Perception of stabilized retinal stimuli in dichoptic viewing conditions

Perceptual awareness and active inference

Perceptual awareness depends upon the way in which we engage with our sensorium. This notion is central to active inference, a theoretical framework that treats perception and action as inferential processes. This variational perspective on cognition formalizes the notion of perception as hypothesis testing and treats actions as experiments that are designed (in part) to gather evidence for or against alternative hypotheses. The common treatment of perception and action affords a useful interpretation of certain perceptual phenomena whose active component is often not acknowledged. In this article, we start by considering Troxler fading - the dissipation of a peripheral percept during maintenance of fixation, and its recovery during free (saccadic) exploration. This offers an important example of the failure to maintain a percept without actively interrogating a visual scene. We argue that this may be understood in terms of the accumulation of uncertainty about a hypothesized stimulus when free exploration is disrupted by experimental instructions or pathology. Once we take this view, we can generalize the idea of using bodily (oculomotor) action to resolve uncertainty to include the use of mental (attentional) actions for the same purpose. This affords a useful way to think about binocular rivalry paradigms, in which perceptual changes need not be associated with an overt movement.

Yarbus's Conceptions on the General Mechanisms of Color Perception

In the last series of papers published during 1975 to 1980, Alfred Yarbus tried to formulate general conceptions concerning the basic principles of retinal image processing in the human visual system. The original ideas of Yarbus were based on the results of his numerous and various experiments carried out with extraordinary inventiveness and great skill. Being concentrated primarily on the problems of color vision, Alfred Yarbus dreamed of elaborating a comprehensive model that would simulate visual information processing at the monocular precognitive level in the visual system of humans with normal trichromatic color perception. In this article, the most important of Yarbus' experimental paradigms, findings, statements, and conclusions are systematized and considered in relation to the classical theories of color perception and, in particular, fundamental theses of the Nyberg school. The perceptual model developed by Alfred Yarbus remained incomplete. Nevertheless, it is already evident that some intrinsic contradictions make it inadequate in terms of comprehensive modeling. However, certain partial advantages deserve more thorough appreciation and further investigation.

Visual Percepts in the Cases of Binocular and Monocular Viewing Stabilized Test Objects, Ganzfeld Stimuli, and Prolonged Afterimages

A thorough analysis of the literature on retinal image stabilization, as well as our own experimental data, present evidence that Yarbus's concept, implying inevitable and irreversible fading of a visible image evoked by stabilized retinal stimulus of any size, color, and luminance in 1 to 3 s after its onset, is not valid in a general case. It has been demonstrated that, even with Yarbus's stabilization techniques, the lifetime of visible images varies from fractions of a second to the whole stimulus duration-up to 30 min in our experiments-depending on many factors: monocular or binocular viewing, stimulus parameters, characteristics of subjects, and so forth. The dynamics of perceived images is determined mainly by the processes at the higher levels of the visual system. In the cases of such unusual visual stimuli as stabilized retinal images, it is problematic for the visual brain to find their proper interpretations in terms of everyday natural experience. Usually, the responses of retinal units are determined by three types of coexisting images: (a) the optical projections of external objects, (b) shadows of the blood vessels and other internal eye structures, (c) virtual patterns caused by the traces of previous stimuli. A task of the visual system is to recognize and visualize only external objects separating their projections from all the entoptic images of the two remaining types. To implement separation, visual brain employs a number of approaches--in particular, the eye movements that cause sliding over the retina but only the projection of the external objects. This means that the peculiar phenomena observed in the cases of stabilized retinal images can be determined not by invariability of such stimuli per se but rather by the fact that stabilization eliminates a powerful cue helping to identify the retinal images belonging to the external objects, thereby increasing the probability to treat them as the entoptic ones which should be ignored or canceled rather than perceived. However, the probability of canceling--image fading--can be essentially reduced in conditions of concordant, large, bright, and sharp binocular stimuli.

Psychophysical scaling: Judgments of attributes or objects?

Psychophysical scaling models of the form R = f(I), with R the response and I some intensity of an attribute, all assume that people judge the amounts of an attribute. With simple biases excepted, most also assume that judgments are independent of space, time, and features of the situation other than the one being judged. Many data support these ideas: Magnitude estimations of brightness (R) increase with luminance (I). Nevertheless, I argue that the general model is wrong. The stabilized retinal image literature shows that nothing is seen if light does not change over time. The classification literature shows that dimensions often combine to produce emergent properties that cannot be described by the elements in the stimulus. These and other effects cannot be adjusted for by simply adding variables to the general model because some factors do not combine linearly. The proposed alternative is that people initially judge the entire stimulus - the object in terms of its environment. This agrees with the constancy literature that shows that objects and their attributes are identified through their relations to other aspects of the scene. That the environment determines judgments is masked in scaling studies where the standard procedure is to hold context constant. In a typical brightness study (where different lights are presented on the same background on different trials) the essential stimulus might be the intensity of the light or a difference between the light and the background. The two are perfectly confounded. This issue is examined in the case of audition. Judgments of the loudness of a tone depend on how much that tone differs from the previous tone in both pitch and loudness. To judge loudness (and other attributes) people first seem to process the stimulus object in terms of differences between it and other aspects in the situation; only then do they assess the feature of interest. Psychophysical judgments will therefore be better interpreted by theories of attention that are based in biology or psychology than those (following Fechner) that are based in classical physics.

Yarbus, eye movements, and vision

The impact of Yarbus's research on eye movements was enormous following the translation of his book Eye Movements and Vision into English in 1967. In stark contrast, the published material in English concerning his life is scant. We provide a brief biography of Yarbus and assess his impact on contemporary approaches to research on eye movements. While early interest in his work focused on his study of stabilised retinal images, more recently this has been replaced with interest in his work on the cognitive influences on scanning patterns. We extended his experiment on the effect of instructions on viewing a picture using a portrait of Yarbus rather than a painting. The results obtained broadly supported those found by Yarbus.

Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action

Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological “readiness potentials” (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about—550 ms. Such RPs were used to indicate the minimum onset times for the cerebral activity that precedes a fully endogenous voluntary act. The time of conscious intention to act was obtained from the subject's recall of the spatial clock position of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of intending or wanting to move (W). W occurred at about—200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.

For spontaneous voluntary acts, RP onset preceded the uncorrected Ws by about 350 ms and the Ws corrected for S by about 400 ms. The direction of this difference was consistent and significant throughout, regardless of which of several measures of RP onset or W were used. It was concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously. However, it was found that the final decision to act could still be consciously controlled during the 150 ms or so remaining after the specific conscious intention appears. Subjects can in fact “veto” motor performance during a 100–200-ms period before a prearranged time to act.

The role of conscious will would be not to initiate a specific voluntary act but rather to select and control volitional outcome. It is proposed that conscious will can function in a permissive fashion, either to permit or to prevent the motor implementation of the intention to act that arises unconsciously. Alternatively, there may be the need for a conscious activation or triggering, without which the final motor output would not follow the unconscious cerebral initiating and preparatory processes.

Troxler effect with dichoptic stimulus presentations: evidence for binocular inhibitory summation and interocular suppression

Whether the Troxler effect (TE) has to do with interocular suppression and/or summation was studied with dichoptically matched (binocular or dioptic) and unmatched (monocular) stimulus presentations. Perceptual disappearance was found to occur more slowly under the binocular condition (mean=14.2s) than the monocular condition (mean=8.4s), but much faster than predicted by probability summation of the experimentally obtained latencies and durations of the TE in the monocular conditions (>27 s), suggesting a binocular inhibitory summation, the opposite of the binocular summation found with detection and contrast matching tasks [(Blake, R., & Fox, R. (1973). The psychological inquiry into binocular summation. Perception and Psychophysics, 14, 161-185; Blake, R., Sloane, M., & Fox, R. (1981). Further developments in binocular summation. Perception &Psychophysics 30, 266-276.)]. In addition, Ss with poorer stereoacuity took longer to see the disappearance in the monocular condition, and showed a larger disparity between the TEs from the two monocular conditions, suggesting a contribution of interocular suppression to the TE.

Peripheral fading with monocular and binocular viewing

This study measured the fading times of peripheral targets as a function of whether viewing was monocular or binocular, and of brightness contrast. Data from a binocularly normal group showed Troxler fading to be significantly faster with monocular (i.e., patched) than with binocular viewing. In contrast, one-eyed observers showed significantly longer fading times than the two-eyed observers viewing monocularly and equivalent times to their binocular viewing. A control experiment showed that these findings were not due to worse fixation stability, larger pupil sizes, or an unusually large blinking rate in the enucleated group. The enucleated group actually exhibited a slight miosis, equivalent fixation stability, and a normal blinking rate. In both experiments, the times to fading of all observers were a function of brightness contrast. We conclude that in binocularly normal observers patching or closing one eye does not produce monocular vision but rather a condition of weak binocular rivalry, and that the absence of inhibitory binocular interactions in the enucleated group may explain, in part, their resistance to fading and their superior performance in other contrast-defined tasks.

How patterns of bleached rods and cones become visual perceptual experiences: a proposal

In an attempt to increase information about how mammalian visual systems create a perceptual experience out of a retinal photochemical bleach pattern, this article brings together recent rat physiological data acquired with large electrodes, an old cat behavioral experiment, and two complex human behaviors: reading and the reversible blindness people experience when the scene being viewed is stabilized on the retinal surface. The outcome suggests this juxtaposition of disparate data sets has been logical, reasonable, and informative. The link between rats and reading is the fact that both rat and human retinas convert bleach patterns into ganglion cell volleys 3 times a second. The probable trigger for these episodic retinal volleys is a more or less abrupt change in the pattern of bleached rods and cones, and we claim the absence of this trigger when the image is stabilized is responsible for the blindness. The cat behavioral experiment correlates performance on visual discrimination tasks with the number of nerve fibers remaining after lesions of the optic tract. The analysis of the result, which shows that as few as 2% of the normal number of nerve fibers supports perfect performance of such tasks, prompts the concept of a second dynamic visual system, operating in parallel with the anatomical nervous system pictured in the textbooks. The dynamic visual system model, which brings into the foreground important old facts that have been neglected and integrates them with new data, offers a synthesis that may be useful in interpreting classical visual behavioral phenomena.

Brightness fading during Ganzfeld adaptation

The time course and extent of brightness fading in a Ganzfeld were determined for adapting luminances ranging from 0.01 to 100 cd/m2. Magnitude estimation and interocular brightness matching were used. During Ganzfeld adaptation, perceived brightness decreased slowly and leveled off, on average, after 5-7 min (adapting time increasing with luminance). On average, the total brightness loss was equivalent to a 1.2 log unit reduction in luminance, independent of adapting luminance. The residual brightness perceived at the final plateau was generally higher than the brightness of the Eigengrau, suggesting a partially sustained luminance channel.