specific object of this perspective article. Starting from the legal proposal, we analyse and discuss some perspectives on cognitive enhancement, or "neuroenhancement", which could be considered as part of enhancement neurotechnologies, pointing out that pharmacological enhancers, or "smart drugs", might be considered as part of these enhancers. We present a classification of the different types of cognitive enhancements as it has been proposed in the literature, into which pharmacological cognitive enhancement can be included, concluding that there is currently no agreement amongst scholars and lawyers about the ethical consideration of pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We therefore argue that it is necessary for the legislator to explicitly address the issue in the proposed regulations, in order to take a clear position on the topic, as it has been done in the United Kingdom, where the pharmacological neuroenhancers have been explicitly excluded from the regulation. If pharmacological neuroenhancers are going to be considered neurotechnologies, then new law proposals should seek harmonization with the already existing legislation regulating pharmacological health and consumer rights (both globally, taking into account international drug laws, and locally, according to each country's internal regulations) and of course, with the whole system of fundamental rights. Finally, we briefly discuss the ethical problem of equitable access to this new type of neurotechnologies (as part of the neurorights) and leave the debate open for new insights from the scientific community on the possible consequences of including (or not) pharmacological neuroenhancers as neurotechnologies for cognitive enhancement in the framework of the ethical and legal debate.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Isabel Cornejo-Plaza
- Neurometa Research Center in Neurorights, Neuroethics, Metaverse, Behavioural Economics and Artificial Intelligence, School of Law, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Santiago, Chile
| | - Chiara Saracini
- The Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neurosciences Research Center (CINPSI Neurocog), Faculty of Health Sciences, Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca, Chile
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Ligthart S, Ienca M, Meynen G, Molnar-Gabor F, Andorno R, Bublitz C, Catley P, Claydon L, Douglas T, Farahany N, Fins JJ, Goering S, Haselager P, Jotterand F, Lavazza A, McCay A, Wajnerman Paz A, Rainey S, Ryberg J, Kellmeyer P. Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023:1-21. [PMID: 37183686 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000245] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/16/2023]
Abstract
The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sjors Ligthart
- Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Denmark; Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg University, Tilberg, The Netherlands
| | - Marcello Ienca
- School of Medicine, Technical University of Munich (TUM), Germany & College of Humanities, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Gerben Meynen
- Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Denmark; Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | | | - Roberto Andorno
- Institute for Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland
| | | | - Paul Catley
- School of Law, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
| | - Lisa Claydon
- School of Law, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
| | | | | | - Joseph J Fins
- Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY, USA
| | - Sara Goering
- Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
| | - Pim Haselager
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Fabrice Jotterand
- Center for Bioethics and Medical Humanities, Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA
| | | | - Allan McCay
- The University of Sydney Law School, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Abel Wajnerman Paz
- Instituto de Éticas Aplicadas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
| | - Stephen Rainey
- Ethics and Philosophy of Technology Section, Delft University, Delft, The Netherlands
| | - Jesper Ryberg
- Department of Philosophy, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark
| | - Philipp Kellmeyer
- Department of Neurosurgery, University of Freiburg - Medical Center, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
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Gilbert F, Ienca M, Cook M. How I became myself after merging with a computer: Does human-machine symbiosis raise human rights issues? Brain Stimul 2023; 16:783-789. [PMID: 37137387 DOI: 10.1016/j.brs.2023.04.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/05/2022] [Revised: 04/07/2023] [Accepted: 04/20/2023] [Indexed: 05/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Novel usages of brain stimulation combined with artificially intelligent (AI) systems promise to address a large range of diseases. These new conjoined technologies, such as brain-computer interfaces (BCI), are increasingly used in experimental and clinical settings to predict and alleviate symptoms of various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Due to their reliance on AI algorithms for feature extraction and classification, these BCI systems enable a novel, unprecedented, and direct connection between human cognition and artificial information processing. In this paper, we present the results of a study that investigates the phenomenology of human-machine symbiosis during a first-in-human experimental BCI trial designed to predict epileptic seizures. We employed qualitative semi-structured interviews to collect user experience data from a participant over a six-years period. We report on a clinical case where a specific embodied phenomenology emerged: namely, after BCI implantation, the patient reported experiences of increased agential capacity and continuity; and after device explantation, the patient reported persistent traumatic harms linked to agential discontinuity. To our knowledge, this is the first reported clinical case of a patient experiencing persistent agential discontinuity due to BCI explantation and potential evidence of an infringement on patient right, where the implanted person was robbed of her de novo agential capacities when the device was removed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Frederic Gilbert
- EthicsLab, Philosophy & Gender Studies, School of Humanities, College of Arts, Law and Education, University of Tasmania, Australia.
| | - Marcello Ienca
- Institute for Ethics and History of Medicine, School of Medicine - Technische Universität München (TUM), Ismaninger Str. 22, 81675, München, Germany; Intelligent Systems Ethics Group, College of Humanities (CDH), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland
| | - Mark Cook
- Division Engineering and IT - Biomedical Engineering, University of Melbourne, Australia; The Sir John Eccles Chair of Medicine, Director of Clinical Neurosciences, St. Vincent's Hospital, Melbourne, Australia
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Lavazza A, Giorgi R. Philosophical foundation of the right to mental integrity in the age of neurotechnologies. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2023. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-023-09517-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/29/2023]
Abstract
AbstractNeurotechnologies broadly understood are tools that have the capability to read, record and modify our mental activity by acting on its brain correlates. The emergence of increasingly powerful and sophisticated techniques has given rise to the proposal to introduce new rights specifically directed to protect mental privacy, freedom of thought, and mental integrity. These rights, also proposed as basic human rights, are conceived in direct relation to tools that threaten mental privacy, freedom of thought, mental integrity, and personal identity. In this paper, our goal is to give a philosophical foundation to a specific right that we will call right to mental integrity. It encapsulates both the classical concepts of privacy and non-interference in our mind/brain. Such a philosophical foundation refers to certain features of the mind that hitherto could not be reached directly from the outside: intentionality, first-person perspective, personal autonomy in moral choices and in the construction of one's narrative, and relational identity. A variety of neurotechnologies or other tools, including artificial intelligence, alone or in combination can, by their very availability, threaten our mental integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a specific right and provide it with a theoretical foundation and justification. It will be up to a subsequent treatment to define the moral and legal boundaries of such a right and its application.
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Rainey S. Neurorights as Hohfeldian Privileges. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2023. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-023-09515-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/15/2023]
Abstract
AbstractThis paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege. It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.
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Mostajo-Radji MA. A Latin American perspective on neurodiplomacy. FRONTIERS IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 2023; 4:1005043. [PMID: 36712171 PMCID: PMC9880232 DOI: 10.3389/fmedt.2022.1005043] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2022] [Accepted: 12/08/2022] [Indexed: 01/15/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Mohammed A. Mostajo-Radji
- UCSC Genomics Institute, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States,Live Cell Biotechnology Discovery Lab, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States,Correspondence: Mohammed A. Mostajo-Radji
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Meynen G, Van de Pol N, Tesink V, Ligthart S. Neurotechnology to reduce recidivism: Ethical and legal challenges. HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 2023; 197:265-276. [PMID: 37633715 DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-821375-9.00006-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 08/28/2023]
Abstract
Crime comes with enormous costs, not only financial but also in terms of loss of mental and physical health and, in some cases, even loss of life. Recidivism is responsible for a considerable percentage of the crimes, and therefore, society deems reducing recidivism a priority. To reduce recidivism, several types of interventions can be used, such as education and employment-focused rehabilitation programs which are intended to improve psychological and social factors. Another way to prevent reoffending is to influence the offender's brain functions. For example, medication can be offered to treat delusions or to diminish sexual drive. In the near future, innovative neurotechnologies are expected to improve prediction and prevention of reoffending. Potential positive effects of such neurotechniques include a safer society and earlier release of prisoners who are no longer "at high risk" to relapse into criminal behavior. Meanwhile, employing these neurotechniques in the criminal justice system raises fundamental concerns, for example, about autonomy, privacy and mental integrity. This chapter aims to identify some of the ethical and legal challenges of using neurotechnologies to reduce recidivism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gerben Meynen
- Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands; Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
| | - Naomi Van de Pol
- Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
| | - Vera Tesink
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Sjors Ligthart
- Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands; Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
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20
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The ethical and legal landscape of brain data governance. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0273473. [PMID: 36580464 PMCID: PMC9799320 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0273473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2022] [Accepted: 08/09/2022] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Neuroscience research is producing big brain data which informs both advancements in neuroscience research and drives the development of advanced datasets to provide advanced medical solutions. These brain data are produced under different jurisdictions in different formats and are governed under different regulations. The governance of data has become essential and critical resulting in the development of various governance structures to ensure that the quality, availability, findability, accessibility, usability, and utility of data is maintained. Furthermore, data governance is influenced by various ethical and legal principles. However, it is still not clear what ethical and legal principles should be used as a standard or baseline when managing brain data due to varying practices and evolving concepts. Therefore, this study asks what ethical and legal principles shape the current brain data governance landscape? A systematic scoping review and thematic analysis of articles focused on biomedical, neuro and brain data governance was carried out to identify the ethical and legal principles which shape the current brain data governance landscape. The results revealed that there is currently a large variation of how the principles are presented and discussions around the terms are very multidimensional. Some of the principles are still at their infancy and are barely visible. A range of principles emerged during the thematic analysis providing a potential list of principles which can provide a more comprehensive framework for brain data governance and a conceptual expansion of neuroethics.
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21
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Díaz Soto JM, Borbón D. Neurorights vs. neuroprediction and lie detection: The imperative limits to criminal law. Front Psychol 2022; 13:1030439. [PMID: 36591076 PMCID: PMC9801636 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1030439] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2022] [Accepted: 11/23/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- José Manuel Díaz Soto
- Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia
| | - Diego Borbón
- NeuroRights Research Group, The Latin American Observatory of Human Rights and Enterprises, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia,*Correspondence: Diego Borbón
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22
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Fins JJ. The Unintended Consequences of Chile’s Neurorights Constitutional Reform: Moving beyond Negative Rights to Capabilities. NEUROETHICS-NETH 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s12152-022-09504-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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23
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Fyfe S, Lanphier E, Peterson A. Neurorights for Incarcerated Persons: Should We Curb Inflation? AJOB Neurosci 2022; 13:165-168. [PMID: 35797127 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2022.2082585] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Elizabeth Lanphier
- Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center.,University of Cincinnati College of Medicine
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