From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology

The fear-avoidance model as an embodied prediction of threat

The fear-avoidance model is a well-established framework in the understanding of persistent pain. It proposes a dichotomous path: either the context is interpreted as safe; there is no fear reaction and, therefore, the individual engages in active (positive) coping; or the context is interpreted as threatening, leading to a self-reinforcing vicious circle of fear and (negative) avoidance. We propose an embodied interpretation of this phenomenon employing the joint framework of predictive coding and active inference. The key idea is that multisensory integration of exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive sensory inputs can lead to dysfunctional experiences of threat in nonthreatening situations. Threat inference can promote fear responses, maladaptive strategies (i.e., avoidance) and self-provides evidence for threat in associated or future contexts, or both. Under this treatment, the prediction of nonrealized threat becomes self-evidencing and context-invariant, and hence self-perpetuating. Safety cues are unable to attenuate the interpretation of the negative context as the dominant inference of the context is threatful and gains more precision and becomes resistant over time. Our model provides an explanation for the emergence of a dysfunctional fear response in the clinical setting despite apparent safety based on modern concepts from theoretical (computational) neuroscience.

When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

Clere Smithe T, Friedman DA, Friston K, Ramstead MJD. Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference

In this paper, we unite concepts from Husserlian phenomenology, the active inference framework in theoretical biology, and category theory in mathematics to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding social action premised on shared goals. We begin with an overview of Husserlian phenomenology, focusing on aspects of inner time-consciousness, namely, retention, primal impression, and protention. We then review active inference as a formal approach to modeling agent behavior based on variational (approximate Bayesian) inference. Expanding upon Husserl's model of time consciousness, we consider collective goal-directed behavior, emphasizing shared protentions among agents and their connection to the shared generative models of active inference. This integrated framework aims to formalize shared goals in terms of shared protentions, and thereby shed light on the emergence of group intentionality. Building on this foundation, we incorporate mathematical tools from category theory, in particular, sheaf and topos theory, to furnish a mathematical image of individual and group interactions within a stochastic environment. Specifically, we employ morphisms between polynomial representations of individual agent models, allowing predictions not only of their own behaviors but also those of other agents and environmental responses. Sheaf and topos theory facilitates the construction of coherent agent worldviews and provides a way of representing consensus or shared understanding. We explore the emergence of shared protentions, bridging the phenomenology of temporal structure, multi-agent active inference systems, and category theory. Shared protentions are highlighted as pivotal for coordination and achieving common objectives. We conclude by acknowledging the intricacies stemming from stochastic systems and uncertainties in realizing shared goals.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Modelling phenomenological differences in aetiologically distinct visual hallucinations using deep neural networks

Visual hallucinations (VHs) are perceptions of objects or events in the absence of the sensory stimulation that would normally support such perceptions. Although all VHs share this core characteristic, there are substantial phenomenological differences between VHs that have different aetiologies, such as those arising from Neurodegenerative conditions, visual loss, or psychedelic compounds. Here, we examine the potential mechanistic basis of these differences by leveraging recent advances in visualising the learned representations of a coupled classifier and generative deep neural network-an approach we call 'computational (neuro)phenomenology'. Examining three aetiologically distinct populations in which VHs occur-Neurodegenerative conditions (Parkinson's Disease and Lewy Body Dementia), visual loss (Charles Bonnet Syndrome, CBS), and psychedelics-we identified three dimensions relevant to distinguishing these classes of VHs: realism (veridicality), dependence on sensory input (spontaneity), and complexity. By selectively tuning the parameters of the visualisation algorithm to reflect influence along each of these phenomenological dimensions we were able to generate 'synthetic VHs' that were characteristic of the VHs experienced by each aetiology. We verified the validity of this approach experimentally in two studies that examined the phenomenology of VHs in Neurodegenerative and CBS patients, and in people with recent psychedelic experience. These studies confirmed the existence of phenomenological differences across these three dimensions between groups, and crucially, found that the appropriate synthetic VHs were rated as being representative of each group's hallucinatory phenomenology. Together, our findings highlight the phenomenological diversity of VHs associated with distinct causal factors and demonstrate how a neural network model of visual phenomenology can successfully capture the distinctive visual characteristics of hallucinatory experience.

Restoring the missing person to personalized medicine and precision psychiatry

Precision psychiatry has emerged as part of the shift to personalized medicine and builds on frameworks such as the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), multilevel biological "omics" data and, most recently, computational psychiatry. The shift is prompted by the realization that a one-size-fits all approach is inadequate to guide clinical care because people differ in ways that are not captured by broad diagnostic categories. One of the first steps in developing this personalized approach to treatment was the use of genetic markers to guide pharmacotherapeutics based on predictions of pharmacological response or non-response, and the potential risk of adverse drug reactions. Advances in technology have made a greater degree of specificity or precision potentially more attainable. To date, however, the search for precision has largely focused on biological parameters. Psychiatric disorders involve multi-level dynamics that require measures of phenomenological, psychological, behavioral, social structural, and cultural dimensions. This points to the need to develop more fine-grained analyses of experience, self-construal, illness narratives, interpersonal interactional dynamics, and social contexts and determinants of health. In this paper, we review the limitations of precision psychiatry arguing that it cannot reach its goal if it does not include core elements of the processes that give rise to psychopathological states, which include the agency and experience of the person. Drawing from contemporary systems biology, social epidemiology, developmental psychology, and cognitive science, we propose a cultural-ecosocial approach to integrating precision psychiatry with person-centered care.

Time-consciousness in computational phenomenology: a temporal analysis of active inference

Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology-a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We also show that a Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations.

Integrated world modeling theory expanded: Implications for the future of consciousness

Integrated world modeling theory (IWMT) is a synthetic theory of consciousness that uses the free energy principle and active inference (FEP-AI) framework to combine insights from integrated information theory (IIT) and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT). Here, I first review philosophical principles and neural systems contributing to IWMT's integrative perspective. I then go on to describe predictive processing models of brains and their connections to machine learning architectures, with particular emphasis on autoencoders (perceptual and active inference), turbo-codes (establishment of shared latent spaces for multi-modal integration and inferential synergy), and graph neural networks (spatial and somatic modeling and control). Future directions for IIT and GNWT are considered by exploring ways in which modules and workspaces may be evaluated as both complexes of integrated information and arenas for iterated Bayesian model selection. Based on these considerations, I suggest novel ways in which integrated information might be estimated using concepts from probabilistic graphical models, flow networks, and game theory. Mechanistic and computational principles are also considered with respect to the ongoing debate between IIT and GNWT regarding the physical substrates of different kinds of conscious and unconscious phenomena. I further explore how these ideas might relate to the "Bayesian blur problem," or how it is that a seemingly discrete experience can be generated from probabilistic modeling, with some consideration of analogies from quantum mechanics as potentially revealing different varieties of inferential dynamics. I go on to describe potential means of addressing critiques of causal structure theories based on network unfolding, and the seeming absurdity of conscious expander graphs (without cybernetic symbol grounding). Finally, I discuss future directions for work centered on attentional selection and the evolutionary origins of consciousness as facilitated "unlimited associative learning." While not quite solving the Hard problem, this article expands on IWMT as a unifying model of consciousness and the potential future evolution of minds.

Grievance-fueled violence can be better understood using an enactive approach

Understanding lone actor grievance-fueled violence remains a challenge. We believe that the concept of grievance provides an opportunity to add an engaged, first-person perspective to the assessment of lone actor extreme violence. We propose an enactivist philosophical approach that can help to understand the why and how of the pathway from grievance to violent extremism. Enactivism sees grievance as a dynamic, interpersonal, and context-sensitive construct that indicates how (potential) offenders make sense of the world they live in and how under certain circumstances it fuels violent behavior. Hence, grievance should not be understood as a given thing, but as an unfolding experience that involves sense-making through (regulation of one’s) interaction with the (social) environment. This (self-)relational and ecological understanding requires another approach than looking at demographic factors or life histories, only from an outsider’s perspective. Enactivism invites us to look at such risk factors as external indices of an ongoing process of active self-regulation and sense-making, and in some cases spiraling toward extreme violence. To understand the mindset of the offender we need to look more in depth at the processes that shape this mindset: why does this person, with this history, in this context, and at this point in time, proceed to use violence? The enactivist approach to the mind offers a complementary framework that may help us to understand the dynamics of grievance as a possible precursor to violent extremism. It also helps to appreciate why the relative unpredictability of the pathway toward lone actor extreme violence is not necessarily a sign of empirical weakness but a matter of principle due to the non-linearity of the processes involved. We end by summarizing how enactivism could contribute to the prevention of extremist violence and research and how it can help to avoid reinforcing stigmas and re-establishing a confirmation bias.

Brain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness

Recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness, and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. More evidence obtained through mathematical modeling of physiological dynamics revealed that emotion processing is prompted by an initial modulation from ascending vagal inputs to the brain, followed by sustained bidirectional brain-heart interactions. Those findings support long-lasting hypotheses on the causal role of bodily activity in emotions, feelings, and potentially consciousness. In this paper, the theoretical landscape on the potential role of heartbeats in cognition and consciousness is reviewed, as well as the experimental evidence supporting these hypotheses. I advocate for methodological developments on the estimation of brain-heart interactions to uncover the role of cardiac inputs in the origin, levels, and contents of consciousness. The ongoing evidence depicts interactions further than the cortical responses evoked by each heartbeat, suggesting the potential presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics. Further developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions may contribute to a better understanding of the physiological dynamics involved in homeostatic-allostatic control, cognitive functions, and consciousness.