Dimensions and Dissociation in PTSD in the DSM-5: Towards Eight Core Symptoms

PTSD in Court I: Introducing PTSD for Court

The first part of the series of three articles on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Court to appear in the journal reviews the history of the construct of PTSD and its presentation in the DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the ICD-11 (International Classification of Diseases, 11th Edition; World Health Organization, 2018). There are 20 symptoms of PTSD in the DSM-5. PTSD symptoms are arranged into a four-cluster model, which has received partial support in the literature. Other four-factor models have been found that fit the data even better than that of the DSM-5. There is a five-factor dysphoria model and two six-factor models that have been found to fit better the DSM-5 PTSD symptoms. Finally, research is providing support for a hybrid seven-factor model. An eighth factor on dissociation seems applicable to the minority of people who express the dissociative subtype. At the epidemiological level, individuals can expect trauma exposure to take place about 70% over one's lifetime. Also, traumatic exposure leads to traumatic reactions in about 10% of cases, with PTSD being a primary diagnosis for trauma. Once initiated, PTSD becomes prolonged in about 10% of cases. Polytrauma and comorbidities complicate these prevalence statistics. Moreover, the possibility of malingered PTSD presents confounds. However, the estimate for malingered PTSD varies extensively, from 1 to 50%, so that the estimate is too imprecise for use in court without further research. This first article in the series of three articles appearing in the journal on PTSD in Court concludes with discussion of complications related to comorbidities and heterogeneities, in particular. For example, PTSD and its comorbidities can be expressed in over one quintillion ways. This complexity in its current structure in the DSM-5 speaks to the individual differences involved in its expression.

Forensic implications of changes in DSM-5 criteria for responses to trauma and stress

DSM-5 significantly changed the diagnostic criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) relative to DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR. These changes do not alter its basic approach to diagnosing mental disorders, which treats each disorder as a separate category. This article analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the categorical approach, and reviews empirical evidence regarding the impact of changes within it on the ease or difficulty of receiving the PTSD diagnosis. It especially analyzes the impact of newly included symptoms that are meant to identify cases in which trauma exposure was associated with changes in more serious PTSD cases, known as Complex PTSD (C-PTSD). It proposes some effects that the changes could have on psychological injury claims. Many changes could support plaintiffs' claims while others could support defense claims. Some changes could support either. Overall, DSM-5 PTSD diagnosis is more responsive to individual differences in symptom presentations and appears able to diagnose some C-PTSD cases. The thesis throughout the article is that PTSD diagnostic accuracy could be improved further, especially for C-PTSD cases, by complementing its current exclusive reliance on behavioral symptoms that are characteristic of victims in general with assessment of the meaning that the symptoms have for individual victims. The article proposes some principles to guide interpretation of the individualized meaning of victims' symptoms, which help make the reasoning behind the interpretations explicit.

Causality in Psychiatry: A Hybrid Symptom Network Construct Model

Causality or etiology in psychiatry is marked by standard biomedical, reductionistic models (symptoms reflect the construct involved) that inform approaches to nosology, or classification, such as in the DSM-5 [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; (1)]. However, network approaches to symptom interaction [i.e., symptoms are formative of the construct; e.g., (2), for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)] are being developed that speak to bottom-up processes in mental disorder, in contrast to the typical top-down psychological construct approach. The present article presents a hybrid top-down, bottom-up model of the relationship between symptoms and mental disorder, viewing symptom expression and their causal complex as a reciprocally dynamic system with multiple levels, from lower-order symptoms in interaction to higher-order constructs affecting them. The hybrid model hinges on good understanding of systems theory in which it is embedded, so that the article reviews in depth non-linear dynamical systems theory (NLDST). The article applies the concept of emergent circular causality (3) to symptom development, as well. Conclusions consider that symptoms vary over several dimensions, including: subjectivity; objectivity; conscious motivation effort; and unconscious influences, and the degree to which individual (e.g., meaning) and universal (e.g., causal) processes are involved. The opposition between science and skepticism is a complex one that the article addresses in final comments.