Reasoning, decision making and rationality

Executive functions and their relationship with age: Insights from a novel neuropsychological Assessment Battery in Children-a pilot study

Executive functions (EFs) are a set of cognitive processes that enable individuals to manage and coordinate their thoughts and actions toward achieving specific goals. EFs include planning, organizing, initiating, and monitoring actions, and have been found to improve with age due to the maturation of the brain, especially during childhood. Therefore, our correlational study sought to determine the relationship between the performance in executive functions and age in 79 children (36 girls, 45.6%) throughout development, between the ages of 6 and 12 (mean = 9.25; SD = 2.05), using a battery designed in Chile: BEFE (Batería de Evaluación de las Funciones Ejecutivas: Executive Function Assessment Battery) based on traditional neuropsychological tests to evaluate Working Memory, Inhibitory Control, Cognitive Flexibility, and Planning skills. Our results showed various correlations between the variables age and performance in various behavioral parameters, demonstrating an increase in the number of correct responses (positive correlation) and/or a decrease in errors (negative correlation) with age (6-12) in the subtests that correspond to dimensions of Cognitive Flexibility (Semantic and Phonological Fluency, Card Sorting Game, and Tracing Tasks), Inhibitory Control (ENA-F and Sentence Completion), Working Memory (Audio-verbal WM Forward and Ordering, and Visuospatial WM Forward and Backward), and Planning (La Portada de Antofagasta and FISA Maps). These results are consistent with previous empirical evidence and support the notion of a developmental relationship between EF performance and age. Additionally, this study contributes to understanding EF development in culturally specific contexts, highlighting the importance of contextually relevant assessment tools in evaluating cognitive development.

The Roles of Rule Type and Word Term in the Deductive Reasoning of Adults with and without Dyslexia

Despite its importance to everyday functioning, reasoning is underexplored in developmental dyslexia. The current study investigated verbal deductive reasoning on the Wason selection task, not previously used in dyslexia research despite its well-established pedigree. Reasoning rule was manipulated, with the conditional rules varying in the logical values presented. The word frequency and imageability of the word terms was also manipulated. Twenty-six adults with dyslexia and 31 adults without dyslexia completed Wason selection task problems. No group difference in reasoning accuracy or completion time was found. However, the participants were most accurate when reasoning with the rule type "If p, then not q" and least accurate with the rule type "If p then q". More trials were also answered correctly when the word terms were highly imageable but of average word frequency. These findings are in line with the general reasoning literature. Dyslexia status did not interact with either rule type or word term type. The study expands upon previous research by testing verbal deductive reasoning in dyslexia, highlighting the role of imageability in facilitating reasoning performance for all, regardless of the presence or absence of dyslexia. Implications for the design of educational materials are considered.

Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases

One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people's information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several-so far mostly unrelated-biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans' tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.

Neural correlates of valence-dependent belief and value updating during uncertainty reduction: An fNIRS study

Selective use of new information is crucial for adaptive decision-making. Combining a gamble bidding task with assessing cortical responses using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), we investigated potential effects of information valence on behavioral and neural processes of belief and value updating during uncertainty reduction in young adults. By modeling changes in the participants' expressed subjective values using a Bayesian model, we dissociated processes of (i) updating beliefs about statistical properties of the gamble, (ii) updating values of a gamble based on new information about its winning probabilities, as well as (iii) expectancy violation. The results showed that participants used new information to update their beliefs and values about the gambles in a quasi-optimal manner, as reflected in the selective updating only in situations with reducible uncertainty. Furthermore, their updating was valence-dependent: information indicating an increase in winning probability was underweighted, whereas information about a decrease in winning probability was updated in good agreement with predictions of the Bayesian decision theory. Results of model-based and moderation analyses showed that this valence-dependent asymmetry was associated with a distinct contribution of expectancy violation, besides belief updating, to value updating after experiencing new positive information regarding winning probabilities. In line with the behavioral results, we replicated previous findings showing involvements of frontoparietal brain regions in the different components of updating. Furthermore, this study provided novel results suggesting a valence-dependent recruitment of brain regions. Individuals with stronger oxyhemoglobin responses during value updating was more in line with predictions of the Bayesian model while integrating new information that indicates an increase in winning probability. Taken together, this study provides first results showing expectancy violation as a contributing factor to sub-optimal valence-dependent updating during uncertainty reduction and suggests limitations of normative Bayesian decision theory.

Identifying ICU admission decision patterns in a '20-questions game' approach using network analysis

Background

The complex intensive care unit (ICU) admission decision process has numerous non-linear relationships involving multiple factors. To better describe and analyse this process, exploration of novel techniques to clearly delineate the importance and interrelationships of factors is warranted. Network analysis (NA), based on graph theory, attempts to identify patterns of connections within a network and may be useful in this regard.

Objectives

To identify patterns of ICU decision-making pertaining to patients referred for admission to ICU and to identify key factors, their distribution, connection and relative importance. The secondary aim was to compare subgroups as per decision outcomes and case labels.

Methods

NA was performed using Gephi software package as a secondary analysis on a dataset generated from a previous study on ICU admission decision-making process using a 20-questions game approach. The data were standardised and coded up to a quaternary level for this analysis.

Results

The coding process generated 31 nodes and 964 edges. Regardless of the measure used (centrality, prestige, authority and hubs), properties of the acute illness, progress of the acute illness and properties of comorbidities emerged consistently as among the most important factors and their relative rankings differed. Using different measures allowed important factors to emerge differentially. The six subgroups that emerged from the modularity measure bore little resemblance to traditional factor subgroups. Differences were noted in the subgroup comparisons of decision outcomes and case prognoses.

Conclusion

The use of NA with its various measures has facilitated a more comprehensive exploration of the ICU admission decision, allowing us to reflect on the process. Further studies with larger datasets are needed to elucidate the exact role of NA in decision-making processes.

Contributions of the study

We performed a novel analysis of a complex decision-making process that allowed for comparison with traditional analytic methods. It allowed for identification of key factors, their distribution, connection and relative importance. This may subsequently allow for reflection on difficult decision-making processes, thereby leading to more appropriate outcomes. Moreover, this may lead to new considerations in developing decision support systems such as the formulation of pro-forma data-capture tools (e.g. referral forms). Further, the way factors have been traditionally subgrouped may need to be reconsidered, with different subgroups being partitioned to better reflect their connection. This study offers a good basis for more advanced future studies in this area to use a new variety of analytical tools.

Conditional content, explicit information and generating cases: Sources for suppressing inferences

In the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday conditionals ("if A, then B"; "if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre"), choosing between three possible conclusions ("she went to the theatre"; "she did not go to the theatre"; "it cannot be concluded"). We test how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative conditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g. Ana found a friend but they did not go to the theatre; or Ana did not find a friend but she went to the theatre) and c) when participants have to look for concrete disabling (e.g. Ana's friend had to work) and alternative cases (e.g. Ana's sister wanted to go to the theatre) before making the inferences. Previous studies have shown what were called "suppression effects": disabling conditions reduced valid inferences while considering alternatives led to a reduction in fallacies. These two "suppression effects" were shown in Experiment 1: a) in an Implicit condition that included just the content factor of the conditional and b) with a greater magnitude in a second Explicit condition that included the three factors (content, explicit information and search for counterexamples). Experiment 2 compared the same Explicit condition with another in which participants, instead of looking for counterexamples, completed a control task of looking for synonyms. In addition, half the participants looked for a few items (2 cases) and the other half for many items (5 cases). Results again showed the suppressing effect in all the conditions, but the magnitude was greater in the counterexample condition. No relevant differences were obtained according to the number of cases generated; the most relevant result was that the factors provided an additive effect on the suppression.

The Link Between Creativity, Cognition, and Creative Drives and Underlying Neural Mechanisms

Having a creative mind is one of the gateways for achieving fabulous success and remarkable progress in professional, personal and social life. Therefore, a better understanding of the neural correlates and the underlying neural mechanisms related to creative ideation is crucial and valuable. However, the current literature on neural systems and circuits underlying creative cognition, and on how creative drives such as motivation, mood states, and reward could shape our creative mind through the associated neuromodulatory systems [i.e., the dopaminergic (DA), the noradrenergic (NE) and the serotonergic (5-HT) system] seems to be insufficient to explain the creative ideation and production process. One reason might be that the mentioned systems and processes are usually investigated in isolation and independent of each other. Through this review, we aim at advancing the current state of knowledge by providing an integrative view on the interactions between neural systems underlying the creative cognition and the creative drive and associated neuromodulatory systems (see Figure 1).

Decision-making in ICU - A systematic review of factors considered important by ICU clinician decision makers with regard to ICU triage decisions

BACKGROUND

The ICU is a scarce resource within a high-stress, high-stakes, time-sensitive environment where critically ill patients with life-threatening conditions receive expensive life-sustaining care under the guidance of expert qualified personnel. The implications of decisions such as suitability for admission into ICU are potentially dire and difficult.

OBJECTIVES

To conduct a systematic review of clinicians' subjective perceptions of factors that influence the decision to accept or refuse patients referred to ICU.

RESULTS

Twenty studies yielded 56 different factors classified into patient, physician and environmental. Common, important factors were: acute illness severity and reversibility; presence and severity of comorbidities; patient age, functional status, state-of-mind and wishes; physician level of experience and perception of patient QOL; and bed availability. Within-group variability among physicians and thought-deed discordance were demonstrated.

CONCLUSIONS

The complex and dynamic ICU triage decision is affected by numerous interacting factors. The literature provides some indication of these factors, but fail to show complexities and interactions between them. A decision tree is proposed. Further research should include a reflection on how decisions for admission to ICU are made, such that a better understanding of these processes can be achieved allowing for improved individual and group consistency.

Motivational Reasons for Biased Decisions: The Sunk-Cost Effect’s Instrumental Rationality

The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106), participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option (SCO) was the most chosen option, supporting the hypothesis of this study. The reason behind the majority of participants choosing the SCO seemed to be the satisfaction of psychological needs, despite a reduced chance of winning money. An intervention, which aimed at triggering self-reflection, had no impact on the decision. The findings of this study contribute to the discussion on the reasons for cognitive biases and their formation in the human mind. Moreover, it discusses the application of the label “irrational” for biased decisions and proposes reasons for instrumental rationality, which exist at an unconscious, need-regulative level.

Deduction from Uncertain Premises

We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne (1989). These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given a third statement that qualifies the likelihood of the additional premise, then the uncertainty of the conclusions they choose is systematically related to the suggested uncertainty. Experiment 2 confirms these observations in problems that omit the additional premise and qualify the first premise directly. Experiment 3 shows that the qualifying statement also affects the perceived probability of the consequent given the antecedent of the conditional. Experiment 4 investigates the effect of suggested uncertainty on the fallacies and shows that increases in uncertainty reduce the number of certain conclusions that are chosen while affirming the consequent but have no effect on denying the antecedent. We discuss our results in terms of rule theories and mental models and conclude that the latter give the most natural account of our results.

"What I believe is true": Belief-confirming reasoning bias in social anxiety disorder

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Research shows that people tend to consider believable conclusions as valid and unbelievable conclusions as invalid (belief bias). When applied to anxiogenic beliefs, this belief bias could well hinder the correction of dysfunctional convictions. Previous work has shown that high socially anxious students indeed display such fear-confirming, belief biased, reasoning. A critical next question is whether these findings translate to a clinical population of people with social anxiety disorder (SAD). We test whether (i) patients with SAD show belief bias with regard to SAD-relevant themes, (ii) this belief bias is specific for SAD patients or can also be found in panic disorder (PD) patients, (iii) differential belief bias effects in SAD are restricted to social anxiety concerns or are also evident in the context of reasoning with neutral themes.

METHOD

45 SAD patients, 24 PD patients, and 45 non-symptomatic controls (NSCs) completed a syllogistic belief bias task with SAD-relevant and neutral content.

RESULTS

SAD patients displayed belief bias for social anxiety related materials, while the PD group and the NSC group did not. Yet, the difference between SAD and PD was not significant. All groups showed similar belief bias effects for neutral content.

LIMITATIONS

Content of the belief bias task was not tailored to idiosyncratic beliefs. The study lacked power to detect medium or small differences.

CONCLUSIONS

SAD patients showed concern-congruent belief biased interference effects when judging the logical validity of social anxiety relevant syllogisms. Such concern-relevant belief bias may contribute to the persistence of anxiogenic beliefs.

“Leaky” Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to “irrational” decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to “leak” into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.

Utilities in the 2-4-6 task

The Wason 2-4-6 task was embedded in a practical reasoning scenario where number sequences had well-defined utilities in the process of achieving a goal. Reasoners' hypothesis-testing behavior was clearly goal-driven and was significantly influenced by whether the utilities favored positive or negative sequences. In the version of the scenario where generating positive sequences had greater benefits than generating negative ones, participants performed poorly at the task as measured by their ability to guess the correct rule and by the nature and number of triples tested before making an announcement. In contrast, the scenario that assigned a greater utility to the production of negative sequences fostered significantly more diligent and creative hypothesis-testing behavior, and participants were significantly more likely to discover the rule. These results suggest that the poor performance observed in Wason's traditional 2-4-6 task reflects a hypothesis-testing process that by default assigns greater utility to the production of sequences that conform to the initial triple, and hence receive positive feedback. However, reasoners are not averse to producing negative sequences, and understand their implication, if their utility is made relevant in the process of achieving goals.

Relevance-driven information search in "pseudodiagnostic" reasoning

When faced with two competing hypotheses, people sometimes prefer to look at multiple sources of information in support of one hypothesis rather than to establish the diagnostic value of a single piece of information for the two hypotheses. This is termed pseudodiagnostic reasoning and has often been understood to reflect, among other things, poor information search strategies. Past research suggests that diagnostic reasoning may be more easily fostered when participants seek data to help in the selection of one of two competing courses of action as opposed to situations where they seek data to help infer which of two competing hypotheses is true. In the experiment reported here, we provide the first empirical evidence demonstrating that manipulating the relevance of the feature for which participants initially receive information determines whether they will make a nominally diagnostic or pseudodiagnostic selection. The discussion of these findings focuses on implications for the ability to engage in diagnostic hypothesis testing.

Deductive Reasoning and Social Anxiety: Evidence for a Fear-confirming Belief Bias

This study investigated the relationship between belief bias and fear of negative evaluation. Belief bias refers to a bias in deductive reasoning that acts to confirm rather than falsify prior beliefs. Participants (N = 52) with varying levels of fear of negative evaluation completed a belief bias task by means of linear syllogisms, with stimuli covering both social anxiety convictions and factual neutral statements. A linear relationship was found between fear of negative evaluation and belief bias for the social anxiety conviction category. No differences in reasoning were found for the neutral syllogisms. These results support the view that highly socially anxious individuals do not have a reasoning abnormality, but do have difficulty judging anxiogenic information as false and reassuring convictions-contradicting information as true. Such belief bias logically prevents dysfunctional cognitions from being corrected, thereby sustaining phobic fear.

Decision making: rational or hedonic?

Three experiments studied the hedonicity of decision making. Participants rated their pleasure/displeasure while reading item-sentences describing political and social problems followed by different decisions (Questionnaire 1). Questionnaire 2 was multiple-choice, grouping the items from Questionnaire 1. In Experiment 1, participants answered Questionnaire 2 rapidly or slowly. Both groups selected what they had rated as pleasant, but the 'leisurely' group maximized pleasure less. In Experiment 2, participants selected the most rational responses. The selected behaviors were pleasant but less than spontaneous behaviors. In Experiment 3, Questionnaire 2 was presented once with items grouped by theme, and once with items shuffled. Participants maximized the pleasure of their decisions, but the items selected on Questionnaires 2 were different when presented in different order. All groups maximized pleasure equally in their decisions.These results support that decisions are made predominantly in the hedonic dimension of consciousness.

The effect of emotion on interpretation and logic in a conditional reasoning task

The effect of emotional content on logical reasoning is explored in three experiments. Theparticipants completed a conditional reasoning task (If p, then q) with emotional and neutral contents. In Experiment 1, existing emotional and neutral words were used. The emotional value of initially neutral words was experimentally manipulated in Experiments 1B and 2, using classical conditioning. In all experiments, participants were less likely to provide normatively correct answers when reasoning about emotional stimuli, compared with neutral stimuli. This was true for both negative (Experiments 1B and 2) and positive contents (Experiment 2). The participants' interpretations of the conditional statements were also measured (perceived sufficiency, necessity, causality, and plausibility). The results showed the expected relationship between interpretation and reasoning. However, emotion did not affect interpretation. Emotional and neutral conditional statements were interpreted similarly. The results are discussed in light of current models of emotion and reasoning.

Control theory and psychopathology: an integrative approach

Perceptual control theory (PCT; Powers, 1973) is presented and adapted as a framework to understand the causes, maintenance, and treatment of psychological disorders. PCT provides dynamic, working models based on the principle that goal-directed activity arises from a hierarchy of negative feedback loops that control perception through control of the environment. The theory proposes that psychological distress arises from the unresolved conflict between goals. The present paper integrates PCT, control theory, and self-regulatory approaches to psychopathology and psychotherapy and recent empirical findings, particularly in the field of cognitive therapy. The approach aims to offer fresh insights into the role of goal conflict, automatic processes, imagery, perceptual distortion, and loss of control in psychological disorders. Implications for psychological therapy are discussed, including an integration of the existing work on the assessment of control profiles and the use of assertive versus yielding modes of control.

Reasoning about emotional and neutral materials. Is logic affected by emotion?

In two experiments, we investigated whether people reason differently when they reason about emotional and neutral contents. We gave participants a conditional reasoning task ("If p, then q") and varied the emotionality of the items used as p and q. Participants were asked to draw inferences based on these statements. In Experiment 1, we compared statements including preexisting emotional and neutral words. In Experiment 2, we experimentally manipulated the emotionality of initially neutral words using classical conditioning. In both experiments, emotionality affected participants' responses. They were more likely to draw invalid inferences in response to emotional compared with neutral statements.

Cancel and Rethink in the Wason Selection Task: Further Evidence for the Heuristic-Analytic Dual Process Theory

The reasoning process in the Wason selection task was examined by measuring card inspection times in the letter-number and drinking-age problems. 24 students were asked to solve the problems presented on a computer screen. Only the card touched with a mouse pointer was visible, and the total exposure time of each card was measured. Participants were allowed to cancel their previous selections at any time. Although rethinking was encouraged, the cards once selected were rarely cancelled (10% of the total selections). Moreover, most of the cancelled cards were reselected (89% of the total cancellations). Consistent with previous findings, inspection times were longer for selected cards than for nonselected cards. These results suggest that card selections are determined largely by initial heuristic processes and rarely reversed by subsequent analytic processes. The present study gives further support for the heuristic-analytic dual process theory.

Logic and human reasoning: an assessment of the deduction paradigm

The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process of human reasoning, and many use the paradigm principally to study pragmatic and probabilistic processes. It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases.

Ecological and evolutionary validity: comments on Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni's (1999) mental-model theory of extensional reasoning

The mental-model account of naive probabilistic reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, M. S. Legrenzi, and J.-P. Caverni (1999) provides an opportunity to clarify several similarities and differences between it and ecological rationality (frequentist) accounts. First, ambiguities in the meaning of Bayesian reasoning can lead to disagreements and inappropriate arguments. Second, 2 conflated effects of using natural frequencies are noticed but not actually tested separately because of an artificial dissociation of frequency representations and natural sampling. Third, similarities are noted between the subset principle and the principle of natural sampling. Finally, some potentially misleading portrayals of the role of evolutionary factors in psychology are corrected. Mental-model theory, rather than better explaining probabilistic reasoning, may be able to use frequency representations as a key element in clarifying its own ambiguous constructs.

Pleasure in decision-making situations

BACKGROUND

This study explores the role of pleasure in decision making.

RESULTS

In Experiment 1, 12 subjects were presented with a questionnaire containing 46 items taken from the literature. Twenty-three items described a situation where a decision should be made and ended with a suggested solution. The other items served as filler items. The subjects were requested not to make a decision but to rate the pleasure or displeasure they experienced when reading the situation described in the item. The subjects' ratings were then compared to the decisions on the same situations made by the other subjects of the studies published by other workers. The ratings of pleasure/displeasure given by our subjects correlated significantly with the choices published by other authors. This result satisfies a necessary condition for pleasure to be the key of the decision making process in theoretical situations. In Experiment 2, a new group of 12 subjects rated their experience of pleasure/displeasure when reading various versions of 50 situations taken from daily life where an ethical decision had to be made (Questionnaire I) including 200 items. This was followed by a multiple-choice test with the 50 situations (Questionnaire II) using the same 200 items and offering the various behaviors. Subjects tended to choose ethical and unethical responses corresponding to their highest pleasure rating within each problem. In all cases the subjects' behavior was higher than chance level, and thus, followed the trend to maximize pleasure. In Experiment 3, 12 subjects reading 50 mathematical short problems followed by correct and incorrect versions of the answer to the problem (Questionnaire III), including 200 items. This was followed by a multiple-choice mathematical test with the 50 problems (Questionnaire IV) using the same 200 items and offering the correct and incorrect answers. In questionnaire IV, subjects tended to choose correct as well as incorrect responses corresponding to their highest hedonic rating within each problem. In all cases the subjects' behavior was higher than chance level, and thus, followed the trend to maximize pleasure.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the three experiments support the hypothesis according to which decisions are made in the hedonic dimension of conscious experience.

Necessity, possibility and belief: a study of syllogistic reasoning

The present study extended the investigation of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning in two ways: (1) The effect was studied under instructions to decide whether conclusions were possible, as well as necessary, given the premises; and (2) the effect was studied for types of syllogism where people rarely endorse the conclusions as well as those (valid and fallacious) where endorsements are common. Three experiments are reported, which show first that there is a marked tendency to reject unbelievable conclusions relative to abstract or neutral controls on all kinds of syllogism and under both types of instruction. There was also significant evidence of positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable conclusions) and of interactions between belief bias effects and logical form. The results are discussed with particular respect to accounts of belief bias offered by theorists in the mental-model tradition.

Obligation conditionals in a nonstandard conditional selection task: general versus specific reasoning strategies as a false dichotomy

The paper reports a study comparing performance on obligation and causal conditionals in the explicit standard order conditional selection task. Analysis indicated that both general and specific reasoning strategies are used when a request is given to disprove obligation conditionals, contradicting the prevalent view that only one of the two kinds of strategy is used and confirming the 1993 suggestions of Evans and later ones by Evans and Over. The incidence of general reasoning strategies in this situation is reduced, compared to that for other kinds of conditional in a disproof task probably because a specific reasoning strategy is available that is easier to use.

If you suffer from a headache, then you have a brain tumour: domain-specific reasoning 'bias' and hypochondriasis

We explored whether hypochondriacal patients selectively search for threat-confirming information when asked to judge the validity of conditional rules in the context of general and health threats. We also explored several factors that may underly participants' information selection (e.g., believability of the rule). Hypochondriacal patients (n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20) were presented with modified Wason Selection Tasks (WSTs). The WSTs contained safety rules and danger rules. In the context of general threat, both groups of participants adopted a verificationistic strategy in the case of danger rules and a Popperian strategy in the case of safety rules. Importantly, only hypochondriacal persons showed a similar threat-confirming reasoning pattern in the context of health threat. The latter finding contrasts with the earlier study of de Jong et al. (1998) [de Jong, P. J., Haenen, M.-A., Schmidt, A., & Mayer, B. (1998a). Hypochondriasis: the role of fear-confirming reasoning. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 65-74; de Jong, P. J., Mayer, B., van der Hijden, B., Bögels, S., & van den Hout, M. (1998b). Better safe than sorry: reasoning with conditionals in the context of threat. Submitted for publication.] in which both hypochondriacs and healthy controls showed a threat-confirming strategy in the domain of health threat. The WSTs in that study however, contained a (unintended) worry manipulation ("after hearing this, you get worried"), which might have induced a reasoning strategy in controls that is normally restricted to hypochondriacs. Taken together, the present results sustain the idea that the perception of threat activates a better safe than sorry strategy. In the case of phobic threats, such a reasoning strategy immunizes against refutation of phobic convictions.

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.

Who uses base rates and P(D/approximately H)? An analysis of individual differences

In two experiments, involving over 900 subjects, we examined the cognitive correlates of the tendency to view P(D/approximately H) and base rate information as relevant to probability assessment. We found that individuals who viewed P(D/approximately H) as relevant in a selection task and who used it to make the proper Bayesian adjustment in a probability assessment task scored higher on tests of cognitive ability and were better deductive and inductive reasoners. They were less biased by prior beliefs and more data-driven on a covariation assessment task. In contrast, individuals who thought that base rates were relevant did not display better reasoning skill or higher cognitive ability. Our results parallel disputes about the normative status of various components of the Bayesian formula in interesting ways. It is argued that patterns of covariance among reasoning tasks may have implications for inferences about what individuals are trying to optimize in a rational analysis (J. R. Anderson, 1990, 1991).