Spatial attention and two modes of visual consciousness

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

A multiple-response frequency-tagging paradigm measures graded changes in consciousness during perceptual filling-in

Perceptual filling-in (PFI) occurs when a physically present visual target disappears from conscious perception, with its location filled-in by the surrounding visual background. These perceptual changes are complete, near instantaneous, and can occur for multiple separate locations simultaneously. Here, we show that contrasting neural activity during the presence or absence of multi-target PFI can complement other findings from multistable phenomena to reveal the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We presented four peripheral targets over a background dynamically updating at 20 Hz. While participants reported on target disappearances/reappearances via button press/release, we tracked neural activity entrained by the background during PFI using steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs) recorded in the electroencephalogram. We found background SSVEPs closely correlated with subjective report, and increased with an increasing amount of PFI. Unexpectedly, we found that as the number of filled-in targets increased, the duration of target disappearances also increased, suggesting that facilitatory interactions exist between targets in separate visual quadrants. We also found distinct spatiotemporal correlates for the background SSVEP harmonics. Prior to genuine PFI, the response at the second harmonic (40 Hz) increased before the first (20 Hz), which we tentatively link to an attentional effect, while no such difference between harmonics was observed for physically removed stimuli. These results demonstrate that PFI can be used to study multi-object perceptual suppression when frequency-tagging the background of a visual display, and because there are distinct neural correlates for endogenously and exogenously induced changes in consciousness, that it is ideally suited to study the NCC.

Neural correlates of goal-directed enhancement and suppression of visual stimuli in the absence of conscious perception

An observer's current goals can influence the processing of visual stimuli. Such influences can work to enhance goal-relevant stimuli and suppress goal-irrelevant stimuli. Here, we combined behavioral testing and electroencephalography (EEG) to examine whether such enhancement and suppression effects arise even when the stimuli are masked from awareness. We used a feature-based spatial cueing paradigm, in which participants searched four-item arrays for a target in a specific color. Immediately before the target array, a nonpredictive cue display was presented in which a cue matched or mismatched the searched-for target color, and appeared either at the target location (spatially valid) or another location (spatially invalid). Cue displays were masked using continuous flash suppression. The EEG data revealed that target-colored cues produced robust N2pc and N_T responses-both signatures of spatial orienting-and distractor-colored cues produced a robust P_D-a signature of suppression. Critically, the cueing effects occurred for both conscious and unconscious cues. The N2pc and N_T were larger in the aware versus unaware cue condition, but the P_D was roughly equivalent in magnitude across the two conditions. Our findings suggest that top-down control settings for task-relevant features elicit selective enhancement and suppression even in the absence of conscious perception. We conclude that conscious perception modulates selective enhancement of visual features, but suppression of those features is largely independent of awareness.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Oscillatory Correlates of Visual Consciousness

Conscious experiences are linked to activity in our brain: the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Empirical research on these NCCs covers a wide range of brain activity signals, measures, and methodologies. In this paper, we focus on spontaneous brain oscillations; rhythmic fluctuations of neuronal (population) activity which can be characterized by a range of parameters, such as frequency, amplitude (power), and phase. We provide an overview of oscillatory measures that appear to correlate with conscious perception. We also discuss how increasingly sophisticated techniques allow us to study the causal role of oscillatory activity in conscious perception (i.e., ‘entrainment’). This review of oscillatory correlates of consciousness suggests that, for example, activity in the alpha-band (7–13 Hz) may index, or even causally support, conscious perception. But such results also showcase an increasingly acknowledged difficulty in NCC research; the challenge of separating neural activity necessary for conscious experience to arise (prerequisites) from neural activity underlying the conscious experience itself (substrates) or its results (consequences).

Different Signal Enhancement Pathways of Attention and Consciousness Underlie Perception in Humans

It is not yet known whether attention and consciousness operate through similar or largely different mechanisms. Visual processing mechanisms are routinely characterized by measuring contrast response functions (CRFs). In this report, behavioral CRFs were obtained in humans (both males and females) by measuring afterimage durations over the entire range of inducer stimulus contrasts to reveal visual mechanisms behind attention and consciousness. Deviations relative to the standard CRF, i.e., gain functions, describe the strength of signal enhancement, which were assessed for both changes due to attentional task and conscious perception. It was found that attention displayed a response-gain function, whereas consciousness displayed a contrast-gain function. Through model comparisons, which only included contrast-gain modulations, both contrast-gain and response-gain effects can be explained with a two-level normalization model, in which consciousness affects only the first level and attention affects only the second level. These results demonstrate that attention and consciousness can effectively show different gain functions because they operate through different signal enhancement mechanisms.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The relationship between attention and consciousness is still debated. Mapping contrast response functions (CRFs) has allowed (neuro)scientists to gain important insights into the mechanistic underpinnings of visual processing. Here, the influence of both attention and consciousness on these functions were measured and they displayed a strong dissociation. First, attention lowered CRFs, whereas consciousness raised them. Second, attention manifests itself as a response-gain function, whereas consciousness manifests itself as a contrast-gain function. Extensive model comparisons show that these results are best explained in a two-level normalization model in which consciousness affects only the first level, whereas attention affects only the second level. These findings show dissociations between both the computational mechanisms behind attention and consciousness and the perceptual consequences that they induce.

Structure of attention and the logic of visual composition

Two groups of subjects were presented with two façade designs, one with the front façade of the existing Atlanta Public Library, an exercise in modern abstract plastic composition by the Bauhaus-trained architect Marcel Breuer, and the other with alteration that toned down its plasticity and enhanced simple relations of its parts like symmetry and repetition. The subjects were asked to recall and copy the façades. The results showed that while significantly more students recalled elements of the altered façade, the performance was equivocal for the façades for the copying task. However, the copying task showed the subjects making greater errors in reproducing elements and relations on the periphery, and those that reflect a reading of depth in the façades. We present an account of the experiment, making the case that the results show the influence of visual design of the façade on the way that an interested and involved viewer attends to it in the course of parsing and comprehending it. The broader implication of this point is to see the visual design of buildings not as simple means to increase its aesthetic value, but as a sophisticated means to lead the viewer to specific forms of imaginative engagement.

Attentional networks and consciousness

The term consciousness is an important one in the vernacular of the western literature in many fields. It is no wonder that scientists have assumed that consciousness will be found as a component of the human brain and that we will come to understand its neural basis. However, there is rather little in common between consciousness as the neurologist would use it to diagnose the vegetative state, how the feminist would use it to support raising male consciousness of the economic plight of women and as the philosopher would use it when defining the really hard question of the subjective state of awareness induced by sensory qualities. When faced with this kind of problem it is usual to subdivide the term into more manageable perhaps partly operational definitions. Three meanings that capture aspects of consciousness are: (1) the neurology of the state of mind allowing coherent orientation to time and place (2) the selection of sensory or memorial information for awareness and (3) the voluntary control over overt responses. In each of these cases the mechanisms of consciousness overlap with one or more of the attentional networks that have been studied with the methods of cognitive neuroscience. In this paper we explore the overlap and discuss how to exploit the growing knowledge of attentional networks to constrain ideas of consciousness.

Against the View that Consciousness and Attention are Fully Dissociable

In this paper, I will try to show that the idea that there can be consciousness without some form of attention, and high-level top-down attention without consciousness, originates from a failure to notice the varieties of forms that top-down attention and consciousness can assume. I will present evidence that: there are various forms of attention and consciousness; not all forms of attention produce the same kind of consciousness; not all forms of consciousness are produced by the same kind of attention; there can be low-level attention (or preliminary attention), whether of an endogenous or exogenous kind, without consciousness; attention cannot be considered the same thing as consciousness.

Attentional routes to conscious perception

The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.

Consciousness and attention: on sufficiency and necessity

Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. More contentious is the finding that subjects can become conscious of an isolated object, or the gist of the scene in the near absence of top-down attention; we critically re-examine the possibility of "complete" absence of top-down attention. We also cover the recent flurry of studies that utilized independent manipulation of attention and consciousness. These studies have shown paradoxical effects of attention, including examples where top-down attention and consciousness have opposing effects, leading us to strengthen and revise our previous views. Neuroimaging studies with EEG, MEG, and fMRI are uncovering the distinct neuronal correlates of selective attention and consciousness in dissociative paradigms. These findings point to a functional dissociation: attention as analyzer and consciousness as synthesizer. Separating the effects of selective visual attention from those of visual consciousness is of paramount importance to untangle the neural substrates of consciousness from those for attention.

Types of attention matter for awareness: a study with color afterimages

It has been argued that attention and awareness might oppose each other given that attending to an adapting stimulus weakens its afterimage. We argue instead that the type of attention guided by spatial extent and perceptual levels is critical and might result in differences in awareness using afterimages. Participants performed a central task with small, large, local, or global letters and a blue square as an adapting stimulus in three experiments and indicated the onset and offset of the afterimage. We found that increases in the spatial spread of attention resulted in the decrease of afterimage duration. In terms of levels of processing, global processing produced larger afterimage durations with stimuli controlled for spatial extent. The results suggest that focused or distributed attention produce different effects on awareness, possibly through their differential interactions with polarity dependent and independent processes involved in the formation of color afterimages.

Toward a physical basis of attention and self regulation

The concept of self-regulation is central to the understanding of human development. Self-regulation allows effective socialization and predicts both psychological pathologies and levels of achievement in schools. What has been missing are neural mechanisms to provide understanding of the cellular and molecular basis for self-regulation. We show that self-regulation can be measured during childhood by parental reports and by self-reports of adolescents and adults. These reports are summarized by a higher order factor called effortful control, which reflects perceptions about the ability of a given person to regulate their behavior in accord with cultural norms. Throughout childhood effortful control is related to children's performance in computerized conflict related tasks. Conflict tasks have been shown in neuroimaging studies to activate specific brain networks of executive attention. Several brain areas work together at rest and during cognitive tasks to regulate competing brain activity and thus control resulting behavior. The cellular structure of the anterior cingulate and insula contain cells, unique to humans and higher primates that provide strong links to remote brain areas. During conflict tasks, anterior cingulate activity is correlated with activity in remote sensory and emotional systems, depending upon the information selected for the task. During adolescence the structure and activity of the anterior cingulate has been found to be correlated with self-reports of effortful control.Studies have provided a perspective on how genes and environment act to shape the executive attention network, providing a physical basis for self-regulation. The anterior cingulate is regulated by dopamine. Genes that influence dopamine levels in the CNS have been shown to influence the efficiency of self-regulation. For example, alleles of the COMT gene that influence the efficiency of dopamine transmission are related to the ability to resolve conflict. Humans with disorders involving deletion of this gene exhibit large deficits in self-regulation. Alleles of other genes influencing dopamine and serotonin transmission have also been found to influence ability to resolve conflict in cognitive tasks. However, as is the case for many genes, the effectiveness of COMT alleles in shaping self-regulation depends upon cultural influences such as parenting. Studies find that aspects of parenting quality and parent training can influence child behavior and the efficiency of self-regulation.During development, the network that relates to self-regulation undergoes important changes in connectivity. Infants can use parts of the self-regulatory network to detect errors in sensory information, but the network does not yet have sufficient connectivity to organize brain activity in a coherent way. During middle childhood, along with increased projection cells involved in remote connections of dorsal anterior cingulate and prefrontal and parietal cortex, executive network connectivity increases and shifts from predominantly short to longer range connections. During this period specific exercises can influence network development and improve self-regulation. Understanding the physical basis of self-regulation has already cast light on individual differences in normal and pathological states and gives promise of allowing the design of methods to improve aspects of human development.

The neural correlates of consciousness: an update

This review examines recent advances in the study of brain correlates of consciousness. First, we briefly discuss some useful distinctions between consciousness and other brain functions. We then examine what has been learned by studying global changes in the level of consciousness, such as sleep, anesthesia, and seizures. Next we consider some of the most common paradigms used to study the neural correlates for specific conscious percepts and examine what recent findings say about the role of different brain regions in giving rise to consciousness for that percept. Then we discuss dynamic aspects of neural activity, such as sustained versus phasic activity, feedforward versus reentrant activity, and the role of neural synchronization. Finally, we briefly consider how a theoretical analysis of the fundamental properties of consciousness can usefully complement neurobiological studies.

Interdependence of attention and consciousness

Research on attention has been closely linked with possible advances in the study of consciousness. Various theories and models have been proposed for attention in the past 50 years. Behavioural, computational, and neuroscientific approaches have been successful in improving our understanding of attentional processes. Given the current status of attention research, what can we say about the relationship between attention and consciousness? This paper discusses the possible relationships between attention and consciousness. Findings from cognitive science and neuroscience relevant to the elucidation of this relationship are discussed. Recent findings from phenomena that have a bearing on this relationship such as inattentional amnesia, change blindness, attentional blink, perceptual stabilization, and afterimages are described. The implications of the results of these phenomena for attention and awareness are also discussed. It is proposed that top-down attention is not a unitary phenomena and such a characterization may provide a way to interpret some of the results from these findings.

Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention

We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.

Genes and experience shape brain networks of conscious control

One aspect of consciousness involves voluntary control over thoughts and feelings, often called will. Progress in neuroimaging and in sequencing the human genome makes it possible to think about voluntary control in terms of a specific neural network that includes midline and lateral frontal areas. A number of cognitive tasks involving conflict as well as the control of emotions have been shown to activate these brain areas. Studies have traced the development of this network in the ability to regulate cognition and emotion from about 2.5 to 7 years of age. Individual differences in this network have been related to parental reports of the ability of children to regulate their behavior, to delay reward and to develop a conscience. In adolescents these individual differences predict the propensity for antisocial behavior. Differences in specific genes are related to individual efficiency in performance of the network, and by neuroimaging, to the strength of its activation of this network. Future animal studies may make it possible to learn in detail how genes influence the common pattern of development of self-regulation made possible by this network. Moreover, a number of neurological and psychiatric pathologies involving difficulties in awareness and volition show deficits in parts of this network. We are now studying whether specific training experiences can influence the development of this network in 4-year-old children and if so, for whom it is most effective. Voluntary control is also important for the regulation of conscious input from the sensory environment. It seems likely that the same network involved in self-regulation is also crucial for focal attention to the sensory world.

Progress in the neural sciences in the the century after Cajal (and the mysteries that remain)

One hundred years after Santiago Ramon y Cajal provided critical evidence for the "neuron doctrine," his cellular view of the brain remains the basis of modern neural science. This article begins with a review of how the early work of Ramon y Cajal, Charles Sherrington, and John Eccles and their contemporaries laid the groundwork for our current understanding of he information processing of neural systems and for understanding the task faced by studies of how the brain develops. The visual system is examined in some detail as a model for experimental investigation into the structure, operational mechanisms, and functions of large neural systems. Discussion of the phenomena of visual awareness and consciousness, links between the visual system and other brain systems, and disorders that disrupt voluntary control of cognition and emotion lead to a broader consideration of the problem of consciousness.

Attention, self-regulation and consciousness

Consciousness has many aspects. These include awareness of the world, feelings of control over one's behaviour and mental state (volition), and the notion of continuing self. Focal (executive) attention is used to control details of our awareness and is thus closely related to volition. Experiments suggest an integrated network of neural areas involved in executive attention. This network is associated with our voluntary ability to select among competing items, to correct error and to regulate our emotions. Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that these various functions involve separate areas of the anterior cingulate. We have adopted a strategy of using marker tasks, shown to activate the brain area by imaging studies, as a means of tracing the development of attentional networks. Executive attention appears to develop first to regulate distress during the first year of life. During later childhood the ability to regulate conflict among competing stimuli builds upon the earlier cingulate anatomy to provide a means of cognitive control. During childhood the activation of cingulate structures relates both to the child's success on laboratory tasks involving conflict and to parental reports of self-regulation and emotional control. These studies indicate a start in understanding the anatomy, circuitry and development of executive attention networks that serve to regulate both cognition and emotion.

Attention: the mechanisms of consciousness

A number of recent papers and books discuss theoretical efforts toward a scientific understanding of consciousness. Progress in imaging networks of brain areas active when people perform simple tasks may provide a useful empirical background for distinguishing conscious and unconscious information processing. Attentional networks include those involved in orienting to sensory stimuli, activating ideas from memory, and maintaining the alert state. This paper reviews recent findings in relation to classical issues in the study of attention and anatomical and physical theories of the nature of consciousness.