Individuality as a Theoretical Scheme. I. Formal and Material Concepts of Individuality

Resilience and the shift of paradigm in ecology: a new name for an old concept or a different explanatory tool?

In the shift from the balance of nature to the flux of nature paradigm, the concept of resilience has gained great traction in ecology. While it has been suggested that the concept of resilience does not imply a genuine departure from the balance of nature paradigm, I shall argue against this stance. To do so, I first show that the balance of nature paradigm and the related conception of a single-state equilibrium relies on what Eliot Sober has named the "Natural State Model (NSM)", suggesting that the NSM has instead been dismissed in the flux of nature paradigm. I then focus on resilience as the main explanatory concept of the flux paradigm. After distinguishing between two main different understandings of "resilience", namely engineering resilience and ecological resilience, I argue that the former is close to the concept of balance or stability and still part of the NSM, while the latter is not. Finally, I claim that ecological resilience is inconsistent with the NSM, concluding that this concept-being incompatible with the NSM-is not part of the balance of nature paradigm but rather a genuinely new explanatory tool.

Agential autonomy and biological individuality

What is a biological individual? How are biological individuals individuated? How can we tell how many individuals there are in a given assemblage of biological entities? The individuation and differentiation of biological individuals are central to the scientific understanding of living beings. I propose a novel criterion of biological individuality according to which biological individuals are autonomous agents. First, I articulate an ecological-dynamical account of natural agency according to which, agency is the gross dynamical capacity of a goal-directed system to bias its repertoire to respond to its conditions as affordances. Then, I argue that agents or agential dynamical systems can be agentially dependent on, or agentially autonomous from, other agents and that this agential dependence/autonomy can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, strong or weak. Biological individuals, I propose, are all and only those agential dynamical systems that are strongly agentially autonomous. So, to determine how many individuals there are in a given multiagent aggregate, such as multicellular organism, a colony, symbiosis, or a swarm, we first have to identify how many agential dynamical systems there are, and then what their relations of agential dependence/autonomy are. I argue that this criterion is adequate to the extent that it vindicates the paradigmatic cases, and explains why the paradigmatic cases are paradigmatic, and why the problematic cases are problematic. Finally, I argue for the importance of distinguishing between agential and causal dependence and show the relevance of agential autonomy for understanding the explanatory structure of evolutionary developmental biology.

Individual differences, uniqueness, and individuality in behavioural ecology

In this paper I develop a concept of behavioural ecological individuality. Using findings from a case study which employed qualitative methods, I argue that individuality in behavioural ecology should be defined as phenotypic and ecological uniqueness, a concept that is operationalised in terms of individual differences such as animal personality and individual specialisation. This account make sense of how the term "individuality" is used in relation to intrapopulation variation in behavioural ecology. The concept of behavioural ecological individuality can sometimes be used to identify individuals. It also shapes research agendas and methodological choices in behavioural ecology, leading researchers to account for individuals as sources of variation. Overall, this paper draws attention to a field that has been largely overlooked in philosophical discussions of biological individuality and highlights the importance of individual differences and uniqueness for individuality in behavioural ecology.

Natural Selection beyond Life? A Workshop Report

Natural selection is commonly seen not just as an explanation for adaptive evolution, but as the inevitable consequence of “heritable variation in fitness among individuals”. Although it remains embedded in biological concepts, such a formalisation makes it tempting to explore whether this precondition may be met not only in life as we know it, but also in other physical systems. This would imply that these systems are subject to natural selection and may perhaps be investigated in a biological framework, where properties are typically examined in light of their putative functions. Here we relate the major questions that were debated during a three-day workshop devoted to discussing whether natural selection may take place in non-living physical systems. We start this report with a brief overview of research fields dealing with “life-like” or “proto-biotic” systems, where mimicking evolution by natural selection in test tubes stands as a major objective. We contend the challenge may be as much conceptual as technical. Taking the problem from a physical angle, we then discuss the framework of dissipative structures. Although life is viewed in this context as a particular case within a larger ensemble of physical phenomena, this approach does not provide general principles from which natural selection can be derived. Turning back to evolutionary biology, we ask to what extent the most general formulations of the necessary conditions or signatures of natural selection may be applicable beyond biology. In our view, such a cross-disciplinary jump is impeded by reliance on individuality as a central yet implicit and loosely defined concept. Overall, these discussions thus lead us to conjecture that understanding, in physico-chemical terms, how individuality emerges and how it can be recognised, will be essential in the search for instances of evolution by natural selection outside of living systems.

The Epistemic Revolution Induced by Microbiome Studies: An Interdisciplinary View

Simple Summary

This interdisciplinary study, conducted by experts in evolutionary biology, ecology, ecosystem studies, arts, medicine, forensic analyses, agriculture, law, and philosophy of science describe how microbiome studies are convergently affecting the concepts and practices of diverse fields and practices, that now consider microbiomes within their legitimate scope. Consequently, it describes what seems to be an ongoing pluridisciplinary epistemic revolution, with the potential to fundamentally change how we understand the world through an ecologization of pre-existing concepts, a greater focus on interactions, the use of multi-scalar interaction networks as explanatory frameworks, the reconceptualization of the usual definitions of individuals, and a de-anthropocentrification of our perception of phenomena.

Abstract

Many separate fields and practices nowadays consider microbes as part of their legitimate focus. Therefore, microbiome studies may act as unexpected unifying forces across very different disciplines. Here, we summarize how microbiomes appear as novel major biological players, offer new artistic frontiers, new uses from medicine to laws, and inspire novel ontologies. We identify several convergent emerging themes across ecosystem studies, microbial and evolutionary ecology, arts, medicine, forensic analyses, law and philosophy of science, as well as some outstanding issues raised by microbiome studies across these disciplines and practices. An ‘epistemic revolution induced by microbiome studies’ seems to be ongoing, characterized by four features: (i) an ecologization of pre-existing concepts within disciplines, (ii) a growing interest in systemic analyses of the investigated or represented phenomena and a greater focus on interactions as their root causes, (iii) the intent to use openly multi-scalar interaction networks as an explanatory framework to investigate phenomena to acknowledge the causal effects of microbiomes, (iv) a reconceptualization of the usual definitions of which individuals are worth considering as an explanans or as an explanandum by a given field, which result in a fifth strong trend, namely (v) a de-anthropocentrification of our perception of the world.

Fish and fishpond. An ecological reading of G.W. Leibniz's Monadology §§ 63-70

One of Leibniz's most original ideas is his conception of the living individual as a hierarchical network of living beings whose relationships are essential to the proper functioning of its organic body. This idea is also valid to explain any existing order in nature that depends on the set of relationships of living beings that inhabit it. Both ideas are present in the conception of the natural world that Leibniz presents in his Monadology (§§ 63-70) through his idea of biological infinitism. According to this idea, nature consists of infinite theatres (some within others and some unfolding from others) where living beings unfold their vital functions. Through this idea Leibniz defines both the biological complexity of nature and the living individual, which is in turn a portion of nature that unfolds from an infinite set of inferior living beings. The thesis that I defend in this work is that this Leibnizian understanding of the living individual and the natural complexity that includes infinite hierarchical levels of individuality has a marked ecological sense, as we would say today. This Leibnizian metaphysics of individuality that we could call biological is also interesting in light of the recent studies in the philosophy of biology.

Multispecies individuals

We assess the arguments for recognising functionally integrated multispecies consortia as genuine biological individuals, including cases of so-called 'holobionts'. We provide two examples in which the same core biochemical processes that sustain life are distributed across a consortium of individuals of different species. Although the same chemistry features in both examples, proponents of the holobiont as unit of evolution would recognize one of the two cases as a multispecies individual whilst they would consider the other as a compelling case of ecological dependence between separate individuals. Some widely used arguments in support of the 'holobiont' concept apply equally to both cases, suggesting that those arguments have misidentified what is at stake when seeking to identify a new level of biological individuality. One important aspect of biological individuality is evolutionary individuality. In line with other work on the evolution of individuality, we show that our cases can be distinguished by focusing on the fitness alignment between the partners of the consortia. We conclude that much of the evidence currently presented for the ubiquity and importance of multi-species individuals is simply not to the point, at least unless the issue of biological individuality is firmly divorced from the question of evolutionary individuality.